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In this dissertation, I engage issues associated with the particular nature of the American 
Constitution, seeking why and how Americans have come so strongly to identify with the 
Constitution as a text, and with the framers of that document as authors of that text. This 
identification remains a central part of American political culture, placing limits upon what is 
ideologically permissible within the polity. Examining newspapers accounts, I trace the historical 
origins of the close association of the American Constitution with its “framers” – an idea that has 
currency through popular constitutional interpretation via “framer intent.” I locate the genesis of 
this idea within three ideational environments within the early American Republic. These are (1) 
the emergence of the Author figure as a method of ordering texts, (2) the veneration of the 
founders and their association with the Constitution, and (3) the divergence of legal and non-elite 
constitutional interpretations. Each of these developmental strands contributed in forming a 
constellation within which claims of framer intent could come to carry weight. The final 
component of the dissertation explores the culmination of these processes within the debates 
over abolition with the District of Columbia in the 1830s, and the resultant turn to constitutional 
understandings predicated upon beliefs as to the framers’ intentions rather than the text of the 
Constitution. 
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Introduction 
 
In the final days of the 1787 Philadelphia Convention, as the delegates restlessly moved 
towards finalizing the document and returning home, the issue of its transmission to Congress 
and ultimately the state conventions came to a head. Franklin, partially breaking his aversion to 
public speech – he had James Wilson read his comments for him – offered a suggestion that the 
Convention’s members sign the new Constitution as an indication of the unanimity of the States.1 
While the unanimity Franklin sought would be undermined by the refusals of George Mason, 
Elbridge Gerry, and Governor Randolph to sign, the Convention voted unanimously as States for 
the measure, and those present signed the document that day. In signing, they sought to lend their 
collective personal prestige to the Constitutional project in order that it might more smoothly 
navigate the choppy waters of ratification, understanding “the vast majority & venerable names 
that would give sanction to its wisdom and its worth.”2  
In putting their names to the document, the delegates of 1787 also marked the text as the 
product of their efforts, and it was for exactly this reason that the holdouts resisted. Both 
Randolph and Gerry articulated their reasons for refusing to sign in terms of personal association 
with the measures contained within the Constitution. Randolph insisted that his refusal should 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787: Volume 2, ed. Max Farrand, (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1961), 641-649. For a discussion of the questions raised in this short debate cf. Eric 
Slauter, The State as a Work of Art: The Cultural Origins of the Constitution, (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2009), 5-7. For a recent discussion which argues that the act of signing operated to bind 
the Convention participants to the Constitution during Ratification and to lend their prestige to it cf. 
Michael Coenen, “The Significance of Signatures: Why the Framers Signed the Constitution and What 
They Meant by Doing So,” Yale Law Journal 119 (2010). On Franklin’s aversion to public speech cf. 
Larzer Ziff, Writing in the New Nation: Prose, Print, and Politics in the Early United States, (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1991): 101-104. 
2 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787: Volume 2, 644-645. 
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not be taken to indicate disenchantment with the Convention’s project – rather he feared that the 
mechanism of ratification would undermine the objectives of the Constitution: 
“…he did not mean by this refusal to decide that he should oppose the 
Constitution without doors… He refused to sign, because he thought the object of 
the convention would be frustrated by the alternative which it presented to the 
people. Nine States will fail to ratify the plan and confusion must ensue.”3 
In light of this, he resisted “pledging himself to support the plan.” Gerry’s opposition similarly 
focused on avoiding being bound to the substance of the Constitution, while supporting its broad 
aims. Given the political context, he felt 
“it necessary… that the plan should have been proposed in a more mediating 
shape, in order to abate the heat and opposition of parties -- As it had been passed 
by the Convention, he was persuaded it would have a contrary effect -- He could 
not therefore by signing the Constitution pledge himself to abide by it at all 
events.”4  
Nevertheless, while Gerry, Mason and Randolph resisted, the remainder of the Convention did 
sign the text perhaps fearing, in the words of Alexander Hamilton, that a “few characters of 
consequence, by opposing or even refusing to sign the Constitution, might do infinite mischief” 
to its prospects.5  
Signing was, for at least Madison, Washington, and Hamilton, a political, not 
philosophical act. All three expressed displeasure with the Convention’s outcome, but 
nonetheless “signed on” in order that some form of stronger federal government might be 
created. Given this, it seems unlikely that they would have wished that the Constitution would 
come to be regarded as an incarnation of their political views and values. Nonetheless, in 
signing, they would eventually take on the mantle of being the “fathers” of the Constitution,6 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787: Volume 2, 645. My emphasis. 
4 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787: Volume 2, 647. My emphasis 
5 Records of the Federal Convention of 1787: Volume 2, 645.  
6 Leading one observer to “wonder whether, to the casual observer at least, the signatures contribute to a 
constitutional consciousness that is framer-heavy and people-lite—one that treats the Constitution as law 
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whose thematic intent and founding philosophy would be taken as a basis for interpretation of 
the textual document.7 In signing, they would become authors. 
  
It is the inadvertent significance of this act with which this dissertation is concerned. I 
seek to locate the origins of the idea that framer intent ought to be a guiding principle of 
constitutional interpretation – that the intentions of those members of the 1787 Convention 
should shape the way we today, and throughout American history, understand the Constitution. I 
argue that the potential for framer intent was created from the confluence of three social 
developments within the early Republic. During the period between 1787 and 1840 three 
mutually supporting ideas gained popular acceptance and created an ideological8 environment in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
that the framers imposed on us, rather than law that our society has imposed, and continues to impose, on 
itself.” Coenen, “The Significance of Signatures,” 1009. 
7 Hamilton stated at the Convention that “no man’s ideas were more remote from the plan than his own.” 
Records of the Federal Convention of 1787: Volume 2, 645-646. Washington wrote to Benjamin Harrison 
after convention that the Constitution was “the best that could be obtained at this time” and remained 
hopeful that the amendment process might allow for its revision – if it had been not approved “anarchy 
would have ensued.” Quoted in Pauline Maier, Ratification: The People Debate the Constitution, 1787-
1788, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010), 38. Madison expressed skepticism that the Constitution 
would even prove to be effective. On September 6th 1787 Madison wrote to Jefferson that if the 
Constitution were adopted it would “neither effectually answer its national object nor prevent the local 
mischiefs which every where excite disgusts ag[ain]st the state governments.” Quoted in Maier, 
Ratification, 36. Further evidence of a desire for distance between the Constitution and their own political 
philosophical views is provided by the reluctance of Hamilton and Madison to embrace the constitutional 
theories of The Federalist Papers afterwards. Cf. Douglass Adair, “The Authorship of the Disputed 
Federalist Papers,” William & Mary Quarterly 1 (1944): 100-102.  
8 This dissertation sits at the crossroads of the subfields of Political theory and American Political 
Development both in its approach and its subject matter. Within each subfield the words “ideological” 
and “ideational” carry different meanings and significances. As I use them somewhat interchangeably in 
the dissertation and it behooves me to clarify the scope of these terms for this project at the outset. I 
understand “ideological” as something that pertains to the political idea structure of an individual or 
group of individuals. I do not in this instance associate it with a Marxian concept of class or group 
consciousness nor a partisan disposition of thought. By “ideational” I refer to the realm of ideas in 
contradistinction to materially or institutionally produced motivations. Under these definitions, ideology 
would reside in the ideational realm, although of course any distinction between institutions, material 
interests, and ideology must always be imperfect and an overly simplistic depiction of the interaction 
between them. 
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which framer intent could be mobilized to political ends. These ideas were (1) the emergence of 
the Author figure as a method of ordering texts, (2) the veneration of the founders and their 
association with the Constitution, and (3) the divergence of legal and non-elite constitutional 
interpretations. In the course of exploring these, I explore the competing claims of constitutional 
authority extant within the early Republic, and in doing so reflect upon the ways in which 
textual, spiritual, and institutional authority developed and was deployed around the 
Constitution.  
 
The Constitution in America 
The identification of the framers with the Constitution has become a commonplace basis 
of constitutional interpretation today.9  The marshaling of supportive framer rhetoric reaches 
across the partisan divide, and makes frequent appearance at the Supreme Court, despite the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 While I intend to primarily examine the manner in which framer intent emerged, it perhaps behooves me 
here to set out my own position on framer intent. Acknowledging the important democratic mechanism 
by which it was the people (as ratifiers) that authorized the Constitution, I nonetheless concur with those 
that regard the stability (and so value of the document as a political constraint) as residing in a fictive 
authorial intent. In light of this fact, and in line with most constitutional scholars, I regard the critical 
intent to be that of the ratifiers, but do not believe a definitive or comprehensive account of this intent is 
possible. I remain deeply skeptical of claims that such intent can be more than broadly construed. The 
frailties of language, noted by James Madison at the time, make it unlikely that even the federal 
Convention shared more than a broad intent as to the text’s meaning. But this frailty ought not be 
regarded as a weakness – it provides space, I think, for active consideration of and deliberation over the 
nature of the American polity. As Bonnie Honig has suggested, it is only through continual re-evaluation 
and argumentation that established rights remain vibrant. Too great a trust in the ability to recover the 
intent of the framers or ratifiers robs Americans of the necessary process of re-examining the basis of 
their institutions, replacing substantive commitment to the values associated with the document with a 
passive acceptance of filial inheritance. Further consideration of these issues is provided in the 
dissertation’s conclusion. James Madison, “Number 37: Concerning The Difficulties Which The 
Convention Must Have Experienced In The Formation Of A Proper Plan” in PJM digital; Bonnie Honig, 
“Dead Rights, Live Futures: A Reply to Habermas’s ‘Constitutional Democracy,’” Political Theory 29 
(2001). 
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public avowals of a commitment to “original meaning” rather than “framer intent.”10 The attempt 
to co-opt the support of the Constitution, and particularly the framers themselves, is of course not 
restricted to the realm of legal debate.11 Wider political discussion is marked by appeals to the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 As can be seen in the recent round of cases concerning the Second Amendment. The debates of District 
of Columbia v. Heller (2008) centered on the contrasting understandings of the drafters’ intentions. On 
one hand, Justice Stevens affirms “there is no indication that the Framers of the Amendment intended to 
enshrine the common-law right of self-defense in the Constitution… [Madison’s initial inclusion of an 
exemption] confirms an intent to describe a duty as well as a right” and Justice Breyer suggests that 
historical context indicates that the right could not have been intended as absolute. On the other, Justice 
Scalia presents veritable avalanche of contemporaneous dictionary definitions, usages, and practices to 
suggest that this was not indeed the case – that the Second Amendment protects an individual right. [554 
US 570 (2008)]. Similar battle lines are drawn in the ensuing case of McDonald v. City of Chicago. In the 
latter, framer intent does much work, be it Justice Alito’s foray into ratification pamphlets to define the 
Second Amendment, Justice Breyer’s dissent that “historians [can not] find any convincing reason to 
believe that the Framers had something [other than a communal right] in mind”, or Justice Thomas’s 
citations of Madison and Hamilton to prove that “the founding generation generally did not consider 
many of the rights identified in these amendments as new entitlements, but as inalienable rights of all 
men.” [561 U.S. 3025 (2010)]. For further discussion on the distinction between framer intent and 
original meaning see below.  
11 It is certainly the case that the framers are invoked with less caution and qualification in the public 
sphere than in legal sphere more alert to the ratifiers important legitimizing role in the Constitution’s 
creation. For John Boehner this means that in invoking the Constitution to oppose healthcare reform, he 
“stand[s] here with our Founding Fathers.” This attitude is often expressed by conservative figures in 
terms of a desire to “return to” the Constitution, implicitly suggestive of a departure from the intent of the 
framers. Michele Bachmann’s congressional TEA Party caucus is motivated by a wish to draw 
“Members’ attention to the cries of everyday Americans who are asking for a return to the fundamental 
principles contained within our nation’s greatest document, the Constitution.” The signatories to the 2010 
Mount Vernon Statement argue that “[t]he federal government today ignores the limits of the 
Constitution, which is increasingly dismissed as obsolete and irrelevant. …The change we urgently need, 
a change consistent with the American ideal, is not movement away from but toward our founding 
principles.” More colloquially, Sarah Palin frames constitutional fidelity as opposition to change in 
general: "Is this what their 'change' is all about? I want to tell 'em, nah, we'll keep clinging to our 
“Boehner mixes up Constitution and Declaration,” Politico, November 5th, 2009. 
http://www.politico.com/blogs/glennthrush/1109/Boehner_mixes_up_Constitution_and_Declaration.html 
Accessed August 14, 2011; Tea Party Caucus Website. http://teapartycaucus-bachmann.house.gov/ 
Accessed October 19th, 2013; Mount Vernon Statement. http://www.themountvernonstatement.com/ 
Accessed August 14, 2011; “Palin rips taxes with Boston tea partiers,” NBC, April 14th, 2010. 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/36505968/ns/politics-more_politics/t/palin-rips-taxes-boston-tea-
partiers/#.TkhEub9m2P4 Accessed August 14th, 2011. 
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framers as definitive authorities,12 and recurrence to direct quotation from the preserved and 
revered papers of these “demi-gods” is itself a peculiar characteristic of American politics. The 
correct interpretation of the constitutional document has become almost synonymous with a 
correct understanding of the framer’s intended meaning as the authors of that document. 
The response of the framers to their veneration as the actors behind the Constitution 
would probably have been somewhat conflicted. While Adair has shown that the founders were 
concerned with their place in history,13 their personal aggrandizement has surely distracted 
attention from what they regarded as their greatest achievement – the Constitution itself.14 Their 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Most notably perhaps in the debates surrounding the separation of church and state. Publications such 
as David Barton, Separation of Church & State: What the Founders Meant, (Aledo, TX: Wallbuilders 
Press, 2007) which show the founders support for Christian values have been countered by attempts to 
place these values within political context such as The Separation of Church and State: Writings on a 
Fundamental Freedom by America's Founders, ed. Forrest Church, (Boston: Beacon Press, 2004) and 
particularly Isaac Kramnick & R. Laurence Moore, The Godless Constitution: A Moral Defense of the 
Secular State, (London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2005). Within the legal sphere, the significance of the 
founders’ personal views for discussions of this issue is highlighted in Everson v. Board of Education in 
which the papers and letters of Madison and Jefferson are used to interpret the First Amendment 
guarantee of religious freedom. Everson v. Board of Education (330 U.S. 1 (1947)). Despite criticism of 
David Barton’s scholarship he remains influential cf. “Using History to Mold Ideas on the Right”, New 
York Times, May 4, 2011. Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/05/us/politics/05barton.html. 
Accessed June 17, 2011. 
13 Adair’s discussion of the influence of Plutarch’s Lives of the Noble Greeks and Romans on the 
founding generation suggests that the Revolution widened the horizons of these men, reconfiguring their 
notions of ambition such that they sought a place in history as the founders of states. Interestingly, his 
essay suggests a divergence between Hamilton’s valuation of founding as a physical act and Jefferson’s 
as the creation of an enduring idea, an idea that somewhat reflects the two “bodies” of the Constitution 
discussed above. Douglass Adair, “Fame and the Founding Fathers” in Douglass Adair, Fame and the 
Founding Fathers: Essays by Douglass Adair, ed. Trevor Colbourn, (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, Inc., 1974). 
14 Jefferson would write in 1789 that “[t]he constitution, too, which was the result of our [sic] 
deliberation, is unquestionably the wisest ever yet presented to men.” In February 1788, Rufus King 
would quote John Adams’s claim that “[t]he deliberate union of so great and various a people in such a 
place, is without all partiality or prejudice, if not the greatest exertion of human understanding, the 
greatest single effort of national deliberation that the world has ever seen.” Thomas Jefferson to David 
Humphreys, 18th March 1789 reproduced in The Writings of Thomas Jefferson Memorial Edition: Volume 
7, eds. A. A. Lipscomb & A. E. Bergh, (Washington DC: Thomas Jefferson memorial association of the 
United States, 1903-04), 322; Rufus King to Theophilus Parsons, 20th February 1788 reproduced in Rufus 
King, The life and correspondence of Rufus King: comprising his letters, private and official, his public 
documents, and his speeches, Volume 1, (G. P. Putnam & Sons, 1894), 321. 
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rise has at the same time undermined the understanding of the Constitution which they 
advocated, and which they did so much to advance.15 Paine’s account of a ceremony in which the 
Law is itself crowned King, before its authority is distributed amongst the people,16 vividly 
depicts the notion of a constitution strived for by those individuals. Seeking not to impose 
themselves upon the people, they instead sought to create a document that was the possession, 
and delegated authority, of all. In the final essay of The Federalist Papers, Hamilton would 
describe the establishment of the Constitution as the act of “a whole people,”17 while Madison 
emphasized the ratifying conventions as the “authoritative bodies that made it law,” the 
mechanisms “through which the Nation made it its own Act.”18 James Wilson, in remarks to the 
Pennsylvanian ratifying convention, drew attention to the preamble in arguing that: 
“…the supreme power resides in the people. This Constitution, Mr. President, 
opens with a solemn and practical recognition of that principle: - “We, the people 
of the United States […] do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United 
States of America.” It is announced in their name – it receives its political 
existence from their authority: they ordain and establish.”19 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Levy has suggested that Madison’s refusal to publish his notes of the Convention was motivated by a 
desire to ensure that it did not become regarded as the work of a select group of framers. Documenting 
Madison’s interventions in the defense of the authority of the ratifying conventions, Levy argues that the 
“Father of the Constitution” was resolute in the belief that the Constitution ought to be regarded as the 
work of the people in such conventions. Leonard Levy, Original Intent and the Framers’ Constitution, 
(Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1988), Chap. 1. 
16 “But where says some is the king of America? I'll tell you Friend, he reigns above, and doth not make 
havoc of mankind like the Royal -- of Britain. Yet that we may not appear to be defective even in earthly 
honours, let a day be solemnly set apart for proclaiming the charter; let it be brought forth placed on the 
divine law, the word of God; let a crown be placed thereon, by which the world may know, that so far as 
we approve of monarchy, that in America THE LAW IS KING. For as in absolute governments the king 
is law, so in free countries the law ought to be king; and there ought to be no other. But lest any ill use 
should afterwards arise, let the crown at the conclusion of the ceremony be demolished, and scattered 
among the people whose right it is.” Thomas Paine, “Common Sense” in Thomas Paine, The Thomas 
Paine Reader, eds. Michael Foot & Isaac Kramnick, (London: Penguin, 1987), 92.  
17 “The establishment of a Constitution, in a time of profound peace, by the voluntary consent of a whole 
people, is a PRODIGY, to the completion of which I look forward with trembling anxiety” Alexander 
Hamilton, “Number 85: Conclusion” in James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, & John Jay, The Federalist 
Papers, ed. Isaac Kramnick, (London: Penguin, 1987), 487. 
18 Quoted in Levy, Original Intent and the Framers’ Constitution, 20. 
19 James Wison, “Remarks of James Wilson in the Pennsylvania Convention to Ratify the Constitution of 
the United States, 1787,” in James Wilson, Collected Works of James Wilson: Volume One, ed. Kermit L. 
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Beardian scholars would argue that behind such rhetoric lurked naked class interest,20 but to 
accept their characterization only makes it all the more surprising that over time the trend has 
been away from the idea of the Constitution as based upon popular ownership and creation.21  
To be sure, the founders of the American polity saw some degree of distance between the 
people and their governing institutions as a necessary part of constitutional rule. The Constitution 
would be a mechanism by which the people-as-authority would grant limited powers to a new 
government in order that the people-as-subjects could be protected.22 Had the people and the 
government been in identity, the passions of the population would have carried over into the 
government with ease – a possibility against which the framers were careful to guard. In 
Federalist No. 27 Hamilton expressed confidence that the new constitutional arrangements 
would ensure that those representing the people in the Senate:  
“will be less apt to be tainted by the spirit of faction, and more out of the reach of 
those occasional ill humors, or temporary prejudices and propensities, which in 
smaller societies frequently contaminate the public deliberations, beget injustice 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Hall & Mark D. Hall, (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2007), 193. Emphasis added. This attribution of a 
strong understanding of the people as authors of the constitutional document is echoed in the “Republican 
Revival” within legal studies. Arguing that it was the intent of those involved in the creation of the 
Constitution to establish a liberal republican form of government scholars such as Sunstein and Ackerman 
have emphasized the people’s role within legal interpretation. Cf. Scott D. Gerber, “The Republican 
Revival in American Constitutional Theory,” Political Research Quarterly 47 (December 1994); Cass R. 
Sunstein, “Beyond the Republican Revival,” The Yale Law Review 97 (July 1988); Bruce Ackerman, We 
The People: Foundations, (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1991). 
20 Charles E. Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States, (New York: The 
Free Press, 1935). 
21 If the Beardian materialist conception of the Constitution was accepted it would surely undermine, not 
enhance, the stature the constitutional document and its framers within these times of heightened criticism 
of class inequality.  Indeed it was the intent of Beard and his followers in developing an economic 
interpretation of the Constitution to engender a willingness to subject the Constitution to criticism and 
ultimate reform on that very basis. It is also important to acknowledge that recent scholarship has sought 
to reinstate the people’s political agency within the early Republic.   
22 For discussion of the two identities of the people cf. Edmund S. Morgan, Inventing the People: The 
Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1988). For 
the classic treatment of the monarchical basis of this idea cf. Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two 
Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). 
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and oppression… and engender schemes which, though they gratify a momentary 
inclination or desire, terminate in general distress, dissatisfaction, and disgust.”23 
Elsewhere, Madison’s famous Federalist No. 10 would make the argument for representation as 
refining the public views.24 What was peculiarly significant about the foundation of Constitution 
in America was the belief that it could both create this distance and ensure it was not abused. The 
arrangement of institutions, the balancing of state and federal powers, and the origin of authority 
in popular election would ensure that the people were afforded the greatest scope of liberty 
possible under state authority. A deliberate act of “self-alienation,” the Constitution would 
simultaneously provide the people with the benefits of government and protection against its 
excesses.  
However, the degree to which the Constitution has become removed from the people 
would surely surprise the actors of 1787-88. Pointing to the dialectical process by which the 
People and the Constitution relate, Anne Norton has noted that while the creation of a written 
constitution enabled the people to recognize themselves as such, it also held them captive to the 
authority of the moment of founding.25 Even those who repudiate the founders are, to paraphrase 
Foucault’s comment on the Enlightenment, subjected to the “blackmail” of the Constitution, 
insofar as they define their own political identity within and against the Constitution as 
understood, but fail to recognize themselves as actors constructing the shared meaning of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 Alexander Hamilton, “Number 27: The Subject Continued With The Same View” in James Madison, 
Alexander Hamilton, & John Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed. Isaac Kramnick, (London: Penguin, 1987), 
202. 
24 James Madison, “Number 10: The Same Subject Continued” in PJM digital. 
25 Although to be sure Norton also highlights the manner in which the founders are themselves 
“conquered” by the subsequent generations that will come to define their project. Anne Norton, 
“Transubstantiation: The Dialectic of Constitutional Authority”, The University of Chicago Law Review 
55 (1988), 460. 
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document.26 Made whole by the Constitution, the American people are also bound by it – to draw 
upon Norton’s titular metaphor, the “flesh” was transubstantiated into the “word,” but the 
“word” in truly dialectical fashion is once more transubstantiated into “flesh.” Whereas the 
moment of alienation ought to have been an enabler of rule-by-the-People, it has instead resulted 
in the rule of the Constitution as the imperfectly articulated, disembodied will of a particular 
instance of the people. Instead of enabling democratic rule, it has constrained it. 
 This idea can be more fully drawn out by considering the oft-invoked quasi-religious 
character of the United States Constitution. Norton’s use of the theological concept of 
transubstantiation to talk about the Constitution echoes the common recourse to religious 
imagery whenever the document is under discussion. The Constitution is “worshipped,” 
“venerated,” and “revered.” Its existence is a “divine blessing,” its content “sacred,” and it 
remains America’s “Covenant.”27 In linguistics if nothing else, Lincoln’s command that 
reverence for the law ought “become the political religion of the nation”28 has been applied to 
the Constitution with relish. Given these echoes, it is not surprising that Ludwig Feuerbach’s 
understanding of religion parallels the relationship between the American people and their 
Constitution. Feuerbach argued that “[r]eligion, at least the Christian, is the relation of a man to 
himself, or more correctly to his own nature… but a relation to it, viewed as a nature apart from 
his own.”29 In this way, Feuerbach argued that religion was the consequence of a process of self-
alienation, through which the conditions of humanity were incarnated in an externalized form 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Norton, “Transubstantiation,” 467; Michel Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?” in Michel Foucault, 
The Foucault Reader, edit. Paul Rabinow, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 45. 
27 For a broader discussion of the “religious” nature of the Constitution in the contemporary United States 
cf. Paul W. Kahn, “Sacrificial Nation,” The Utopian March 29th, 2010. 
28 Abraham Lincoln, “The Perpetuation of Our Political Institutions,” Sangamo Journal, February 3rd, 
1838. 
29 Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, trans. Marian Evans, (London: John Chapman, 1854), 
13-14. 
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and then placed in confrontation with humanity itself.30 Marx would characterize this process as 
one in which “the secular basis [of religion] detaches itself from itself and establishes itself in the 
clouds as an independent realm.”31  
We can apply this idea to the Constitution to draw out the same possibility; that the 
enabling alienation of the people’s authority in order to better construct a democratic polity has 
the potential to constrain the politically possible to the parameters of that alienating act. 32 More 
concretely, the Constitution can become the “First Cause” of American politics, containing 
within itself what is politically “moral” and defining through absence what is “immoral.” Such a 
scenario is in fact contained within Norton’s account: The Constitution was created by the people 
but has come to constrain them. Crucially, the gap between the people and their constitutional 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, 32-33. God exists as the antithesis of man (the divine vs. the 
human), but nonetheless represents man’s own latent higher nature – the perfection of reason, as the 
culmination of knowledge and the suppression of emotion. Man makes sense of his condition and enables 
intellectual development by abstracting from his character those elements he wishes to improve. Positing 
God as a divinely rational being, an individual can provide themselves with a basis for continually 
striving to act “as they should”, despite a human instinct to do otherwise. In Feuerbach’s example, the 
divine model enables a father to condemn his guilty son to death despite the paternal emotion involved in 
such an act. Reminiscent of the notion of self-binding associated with the people’s two bodies, 
Feuerbach’s example suggests that through the alienation, an individual can constrain their emotive, 
instantaneous self to act in their longer-term, rational interest – the contemplative people can check the 
aroused rabble.  
 But Feuerbach’s discussion of religion also highlights the dangers of such self-alienation. By 
abstracting one’s positive action and associating it with a divine entity, the individual also constructs a 
binding notion of what is correct behavior. The litany of discarded religions, now regarded as primitive or 
superstitious, suggests to Feuerbach that what was once regarded as divine has since become resolutely 
human (13). However, the temporary stability of these “primitive” religions attests that erroneous notions 
of reason held power for a time – that the continued striving for the human progress through divinity 
became overshadowed by the corresponding notion that what was conceived of as divine must be perfect. 
God ceased to be the abstraction of the latent potential of humanity, but became the divine First Cause. 
For a time, what God was believed to endorse was perfection by definition and human development 
stagnated as religion became the basis of as well as the spur for moral action. Here, the divine confronts 
the individual and constructs what is moral – constraining the moral development of the individual.  
31 Karl Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach” in Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, The Marx-Engels Reader, ed. 
Robert C. Tucker, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1978), 144. 
32 Although it is important to noted that limiting the politically possible is the intention of any liberal 
democratic constitution. Cf. Stephen Holmes, Passions & Constraints: On the Theory of Liberal 
Democracy, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1995), Chap 4. 
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document, through which the two bodies of the people can be separated, has become alienating 
instead of liberating. The people-as-sovereign have ceded their authority to a Constitution, and 
instead of this process enabling the people to construct a democratic politics,33 the consequence 
has been the constriction of the people’s politics through the reification of the Constitution.  
However the dissertation shows that this process was not a straight-forward elite transfer 
of authority from the people and to the framers. Instead, it was a complex and multifaceted 
development that was not driven by a group of elites alone, but rather emerged from interactions 
between the people and political elites, between the founding and second generations, and within 
the institutional setting of the judiciary and public acts of revolutionary remembrance “out of 
doors.”34 It was as the requirements of a post-revolutionary generation merged with the 
institutional imperatives of the new Republic, against the backdrop of a print culture convulsed 
by the sparring of liberal and republican norms, that America would forge a relationship with its 
Constitution.  
 
The development of framer intent 
I argue, as was indicated above, that three developments form the foundation upon which 
framer intent could be discerned. Taking each in turn before showing how they operated together 
to forge a particular cultural conception of the Constitution, I will show that by the late 1830s the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 For the seminal account of this process in the American context cf. Michael Warner, The Letters of the 
Republic: Publication and the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century America, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1990). Warner’s claim here is that the impersonal constitution provided a basis for the 
interpellation of the American people and their democratic authority. 
34 The complexity of this development required at least the full period of 1787-1837 to play out. As such 
this account challenges depictions which see the initial period of American constitutionalism lasting only 
until Jefferson’s election. Cf. for example Terry Bouton, Taming Democracy: "The People", the 
Founders, and the Troubled Ending of the American Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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notion of the popularly-owned/impersonal Constitution had given way to a framer intent-
orientated conception of the Constitution. 
Examining first the relationship between what Foucault termed the Author function – the 
use of the authorial figure as a method of organizing and categorizing texts – and the 
Constitution, I argue that the emergence of the Author made possible the use of the framers 
intent as a hermeneutic technique.35 Providing a basis for the idea of tying a product to a single 
actor or group and deriving its authority and value by way of this relationship, the Author 
function created a notion of the Constitution in which the framers’ relationship to the document 
was one characterized by textual authority. Highlighting, among others, Madison’s use of the 
Author function as a ratification strategy, I trace the unfolding of this idea in the legal 
commentaries of the early Republic, culminating in Justice Joseph Story’s reliance on The 
Federalist Papers and 1787 Convention records in order to forge a definitive comprehension of 
the Constitution. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 Michel Foucault, “What Is an Author?” 101-120. The ascription of texts to an author emerged in the 
transition to modernity, perhaps primarily, as Foucault suggested, as a means of holding individuals 
responsible for seditious writings. However, the acceleration of this process, and its ultimate legal 
codification, was a consequence of the emergence of a liberal political economy and the need to ascribe 
and enable the transfer of property in texts. For this reason the protagonists in the debates over authorship 
claims - and their legal existence as copyrights - were almost universally those with an economic interest 
in the printed texts. In England this meant a series of Eighteenth century legal disputes in which 
publishers sought to protect their monopoly over marketable texts under the guise of protecting authors. 
In America, similar debates saw authors such as Noah Webster and James Fenimore Cooper seek to 
insure they received adequate compensation from publishers and by extension the public for their 
“material.” Often couched in explicitly Lockean terms, the proprietorial claims of authors shaped contests 
over authorship such that economic concerns became the locus of debate. In Grantland Rice’s 
formulation, copyright debates at the end of the Eighteenth century saw  “the private imperatives of 
individualism with its attendant ideology of sacrosanct ownership rights (e.g. Locke) [meet] with the 
public need for free commerce and circulation (e.g., Montesquieu).” While republican ideology offered a 
brake on the advancing liberal rights of the author, the structuring of the debate as between the individual 
and society inherently privileged a notion of ownership of ideas and of literary style that worked to 
valorize the creative individual and lay the foundations for the ultimate triumph of the liberal conception 
of authorship. Grantland S. Rice, The Transformation of Authorship in America, (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1997), 78.  
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However, the association between the framers and the Constitution document would have 
remained a reified artifact of legal discourse had it not been for the increasing veneration of the 
founding generation and growing politicization and popularity of the Constitution during the 
period. I argue that these trends were not merely complementary to, but actually fundamentally 
linked to each other, and to the use of authorship as an organizing principle. With the passing 
away of the revolutionary generation, a second generation of Americans confronted the problems 
arising from locating the Revolution, and by extension themselves, within history. Faced with a 
need to find an historical role for themselves that did not threaten the revolutionary settlement, 
this second generation increasingly located the founders within a timeless mythology and came 
to understand their task as the second generation as one of institutional preservation.36 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 The problems faced by this generation echo to no small degree the interplay of “essentialism” and 
“epochalism” attributed by Geertz to all post-colonial societies, and the imperative of forging a nation 
from “American” society. Caught between the counter-metropolitan identification necessary for throwing 
off the colonizers (the essential) and the forward-looking centralization of identity necessary for nation-
building (the epochal), Geertz argues that nascent societies erect nationalist ideologies through “images, 
metaphors, and rhetorical turns…, cultural devices designed to render one or another aspect of the broad 
process of collective self-redefinition explicit, to cast essentialist pride or epochalist hope into specific 
symbolic forms, where more than dimly felt, they can be described, developed, celebrated, and used” – 
and crucially to co-exist without overt friction. The political elites of the new American nation were 
deeply aware of the need to form a single nation from the disparate colonies, and worked to make real the 
fiction proclaimed in Federalist No. 2 that America comprised: 
“…one connected country… one united people – a people descended from the same ancestors, 
speaking the same language, professing the same religion, attached to the same principles of 
government, very similar in their manners and customs….” 
In this light, the mythologizing of the founders and Constitution reflects a process of nation-building, 
providing unifying symbols which harnessed epochical hopes to essentialist pride. For the post-
revolutionary generation the figure of Washington worked to emphasize the world-historic significance of 
the revolutionary epoch, while creating an American heritage and identity that could inform essentialist 
claims. Indeed, for Washington’s most famous hagiographer, Parson Weems, the very significance of 
Washington’s story lay in its ability to shore up patriotic character – enabling him to prize didactic value 
over truth in his rendition of the felling of the cherry tree (amongst other tales). In a similar way, the 
Constitution could operate as a national symbol, signaling both America’s particularity and its world-
historic importance. Clifford Geertz, “After the Revolution: The Fate of Nationalism in the New States” 
in Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays, (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1973), 
252; John Jay, “Number 2: Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force And Influence” in The Federalist 
Papers, ed. Isaac Kramnick, (London: Penguin Books, 1987), 91. On Weems cf. George B. Forgie, 
Patricide in the House Divided: A Psychological Interpretation of Lincoln and His Age, (New York: W. 
W. Norton & Company, 1979), 36-47. On the mobilization of the Constitution, see Jeremy Engels’s 
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Examining the orations made on the Fourth of July and compiling a database of the toasts offered 
during these celebrations, I trace an emerging discourse in which that generation’s interpretation 
of history merged with a veneration of the founding generation, and lead to the close 
identification of the founding generation with the Constitution itself.37 The result was that the 
American came to see the Constitution as a timeless document, both the product of a glorified 
group of individuals and the reason for their glorification.  
The relationship between framer intent and the divergence of legal and non-elite 
constitutional interpretations is perhaps the most complicated of the three “legs” of the argument. 
The legal commentaries explored in reference to the framers’ authorship of the Constitution 
demonstrate that a single, authoritative meaning was gradually attributed to the Philadelphia 
Convention’s intent. Nonetheless, the institutional pressures faced by the Supreme Court led it to 
articulate a contrary understanding of the Constitution’s authority. In the opinions of Chief 
Justice John Marshall, the people’s authority was invoked to justify the Court’s conflicts with the 
electorally responsive branches and the States. In these instances Marshall sought to frame the 
Court as the guardian of the people’s Constitution in order to legitimize the nascent power of 
judicial review and by extension the Court itself. Perversely, the invocation of the people’s 
originary authority was used by the Court to undermine the people’s contemporary authority 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
interesting discussion of the use of the “Army of the Constitution” to suppress 1790s hinterland rebellion. 
Jeremy Engels, Enemyship: Democracy and Counter-Revolution in the Early Republic, (East Lansing, 
MI: Michigan State University Press, 2010). 
37 The interplay between (constitutional) text and national history calls to mind here Benedict Anderson’s 
Imagined Communities, and particularly his analysis of post-colonial nationalisms in the Americas. The 
account echoes Anderson’s insight that, in the absence of a unique national language, Americans turned 
to history and self-location within serial time as the “inheritors” of national independence in order to 
forge national identification. That the Constitution, a text, should be the vehicle of this identification, only 
reaffirms Anderson’s view of the centrality of print-capitalism in creating the potential for the American 
colonial struggles. For the seminal account of the importance of a printed Constitution for this process see 
Michael Warner’s work on this subject. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the 
Origin and Spread of Nationalism, (New York: Verso, 2006); Warner, The Letters of the Republic. 
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over the Constitution, and to reserve interpretative authority to a cadre of judges and lawyers. 
Without overtly transferring authority to the framers, the Court did work to remove authority 
from the people. This institutional interest delayed court expressions of the legitimacy of framer 
intent as a method of legal interpretation. It also placed the judiciary on a different trajectory 
from that of the popular press as far as constitutional interpretation was concerned. Thus, despite 
significant evidence that the Constitution was popularly identified with the framers, the Court 
would resist that doctrine until the Twentieth century case of Cooper v, Aaron (with the 
important exception of the ill-fated Dred Scott decision).  
Together these three developments fostered the potential for the emergence of framer 
intent as the prevailing mode of constitutional interpretation. This potential was actualized in the 
political debates of the 1830s regarding slavery. As defenders of slavery sought to respond to 
abolitionist attacks on the peculiar institution, they promoted an understanding of the 
Constitution as the sacred works of the framers. In doing so they aimed to make literal readings 
of the constitutional text illegitimate and to deny the abolitionists constitutional space within 
which to advocate for abolition in the District of Columbia. This mode of constitutional 
argumentation had developed sufficiently by 1836, that Martin Van Buren could exploit framer 
intent to side-step the sectionally divisive issue of slavery in the District of Columbia.38 From the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 Delivering his Inaugural Address in 1837, Van Buren repeated the stance hammered out during his 
campaign; 
"’I must go into the Presidential chair the inflexible and uncompromising opponent of every 
attempt on the part of Congress to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia against the 
wishes of the slaveholding States, and also with a determination equally decided to resist 
the slightest interference with it in the States where it exists.’ These opinions have been 
adopted in the firm belief that they are in accordance with the spirit that actuated the 
venerated fathers of the Republic… For myself, therefore, I desire to declare that the 
principle that will govern me in the high duty to which my country calls me is a strict 
adherence to the letter and spirit of the Constitution as it was designed by those who framed 
it.” (My emphasis). 
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mid-Antebellum period, American politics would be constrained for better or worse by a notion 
of the national Constitution underpinned by ideas of framer intent. 
 
Scholarly Framework 
 The dissertation’s research builds upon the vast academic literature concerned with the 
Constitution. A brief historiography of efforts to understand the founding shows that at least 
since the Progressive Era, the Whiggish account of the Constitution’s creation as the culmination 
of the Revolution has been vigorously challenged. With the twin blows of Sydney Fisher’s 
commitment to knocking the founders from their pedestals39 and Charles Beard’s Economic 
Interpretation of the Constitution,40 the narrative that framed the Constitution as a triumph of 
liberal democracy was, if not overturned, at least considered worthy of academic scrutiny. While 
Beard’s analysis would be questioned41 and the Cold War mentalité would do much to undo 
Fisher’s arguments,42 the notion that the historical meaning of the Constitution was sacrosanct 
was firmly put to rest. Though the Progressives had cleared the ground, it would be with the New 
Left scholars of the 1960s and the Revolutionary bicentennials of the 1970s that extended 
academic debate would emerge. Bernard Bailyn’s seminal work argued that the Revolution 
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Martin Van Buren, “Inaugural Address”, (March 4, 1837). Available at 
http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/speeches/detail/3486. Accessed June 9, 2011. 
39 See for example Sydney G. Fisher, “The Legendary and Myth-Making Process in Histories of the 
American Revolution”, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 51 (1912). 
40 Beard, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States. 
41 Forrest McDonald, We the People: The Economic Origins of the Constitution, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1958); Robert E. Brown, Reinterpretation of the Formation of the American Constitution, 
(Boston: Boston University Press, 1963). For a thorough account of the historiography of the Revolution 
and Founding cf. Alan Gibson, Interpreting the Founding: Guide to the Enduring Debates over the 
Origins and Foundations of the American Republic, (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2006). 
Much of the following discussion is informed by Gibson’s account. 
42 Not least in the title of Catherine Drinker-Bowen’s account of the Convention – The Miracle at 
Philadelphia, (Boston: Brown, Little and Company, 1966). 
!
!
!
!
18!
should be understood as the result of an ideological disposition labeled the “republican 
synthesis,” representing a complex of five theoretical strands drawn from classical antiquity, the 
Enlightenment, English common law, New England Puritanism, and the radical Whig thought of 
the English Civil War.43 Bailyn was careful to place this ideology within the material context of 
the colonies, but his followers and opponents have underplayed this vital qualification to such an 
extent of polarization that ideological and economic accounts often speak past, rather than to, 
each other.44 As economic accounts of the revolutionary period lost favor among scholars, a new 
line of polarization emerged, once again motivated by Bailyn’s intervention.  
In the 1980s and 1990s scholarly discussion focused upon whether the disposition of the 
revolutionaries was republican or liberal, and by extension whether the Constitution represented 
a liberal ethos, republican ethos, or a liberal reaction to a republican revolution.45 This debate 
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43 Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap 
Press of the Harvard University Press, 1967); Bernard Bailyn, “The Central Themes of the American 
Revolution: An Interpretation” in Essays on the American Revolution, ed. Stephen G. Kutz & James H. 
Hutson, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1973). Lutz offers an account of Bailyn’s 
significance at the beginning of his assessment of the importance of different strands of thought to the 
Revolution. Donald S. Lutz, “The Relative Influence of European Writers on Late Eighteenth-Century 
American Political Thought,” American Political Science Review 78 (1984), 189. 
44 Cf. Bailyn, “The Central Themes of the American Revolution”, 10-14; Lance Banning, The 
Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution of a Party Ideology, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978). In part, 
of course, the marginalization of economic factors was a methodological necessity of what became the 
“Republican school.” Suggesting the ideology operated as a system of ideas through which material life 
was filtered, the advocates of the republican interpretation questioned realists’ claims that economic 
factors could have a direct influence on political thought. Cf. Linda K. Kerber, “The Republican Ideology 
of the Revolutionary Generation,” American Quarterly 37 (1985). Nevertheless, a limited focus on 
material conditions has constrained the potential influence of the republican approach. As Alan Gibson 
has noted, the endurance of the Beardian interpretation lies in part in the fact that it is “one of the few 
approaches that relies extensively on empirical analysis. As such, it remains an essential balance to the 
ideological interpretations of the American Revolution and the formation of the Constitution that have 
dominated scholarship….” Gibson, Interpreting the Founding, 87-88.  Woody Holton has even suggested 
that Beard’s account of economic motivations may have stood the test of time even if the data has been 
criticized. Woody Holton, “Lionizing the Beard,” Commonplace 2 (July 2002). Available at 
http://www.common-place.org/vol-02/no-04/reviews/holton.shtml. Accessed July 14, 2011. 
45 Joyce Appleby, “Republicanism in Old and New Contexts,” William and Mary Quarterly 43 (1986); 
Isaac Kramnick, “Republican Revisionism Revisited,” American Historical Review 87 (1982); John P. 
Diggins, The Lost Soul of American Politics, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986); Lance 
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reached its conclusion in the observation that no single tradition (and certainly not the dichotomy 
of liberal-republican)46 could adequately account for revolutionary mentalité  – an observation 
that had been an implicit assumption of Bailyn’s use of a synthetic account of ideology. 
The dissertation stands upon the shoulders of these great debates, but looks beyond 
them.47 In line with more recent constitutional scholarship it does not seek to directly 
characterize, or periodize, the founding in liberal or republican terms.48 As James Otis’ 
invocation of “life, liberty, and property,” and Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence attest, 
Lockean liberalism was current at the outset of the Revolution. Equally, the Jacksonian 
valorization of the people and the founder’s Constitution indicate that civic republicanism did 
not give way with the arrival of a market society. Instead, the ideologies of republicanism and 
liberalism that political theorists shed much ink to differentiate ebbed and flowed, and enveloped 
each other within the early Republic. It was within this fluid ideological environment that a 
framer-orientated conception of the Constitution emerged, but it was not a process that was tied 
to liberalism’s or republicanism’s relative strength. Nonetheless, evidence regarding authorship, 
in the practice of toasting, and the assumptions of a virtuous founding locate the dissertation’s 
discussion within a broad transition from republican to liberal attitudes. Republicanism also 
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Banning, “Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited: Liberal and Classical Ideas in the New American Republic,” 
William and Mary Quarterly 42 (1987). Many of the republican accounts make use of the work of Pocock 
and Rahe as a basis. J. G. A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the 
Atlantic Republic Tradition, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); Paul Rahe, Republics Ancient 
and Modern: Classical Republicanism and the American Revolution, (Chapel Hill, NC: University of 
North Carolina Press, 1992).   
46 Gordon S. Wood, “Ideology and the Origins of Liberal America,” William and Mary Quarterly 44 
(1987); James T. Kloppenberg, “The Virtues of Liberalism: Christianity, Republicanism, and Ethics in 
Early American Political Discourse,” The Journal of American History 74 (1987); Alan Gibson, 
“Ancients, Moderns, and Americans: The Republicanism-Liberalism Debate Revisited,” History of 
Political Thought 21 (2000). 
47 Which certainly should not be taken to mean its had pretentions to see further than the canonical 
scholars involved in them. 
48 For an important recent account of the Constitution which bypasses liberal and republican debates cf. 
Slauter, The State as a Work of Art. 
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looms large in the account of the elevation of the founders. As the second generation of 
Americans sought to make sense of their Constitution, they drew on, and were shaped by, 
emerging ideological constructs – authorship, judicial supremacy, the revolutionary myth – in 
order to situate the document within their shared national consciousness. In doing so they made 
use of the republican “grammar” of founding moments to shape their own discourse regarding 
the American founding. The result, though, was not a classically liberal or republican 
understanding of the Constitution, but rather to a Constitution tied to its framers and engendering 
a political culture in which America became constrained rather than liberated by its founding.  
In a similar way, while the argument offered by the dissertation shapes the development 
of framer intent as somewhat inevitable given the ideological structures of the early Republic, it 
is not to be understood as relentlessly “progressive” in its development. I show that the 
Constitution of 1787 was not that of 1800, and the Constitution of 1837 was perhaps even further 
removed from that of 1800 than 1787. I argue that the legacy of the Constitution was not set in 
the heat of the founding period, but forged in the warm afterglow of the National period (defined 
here as approximately 1790-1830). “Forged” here provides a useful metaphor, in the sense of 
shifting from a flexible and malleable institution to one that would become rigid and durable, but 
as also, in the longer term, suggestive of an eventual period of brittleness and rust.  
My argument leads me to take a position on the question of institutional influence. It 
reflects and evinces the importance of ideas as the currency of political culture. I hope to show 
that the Constitution is in the final analysis a constructive institution, as Madison’s famous 
allusion to parchment barriers suggested. The extent to which the Constitution guides and shapes 
American political culture rests upon a shared, if often fraught, understanding of what the 
Constitution allows for and forbids. The power and durability of this construct is remarkable 
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when it is considered that the Constitution has survived more than two hundred years, countless 
wars, major social movements and accompanying reform, and the vast expansion of the federal 
government. That the document has remained a constraint on the actions of individuals for this 
length of time, supported by significant force only during the period of the Civil War and 
Reconstruction, is a testament to the institutional power of shared ideas.  
But my commitment to the political importance of ideas is not only at the level of the 
Constitution. I also want to show that the Constitution as it ultimately emerged is itself the 
product of an interaction of ideas. The model of constitutional development used here takes 
seriously the claims of constructivist institutionalism. It follows the belief that ideas can “become 
codified, serving as ideational lenses through which actors come to interpret environmental 
signals.”49 I would argue for the emergence of authorship, judicial review, and the veneration of 
the founders as processes by which ideas became codified cognitive filters. To take the Fourth of 
July orations as an example, the emergence of particular norms for composing these speeches 
can be seen as a codification of the ideational orientation of the second generation of Americans 
to their own history. Creating a cognitive filter, this narrative created norms of political behavior 
(fidelity to the Constitution) against which actors were measured. And authorship can been seen 
as an increasingly codified (copyright) norm that organizes the interpretation of textual content 
(the Author function). It was only through the emergence and consolidation of these ideas that 
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49 Colin Hay, “Constructivist Institutionalism” in The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions, ed. 
R.A.W. Rhodes, Sarah A. Binder & Bert A. Rockman, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 65. See 
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the final construction of the Constitution as framer-produced/intended could develop. At its 
heart, this is an argument for the importance of ideas within American political development.50 
The dissertation’s argument places particular emphasis upon the interaction of the three 
ideational developments incorporated within it. This interaction is a reflection of a particular 
social and material context and the need to respond to the requirements of each as it developed. 
Authorship as a concept emerged over the longue durée but was consolidating by the beginning 
of the nineteenth century. Judicial Review had a weak history in the common law, but was far 
from the norm of British jurisprudence, and became pressing only once the notion of 
constitutionalizing the polity at a particular moment became current. And the veneration of the 
founders as an act emerged from the interplay between first and second generations. That each 
ideational disposition came into being at the same moment, as a result of material considerations, 
and found partial succor in the others was central to the potential for framer intent. It is also a 
consideration when meditating on the particular “American-ness” of framer intention, given the 
wide array of countries claiming a written constitution. In offering a model of institutional 
development structured this way, I reaffirm the political importance of ideas and the significance 
of ideational orientations as elements of the social and material context within which institutional 
development occurs. That is to say, ideas are “things.” 
I also want to address the academic debates surrounding the idea of the democratic 
founding within democratic theory. Work in political theory has highlighted the conceptual 
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50 For examples of such work cf. Robert C. Lieberman, "Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order: 
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problems presented by the act of creating a democratic polity prior to the emergence of a people 
to consent to it.51 This literature points to the necessarily undemocratic beginnings of all 
democratic polities, and seeks to theorize the consequences of and responses to this paradox. In 
the canonical discussion of this issue, Rousseau reverts in The Social Contract to the figure of 
the Lawgiver or Legislator as an extralegal authority.52 This figure creates for the democratic 
polity a set of rules through which the democratic will of the people might be addressed. 
Necessarily extralegal – they predate the ability of the people to articulate consent, or even to 
exist as a coherent entity – Rousseau looks to authority outside of the democratic institutions 
created for their support. But as Madison noted in Federalist No. 40, in attempting to address the 
question of whether the “convention were authorized to frame and propose this mixed 
Constitution,” neither religion nor force were satisfactory supports for the project of American 
democracy.53 Madison concluded that the creation of the American polity necessitated that it be 
“instituted by some informal and unauthorized propositions, made by some patriotic and 
respectable citizen or number of citizens,”54 but that crucially, and necessarily, in the last 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51 For a flavor of these discussions cf. Jürgen Habermas & William Rehg, “Constitutional Democracy: A 
Paradoxical Union of Contradictory Principles?” Political Theory 29 (2001); Alessandro Ferrara, “Of 
Boats and Principles: Reflections on Habermas’s ‘Constitutional Democracy,’” Political Theory 29 
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Essays on Reason and Politics, (Boston: The MIT Press, 1997). 
52 Cf. Rousseau’s discussion of the Lawgiver in Book II, Chapter 7 of On the Social Contract. Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, “On the Social Contract” in Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Basic Political Writings, 
trans. Donald A. Gress with intro. Peter Gray, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987). 
53 James Madison, “Number 40: The Same Objection Further Examined” in PJM digital. Although 
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critical stages of the revolution.” Madison, “Number 37.” However it is worth noting that this invocation 
of divine authority is refracted through the Convention as drafters. 
54 Madison, “Number 40.” Original emphasis. For a detailed discussion of this cf. Jason Frank, 
““Unauthorized Propositions” The Federalist Papers and Constituent Power,” diacritics 37 (2007): 103-
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instance, the people would affirm or reject those propositions. Accepting the inevitability of the 
extralegal beginnings of the polity, Madison nonetheless sought to build upon the existing 
democratic communities – the States – in order to provide retroactive consent to the initial 
extralegal moment of creation. 
In shunning resort to force and religion during the ratification process of 1787-88, 
Madison widened the potential forms of founding legitimation to include authorship. Invoking 
the absolutism of the Author with regard to their text, Madison’s use of framer intent in 1788 
highlights both the inescapability and subtlety of the democratic paradox. Madison’s move 
underlines the need for an absolute in the creation of a democracy, and also shows that the 
absolute need not be force or divinity but could be drawn from the authority an author had come 
to wield over their text. This conclusion offers a counterpoint to Michael Warner’s claim that it 
was the lack of an identifiable author is what enabled the Constitution to succeed in the early 
Republic.55 
The rise of framer intent also challenges the positive account of the limited nature of 
democratic foundings offered by Habermas. Habermas argues for the ability of absolutist 
democratic foundings to be “tapped” on future occasions in order that the polity might come to 
better approximate its democratic claims.56 Progressive constitutional theorists have in different 
ways sought to encourage such tapping. In differing accounts, both Larry Kramer and Bruce 
Ackerman have sought to emphasize practices of popular constitutional ownership within the 
founding era as a basis for reinvigorating American democracy.57 Depicting judicial review as a 
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facet of the constitutional theory of “departmentalism” – in which each branch has a co-equal 
interpretative authority, all subject to intervention by the people themselves – Kramer links the 
early Republic with the present insofar as “efforts to define a role for courts have been part of a 
larger and more fundamental struggle to maintain the authority of ordinary citizens over their 
Constitution.”58 Likewise, in his three volume work We The People, Ackerman has argued for an 
understanding of American constitutional history in which each of three acts (Founding, 
Reconstruction, and the New Deal)59 represent moments of higher law making by the people, 
establishing a new constitutional order that frames the following period of political self-
government. In that narrative, the founding period forms the basis for the later moments of 
popular constitutional intervention. 
But, for as many times as this may have occurred in American history, I argue that a 
reversed interaction can also be seen – the present has been “tapped” by a reified past, draining 
off its democratic exuberance in a way that retards the expansion of democratic values and limit 
the scope of political action. For although Madison’s temporary invocation of authorship 
explicitly did not intend to bind the American polity to the absolutism of the framers, the 
“intention of the framers” has become a constructive constraint on subsequent generations. When 
the Supreme Court argues aboutwhat was meant by the “right to bear arms,” it is not a radical 
unfolding of the ethos of ratification that is taking place, but a narrowing of the policy 
possibilities within an existing democratic polity. And as the recent rise of the TEA Party has 
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58 Kramer, The People Themselves, 7. Barry Friedman has offered a similarly optimistic account of the 
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and Giroux, 2009). 
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shown, pleas for constitutional fidelity often work not to expand the democratic community but 
rather to restrict and protest its growth.60  
Moreover, these accounts have left underexplored the possibility that notions of original 
intent emerged earlier – and that they might have emerged with the support of the people, rather 
than despite them. Asserting an originary popular ownership of the document in contradistinction 
to the later framer-orientated understandings, both Kramer and Ackerman overlook the impact 
that concepts of authorship could, when combined with the republican valuation of foundings, 
have in creating a prevailing – and crucially, popularly supported – understanding of the 
document in terms of framer intent. The decline of the people’s interpretative authority was key 
to the emergence of the alienated relationship that the American people have with their 
Constitution. But juxtaposing the people and the framers obscures the people’s complicity in the 
increased authority of the framers. As the Fourth of July celebrations explored in the dissertation 
show, the people themselves were active in the process of mythologizing the founders.  
In offering a model of constitution development which engages with this literature, I hope 
to show that it was only through the interaction of ideas within the Early Republic that a 
constellation providing for framer intent came into being. And moreover, that it was only in the 
extended aftermath of the Constitution – and with the participation of the people themselves –  
that the democratic impulse of ratification was undermined by a constitutional calcification 
around the idea of framer intent.  
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Chapter 1: Interpreting The American Constitution: The changing popular understanding 
of the Constitution 
 
“The Constitution of the United States – May its errors be calmly discussed, and peaceably 
amended.”61 
 The introduction has outlined the argument of the dissertation and presented a map of the 
manner in which it will attempt to explore how the people’s relationship with the Constitution 
transformed in the first decades of the American Republic. However, without evidence that 
understandings of constitutional authority did indeed transition during this period, the argument 
of the dissertation is a solution in search of a problem. If the understandings of the Constitution 
expressed in print between 1787 and 1837 remained stable, then there is no need to detail the 
“constellation” that enabled ideas of framer intention to emerge as significant by the end of the 
time frame under examination. It is the intention of this chapter to offer a brief sketch of 
constitutional interpretation at four moments during the early Republic. These moments indicate 
that the popular understanding of the Constitution rapidly changed over the first decades of its 
existence, towards a social understanding of the Constitution which tied it closely to those 
actively engaged in its creation. By examining the newspaper debates at these crucial points of 
constitutional debate, it can be shown that the arguments marshaled by correspondents to these 
newspapers progress over time and can illustrate the emergence of a conception of “framer 
intent” within popular discourse.  
The four moments examined are (1) the debate over the establishment of a national bank 
in 1790-91; (2) the electoral crisis of 1800-01; (3) the debate surrounding the renewal of the 
Bank’s charter in 1810-11; and (4) the Missouri Crisis. Newspaper correspondents between 1790 
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and 1820 track the changing norms of constitutional exchange from arguments grounded firmly 
in printed text and towards an association between constitutional meaning and the intention of 
the framers. By 1810-11 the rhetoric of intention is inescapable within popular constitutional 
debate, manifesting the collapse of the conceptual distinction between textual meaning and the 
intention of the actors responsible for the constitutional text. A decade later in 1819-20, the 
association of the founders with the constitutional text meant that its preservation was a broadly 
accepted ideal. In such an environment, modes of constitutional interpretation moved from 
examinations of the text-alone as authoritative and towards the view that the text was evidence of 
the anticipated meanings of the actors in 1787-88. This shift can be given concreteness by the 
manner in which actors in 1819-20 were willing to call upon historical context and to place 
themselves in the minds of the founders in order to derive constitutional meanings. Such actions 
are in marked contrast to the rejection of framer intent as a basis for deriving constitutional 
meaning in 1790-91 and the willingness in 1800-01 to give the people the power to construct 
constitutional meanings in real time. This survey shows that while framer intent was not the 
“original understanding” of the Constitution, by as early as 1810 it was a crucial concept within 
popular constitutional debate and by 1820 a central assumption.  
 In order to assess how interpretation of the Constitution was shifting over this thirty-year 
period, the America’s Historical Newspapers database (produced by Readex) was used. Using 
the search function to identify articles related to the words “Bank,” “Election,” “Bank,” and 
“Missouri,” and “Constitution,” respectively for four month periods centered on the event in 
question (or for the six months 11/1800 – 4/1801 given the drawn out nature of Jefferson’s 
election), the top 100 returns were sifted to identify articles with a bearing on the question of 
constitutional interpretation. From close reading of these articles a sense of the different 
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positions taken within the print debates was formed and is reproduced in the form of qualitative 
analysis below. While the incomplete nature of the database means that some significant 
newspapers were unavailable for each period, it is believed that this will not hinder the attempt to 
understand the nature of and assumptions present in each debate. Moreover, the use of secondary 
sources to identify exchanges deemed significant by others has not led to suspicions that the 
above approach misrepresents the tenor of each period of constitutional debate. 
 
The First Bank, 1790-91 
 As David Currie has extensively documented, the first Congress was by no means able to 
assume control of a fully functional constitutional order as a consequence of the passage of the 
Constitution.62 A slender and sparing document, the Constitution as drawn up in Philadelphia left 
much detail to be filled out by those first charged with legislating and governing under it. 
Moreover, much of this work was carried out in the first decade of the federal government not by 
the Supreme Court, but by the Legislature and the Executive. Regarding the constitutional 
importance of the first decade of the federal government, Currie comments that: 
“a number of constitutional issues of the first importance have never been 
resolved by judges; what we know of their solution we owe to the legislative and 
executive branches, whose interpretations have established traditions almost as 
hallowed in some cases as the Constitution itself.”63 
Among such weighty constitutional issues, the chartering of the first National Bank of the United 
States loomed large, generating debate on the floor of Congress and beyond. The Bank formed a 
key component of Hamilton’s economic program and as such was a polarizing issue for the 
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62 David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period 1789-1801 (Chicago: The 
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nascent party groupings within the federal government. Opposed by Madison and Jefferson, the 
Bank would become established only after Washington’s examination of Jefferson’s and 
Hamilton’s written considerations as to its constitutionality.  
 While every argument that could be mustered was put to use by the actors within 
Congress,64 the debate held within the newspapers suggests a narrower sense of accepted forms 
of constitutional argumentation.  While Madison had made the tentative step on the floor of 
Congress of suggesting that his own presence at the Philadelphia Convention gave him insight 
into the limits and expectations of constitutional authority,65 this notion met with a swift rebuttal 
from Elbridge Gerry in a speech reprinted in the Federal Gazette; 
“This would be improper, because the memories of different gentlemen would 
probably vary, as they had already done, with respect to those facts; and if not, the 
opinions of the individual members who debated, are not to be considered as the 
opinions of the convention...  the speech of one member is not to be considered as 
expressing the sense of a convention.”66 
A view similar to Gerry’s appears to prevail in the wider debate over the Bank that took place 
within the printed sphere of newspaper publications. While numerous arguments were offered by 
both sides, the ability of the framers to offer a comprehensive understanding of constitutional 
intent is not evident. “Framer authority,” to the extent that it exists, appears in the form of 
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deference to their individual understandings of the Constitution as a document, not to their 
understandings of its intentions. 
  A piece written in Dunlap’s American Daily Advertiser in mid-February, aimed at a 
laying out both sides of the Bank debate, does invoke Madison’s authority regarding the 
Constitution but without suggesting this insight should have any constitutional weight. Writing 
as “An American,” the correspondent to the Dunlap’s American Daily Advertiser seeks to review 
the arguments offered by both sides, but does so without repeating Madison’s own claim to 
unique constitutional insight. Characterizing the congressional debate as one in which an 
understanding of the implied powers granted under the general welfare and taxation powers was 
pitted against an understanding in which the Constitution was seen only as granting those powers 
expressly given, the writer suggests the authority to turn to for guidance was not the framers, but 
the philosopher David Hume.67 Madison’s position on the proposed bank is noted, but in a 
manner that suggests such opposition ought not to have any constitutional import, but instead is 
only a reflection of Madison’s personal judgment: 
“The opposition to this bill was very ably supported in the House of 
Representatives, amongst others, by Mr. Madison, whose talents as a statesman, 
and integrity as an individual, have long been the deserved subjects of popular 
applause; and whose active part in forming and promulgating the present federal 
system of government, put out of all doubt his resolution to support it on every 
constitutional ground. He had been left, it is true, in a minority; but the sterling 
weight of his objections, and the solidity of his reasoning, lose nothing by having 
proved unsuccessful. This has equally happened to the most celebrated characters, 
who have, in different periods of the world, adorned the history of mankind, and 
whose names, like his, have been progressively obtaining what they must 
permanently hold – the affection, the veneration, and I had almost said, the 
adoration of their country.”68 
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Elsewhere in the article the Constitution is itself alluded in such a way as to suggest that 
constitutional interpretation has little connection with the framers as individuals. In discussing 
the privilege of granting incorporation, the writer restates the argument that “no exclusive 
privileges... having been ever contemplated by the constitution of the union” the Bank should not 
be incorporated. Strikingly in this passage the actor, capable of contemplation, is not an 
individual, but the Constitution itself. Absent from the initial deliberation over the powers of the 
Constitution are the framers themselves, a depiction which suggests both the authority of the 
document itself as a document and undermines the notion that any individual might offer a 
definitive understanding of it.   
 Other articles seeking to make an effective case against the Bank adopt a variety of 
arguments, but none make allusion to Madison’s self-claimed insight. As “An American” 
suggested, the writers opposed to the Bank made much of the notion that the Constitution 
granted only expressed powers. “A Pennsylvanian”, writing an article which appeared in 
Dunlap’s American Daily Advertiser in early February and was later reprinted in the New York 
Daily Advertiser, exclaimed that “[a]ll the reasonings in the world can never, from the 
constitution of the United States, deduce a power in Congress to establish a National Bank.”69 
Denouncing the notion that such a power is implied in the Constitution, the writer rested his case 
with the observation that the Constitution “says expressly” that no preference can be given to any 
state with regard to commerce or revenue. Later that month, a letter published in the Federal 
Gazette signed “Z” would reiterate a similar argument, countering claims based “on supposed 
implications from the Constitution of the Union” with the challenge that “until the power of 
laying taxes and of borrowing money should be proved synonymous to the granting charters of 
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incorporation... these arguments will fail of their weight.”70 Another writer to the same paper 
suggested that “...unconstitutional must be deemed the National Bank under the charter of a 
government, not empowered to grant any, and who are expressly restrained from granting 
exclusive privileges or preferences to any individual whatever.”71  
 Alongside the argument that the Constitution could only grant express powers, and 
possibly as consequence of it, an understanding of the document as a compact of states is 
evidenced among some critics of the Bank. Powell has suggested that a “states’ compact” 
interpretation of the constitution can be dated to the Kentucky and Virginia resolutions in the 
later 1790s,72 but in early 1791 the opponents of the Bank seem to have been moving towards 
such an understanding. The writer  “Mercator,” in an article which first appeared in Dunlap’s but 
which was reprinted in New York a week later, made the case for regarding a national bank as 
infringing the rights of the states. Viewing the proposal as unconstitutional, the author warned of 
the need to be: 
“...on our guard how we suffer the doctrine of political expediency or necessity, 
or plausible constructions of the constitution, to be pleaded against manifestly 
retained rights, in the separate states.”73 
Mixing an understanding of constitutional interpretation grounded in current practice with a 
strong distrust of the centralization of power deemed inherent in a national bank, “Mercator” 
cited the incorporation of a bank in Baltimore as evidence that “the states consider this power to 
remain with them,” and that the establishment of the national Bank would “indirectly clip the 
wings of all similar institutions on the continent.” Once again Hume is cited as an authority 
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relevant to this debate. However the article stopped short of expressing a fully developed notion 
of the Constitution as a compact of states, placing greater emphasis on the corruption federal 
action could bring.74 This should not be taken as evidence that the states’ compact understanding 
was beyond public consciousness. Elsewhere less nuanced critics of the Bank were more ready 
to advance an argument grounded in the states.  On the day before “Mercator’s” article, a 
correspondent to Dunlap’s American Daily Advertiser was willing to state more directly that 
“[w]hatever powers the state-governments did not grant, are expressly to be retained.”75 
On the other side of the argument, writers seemed to share in the broad consensus that 
constitutional interpretation was a process of identifying the meaning of the text as written, but 
disagreed as to the correct method by which this understanding was achieved. They also seemed 
to share the view that the intention of the individual actors at the Philadelphia Convention was of 
little assistance in this process.  
Writing in The Gazette of the United States, “A Constitutionalist” argued that the Bank’s 
incorporation ought to be understood in terms of the “necessary and proper” powers granted to 
Congress. Sharing (and given the provenance of the Gazette, quite probably expressing76) 
Hamilton’s understanding of the federal government as charged with energetically using its 
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powers, “A Constitutionalist” answers suggestions of the Bank’s unconstitutionality with the 
question: 
“ ...if it is a useful mean for carrying into effect any of the powers specially vested 
in the government of the United States, and does not infringe the rights of any 
individual state or person, on what principal can it be unconstitutional?”77 
Viewing it as within the “discretion of Congress to chuse the most fit and proper means” for 
carrying into effect the powers with which it has been charged, “A Constitutionalist” cites the 
Revolutionary War practice of operating a national bank as evidence that such an institution is 
both useful and necessary to an administration. But if the Revolutionary War offers a precedent, 
it seems not to have been necessary or useful to cite the revolutionaries themselves. Despite the 
overlap in those active during the Revolution and those at Philadelphia in 1787, the authority in 
the matter to which “A Constitutionalist” turns is “[t]he celebrated MR. BURKE” – in order to 
show the economic advantage of a national bank. Constitutionality is legitimized by the 
contribution of a given institution to the execution of the powers granted to the federal 
government. In this respect, as with the opponents of the Bank, the text of the Constitution 
matters, but at a degree removed. The federal government’s obligation to oversee the “fiscal 
operations of the Union” leads to the usefulness of establishing the Bank – and “all the citizens 
of the United States will share in the public benefits derived from it.” Despite the available 
argument that the actors at Philadelphia would have not sought to reduce the powers of the 
wartime Congress which previously made use of the power to incorporate bank, it is never made. 
 The reluctance to make use of an argument rooted in the intention of those involved in 
the deliberations at Philadelphia is manifest in an article penned by “Lucius” in the New-York 
Daily Gazette of the same month. Identifying Hamilton’s dual nature as the author of the 
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National Bank legislation and a key figure in the Philadelphia Convention, “Lucius” seeks to 
highlight this double role in order to strengthen the argument in favor of the constitutionality of 
the Bank. However, the manner in which this is attempted places emphasis on Hamilton’s 
knowledge of the document, not his knowledge of the intentions behind it: 
“It will not, I believe, be denied by any candid person, that the projector of this 
national bank, is as perfectly informed of what is, and what is not constitutional, 
as any man. His agency in-framing [sic] the constitution gives him an advantage, 
in that respect, which many do not posses; and as to the doctrine of constructions, 
his legal knowledge places him in the foremost rank.”78  
The coupling of Hamilton’s legal credentials with his presence at the Convention in 1787 
suggests that attendance at the debates it not in itself enough to ensure accuracy in identifying the 
constitutional. Instead, Hamilton’s authority with regard to the Constitution emerges from a close 
understanding of the text and the ability to construct its meaning in a sound and lawyerly 
fashion. In place of making an argument based on Hamilton’s knowledge of the framers’ intent 
“Lucius” opts to echo the argument of “A Constitutionalist” that the constitutionality of the Bank 
rests on its ability to enhance the execution of the powers entrusted to the federal government by 
the Constitution. Once the “utility and convenience of a bank to government, in the operations of 
finance” is considered, the reader is invited to “admit it is not only an expedient but a necessary 
provision” (original emphasis). Indeed, “Lucius” is prepared to go further and denounce 
opposition to the Bank as opposition to “the general sense of America” given the difficulties 
arising from a reliance upon specie across such a large nation. Rising the stakes of Bank 
opposition, “Lucius” offers the argument that federal government’s constitutional obligation to 
maintain the Union requires a national bank.  
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 A less stark article, but one which sought to situate the question over the Bank in a wider 
consideration of the Constitution, was published a week and a half after this in Philadelphia. 
Published in The Federal Gazette, “Remarks on the Constitutionality of the National Bank” 
offered a measured articulation of the constitutional theory emerging amongst supporters of the 
Bank. Opening with the claim that “[t]hough Congress possess none but delegated powers, they 
possess many that are not expressed, and all that are necessary to carry into effect the powers 
specifically given, in the best manner,” the article sought to show the need for measures about 
which “the constitution is silent.”79 After pointing to instances of powers exercised without 
explicit authority, the author encapsulates the position of those supporting the Bank – that 
without implied powers, the expressed powers have little meaning: 
“With the aid of a bank, the power of borrowing may be exercised for the great 
purposes for which it was given; without it, the power when most wanted, will be 
most useless, - the rights of it in the constitution will insult instead of relieving the 
public distress.” 
This position - that the Constitution’s grant of authority must imply powers not directly 
expressed in order that the document can be operable – foreshadowed arguments regarding the 
need to interpret the Constitution as a holistic document that would be advanced in 1800-01. 
Those later Federalist arguments would move beyond the notion of implied powers to stake out 
an argument for the inherent completeness of the constitutional document.  
Before turning attention to that later debate however, it is worth noting that as with those 
opposing the Bank, its supporters in 1790-91 did not turn to any notion of framer intent but 
instead looked to the text of the Constitution itself for guidance as to its meaning. Such an 
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approach would be put under pressure in the electoral impasse of 1800-01, and would result in a 
wider variety of approaches to constitutional interpretation, although the invocation of framer 
intent within constitution debate would not yet become a widespread device. Rather, the election 
would create the context in which innovative and radically differing approaches to constitutional 
interpretation would meet and challenge each other within the printed public sphere.   
 
The Electoral Crisis of 1800-01 
 Discussions over the constitutionality of political acts continued throughout the 1790s. In 
1800 such a debate emerged in response to the system of presidential elections. The Convention 
of 1787, not foreseeing the emergence of the party system, had crucially failed to provide in the 
document for the situation wrought by the election of 1800. When the electoral college ballots 
were opened in late 1800, the count gave the Republican candidates for president and vice-
president, Jefferson and Burr, an equal number of votes. With the Federalists seeking to exploit 
this situation in order to block Jefferson’s appointment, the administration of John Adams moved 
towards its date of expiration without a replacement having been constitutionally recognized. As 
the impasse grew more critical, newspapers provided a platform for discussion of how a 
constitutionally sound solution could be reached – and by extension how the Constitution itself 
ought to be interpreted with regard to this apparent blind spot. In contrast to the debates of 1790-
91, the interpretations proffered in 1800-01 moved beyond textual examination and embraced a 
wide variety of possibilities, including framer intent. However, the very extent of the techniques 
suggested belies any claim that a dominant mode of interpretation existed within the popular 
public debate of the newspapers. 
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 Bruce Ackerman has suggested that the disputed election of 1800 heralded in a decade of 
“institutional struggle between the men of 1800 and the men of 1787,”80 but within the debates 
engaged most immediately with the election – that is to say those seeking to break the impasse it 
caused - it is hard to draw a neat division into “constitutional conservatives” and “republicans.” 
The very absence of a constitutional solution to the problem within the document meant that no 
one could advocate a strict textual interpretation in this instance, and therefore all those 
contributing to the printed debate on the subject were required to shore up their adopted position 
with some degree of interpretative innovation. Constitutional debate could not take the form of a 
spectrum running between advocacy for implied powers and an adherence to the doctrine of 
expressed powers – everyone was engaged in locating a source for implied meaning. 
 In Washington the National Intelligencer, founded with the intention of emerging as 
quasi-official voice of a future Jefferson administration,81 sought to frame constitutional 
interpretation in terms of popular democracy, placing itself at odds with the textual and states’ 
compact approaches emergent in 1790-91. In reviewing the role of The National Intelligencer in 
the 1800 election, Mel Laracey has highlighted the manner in which essays were used in the 
course of laying out an understanding of constitutional interpretation grounded firmly in notions 
of popular will.82 Writing in two overlapping series and an extended letter, “Aristides,” “An 
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American,” and “a respectable citizen” cumulatively offered an understanding of constitutional 
interpretation that appeared radically democratic when compared to the debates regarding the 
chartering of the first Bank.  
In late December 1800 a contributor to the National Intelligencer using the pseudonym 
“Aristides,” began a series of essays “On the Election of President” which sought to argue that 
the constitutional impasse must be broken by recognition that popular will was the origin of 
constitutional and governmental authority. To ignore the popular mandate given to Jefferson in 
the election would be to call forth a broader constitutional crisis. In the third, and most 
constitutionally minded, essay, “Aristides” seeks to examine the consequences arising from the 
House of Representatives failing to acknowledge the people’s choice of Jefferson as legitimate 
president.83 The essay’s main aim is to depict the terrible consequences of the House of 
Representatives failing to grant Jefferson the presidency, but within the discussion an 
understanding of the Constitution emerges which is at odds with the “states’ compact” doctrine. 
“Aristides” suggests two courses would arise from a continuation of the impasse in the House – 
the dissolution of the general government or its continuation in a tyrannical form.  As such: 
“It becomes the people of the United States to contemplate with cool collected 
wisdom these alternatives; to estimate the effects of each on the tranquility [sic] 
and prosperity of the empire; and to appreciate the actions of those public agents 
who would make one or other the necessary result of their measures.”   
Crucially in this description is the view that it is the people themselves who have the authority to 
decide the fate of the government and that of those who bring it to the brink. Apparently more 
than a rhetorical device, this possibility is expounded elsewhere in more overtly constitutional 
terms. Reviewing the situation itself, “Aristides” argues that Congress has no authority to fill in 
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constitutional gaps as its powers are themselves derived from the popular and express grant of 
power in the Constitution: 
“As the constitution has made no provision for the temporary discharge of 
executive duties in the case of no election; not having, apparently, contemplated 
such a contingency; and as Congress therefore possess no power, in such an 
event, derived from the constitution, it follows that after the third day of March 
there would be no executive magistrate.” 
In such a scenario the powers of the general government would not devolve to the states, as 
might be expected of the states’ compact theory, but would return to the people themselves, for 
“[t]he Federal Constitution was the act of the people of the United States; not of the states 
themselves.” 
 Writing in the same newspaper, “An American” drew on many of the themes developed 
by “Aristides” to paint a similar fearful picture of the consequences of the House rejecting 
Jefferson’s claim to the presidency. Regarding the Constitution as to some degree a reform of the 
Articles of Confederation, “An American” seemed more reluctant to reject a states’ compact 
understanding of the Constitution and saw the dissolution of the general government as returning 
power to the states.   However, in arguing that such a failure would mean a reversion back to the 
Articles of Confederation, “An American” was nonetheless quick to point out that this would 
result in all the flaws that the Constitution had sought to alleviate and was not a desirable step.84 
If less critical of the states’ compact theory, “An American” was nevertheless similarly engaged 
in attempting to reconcile the lack of textual constitutional guidance as to how to break the 
electoral impasse with Jefferson’s claim to a clear popular mandate. Recognizing that the 
situation was “entirely new,” “An American” saw in the disputed election the problem of how an 
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entrenched constitution might be revised retroactively in order that the popular will could 
prevail, without undermining its claim to be a higher law.85 Identifying the sophisticated issue at 
stake, the writer attempted to address it in mid-January with the claim that: 
“[t]he spirit of the constitution requires the will of the people to be executed.” 
This innovation, not fully elucidated at this point, that the Constitution possessed a “spirit” that 
both informed and extended the meaning of the textual document, offered a manner in which the 
will of the people might be invoked without directly conflicting with the entrenched 
Constitution. It also signaled a departure from constitutional debate as deliberation over the 
meaning of the text itself, and a movement towards comprehending the Constitution as an 
embodiment of the popular will. 
 Just under two weeks later, on the 23rd January 1801, “An American” returned to the 
question of the election in the same newspaper in a third article which avoided use of the phrase 
“spirit of the constitution,” but which seemed to add substance to the concept. In a turn which 
would have horrified the opposition writers of the early 1790s, “An American” advanced the 
argument that the Constitution could be understood to express something quite clearly despite 
there being no text within the document to that effect. By observing the practice of the 
Constitution, one would be able to derive a contemporary understanding of the document: 
“It is plain that Congress, in that important expression of the constitution, the 
contemporary expression of the sense of that instrument, have not acted upon the 
idea of a vacancy at the end of the presidential terms;”86 
Warming to this possibility, he continued: 
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“The meaning of the constitution is perfectly clear; it is as if it should have said, 
and in case a person, being President, shall die, be removed, resign, or become 
incapable, an officer, to be named by law, shall act as President.” (emphasis in 
bold added). 
By observing the expectations and actions of individuals during their interactions with the 
Constitution and “the contemporary expression of the sense of that instrument,” a form of 
constitutional interpretation was possible. Moreover, such an approach to interpretation offered 
the possibility that contemporary popular feelings played a role in constitutional debates, a 
possibility developed further by another writer in the same paper. 
 “A respectable citizen” contributed a letter to “a Member of Congress” in 21st January 
edition of The National Intelligencer which argued that with regard to the electoral crisis the 
Constitution was silent, but not necessarily deficient. Writing in between the two interventions of 
“An American,” “a respectable citizen” brought the problem at hand into sharper focus and 
offered a solution that involved a more explicit call for popular involvement.87  Identifying the 
democratic paradox that “An American” had grappled with, the writer confidently detailed the 
nature of the problem88 before asserting, “I am inclined to think that this is not a defect capable 
of remedy.”89 Without the possibility of a legally derived resolution “a respectable citizen” 
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believed that “in this instance, as in many others, it was necessary to confide in the force of 
public opinion, for the execution of the constitution.”  Drawing a parallel with the potential for 
states to derail the operation of the general government by failing to appoint senators, “a 
respectable citizen” advances his argument, suggesting that the Constitution omits resolution for 
such instances because it rightly falls to the people to decide the constitutionality of such actions: 
“There is no constitutional provision for this dilemma either; and wherefore? – 
because it is not capable of such a provision. It would be a case proper for the 
tribunal of public opinion, which would either decide that the progress of the 
government ought to be arrested, or that these legislatures had perpetrated the 
most consuinmate [sic] act of treason against the happiness of society.”90 
“No body thought of a remedy for the case quoted, because no body conceived 
that any other than the force of public opinion was necessary.”  
But the writer goes further than allowing that the people are the correct authority to fill in the 
gaps in the constitutional document – the operation of Constitution itself is to be assessed against 
the ability of the people to express themselves in government. Moving close to “An American’s” 
notion of the spirit of the Constitution, the writer suggests that constitutionality is that which 
accords with the expression of popular will.  
  “A respectable citizen” sees the Constitution as operating in tandem with the will of the 
people in a manner that enables the latter to function as the basis of government. Public opinion 
has selected Jefferson as president, and as a consequence the Constitution can be judged as 
operational if it allows him to ascend to office. The Constitution enables government grounded 
on public opinion and should not be understood as restrictive of that process – when public 
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opinion is no longer the basis of government an unconstitutional act has taken place. The 
question at hand therefore is not over the constitutional innovation that is required to enable the 
election of a president to take place, but the constitutional innovation that is blocking Jefferson 
from office. The Federalists, by resisting Jefferson’ selection, are “engaged in a stratagem to 
break the constitution,” an attempt “to substitute the will of faction for the will of the people, so 
that hereafter changes of men in office will be epochs of revolution.” In the final sentence of the 
article he offers a motto by which “all good men” ought to adhere, but which would seem to 
Federalist eyes to invert the very purpose of a constitution; “The public will, and the supremacy 
of the constitution over government.” Here public will and the supremacy of the constitution are 
weighted equally, but drawn distinctly and apparently both placed in a position over government. 
However the implicit claim must be that the supremacy of the constitution exists when the public 
will governs – that the constitution functions when the will of the people is heard and 
authoritative. 
 Between these three correspondents to the National Intelligencer the possibility for a 
mode of constitutional interpretation that was radically (and to the Federalists, dangerously) 
democratic was emerging. Accepting that the Constitution did not provide guidance for every 
eventuality, they saw such gaps as instances in which public opinion ought to lead the way, 
enhancing its claim to be an expression of the people’s will. Moreover, they were moving 
towards recognition of problems inherent to a society seeking to be governed by both a 
constitution and popular will – even if they lacked the conceptual insight to deal with these 
problems in a philosophically complex manner. What is most significant to the discussion at 
hand however is that the Constitution was at no point regarded as the untouchable product of the 
Philadelphia Convention. Rather it was a basis for a democratic society that would be shaped and 
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reshaped by the democratic will of the people and ultimately subject to that will.91 The intention 
of the founders was not therefore invoked by these writers at any point, despite the presence of 
Madison at the head of their party. 
 If the quasi-official Republican writers made little use of intention as a guide to 
constitutional interpretation, those who opposed them were more inclined to do so. In the 
Federalist newspapers of the nascent capital at Washington, legally-minded writers made the 
notion of intent central to their constitutional arguments against the appointment of Jefferson as 
president. However, their understanding of the conception of intention did not immediately 
correspond with that of those engaged in the Constitution’s initial design. For the most part 
invoking an understanding of intent that drew on contemporary legal practice, they fashioned a 
position that countered the Republican framing of the constitutional debate as a matter of 
democratic will. Utilizing the legal norms of interpretation of the time, they put forward an 
argument which worked to limit both the democratic potential of the Constitution and popular 
ownership of it, signaling perhaps the counter-revolutionary potential of a re-conceptualization 
of the relationship between the Constitution and the People’s claim to it. While this move is 
significant of itself, this group of articles is also marked by the explicit invocation of framer 
intent within one essay. While at this point the exception rather than the norm, when coupled 
with the other articles it is possible to make out strands of what would become the dominant 
mode of constitutional discourse within newspapers in a later period.  
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The turn of the year in 1801 saw the publication of an extended essay, signed with the 
pseudonym “Horatius,” in the Washington Federalist and the Alexandria Advertiser. This article 
argued that in the event of continued deadlock an existing officer of the Executive should be 
appointed president. Bruce Ackerman has presented much circumstantial evidence to support the 
view that the author may well have been John Marshall, presenting a clear personal interest in 
such an argument while he remained arguably the most senior executive officer after the 
president and vice-president.92 Whether or not the articles, entitled “The Presidential Knot,” were 
clouded by a conflict of interest, their approach to constitutional interpretation provides a marked 
example of the common law conception of attempting to identify the intent of a document in its 
entirety. Powell has noted that American lawyers well into the Nineteenth century looked 
primarily to common law tradition and the Protestant notion of “sola Scriptura” (scripture alone) 
in order to guide their approach to interpretation.93 With regard to constitutional interpretation, 
the latter yielded the textual conflicts exemplified in the newspapers debates surround the First 
Bank of the United States. The former common law tradition, drawing upon Blackstone, urged 
that the document be interpreted against its intent – but the intention as defined by the 
“reasonable and legal meaning” of the words of the document, not the original intent of the 
parties to the document.94 The “Horatius” articles draw upon such a legal tradition and present 
the argument that constitutional interpretation is most sound when it seeks to understand 
individual clauses as parts of the document as a whole. 
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 Identifying the clauses that in his opinion were most relevant to the problem at hand, 
“Horatius” sought to present an interpretation that most effectively unified the Constitution in a 
single holistic meaning. Pointing to the clause in the first section of the second article regarding 
the removal of the President from office95 that had became the textual locus of the constitutional 
debate over Jefferson’s election, “Horatius” argued that interpretation must be in accordance 
with the document as a whole. The Constitution’s self preservation must, “Horatius” reasoned, 
be regarded as its primary end. Therefore any clause within the document is most accurately 
interpreted in the manner which best ensures that preservation, as the document’s intent. Making 
this approach to interpretation explicit, he states that: 
“In the interpretation of the words of a statute and more strongly in the 
interpretation of a written constitution or form of government, that interpretation 
is never to be made which will frustrate the end of the statute or constitution. If 
therefore the words of the constitution be susceptible of two constructions, one 
which... will put an end to all its operations, and the other which will continue its 
existence, the latter must undoubtedly be preferred...”96 
Moreover, the Constitution must itself provide for the possibility that a president would not be 
selected through the usual election mechanisms – to fail to do so would render it unable to 
preserve itself: 
“For such a state of things the constitution ought not to be understood to be 
unprovided, or it will be understood to be without the means of self preservation.” 
On this basis “Horatius” concluded that Congress was obliged to appoint an executive officer to 
the presidential chair in the event of a continued deadlock. However, the actual conclusion is not 
as significant as the mode of argumentation used. Framing the debate as one of legal 
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interpretation over a necessarily comprehensive document did much to shore up the Federalist 
position.97  
Establishing that the Constitution must contain within it a solution to the problem at hand 
provided the Federalist correspondents with a strong argumentative position. In the first instance 
it countered the Republican argument that an oversight in the Constitution required a return to 
the people as the legitimate authority. Elevating the Constitution to the status of a document 
without need of revision enabled the Federalists to regard the text as wholly distinct from the 
people as authors. Secondly, it limited the extent of the debate to one of legal interpretation – and 
so by extension to those with legal training. As a consequence, Federalists disputed the accurate 
interpretation of the Constitution, but never challenged its ability to provide a solution directly 
derived from it. Indeed, it seems not unlikely that “Horatius” was expanding on the argument put 
forward by “Civilis” on 22nd December in the Alexandria paper that; 
“Th[e] interpretation of the text in the Constitution that has been quoted, is to be 
maintained not only for the reasons which have been given, but because if the 
words be at all doubtful, that construction shall be given which is indispensably 
necessary to preserve the existence of the government.”98 
Even those wary of the notion that the presidency should be handed to a figure who did not 
participate in the election, such as “Constantius” who would challenge “Horatius” in the 
Alexandria Advertiser three days after the initial publication of “The Presidential Knot,” did not 
challenge the idea that the Constitution itself provided for the solution to the electoral 
deadlock.99 
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97 If the identity of Horatius was indeed Marshall, it also offers an early indication of his thinking with 
regard to the Constitution’s “perfection” that would be evident in the later Supreme Court Cases 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
98 “Who will be the next President is uncertain,” Alexandria Advertiser, December 22nd 1800. 
99 "For the Alexandria Advertiser," Alexandria Advertiser, January 6th 1801. 
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 In amongst the Federalist exchanges over the self contained meaning of the Constitution 
however, was one article that pushed for a broader understanding of constitutional intent. The 
assumption that the Constitution could address the impasse without the invocation of popular 
will was shared by “Eumenes” who wrote in the Washington Federalist on 4th February. 
Reiterating the Federalist position that the Constitution could provide for the overcoming of the 
electoral deadlock and so avoid reference to the popular will (“Is then such a case totally 
unprovided for by the Constitution?... I think not”100), “Eumenes” nevertheless reached beyond 
the internal textual examination adopted by his Federalist colleagues and sought to substantiate 
his position with reference to the intentions of the framers and ratifiers. Turning to the meaning 
of Art I, Sec. 2, “Eumenes” disputed the notion that presidential “inability” could be understood 
to extend to the case at hand, in order to argue that in the event of continued deadlock John 
Adams ought to remain president for a further four years.  Key to his argument was establishing 
that “inability” did not indeed extend to the current case. In order to do so he argued that it was 
never the intention of those involved in erecting the Constitution that it should: 
“On the fullest consideration I have been able to give the subject, I am convinced 
that neither the general convention, who framed, nor the state conventions, who 
ratified the constitution, ever contemplated the consequence of the expiration of 
the time, for which the President was elected under the term inability to discharge 
the powers and duties of that office.” 
Elsewhere he went further than arguing that the intention of the framers (or in this case their lack 
of contemplation) might allow for a fuller understanding of the Constitution text. In a reversal 
which suggests a greater belief in unity between framer intent and Constitution meaning than can 
be seen elsewhere, “Eumenes” suggests that the Constitution itself is evidence of the framers’ 
intent – that what is literally written is evidence of what was intended: 
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100 "For the Washington Federalist," Washington Federalist, February 2nd1801. 
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“...there is a clause in the Constitution, which to my mind, most satisfactorily 
proves what was the meaning and intention of those who framed that instrument, 
and establishes its true construction” (emphasis in original). 
“Eumenes” here moves to make the “intention” of the framers the “true construction,” with the 
Constitution operating as textual evidence by which that might be derived. To be sure, none of 
his contemporaries, especially the Federalist authors, would have argued that there is no 
connection between the text and the intention of the parties to it – each in their own manner is 
engaged in showing that the Constitution means and was meant to mean something – but 
“Eumenes” seems here to suggest that the Constitution exists as, and is of value as, a record of 
the intention of particular actors. Consequently, he places value on a reading of the Constitution 
that seeks to identify this particular intention, rather than the Constitution’s spirit or the legal 
meaning of the text. The Constitution then ought to be interrogated for the evidence it provides 
of this intent: 
“In the constitution its framers took into consideration the case of the efflux of the 
time for which the President should be chosen, and for that case made particular 
and specific provisions, in dependent [sic] of the clause in question; a convincing 
proof that this case was not meant to be embraced by that clause.” 
Here the structuring of the Constitution is used to derive the intended meaning of a particular 
clause of the document. Utilizing the entirety of a document to identify the meaning of a 
particular clause would not have been unfamiliar to the legalistic writers at the time, and indeed 
much of the “Horatius”-“Constantius” exchange focuses on the manner in which such an action 
is carried out. However, to directly link this action to a process of discovering what the parties to 
the document had originally intended, and to make that intention the end of such a process, 
places “Eumenes” at odds with his contemporary newspaper commentators. Just ten years later 
the position would be very much reversed. 
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The Rechartering of the National Bank    
 Twenty years after the initial founding of the National Bank of United States, the 
expiration of the Bank’s charter led to the necessity of Congress choosing to renew the charter or 
allowing it to lapse. The opportunity for opponents of the Bank to reopen the constitutional 
question settled in favor of the Bank in 1791 was quickly seized upon, and the ensuing 
newspaper debate saw both sides attempt to prove the constitutionality of their position. The 
debate itself was marked by the dominance of a constitutional interpretation that rested firmly on 
ideas of framer intent and textuality. Two prominent but overlapping schools of interpretation 
opposed to the Bank were evident, states’ compact and strict constructionist, but both made 
framer intent central to the justification of their position. On the other side of the debate, those 
who argued for the renewal of the Bank’s charter likewise made reference to the Founding 
generation, arguing that the initial charter provided proof that such an institution was the 
intention of that esteemed generation. Neither side moved towards what would be today 
recognized as framer intent per se, but both saw value in the idea that an intention of strict 
construction existed. 
 By late 1810 correspondents within Republican papers had already begun to formulate 
arguments against the constitutionality of renewing the Bank’s charter. Drawing on the 
arguments put forth twenty years earlier, an article printed in the Baltimore American and the 
Republican Star of Easton, MD, during December returned to the position that federal power 
extended only to those express powers granted by the Constitution.  Arguing that “[t]he doctrine 
of precedents here does not apply,” the article stated that: 
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“Whoever will trouble themselves to examine the constitution of the U. S. will 
find that the congress of the U. S. derive all their powers from that instrument 
alone by expression, and not by implication.”101 (Original emphasis)  
Elsewhere, an article signed “Pleb” in the Ostego Herald claimed to borrow directly from the 
1790-91 debates in linking a conception of expressed powers to states’ rights: 
“It was contended, that the constitution delegated to congress no power to 
incorporate banks; that all legislative power not delegated to congress by the 
constitution, is reserved to the states.”102 
The return to the position that strict construction prohibited the establishment of a bank made 
logical sense given the availability of such arguments from the debates of 1790-91. However 
their deployment in this second round of discussion was characterized, and distinguished from 
the earlier 1790-91 arguments, by the wide use of framer intention as a justification for this 
position.  
A piece authored by “Harmodius” and addressed to the Virginia Legislature appeared in 
the Enquirer in mid-December made much use of Madison’s 1790-91 opposition to the Bank as 
the basis for the author’s own opposition, resurrecting Madison’s argument that “a power to 
grant charters of INCORPORATION, had within his [Madison’s] recollection been proposed in 
the general convention and REJECTED.”103 But in his consideration of the restriction to the 
express powers granted by the Constitution “Harmodius” moved beyond the standard arguments 
of 1790-91 and considered the reasoning behind strict construction in terms explicitly of intent. 
For “Harmodius” a limited notion of the general welfare clause was constitutional as a 
consequence of the manner in which those at the Philadelphia Convention had come to make use 
of that wording: 
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101 "A National Bank," Republican Star or Eastern Shore General Advertiser, December 4th 1810. 
102 “National Bank,” Ostego Herald, December 8th 1810. 
103 “To The Virginia Legislature,” The Enquirer, December 15th 1810.  
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“Another reason why this [broad] construction should not prevail, is that the term 
“common defence and general welfare,” were evidently taken by the framers of 
the constitution from the 8th article of confederation, and never received the 
interpretation attempted now to be given to them.”  
This approach to constitutional interpretation has parallels with “Eumenes” in 1801 insofar as the 
document is a record by which to interrogate the minds of those composing it in 1787, but also 
indicates a willingness to go beyond the document itself in order to achieve this. Here we see the 
claim that the correct construction of the Constitution is the one which most closely aligns with 
the intention of that Convention – their meanings and understandings of the language deployed is 
superior to the internally consistent legalistic usage within the text or any spirit or popular will 
supposed to surround it. In this argument strict construction is championed not because it ensures 
that the expressed will within the Constitution is honored, but because that is what the framers 
envisaged in choosing the words that they did. 
 The tying of framer intent to strict construction is also evident in two other significant 
contributions to the printed debate over the Bank. The first, entitled “Mr. Bland’s Protest Against 
a National Bank,” appeared in the Enquirer in late November and was reprinted in the Pittsfield 
Sun, a Massachusetts paper, on the 12th December.104 Taking the familiar refrain that the powers 
of Congress were of a particular nature and did not extend to the incorporation of a national 
bank, Bland rejected the argument that congressional powers could be “implied” by the 
Constitution. The doctrine of implication was a dangerous one which “[l]ike an insidious serpent, 
it... wreathed and coiled itself about other governments, and stung them in the very vitals.” 
Moreover, the construction of the Constitution as a grant of particular powers was the 
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104 Addressed to “the Senators and Representatives of the State of Maryland” in Congress, the subtitle 
stated that it had been submitted to the Legislature of Maryland. “Mr. Bland's Protest, Against A National 
Bank,” The Enquirer,  November 20th 1810; “To the Senators and Representatives of the State of 
Maryland in the Congress of the United States,” The Pittsfield Sun; or, Republican Monitor, December 
12th 1810. 
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understanding of the Constitution’s “best friends at the time of its adoption” who worked to 
ensure that it would continue to be understood that way – “& lest other and improper 
constructions should be given to it, the tenth article of the amendments... was finally adopted...” 
Here framer intent is once more deployed in order to show the primacy of a strict construction 
approach to constitutional interpretation, and the Constitution itself is marshaled as evidence as 
to the opinions of the framers on this issue. The presence of the 10th Amendment is a justification 
for holding the belief that strict construction was intended by the framers. For good measure, 
Bland also quotes Madison’s 1791 opposition in hagiographical terms at the final point of 
positive argument, apparently believing that the opinion of the such a figure settles any lingering 
doubts as to the intent of the framers.105  
 The argument that framer intention constricted constitutional interpretation to the mode 
of strict construction was picked up and expanded upon in a series of essays printed in the New 
York Public Advertiser. Writing under the pseudonym “Columbus” a correspondent to the paper 
prepared a string of articles that stretched throughout December 1810 and January 1811 and 
argued against a renewal of the Bank’s charter. Throughout the essays “Columbus” makes 
reference to the framers and their intent elaborating a conception of the Constitution as the 
vehicle by which intentions regarding interpretation and substantive power were to be 
transmitted. In the earlier essays the author expounds the belief that the power to incorporate a 
bank is not within the constitutional scope of Congress.  Relying on the argument that a strict 
construction of the powers granted leaves no room for the power of incorporation, “Columbus” 
suggests that it was thus the intention of the framers that no such power should be enjoyed by 
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105 “This Assembly feels itself fortified in the interpretation which has given [sic] to the Constitution of 
the United States, when it recollects, that it has been solemnly declared by one of the most distinguished 
framers of that instrument, who now fills the highest station in the Union, “that a power to grant charter of 
incorporation had been proposed in the General Convention and REJECTED”.” 
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Congress. However, as this argument develops over the course of the essays it becomes the more 
expansive claim that strict construction itself is the intent of the framers.  
In the early essays, the author argues that framer intent points towards an interpretation of 
the Constitution that constrains congressional renewal of the Bank’s charter. Attempting to link 
opposition to the Bank with the original intention that Congress should not have that power, he 
states: 
“The framers of our inestimable constitution, in the amplification of the powers of 
that body, have not even intimated that they [Congress] might establish such 
institution [sic].”106  
Arguing that had the Convention desired that Congress have the power of incorporation “they 
would have especially noted their intention in some part of the constitution,” “Columbus” 
surmises that such a power can only be assumed under a doctrine of implied powers. To utilize 
such a doctrine would be to “baffle the best designs of the framers of the constitution...” and 
undermine liberty itself. Asserting congressional power in this area is to deny the significance of 
the fact that “in all... enumerated powers there is not an iota concerning the utility or necessity of 
a national Bank.” Simply put, “Columbus” argues that the lack of an explicit constitutional 
mandate in this area makes it impossible that those present in 1787 intended for Congress to have 
such a power. 
 However, in returning to the subject of the Bank’s charter in January 1811 “Columbus” 
moves towards the elaboration of a wider reaching understanding of original intent. In two 
consecutive essays, printed on the 15th and 16th of January, “Columbus” restates his conviction 
that the Constitution does not grant Congress the authority to incorporate a bank. These articles 
move beyond merely showing that the power of incorporation was not considered however. 
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106 “For the Public Advertiser,” Public Advertiser, December 24th 1810. 
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Instead, the correspondent articulates a theory of the Constitution in which the intent of the 
framers operates to bind future actors to interpreting the document in terms of strict construction 
alone. In the first of these articles “Columbus” seeks to contextualize the framers’ decisions 
within a social environment hostile to liberty. As such they worked to ensure that the 
Constitution left no space for the abuse of individual rights by accurately and concisely 
enumerating the powers that the national government would possess: 
“The framers of our constitution had to contend with men not altogether the most 
friendly to the rights of the people; they however so far obtained their object as to 
define, with considerable accuracy the powers of both houses of congress...”107   
As such the Constitution is understood as a comprehensive and detailed textual record of the 
powers that each part of the national government was intended to possess. Establishing this 
point, “Columbus” takes the step of arguing that, as the Constitution was intended to be and is 
such a record, to engage in any form of interpretation aside from that of strict construction is to 
thwart the protections erected by the framers. That is to say that the very mode of interpretation 
is itself part of the process of political self-binding inherent in constitution making. Utilizing 
constitutional interpretations that enable the exercise of implied powers is to act against the 
intent of the framers:   
“The framers of that striking monument of human wisdom and excellence, never 
entertained such an idea [broad construction]; they had long and well 
contemplated the defects of other governments and constitutions – and they were 
determined when they had finished their arderous [sic] labours, not to present 
their countrymen with a flimsy and rotton [sic] instrument.”  
This theme was to be picked up once more in the following day’s newspaper and 
elaborated further. Beginning with the same notion that the Convention intended strict 
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107 “For the Public Advertiser,” Public Advertiser, January 15th 1811. 
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construction in order that the Constitution might fulfill the role it was expected to play,108 
“Columbus” sought to argue that the Constitution itself provided evidence that this was the 
intention. Starting from the assumption that the framers entered into the task of drawing up a 
constitution with an approach marked by caution and deliberateness, the author argues that if 
they had intended for Congress to hold implied powers the framers would have given Congress 
the ability to engage in constitutional interpretation in order to identify those powers. The lack of 
such ability ought to be taken as firm evidence that no such activity was countenanced: 
“Governments and constitutions long since crumbled into dust, taught them a 
salutary lesson... the members of the convention wisely refrained from grantin 
[sic] congress the right of construction, either expressly, or by implication.”109 
Moreover, the framers included a mechanism by which further powers might be granted to 
Congress in the event that the expressed powers proved to be too constraining: 
“if congress are too limited in their powers for the general good... let them obtain 
those powers from an amendment to the constitution.”  
The combination of a mechanism for obtaining further powers and a restriction on engagement in 
constitutional interpretation is understood by “Columbus” as compelling evidence that it was not 
the intention of the framers that anything other that strict construction be constitutional. As with 
the articles produced by Bland and “Harmodius,” framer intention is used to justify both the 
position that a national bank is unconstitutional and, increasingly, strict construction of the 
Constitution itself. 
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108 “The renowed [sic] sages who framed our constitution understood the object for which they were 
called in convention: they never meant to send a constitution to the view of the world, which would 
render our liberties uncertain, and set them afloat to excite the unwarrantable ambition of demagogues 
and usurpers. No; they knew human nature too well, not to perceive the absolute necessity of making the 
provisions of that constitution as clear, and defined as carefully possible:” “For the Public Advertiser,” 
Public Advertiser, January 16th 1811. 
109  “For the Public Advertiser,” Public Advertiser, January 16th 1811. 
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 However, within the arguments put forward by those authors opposed to the Bank was 
also a strand of constitutional interpretation that regarded the Constitution as a union of states. 
While the framers’ intent was invoked to support a strict construction of the text, it was 
nevertheless the case that these discussions contain some sympathy with the idea that the states, 
as compacting parties to the Union, had some prior claim to the right of regulating banking 
institutions. Comprehensively laid out in “The Protest and Resolutions laid before the house of 
Representatives of Pennsylvania by Colonel Holgate,” datelined as Philadelphia December 17th 
1810 but reprinted in The Enquirer on the 29th December, this argument suggested that it was 
within the power of the states to solve constitutional problems.110 The document characterized 
the Constitution as “to all intents and purposes a treaty between sovereign powers,” and thus: 
“The interpretation of that instrument was, as in all other cases of compact, 
between parties having no common umpire, each party having equal right to 
determine for itself, not only as to infractions of the compact, but as to the kind of 
redress to which it would resort...” 
From this, Colonel Holgate deduced that “it rests with the states to apply constitutional 
remedies.” 
Such an argument was touched upon in the articles produced by the strict 
constructionists,111 and was hinted at when Vice-president Clinton defended his vote against the 
first section of the legislation renewing the Bank’s charter on the basis that such a power was “a 
high attribute of sovereignty.”112 As this blend of state compact theory and strict construction 
suggests, it would be a mistake to characterize them as competing camps of thought within this 
debate. Often put forth in the same or subsequent sentences within an article, those opposed to 
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110  “Copy of the PROTEST an RESOLUTIONS laid before the house of Representatives of Pennsylvania 
by Colonel Holgate,” The Enquirer,  December 29th 1810. 
111 For example “Columbus” claimed that rechartering the Bank would be to “prostrate the sovereignty of 
the individual states in the dust.” “For the Public Advertiser,” Public Advertiser, December 24th 1810. 
112 “Washington City,” The National Intelligencer and Washington Advertiser, February 23rd 1811. 
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the Bank seemed to regard states’ rights as an aspect of the argument for a strict construction of 
the Constitution, justified by the intention of the framers that this be the case. This particular 
blend of arguments was particularly pronounced in the New Hampshire Patriot of 4th December 
1810. Within an article entitled “Bank of the United States” that day’s newspaper put forth that: 
“The duties of the general government are explicit, and specified in the 
constitution: that body has no right to do more or less than is laid down in this 
grand directory and guide... where it assumes powers of legislation not expressly 
warranted in that instrument it encroaches on the rights of individual States – it 
usurps a power, against which the enlightened framers of the constitution were 
particular careful to guard, and for which many of the States, as individuals, were 
always jealous.”113 (Original emphasis).  
The characterization of the States as the individual parties to the Union, while the tying of a strict 
constructionist reading of the Constitution to the framers’ intentions seems to place this article 
between the two interpretations of the Constitution discussed above. In truth however, this article 
is merely a particularly strong example of how the arguments came to be intertwined. 
“Columbus” would express concern for the States’ sovereignty, while Holgate actively enlisted 
framer intent and strict construction in support of his argument. Stating that “it is notorious that 
such a right [of Congress to incorporate] was not intended to be given by the Convention who 
framed it,” Holgate reiterated the common argument that such a right had been resounding 
rejected by the Convention: 
“...it having been shown in the most authoritative manner that it not only never 
was intended to be given, but that the proposition to give it was negatived [sic] in 
the convention.”114 (Original emphasis). 
Strikingly, even as figures such as Holgate sought to argue for the Constitution as a compact of 
states, they made use of arguments that drew upon ideas of framer intent. Compared to the 
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113 “Bank of the United States,” New-Hampshire Patriot, December 4th 1810. 
114 “Copy of the PROTEST an RESOLUTIONS laid before the house of Representatives of Pennsylvania 
by Colonel Holgate,” The Enquirer,  December 29th 1810. 
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newspaper contributors of 1790-91 and 1800-01, the almost universal reliance on some form of 
framer intent in 1810-11 is remarkable – and nor was it constrained to those opposed to the re-
chartering of the Bank. 
 Those in favor of renewing the Bank’s charter had perhaps the stronger position in 
arguing for the constitutionality of such a position, given the precedent of the initial charter of 
1791. As with the opponents of the Bank, they reached back to the constitutional arguments of 
1790-91 as the basis of their case, and as with their opponents attempted to graft onto these 
arguments some notion of framer intent. As was the case in 1790-91 the central argument of the 
Bank’s supporters was that the implied powers of Congress under the Constitution extended to 
the ability to incorporate a Bank. To these writers, without this power, in the words Edward St 
Loe Livermore, Congress “might as well go home, and wait for the people to make a new 
Constitution.”115 Moreover, these correspondents argued, these powers had been in use for 
twenty years suggesting that their constitutionality had been well established. In a piece 
published in the Connecticut Mirror and reprinted in Philadelphia’s Poulson’s American Daily 
Advertiser in February, a supporter of the bank suggested that: 
“...it would seem to follow, that the constitutionality of the Bank has been settled 
by the united voice of Congress, under various administrations, and, of course, by 
the various Presidents – by the legislatures of many, perhaps all the States, by the 
federal and state courts, and implicitly by the people, who have partaken in the 
operations and profits of the Bank for twenty years, without any effort to remove 
it on this ground.”116  
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115 “To the Hon. Joseph Story, esq. Speaker of the house of Representatives of the Commonwealth of 
Massachsetts,” The Berkshire Reporter, March 16th 1811.  
116 “United States Bank,” Poulson's American Daily Advertiser, February 20th 1811. 
!
!
!
!
62!
Such an argument may have appeared compelling,117 but the supporters of the Bank sought to 
place a particular emphasis on the support for the Bank that existed not over its twenty years of 
operation, but at the time of its inception. Key to their argument for the constitutionality of 
renewal was the claim that those who best understood the Constitution – those who took part in 
its creation – had understood the text to enable the incorporation of such an institution.  
 For the supporters of the Bank, the creation of it by the first congress, whose members 
intersected with those of the Philadelphia Convention, provided strong proof as to its 
constitutionality. Edward St. Loe Livermore argued that the first congress had regarded 
objections to the constitutionality of the Bank as “mere playful argument, not substantially 
founded” as was evidenced by their frequent engagement with the Bank in the form of legislative 
and fiscal activity.  For St. Loe Livermore, “[t]hese facts seem to afford the highest proof that 
neither the president or Congress had any belief in the pretended objection of 
unconstitutionality.”118 Similarly, the article in Poulson’s sought to point out that those who 
created the Bank were most fully informed of the meaning of the Constitution. Tracking the 
passage of the Bank legislation, the author argued that the Senate that approved it had comprised 
of; 
“members and distinguished members, of the Convention that framed the 
constitution, and of course must have known... what powers the instrument was 
intended to convey...”119  
none of whom raised the point of constitutionality. True, this point was at issue in the House 
debate, but a final vote, “almost two to one in its favour,” with a majority composed of such 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
117 Although as the Bank’s charter was not initially renewed, they were right to assume more support for 
their position was needed.    
118 “To the Hon. Joseph Story, esq. Speaker of the house of Representatives of the Commonwealth of 
Massachsetts,” The Berkshire Reporter, March 16th 1811.  
119 “United States Bank,” Poulson's American Daily Advertiser, February 20th 1811. 
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figures as Roger Sherman, Fisher Ames, and the anti-federalist Elbridge Gerry suggested that the 
expected bounds of the Constitution had not been breached. The presidential approval of 
Washington, whose “understanding always led him to the most correct conclusions” and who 
would never “have given his sanction to a measure which violated the Constitution”, provided 
assurance that the opposition to the Bank was purely a symptom of the “ambition of Mr. 
Jefferson and Mr. Madison.” Washington’s support of the Bank would also be seen as totemic by 
a writer in New York’s Independent American. The belief that the hallowed commander-in-chief 
could be mistaken on this point was dismissed with not a little contempt; 
“...for none can believe, but what George Washington, at the time the Bank was 
established, as well understood the principles of the Constitution, and was as 
tender of its preservation, as the superannuated George Clinton, when he voted for 
its destruction.”120 
Finally, extending the conception of the framers to its widest scope, the contributor Poulson’s 
argued, that had all these actors been misguided or corrupted, the people themselves:  
“having also a perfect knowledge of the powers granted to Congress in the 
Constitution which they had just formed and adopted, there was little room to fear 
a wilful, or mistaken departure in the public mind from the true spirit of that 
instrument.”121  
   As was the case with the opponents of the Bank in this period, the possibility of proving 
the intention and understanding of those closest to the Constitution was deemed the strongest 
manner in which to debate the constitutionality of an issue. While practice over twenty years 
might well have established a precedent of constitutionality for the National Bank, this was not 
the argument believed to most resonate within the printed public sphere. Instead, proof of the 
intention of those contemporary to the Constitution was the locus of debate – forcing Bank 
supporters to explain away Madison’s inconvenient opposition in 1790-91 without resorting to 
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120 “United States' Bank,” The Independent American, March 12th 1811. 
121 “United States Bank,” Poulson's American Daily Advertiser, February 20th 1811. 
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Elbridge Gerry’s response that the intentions of those at Philadelphia in 1787 have no weight in 
later debates.  
For both sides in 1810-11 the fundamental framework of constitutional debate had 
become that of proving that the framers intended a particular interpretation of their words and 
providing evidence to show what that intention was.  However, the ideas of moving outside of 
the text that had been offered in 1800-01 were muted in 1810-11. While supporters of the Bank 
offered practice and the character of the founders as reasons to renew the charter, the opponents 
of the Bank saw those intentions as fundamentally linked to the constitutional text itself. The text 
was seen as the lodestar of constitutional meaning, and intention as an ideal was not wholly 
separable from it. That intention was utilized in this narrow way was indicative of a 
constitutional text not yet valued for the identity of its authors above all else. In the constitutional 
debates over Missouri, the text would still remain central to constitutional understandings. 
 
The Admission of Missouri 
In 1820 a question related to neither the Bank nor presidential elections saw 
constitutional interpretation once more a point of contention. The question of the admission of 
the Missouri territory as a State, wrapped up as it was in questions of sectional power, the 
morality of slavery, and the relationship between the original and new States, would ultimately 
be addressed through the infamous compromise that established a sectional balance of power 
enduring into the 1850s. The Compromise itself was thoroughly debated and resolved only after 
two sessions of Congress. It was said of Missouri’s admission at the time “that a more grave and 
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portentous question had never been agitated” within Congress.122 Following the admission of 
Alabama as a slave State in 1819 and Illinois as a free State in 1818 the Union comprised 
twenty-two States, eleven free and eleven slave-holding. Debates regarding the admission of 
Missouri began in 1819 but ran aground after James Tallmadge attached an amendment in the 
House of Representatives to the needed bill requiring the manumission of children born to slaves 
after statehood upon reaching the age of twenty-five. In the following session, the Senate joined 
bills concerning the admission of Maine and Missouri, keeping the balance of free and slave 
States, and on 17th February 1820 agreed to forbid slavery north of 36’ 30”.123 Missouri entered 
the Union as a slave State alongside Maine, but not before the constitutionality of attaching 
conditions to the admission of States was debated within the print media. These debates saw 
recurrence to the notion that constitutional preservation was vital, and like the debates in 1810-
11 indicated a willingness to understand that preservation as meaning the maintenance of the 
constitutional order envisioned by the framers. But to the extent that intent was a guide in 
application of the Constitution, actors in 1820 were committed to an ideal of the text itself as 
comprising the definitive record of intention. The text, rather than any non-textually derived 
notions of spirit or intent was the authoritative measure of constitutional meaning.  
From the start of these debates, the importance of the issue of Missouri’s admission was 
recognized. The significance of the moment for the nation was signaled through references to it 
as the most pivotal debate since the adoption of the Constitution itself.124  The sectional 
dimension of the conflict meant that the “Missouri question must necessarily excite warm 
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123 Annals of Congress, Senate, 16th Congress Session 1, 428. 
124 For example cf. “Missouri Question,” The Genius of Liberty, February 8th 1820; “The Missouri 
Question No. 1,” Boston Weekly Messenger, December 2nd 1819, 114. 
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feelings” reasoned the editor of The American,125 but the nature of the conflict meant more than 
that was at stake. A Virginian newspaper offered a poetic account of the debate’s importance: 
“This knotty point e’er long must be decided, 
On which the country is at large divided, 
Whether Missouri is, or ought to be, 
Like other states, entitled to be free —“126 
As this rhyme suggests, the intersection of western expansion and slavery was identified as the 
locus of this tension, and one not easily resolved. A report of the congressional debates unusually 
editorialized in parenthesis “[Here the SLAVE question will come up]” after reporting the 
introduction of a bill to accord Missouri statehood.127  The constitutional stakes were twofold. 
Substantively at stake was the application of the Constitution to two issues that had bedeviled the 
1787 Philadelphia Convention, the balance of the States and the existence of slavery. But equally 
the crisis was a test of the Constitution’s ability to absorb conflict over such issues within the 
legislative mechanisms of Washington, D.C. Senator Barbour described the question of Missouri 
as “The crisis… contemplated by the framers of the constitution… to guard against whose effects 
was the principal object of the creation of the Senate.”128 Incorporating questions relating to the 
ultimate trajectory of the United States’ development as well as moral, material, local, and 
national interests, “The time” Barbour suggested, had arrived “which brings to the test the theory 
of the constitution.”129 The debates over Missouri would, therefore, see the first attempts to 
resolve the conflicts that would ultimately pull the country apart in the 1860s within the 
framework of the Constitution. As the poem aptly continued  
“For this decision fearful millions wait, 
And trembling stand as on the brink of fate, 
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While clashing eloquence, with portentous blaze, 
A nation’s interest in the cause displays.”130   
While the political actors of 1819 and 1820 certainly clashed over the constitutional 
conclusions reached, the newspaper debates are marked by broad agreement as to the nature of 
constitutional interpretation. In this moment there appeared widespread agreement that the text 
ought to be regarded as the touchstone of constitutional understanding. As was the case in 1810-
11, the intention of the framers was emerging as an important rhetorical weapon, but it was 
firmly grounded in the idea that text was the definitive guide to such intent, and that the text in 
the final analysis was authoritative over any non-textual supports. In contrast to the modes of 
constitutional argumentation that we shall see deployed with regard to slavery in the 1830s, and 
in keeping with the falling away of the “spirit of the Constitution” arguments seen in 1800-01, 
the debates over Missouri were marked by a reliance on the text. 
Advocates of Missouri’s admission with a restriction on slavery made the Constitution 
the basis of their position and deployed highly textual understandings of the Constitution to that 
effect. Looking to Congress’s powers over the territories and their admission, opponents of 
slavery urged restrictions on the basis that “Congress shall have Power to dispose of, and make 
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the territory and other Property of the United 
States,”131 and that these powers included the restriction of slavery. A significant actor within the 
debates over the admission of Missouri, Rufus King gave two speeches in late 1819 that were 
edited and circulated for popular reprint. In this popularized version of his Senate speeches, King 
offered a view of constitutional interpretation that was firmly located in the text. For King it was 
the case that “in the language of the constitution, Missouri is [Congress’s] territory, or property, 
and is subject…to the regulations and temporary government, which has been, or shall be 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
130 “Missouri Question,” The Genius of Liberty, February 8th 1820. 
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prescribed by congress.”132 Defending this position, King provided a view founded in the plain 
reading of the constitutional document; “The clause of the constitution, which grants this power 
to congress, is so comprehensive, and unambiguous, and its purpose so manifest, that 
commentary will not render the power, or the object of its establishment, more explicit or 
plain.”133 The clause undoubtedly gave authority over the territories to Congress, in the eyes of 
those seeking to restrict slavery. To assess whether this authority extended to forbidding slavery 
as a condition of admission to the Union they turned elsewhere in the Constitution. 
The second important clause for this argument was that concerned with the potential for 
regulation of the slave trade after 1808. The advocates of restriction looked to the Constitution’s 
provision that “the Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing 
shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year eighteen 
hundred and eight,” in order to show that the Constitution did indeed grant Congress regulatory 
powers over the movement of slaves.134 Crucial to this argument was the use of “migration” and 
“importation” in the clause. Assuming that there was no excessive wording in the Constitution, 
opponents of slavery argued that “migration” must denote movement distinct from 
“importation.” On this textual arrangement their argument hung. Writing in the Baltimore 
Patriot, “W.W.H.” outlined the claims; “…it is a rule of construction, that a statute (and the 
Constitution is a statute) ought upon the whole to be so construed, that if it be possible, no 
clause, sentence or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.”135 Given to understand the 
text in this manner, he or she concluded “that migration is not a mere expletive to round a period; 
but a substantive term, signifying a distinct idea.” As such the clause ought to read as giving 
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Congress the power to regulate the importation and migration of slaves after 1808. As Missouri 
could only be populated with slaves through their migration into that territory or State, W.W.H. 
argued that the congressional restriction of slavery was implicitly constitutional. 
Other writers constructed similar arguments on the basis of these two clauses. An 
extended consideration of the issue in the Boston Weekly Messenger drew the same conclusions. 
Sidestepping the question of whether the guarantee of republican government provided a 
constitutional basis for restriction, the Boston writer argued that there was “a clause in the 
Constitution which settles the question” of Missouri.136 This was, as for W.W.H, the slave trade 
clause. Noting the inclusion of migration as well as importation, the author claimed that it 
showed “that the constitution not only contemplated the abolition of external but internal trade, 
in slaves.”137 But this writer extended his/her textual analysis beyond that of the Baltimore 
Patriot’s correspondent; “But secondly, the Congress was only restricted from forbidding before 
1808, the importation and the migration of such persons, as the states then existing, chose to 
admit.”138 As Missouri was not one of the original States, there was no barrier to regulating its 
slave trade as condition of admission. In a manner that was repeated elsewhere, the author went 
further to prove that this was the intent of the text, by allying the interpretation with the practice 
exhibited by those involved in the Constitution’s creation, in this instance through the actions 
concerned with the admission of Ohio.  Grounded in the “ante-constitutional” provisions of the 
North-West Ordinance, it showed how the powers of Congress were understood at that earlier 
time. Pointing to the Ordinance’s ban on slavery within the territories, the author noted that this 
was “precisely the first part of Mr. Tallmadge’s amendment.”139 Here the express text of the 
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Constitution was seen as perfectly in accord with the intentions of the document. The Boston 
writer would later suggest that “if there were any doubt, what the principles and spirit of that 
constitution be, its express provisions are decisive.”140 As this quote suggests, the writer 
understood the Constitution as a record of intent; the words themselves could be turned to and 
parsed when the meaning of the Constitution was in doubt, which is to say, that there exists a 
definitive meaning which the words seek to capture, rather than one which is brought into being 
by them. The power of the text was that it was an extant expression of the commitments of those 
active in 1787-88. 
Reprints of Senator Mellen’s remarks on the issue showed him constructing a similar 
argument from the text of Constitution, “inferences drawn from the celebrated ordinance of 
1787,” and the Louisiana Treaty in order to reach a different, but supportive, conclusion. Making 
the same distinction between “importation” and “migration,” and placing a similar emphasis on 
“existing,” Mellen concluded that the understanding of the Constitution that should be advanced 
was the one that protected “those rights or principles which it was intended to preserve 
inviolate.” As the Louisiana Purchase had not been envisaged by the framers, regulation of its 
admission was perfectly within the powers of Congress — all that mattered was that the 
Constitution bequeathed this authority to Congress.141 Nonetheless, in reaching this conclusion, 
he noted “All compacts are to be construed according to their subject matter; in reference to the 
state of things to which they relate.”142 The possibility of a gap between intention and text 
tentatively explored in 1800-01 and fully embraced by the South in the 1830s was not 
countenanced here. For Mellon, the environment within which the constitutional text was framed 
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offers a way of understanding the text more thoroughly. Like W.W.H., the text is an expression 
of intent, but one that aligns perfectly. There is no scope here for finding the text incomplete (as 
in 1800), nor imperfectly expressing the intentions behind it (as in the 1830s). Instead, as in 
1810-11, text and intention as closely related, if not fully identical. 
In this vein, a correspondent to the New-Hampshire Sentinel would construct an 
argument that saw a perfect identity between the text and the intention of the framers. Detailing 
the commitments of the preamble and context in which the framers worked before taking up the 
use of migration and importation, “W. G.” would claim that the relevant “clause of the 
Constitution sufficiently indicates the feelings of the sages who formed it, while its meaning is 
too obvious to be mistaken.”143 Its inclusion was, the writer argued, inserted as a “check [upon] 
the further inroads of a system at war with the very principles they [the framers] had long been 
struggling to maintain, and in direct violation of all they held most dear.”144 Americans would be 
acting in “obedience to the injunctions of “the Father of his country” in seeking a restriction 
upon slavery. Restriction was in line with the intentions of the republic’s fathers, as expressed in 
the Constitution. 
Citizens of New York likewise offered their faith in the founders as a basis for supporting 
the restriction of slavery. Citing the argument, offered by opponents of restriction, that the only 
condition upon admission possible under the Constitution was a guarantee of republican 
government, these citizens conceded “If this inference were true, we should submit in silence but 
with sorrow.”145 Such an outcome would mean that “the great and good men who framed the 
constitution, had in this particular lost not only their moral sentiments, but their political 
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forecast” and had failed to equipment the Constitution with the ability to ensure justice.146 
However they were relieved to state that the framers “were not thus blind,” and therefore 
included provisions to make possible the end of importation and migration of slaves and 
exercised this authority over the Northwest Territory in 1789 and the Mississippi Territory in 
1793.147 Such acts gave the New Yorkers confidence that “it is within the constitutional power of 
Congress to prohibit the introduction of slavery into any of the new states or territories.”148 Once 
more, text was allied with presumed intention in order to derive constitutional meaning. 
Opponents of the restriction likewise turned to the Constitution in their arguments. For 
some, its mere invocation settled the argument, for example in Senator Barbour’s speech noted 
above: “We are pledged by the most solemn sanctions of our religion, to reject the meditated 
restriction on Missouri: the constitution, which we have sworn to support, forbids it.”149 Others 
went deeper into questions of constitutional interpretation, either in placing emphasis on the text 
alone or as with the advocates of restriction in linking the text to intent. Rejecting the possibility 
of restriction as the setting of a dangerous precedent of congressional power, one critic 
approvingly noted Missouri’s unwillingness to “admit a construction either of the treaty of 
cession, or of the Constitution, which is in direct contradiction to the words of it.”150 Denying the 
legitimacy of non-textual interpretations, the author stated “nothing is more fatal in government, 
than a constructive legislation, a “looking behind the records,” for when this mode is once 
adopted, and acknowledged, there is danger that the express meaning of the national compact 
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will be lost in the preponderancy of party.”151 Such worries chimed with the concerns expressed 
in Rhode-Island, that the “only safeguard of our liberty is a scrupulous fidelity to the principles 
of our Constitution.”152 Worried of the dangers arising “whenever attempts are made to impose 
new constructions upon the Constitution,” this writer voiced an opinion that allowing questions 
over the meaning of precepts invited “sophistical construction[s]” and struck a blow to “that 
feeling of reverence, which is the safeguard of all institutions.”153  
Others though, saw the text and the intentions behind it in unison. Writing in the 
Richmond Enquirer, “A Southron” disputed the interpretation placed upon the Constitution by 
the opponents of slavery, but not the modes of interpretation utilized. Taking as a starting point 
the intent of the Constitution, “A Southron” posited “If there was a subject of peculiar anxiety 
among the states at the time of the adoption of the constitution, it was to retain in their own 
hands the power of regulating their own municipal affairs.”154 Read in this light, the “object… of 
the constitution was to enable Congress to prevent restrictions and prohibitions, not to authorize 
it to impose them.”155 The meaning of the Constitution then was “plain and palpable,” and the 
relevant clause was that regarding commerce between the States.156 Providing a reading of that 
clause that clearly sacrificed the text-alone to the text-as-intent, “A Southron” argued that 
existence of a power to regulate interstate commerce denoted a power to promote it and not in 
any way to restrict it. Any other understanding was “contrary to the plain meaning of the 
clause”157 — which we might take to mean the intention behind the clause, as a power of 
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regulation denotes, on its face, a power to restrict. Opponents of restriction in the North also 
shared this interpretative view. “A Friend to America,” argued that “If the people had intended to 
have given any further powers to Congress [regarding conditions of admission]… one would 
suppose it would be found in the Constitution.”158 Linking text and intent, the writer claimed 
“The Constitution is a limited compact, possessing powers expressed therein… The design of the 
Union was for foreign purposes… and it was never contemplated there should be an inequality of 
privileges or restraints among the states.”159 In Virginia, the House of Delegates issued a 
Preamble and Resolutions on the constitutionality of restriction. Taking the Tenth Amendment160 
as their constitutional clause de jour, the House argued that its meaning ought to be derived 
through “reference to that instrument [the Constitution].”161 As the rights protected in the Tenth 
Amendment must, they suggested, be universal, they only need show that the original parties to 
the federal compact had not ceded control over slavery to prove that Congress had no power to 
restrict slavery in Missouri.  
 
Conclusion 
 The newspapers examined above suggest that while the intent of the framers’ played little 
part in the popular constitutional debates of the first years of the republic, it was only a short 
time before this approach to constitutional interpretation became mainstream. While the 
newspaper correspondents engaged in debate over the constitutionality of the Bank in 1790-91 
would restrict their exchanges to question of textual meaning, reaffirming the characterization of 
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the Constitution as a textual document created and owned by the people in their entirety, only ten 
years later a more expansive discussion would be held. With the constitutional crisis of 1800-01 
a fertile environment in which new and innovative approaches to interpretation would emerge, 
some advancing its popular authorship and others providing a vision of the Constitution which 
would work to restrict its ability to respond to democratic impulses. The radically democratic 
approaches to constitutional interpretation offered by the republican correspondents would in 
some respects foreshadow the constitutional theories that gained acceptance in the middle third 
of the twentieth century. Addressing complex and inherent problems of constitutional 
democracy, these writers offered an understanding of the Constitution that allowed for organic 
change driven by popular sentiment. Imbuing the Constitution with a “spirit” and emphasizing its 
democratic nature, these writers would turn not to the framers, but to the people themselves for 
guidance. The contributions of “An American,” “A respectable citizen,” and “Aristides,” offered 
the possibility of developing an understanding of the Constitution which would energize the 
popular will within American politics, rather than constrain the actions of government. However, 
the same debate would call forth a more restrictive approach to interpretation, which played 
down the popular mandate of the Constitution and stressed the detachment and completeness of 
the constitutional document. The Federalist writers of Washington were crafting a competing 
notion of the Constitution that would enshrine it as a curb on democratic excess by emphasizing 
its holistic perfection and fashion its interpretation as a pursuit of the legal profession. Twisting 
the underlying motivation of the Constitution text as being without author, they would detach it 
from the popular will and conceive of it as a text without editor.   
Bouton, in his recent book on the American Revolution in Pennsylvania, has claimed that 
the period leading up until 1800 was one in which democratic impulses of the Revolution were 
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tamed.162 Despite this, the constitutional debates of 1800-01 suggest that if democratic agency 
was being undermined during this period, it was still a viable form of constitutional 
understanding. However, as the exchanges regarding the rechartering of the Bank in 18010-11 
show, it would not be this strain of constitutional thought which would ultimately come to 
dominant with the popular imagination. Instead as the period progressed, the importance of the 
constitutional text as a record of intent would grow. In both 1810-11 and 1819-20, 
correspondents within newspaper debates would turn to the text as a definitive record of the 
meaning of the Constitution. In doing so, they intertwined the ideas of intention and text to the 
point that a gap between the two was reduced to a theoretical rather than actual possibility. 
 This chapter, as was suggested in the introduction, has set its sights only on attempting to 
survey the development of constitutional interpretation within newspapers between 1790 and 
1820. As such, it has left open the question of why such a shift took place (although an 
explanation may have been hinted at during some discussions). This question is perhaps more 
crucial for American self-understanding than the issue of when and how the shift took place. An 
understanding of why American politics came to be straitjacketed into a Constitution drawn up 
for the Eighteenth century is not intuitive, especially when the framers themselves, particularly 
Madison and Jefferson (always something of an honorary framer) seemed so committed that it 
should not be. Understanding the intertwining of text and framer intention in the 1800s, and its 
relationship to changing social norms and expectations in the same period, is of not insignificant 
importance to American politics today. Existing within a society that finds itself bound to and 
confronted with a Constitution crafted in the 1780s, the American arena of politics is constrained 
institutionally and conceptually. Identifying why such a situation has come to be is a vital in 
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American Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
!
!
!!77!
seeking to return the ownership of the Constitution to the People themselves. As such the 
documenting of the when and how of the shift can only be regarded as the first step – and so the 
dissertation turns now to the question of why this shift took place. 
!
!
!
!
78!
Chapter 2: Authorship and the Constitution 
 
“…there is a somewhat alarming tendency in this country, to resist the settlement of 
constitutional questions ; to embalm doubts in everlasting preservation ; to sacrifice 
history, practice, authority, and acquiescence, to the contested letter of the text…”163 
Constitutional theorists since the Constitution’s bicentennial have placed emphasis upon 
the people’s role in the creation of constitutional authority during the founding period. For 
progressives, initially in the form of the republican revival and subsequently in the guise of 
popular constitutionalism, the people’s authorization provides scope for contemporary 
constitutional constructions.164 For originalists, the people’s authority gives democratic sanctity 
to the constitutional text as an objective restriction on policy.165 To the extent that the people’s 
role in the creation of the Constitution has been emphasized, the framers’ role in that process has 
been increasingly marginalized. The people’s grant of authority has become conflated with an 
imputation of meaning, such that the understanding of the ratifiers now guides, to differing 
degrees, the interpretative endeavors of both popular constitutionalists and originalists. This 
chapter, in tracing the creation of the constitutional text’s authority, argues for a more complex 
understanding – one in which the role of the framers as authors is a more pronounced part of the 
ratification process. Pauline Maier has recently suggested that the public see the founding as only 
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the Philadelphia Convention, ignoring – or ignorant of – the process of ratification.166 
Conceptually, constitutional scholars are perhaps increasingly guilty of the converse sin of 
seeing the founding only in the moment of ratification.  
Showing that the defenders of the proposed constitution initially divided over the 
significance of the Philadelphia Convention’s authorship of the constitutional text, this chapter 
explores the manner in which claims of the convention’s authorship became a strategic necessity 
in light of Anti-federalist demands for amendment of the text prior to ratification.  Faced with the 
prospect of each state offering contradictory amendments as a basis for ratification, some 
Federalists167 argued that only the Philadelphia Convention could author an acceptable 
constitution – and that attempts at amendment of the constitution after its issuance by the 
Philadelphia Convention but prior to ratification by the states (“prior amendment”) would 
undermine the unity of the document and deny the authorial authority of the Conventionvis-à-vis 
the text. By tapping the authority that authors exert upon their texts, these Federalists were able 
to secure ratification, and crucially ratification without prior amendment. Conceiving ratification 
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not as the moment of founding but as the culmination of it, they saw the relationship between the 
framers and the people as structured around a two-step model of constitutional creation, in which 
proposal of a document was followed by its ratification. Commitment to this model created a role 
for the framers as textual authors of the Constitution within the liminal period between proposal 
and ratification.  
This initial invocation of the authorial authority of the framers would have profound 
consequences however. Post-ratification, these claims took on greater significance within a 
society transitioning from a republican to a liberal conception of authorial authority.168 
Alongside a growing acceptance of the idea of textual fallibility, and therefore the need to 
subject the Constitution to interpretation, this trend made questions of constitutional authorship 
pertinent. In this setting, the seed of Philadelphia Convention authorship planted in the midst of 
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the debates over ratification grew into a robust tree of framer intention by the 1830s.169 As it did 
so, the dynamic, democratic constitution envisaged by the above noted Democratic writers of 
1800-01 calcified into a framer-orientated constitution that would restrict the expansive 
democratic promise of the founding. 
In order to explore these developments, the chapter examines the debates over the 
Constitution that took place in 1787-88. Particular attention is paid to the writings of Alexander 
Contee Hanson, John Jay, and James Madison, where an understanding of ratification in which 
the framers assumed authority for the text prior to popular assent is expressed. Here then, the 
Constitution – and its subsequent interpretation – emerges under the initial, sole authority of the 
framers before being transferred to the people. On this basis, I argue that accounts that stress the 
popular nature of ratification at the expense of the role of the framers mischaracterize the 
position of the Constitution in 1787-88. The chapter then briefly turns to the development of this 
authority within the legal commentaries of the early Republic in order to show (1) how authorial 
claims became increasingly important within the cultural understanding of texts, and (2) the 
manner in which particular authorial claims of the framers developed. Subsequent chapters will 
provide additional analysis of this tendency through examination of the causes, consequences, 
and developments allied to it. 
 
A Textual Constitution 
Michael Warner’s consideration of the Constitution’s textual nature, in his Letters of the 
Republic, emphasizes the printed nature of the document. Drawing upon the republican print 
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culture of late Eighteenth century America, Warner suggests that the very printed form of the 
Constitution contributed towards its acceptance as the people’s document.170 Highlighting the 
emphasis placed on the “impersonality of public discourse” within colonial society,171 Warner 
suggests that the association of virtue with disinterestedness enabled anonymous printed 
arguments to come to be regarded as legitimate, and moreover the legitimate, contributions to 
colonial public debate. Within this conceptual setting the establishment of a constitution in the 
form of a printed document provided a novel way to address a fundamental democratic problem; 
How can a political community/order be formed that was both consented to and created by the 
people before their existence is made manifest by that order? The solution as described by 
Warner was ratification of a document drawn up not by a constituted authority, but through an 
extralegal process in which an impersonal, and therefore universally owned, text became the 
“original embodiment of the people.”172 A document that emanated from no one, the 
Constitution interpellated the whole, the people themselves. In Warner’s words, “the printedness 
of the Constitution not only underwrites, so to speak, the popular authorship of the Constitution – 
it summons the readership of the print audience to recertify it continually and universally.”173 
Despite the rich republican print culture that Warner has depicted as a basis for the 
Constitution emanating from no one, and therefore the people, the actors in the events of 1787-
1788 saw authorship of the Constitution as a central issue. Indeed many Federalists, preoccupied 
with questions of authorship, strove to depict themselves not as authors of the document, but 
rather characterized their relationship to the text in the manner that Roland Barthes has defined 
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as being writers.174 For while authors claim ownership over the text and forge a relationship of 
authority over it, writers act as scribes for another authority – they write not for themselves but 
under the commission or authority of some other entity. In the words of Barthes, they are 
“clerks.”175 Drawing parallels between their own actions and those of “obscure individuals” and 
“private pens,” Federalists in this mold emphasized their limited authority regarding the 
Constitution.   
However, while some Federalists mobilized the rhetoric of non-authorship to emphasize 
the people’s authority over the text, others simultaneously traded upon the personal authority of 
members of the Philadelphia Convention in order to ensure ratification. Without a central locus 
of authority to underpin the text and ensure its integrity, the Federalists had no coherent response 
to challenges from opponents that they allow the people to amend the document prior to 
ratification, either through state conventions or through a second national convention. By tapping 
the authority that authors exert upon their texts in the form of authorial intent, the Federalists 
were able to secure ratification, and crucially ratification without prior amendment.  
The two-step process of constitutional creation enabled an invocation of authorial intent. 
Without a mechanism under which the “wisest men” of America, meeting at Philadelphia, had an 
authoritative linkage to the document, they would have been unable to do more than endorse 
it.176 Participation in the Philadelphia Convention enabled them to claim it as their own, and 
forge a relationship of authorship with it. From this base of authorship they could assert correct 
interpretation, denying the strength of criticisms, and place their own personal authority behind, 
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not merely alongside, the Constitution. By positioning themselves as authors, they could hope to 
encourage views similar to that expressed by “A Native of Virginia”: 
“If we read the proposed plan under these ideas, and think we discover 
imperfections, and faults; ought we not rather distrust our own perceptions, than 
the understandings of its makers? Because, it is much more probable, that a single 
reader, even of great capacity, should be mistaken, than that so respectable a body 
as the Convention, with minds enlightened, and more unbiased, should, after the 
freest and fullest investigation of this important subject, be wrong.”177 
But the two-step process also created the need for a particular authority during the liminal period 
following the writing of the constitutional document and before its ratification by the people. In 
this temporal space, the document existed without legal sanction, but required unity. To remain 
intact for the duration of the ratification process it required an authority behind it so that 
amendment and revision by each separate state, under the authority of the people, did not 
produce its own version – a result that would render no single legal, or even usable, constitution. 
The Federalists required an originary authority for the document that could render amendment 
prior to ratification illegitimate. Authorship provided this, linking the framers’ personal authority 
to the as-written document. 
However in mobilizing authorship the Federalist that advanced these claims displaced the 
authority of the people for the text that they and other Federalists emphasized elsewhere. In 
locating a first, albeit temporary, authority in their authorial identity, Federalists such as 
Madison, Jay, and Contee Hanson lodged the basis for textual authority in themselves, not the 
people. If it was through ratification that the Constitution was made legitimate, it was through 
authorship that it was given textual cohesion. 
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Writership and the Textual Constitution 
Beginning with the Pennsylvania convention and under James Wilson’s initial leadership, 
Federalists worked to depict the framers as engaged only in writership, not authorship. Stressing 
that the people were the authority behind the Constitution,178 Wilson would state that: 
“This Constitution, Mr. President, opens with a solemn and practical recognition 
of that principle: - “We, the people of the United States […] do ordain and 
establish this Constitution for the United States of America.” It is announced in 
their name – it receives its political existence from their authority: they ordain 
and establish.”179 
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Articulating the defense of the Philadelphia Convention that it had only engaged in “proposing” 
a new constitution, Wilson would move to assert the limited ambitions of the Conventionin the 
limited terms of writing: “I think the late Convention has done nothing beyond their powers. The 
fact is, they have exercised no power at all, and, in point of validity, this Constitution, proposed 
by them for the government of the United States, claims no more than a production of the same 
nature would claim, flowing from a private pen.”180 In Wilson’s account the people authorized 
the document: “By their fiat, it will become of value and authority; without it, it will never 
receive the character of authenticity and power.”181 
  In the course of ratification convention debates, Wilson’s model of framing the 
Philadelphia Convention’s role as one of draftsmanship would be recurrent. In Virginia, Patrick 
Henry’s demand on behalf of the people stimulated an ensuing discussion that fell along two, 
unequal lines (excluding Henry’s own rejection of the claim). In response Governor Randolph 
argued that the Conventionwas right to begin the Constitution “We, the people” as the 
“government is for the people” and it would receive sanction from them. After all, “[i]f the 
government is to be binding on the people, are not the people the proper persons to examine its 
merits or defects?”182 Nonetheless, Randolph reiterated his earlier refusal to sign: “Wholly to 
adopt, or wholly to reject, as proposed by the convention, seemed too hard an alternative to the 
citizens of America, whose servants we were, and whose pretensions amply to discuss the means 
of their happiness were undeniable.” 183 Randolph’s articulation of his refusal to sign echoed that 
of his fellow Virginian George Mason’s in the Philadelphia Convention. Mason had objected that 
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a second convention would be required after public debate, so it might be possible to “know 
more of the sense of the people, and to be able to provide a system more consonant to it. It was 
improper to say to the people, take this or nothing.”184 Both Virginian hold-outs articulated an 
idea of the convention’s role as one of draftsman, conceiving a project under commission of the 
people, subject to modification by the people’s own hand or through the calling of a further 
convention. 
 The second response to Henry’s challenge came from the Federalists whose support for 
the Constitution was without (public) reservation. Repeating their commitment to the notion that 
“the people are… the fountain of all power,” these Federalists sought to follow Wilson’s lead in 
posing as clerks for the people.185 In putting forth this position, Nicholas utilized textual 
allusions to argue that the use of “We, the people” was “highly proper: it is submitted to the 
people, because on them it is to operate: till adopted, it is but a dead letter, and not binding on 
any one; when adopted, it becomes binding on the people who adopt it.”186 The “paper”  over 
which they were debating was, to John Marshall’s thinking, not an assumption of power by the 
Philadelphia Convention.187 In line with Wilson, Marshall saw the Philadelphia Convention as 
engaged only in “proposing” – and in this they sought no more authority than a private writer; 
“We are not bound to adopt it, if we disapprove of it. Had not every individual in this community 
a right to tender that scheme which he thought most conducive to the welfare of his country?”188 
However, the fullest articulation of this position came from Edmund Pendleton.  
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Pendleton would seek to transform the Philadelphia Convention from authors to writers 
by suggesting the complete absence of authorial contribution: “Suppose the paper on your table 
[the Constitution] dropped from one of the planets; the people found it, and sent us here to 
consider whether it was proper for adoption; must we not obey them?”189 Pendleton’s 
hypothetical radically reversed the actual narrative of the Constitution’s drafting, making 
irrelevant the Philadelphia Convention’s contribution. Here, the Constitution is without an author 
and it is the people who initiate its ratification process, sanctioning the state conventions to 
deliberate over the document on the people’s behalf. Pendleton poses here as the absolute servant 
of the people; the writer in toto.190  
 North Carolinian debates echoed those of Virginia. In the ratifying convention, critics of 
the Philadelphia Convention led by Reverend Caldwell contested the authority assumed in “We, 
the people.” For Joseph Taylor  
“the very wording of this Constitution seems to carry with it an assumed power. 
We, the people, is surely an assumed power… It seems to me that, when they [the 
framers] met in Convention, they assumed more power than was given to them. 
Did the people give them the power of using their name? This power was in the 
people. They did not give it up to the members of the Convention.”191  
Again this challenge was met by a Federalist adoption of the posture of writers rather than 
authors.192 William Richardson Davie, a member of the Philadelphia Convention, sought to 
defend that meeting’s work. Stating that “no part was binding until the whole Constitution had 
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received the solemn assent of the people,” Davie emphasized the people’s authority.193 He then 
moved to echo Wilson and Nicholas: “Is it not immediately through their recommendation that 
the plan of the convention is submitted to the people? And this plan must remain a dead letter, or 
receive its operation from the fiat of this [ratifying] Convention.”194 The Constitution was, yet 
again, analogous to the work of a private writer; “The act of the Convention is but a mere 
proposal, similar to the production of a private pen.”195  
Others defended the use of “We, the people” on similar grounds, pointing out that the 
Philadelphia Convention sought to speak for the people only in anticipation of the people’s 
assenting to that articulation. James Iredell argued that, “…the style, We, the people, was not to 
be applied to the members themselves, but was to the style of the Constitution, when it should be 
ratified in their respective states.”196 Here, ratification served as a post hoc commission of the 
writers’ work. The Constitution is the people’s direct voice prepared for them by the writers at 
Philadelphia. Archibald MacLaine, like Pendleton, would take this argument to its extreme and 
posit the very absence of an author at all. To quote MacLaine at length: 
 “The Constitution is only a mere proposal… After they [Philadelphia Convention] 
had finished the plan, they proposed that it should be recommended to the people 
by the several state legislatures. If the people approve of it, it becomes their act. Is 
not this merely a dispute about words [We, the people], without any meaning 
what ever? Suppose any gentleman of this Convention had drawn up this 
government, and we thought it a good one; we might respect his intelligence and 
integrity, but it would not be binding on us. We might adopt it if we thought it a 
proper system, and then it would be our act. Suppose it had been made by our 
enemies, or had dropped from the clouds; we might adopt it if we found it proper 
for our adoption.”197 
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MacLaine offers two ideas in this extract: The first, that only the people’s assent can give 
substance to the Constitution’s claims of authority; the second, that authorial prestige cannot be a 
basis for authority. Even acknowledging the possibility that “we might respect his [the author’s] 
intelligence and integrity,” this would be an insufficient basis for recommending a constitution. 
Indeed, even if it had come from one’s enemy or fell from the sky, if it served the people’s 
interest (“if we found it proper for our adoption”) and received their assent, the Constitution 
would still be authoritative. In MacLaine’s exposition in his state’s convention, the only role the 
Philadelphia Convention could play was one of writership. 
 
The Authority of the Convention 
The commitment to the notion that the Philadelphia Convention had been mere “writers” 
of the constitutional text did not mean that every Federalist foreswore the persuasive authority of 
the particular members of the Philadelphia Convention. Even before the close of the Philadelphia 
Convention, Alexander Hamilton had privately conjectured that the “very great weight of 
influence of the persons who framed it, particularly in the universal popularity of General 
Washington” would be critical in securing the Constitution’s ratification.198 The Federalist press 
took a similar view, reminding readers whenever possible of the figures – particularly 
Washington and Franklin – involved in the document’s production. The Pennsylvania Gazette 
reviewed the Constitution’s signing in the Philadelphia Convention by noting Benjamin 
Franklin’s endorsement, reasoning that the “concurrence of this venerable patriot in this 
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Government, and his strong recommendation of it, cannot fail of recommending it…”199 Ten 
days later in New York, Curtius, writing in the New York Daily Advertiser would link Franklin 
and Washington to the document in urging its acceptance, suggesting it reflected “the highest 
honor upon its compilers; and adds a lustre, even to the names of Washington and Franklin!”200 
In Massachusetts, a poem composed for the occasion, celebrated the role of Franklin and 
Washington while praising the Philadelphia Convention: 
That these are the blessings, Columbia knows– 
The blessings the Fed’ral CONVENTION bestows. 
O! then let the People confirm what is done 
By FRANKLIN the sage, and by brave WASHINGTON. 
Our freedom we’ve won, and the prize will maintain 
By Jove we’ll Unite, 
Approve and Unite– 
And huzza for Convention again and again.201  
In December, the Pennsylvania Herald would opine that the presence of Franklin and 
Washington among the framers “leads to a suspicion of want of wisdom or want of virtue in the 
opponents of a system to which their sanction and hearty support is given.”202 Such was the 
perceived importance of these figures that the Anti-federalist “Centinel” declared in his first 
number that Washington and Franklin must have been misled in signing.203 
 In truth, Centinel’s first essay – in which he told the people that “it behoves you well to 
consider, uninfluenced by the authority of names” the value of the proposed constitution – 
marked only the beginning of a growing Anti-federalist dissatisfaction with the Federalists’ use 
of the convention’s prestige.204 The “Federal Farmer” would gently suggest in early November 
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that while Americans ought to “view the convention with proper respect…Perhaps the judicious 
friends and opposers of the new constitution will agree, that it is best to let it rest solely on its 
own merits, or be condemned for its own defects.”205 But by the end of November, “A Federal 
Republican” pleaded for the very idea that “[w]e may without derogating from the characters of 
the members of Convention, expect to find defects in the Constitution which they have 
framed.”206 In the course of ratification the tendency of the Federalists to deploy the 
convention’s membership to repress opposition became a point of exasperation for the Anti-
federalists. “Helvidius Priscus” would challenge the notion that the Convention“were so much 
the peculiar favourites of heaven as to receive an immediate inspiration for the model of a 
government,”207 while “Centinel’s” growing anger saw him dub the framers in dripping sarcasm 
as the “immaculate convention.”208 William Findley would write that he was “Sorry that the 
Federalists addressed our implicitie faith So much with great Names, instead of addressing our 
reason with Solid Arguments” [sic].209 
The recurrence to the authority of convention and its members worked to undermine the 
posture of “writership” adopted by Federalists elsewhere. The claim that the Convention merely 
offered suggestions without any claimed authority was difficult to square with ongoing appeals 
to the stature of Washington, Franklin, and others. Arguments, such as Noah Webster’s that “we 
are almost impelled to suspect our own judgements, when we call in question any part of the 
system” given the convention’s composition of “some of the greatest men in America… some of 
them the fathers and saviors of their country,” did little to reassure Anti-federalists that the 
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Federalists truly regarded the Convention as merely clerks of the people.210 Some Anti-
federalists saw in the continued appeals to the Convention the seeds of an aristocratic conspiracy, 
and expressed that view in print. Such attacks can be seen for example, in the “Federal Farmer’s” 
criticism of the disproportionate representation of the “aristocratic parts of the community” at the 
Philadelphia Convention211 and in “Cincinnatus’” conjecture “that a monstrous aristocracy 
springing from [the Constitution], must necessarily swallow up the democratic rights of the 
union, and sacrifice the liberties of the people to the power and domination of a few.”212  
Such attacks sought to question the very prestige of the Convention that its Federalist 
advocates sought to mobilize. By November “A Plain Citizen” in Pennsylvania complained of 
“the virulence, and scurrility the worthy members of the late Convention have experienced.”213 
Towards the end of April 1788 George Lee Turberville looked back upon the ratification process 
and asked “[w]hat has not been done by ignorance – cunning – Interest – and Address to blast 
and blacken this Production? Misrepresentation – false reasoning - & wilful perversion have 
been made use of agt. the piece itself. Calumny and Falshood have Stamp’d the objects of those 
who framed it with the most infamous colours” [sic].214 By late 1787 the promotion and criticism 
of the convention’s prestige had reached such a point that the Federalist Roger Sherman could 
wish to move beyond it and appeal instead to disinterested reason;!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
210 Noah Webster, An examination into the leading principles of the Federal Constitution proposed by the 
late Convention held at Philadelphia. With Answers to the principal objections that have been raised 
against the system. By a Citizen of America, (Philadelphia: Prichard & Hall, 1787). 
211 “Federal Farmer,” “Letters to the Republican” 
212 “Cincinnatus,” “To James Wilson, Esquire,” in New York Journal, November 1st, 1787, in DHRC 
digital. 
213 “A Plain Citizen,” “To the Honorable Convention of the State of Pennsylvania,” in Independent 
Gazetteer, November 22nd, 1787, in DHRC digital. 
214 George Lee Turberville, “Letter to James Madison, April 16,” 1788, in PJM digital. Original 
emphasis. 
!
!
!
!
94!
“…one party has seriously–urged, that we should adopt the New 
Constitution because it has been approved by Washington and Franklin: and the 
other… have urged that we should reject, as dangerous, every clause thereof, 
because that Washington is more used to command as a soldier, than to reason as 
a politician – Franklin is old — others are young –and Wilson is haughty. You are 
too well informed to decide by the opinion of others, and too independent to need 
a caution against undue influence.”215  
Sherman’s attempt to focus upon the text rather than the Convention perhaps reflected concern 
that recurrence to the presence of great men at Philadelphia was opening the Federalists to the 
accusations of an aristocratic conspiracy but no longer yielding any persuasive advantage.216 
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matter what may have been the intent of framers or ratifiers:  
“This, I undertake to say, as the conclusion of the whole matter, that the constitutionality 
of slavery can be made out only by disregarding the plain and common-sense reading of 
the Constitution itself… by disregarding the written Constitution, and interpreting it in 
the light of a secret understanding.” (Frederick Douglass, “The Constitution of the United 
States: Is it Pro-slavery or Anti-slavery?” in The Life and Writings of Frederick 
Douglass: Volume II Pre-Civil War Decade, 1850-1860, ed. Philip S. Foner, (New York: 
International Publishers, 1950), 477). 
As Douglass considered it, “[t]he American Constitution is a written instrument full and complete in 
itself. …it should be borne in mind that the mere text, and only the text, and not any commentaries or 
creeds written by those who wished to give the text a meaning apart from its plain reading, was adopted 
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as the Constitution of the United States.” (Douglass, “The Constitution of the United States: Is it Pro-
slavery or Anti-slavery?” 469). 
 The degree to which this was indeed a viable third alternative during and immediately following 
ratification can be overstated however. It would be unwise to conflate Sherman’s position in the midst of 
the ratification debates with a rejection of any subsequent popular textual authority. Prior to ratification, 
the people had not assumed textual authority, and so an argument based on the people’s textual authority 
was not available to Sherman. Post-ratification, Sherman articulated a view that the people – via the 
ratifying conventions – were indeed the authority behind the document. In discussions during the First 
Congress regarding amendment of the Constitution, Sherman indicated that the textual integrity of the 
document was linked to its popular ratification: 
“The constitution is the act of the people, and ought to remain entire. But the 
amendments will be the act of the State Governments.” (Annals of Congress 1789, 735). 
Rejecting the notion that amendments should be inserted into the original text, Sherman pointed to the 
mediated nature of the anticipated mode of amendment – proposed by the Congress and approved by the 
state legislatures – as a basis for regarding those acts as distinct from the originary textual authority of the 
people: 
“The [Constitution] was established by the people at large, by conventions chosen by 
them for the express purpose. The preamble to the constitution declares the act: but will it 
be a truth in ratifying the next constitution, which is to be done perhaps by the State 
Legislatures, and not conventions chosen for the purpose?” (742) 
Moreover, subsequent re-evaluation of Powell’s evidence has downplayed the degree to which attention 
to the text itself indicated a rejection of the textual authority of the ratifiers. Charles Lofgren’s re-
evaluation of Powell’s sources has pointed to a commitment to the idea of ratifier intent within the Early 
Republic (Charles A. Lofgren, “The Original Understanding of Original Intent?” Constitutional 
Commentary 5 (1988); See also Jack N. Rakove, “The Original Intention of Original Understanding,” 
Constitutional Commentary 13 (1996), for Madison’s role in the development of ratifier intent). It is also 
the case that arguments conceiving of the text alone as authoritative often assumed the popular 
authorization of the document to be the basis of this authority. In line with Warner’s argument that the 
impersonal text was significant precisely because it interpellated the people – that the impersonal text 
underwrote “the popular authorship of the Constitution” (Warner, Letters of the Republic, 110) – early 
Americans articulated the textual authority of the Constitution as intimately linked to the idea of the 
people, as when Justice Chase opined in Ware v. Hylton that  
“There can be no limitation on the power of the people of the United States. By their 
authority, the state constitutions were made, and by their authority the constitution of the 
United States was established; and they had the power to change or abolish the state 
constitutions, or make them yield to the general government, and to treaties made by their 
authority.” (U.S. 3 (Dall. 3) 199 1796). 
While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to explore Douglass’ view of the constitution in detail, it is 
worth noting that even in his articulation of text alone, he noted the basis of this claim in the popular 
sanction of the document and the subsequent authority of the people over the form of the text. The 
Constitution “is a great national enactment done by the people, and can only be altered, amended, or 
added to by the people.” (Douglass, “The Constitution of the United States: Is it Pro-slavery or Anti-
slavery?” 468).  
Subsequently, some scholars have rejected the notion that a focus on the text alone can allow for 
evolution of meaning. Randy Barnett has suggested that “Powell underplays Madison’s and others’ 
commitment to an originalist meaning rather than to a public meaning that evolves over time” (Randy E. 
Barnett, “An Originalism for Nonoriginalists,” Loyola Law Review 45 (1999), 628. Original emphasis). 
Elaborating a theory of originalism in which the written text itself is authoritative, Barnett argues that 
“[w]e are bound because we today – right here, right now – profess our commitment to a written 
constitution, and original meaning interpretation inexorably from that commitment” (636. Original 
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Whatever his motivation, it is clear that by as early as November of 1787 Sherman anticipated 
that his audience was well versed in appeals to the framers’ personal character. However, if 
Sherman had hoped to remove the Convention from the debate, the growing threat of 
amendments pushed other Federalists to embrace it as a necessary basis for textual authority. 
!
Prior Amendment and Authorial Authority 
 James Madison’s letters evinced a quiet confidence in the ratification of Constitution in 
the month after the adjournment of the Philadelphia Convention. In mid-October he noted that 
“[t]he Reports continue to be rather favorable to the Act of the Convention from every 
quarter.”217 Ten days later he advised William Short that although “[t]he Constitution has not 
been yet long enough before the public here to warrant any decided opinion concerning its fate. 
The general impression seems to be favorable as far as it is known.”218 At the end of the month 
he wrote Archibald Stuart that “[t]he first impression has been every where favorable except in 
Rh. Island. Nor is there any reason to suspect that the generality of States will not embrace the 
measure.”219 Others shared Madison’s confidence.220   
However, during that very month Richard Henry Lee reached out to likely opponents of 
the Constitution, offering his own proposed amendments to the text and asking “why may not 
such indispensable amendments be proposed by the Conventions and returned With the new plan 
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emphasis). In this sense, recognition of an objective text as authoritative does not automatically legitimize 
evolution in the meaning of that text. Moreover, as Barnett suggests, even this static text is bound to 
popular sanction for its authority (“…we today… profess our commitment…”). 
217 James Madison, “Letter to George Washington, October 14,” 1787, in PJM digital. 
218 James Madison, “Letter to William Short, October 24,” 1787, in PJM digital. 
219 James Madison, “Letter to Archibald Stuart, October 30,” 1787, in PJM digital. 
220 Edward Carrington, “Letter to William Short, October 25,” 1787, in DHRC digital; Nicholas Gilman, 
“Letter to President John Sullivan, October 31,” 1787, in DHRC digital; Christopher Gadsden, “Letter to 
Thomas Jefferson, October 29,” 1787, in DHRC digital; Walter Minto, “Letter to the Earl of Buchan, 
October 28,” 1787, in DHRC digital. 
!
!
!!97!
to Congress that a new general Convention may so weave them into the proffer’d system as that 
a Web may be produced fit for freemen to wear?”221 Lee’s suggestions and his letter to Edmund 
Randolph were reprinted in mid-November in the Winchester Virginia Gazette, and then to 
greater response in the Petersburg Virginia Gazette.222 In the same month other writers began to 
echo Lee’s question. “A Federal Republican” suggested that while it was true that the “wisdom 
of those patriots who composed the late Convention” might be relied upon to a great degree, 
“surely the people for whom they have acted have an undoubted right to offer such objections as 
they may suppose to exist.”223 Articulating a similar position, the “Federal Farmer” suggested 
that 
“because forty or fifty men have agreed in a system, to suppose the good sense of 
this country, an enlightened nation, must adopt it without examination, and 
though in a state of profound peace, without endeavouring to amend those parts 
they perceive are defective, dangerous to freedom, and destructive of the valuable 
principles of republican government–is truly humiliating.”224  
Elsewhere “An Old Whig” asked “if the people in the different states have a right to be 
consulted, in the new form of continental government, what authority could the late 
convention have to preclude them from proposing amendments to the plan they should offer?”225 
If the people were to be the authority behind the new Constitution, what grounds could there be 
for stopping the people from altering the document as they desired? And these were not idle 
speculations - on the 25th October the Virginia Assembly opted to allow “full and free 
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221 Richard Henry Lee, “Letter to Samuel Adams, October 5,” 1787, in DHRC digital. Cf also. Richard 
Henry Lee, “Letter to George Mason, October 1,” 1787, in DHRC digital; Richard Henry Lee, “Letter to 
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223 “A Federal Republican,” “A Review of the Constitution” 
224 “Federal Farmer,” “Letters to the Republican” 
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investigation and discussion” of the Constitution in its state convention – a concession to the 
members of the Virginia General Assembly who sought prior amendment.226 
In the minds of the Federalists, popular amendment of the Constitution prior to 
ratification, either by state conventions or a second constitutional convention, would be an 
effective defeat for the Constitution. Only eleven days after the Constitution was signed, Daniel 
Clymer suggested in the Pennsylvania Assembly that individual state amendments would destroy 
what unity existed amongst the states. Challenging the Assembly to capitalize upon the unity of 
the Philadelphia Convention, he asked  
“can it be supposed the United States would submit to the amendments and 
alterations to be made by a few inhabitants of Pennsylvania? Could it be expected 
that… Virginia and the Southern States shall coincide with alterations made only 
for the benefit of Pennsylvania? No! Away with such idea, and let that unanimity 
prevail at its adoption that it did at its formation.”227  
Were each state to offer amendments, there was little hope that these suggestions would be 
accepted by the others. In place of a national debate over the adoption or rejection of the 
constitutional text there would emerge a competition of (up to) thirteen distinct proposals, with 
no incentive for any state to forego its immediate interests. James Madison expressed his concern 
in a letter to Archibald Stuart in December of 1787 that the project of prior amendment was 
“pregnant with consequences which [the advocates] fail to bring into view.”  It was “impossible 
indeed to trace the progress and tendency of this fond experiment without perceiving the 
difficulty and danger in every Stage of it.”228 Furthermore Madison posited, amendments could 
be used by the Constitution’s opponents in order to derail the proposed Constitution. Identifying 
Patrick Henry as one such figure, Madison suggested to Jefferson that while Henry “concurs at 
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present with the patrons of Amendments, [he] will probably contend for such as strike at the 
essence of the System.”229  
Even an additional convention offered little prospect of agreement once the possibility of 
amendment gained purchase: 
“Should an attempt now be made to alter [the Constitution], it must be by a new 
convention, and the non-concurring States, would naturally send Members to the 
new convention who were warm for making the wished for alterations; and is it 
probable the other States would agree to such alterations? Is it not much more 
probable, they would disagree? … Amidst the various and opposite propositions, 
can we suppose an union would take place?”230  
Reflecting upon what was known of the Constitution’s opponents, “Philanthropos” 
reasoned that  
“[w]hen we observe how much the several gentlemen of the late Convention, who 
declined to sign the federal constitution, differ in their ground of opposition, we 
must seen how improbable it is, that another convention would unite in the same 
degree to any plan.”231 
Washington wrote to LaFayette in early 1788 of his wonder “that sensible men should not see the 
impracticability of the scheme. The members would go fortified with such Instructions that 
nothing but discordant ideas could prevail.”232 
Without each state ratifying the Constitution as proposed, the Federalists saw no 
prospects for a successful replacement of the Articles of Confederation. Successful attempts at 
amendment prior to ratification would mark the effective defeat of their hopes for a centralized 
government. Moreover, Madison noted in his letter to Jefferson, Virginia’s lead had been 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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followed by Maryland. Going into 1788, it appeared that amendments posed a significant threat 
to the Constitution, a fear reinforced as the convention in Massachusetts looked to 
recommendatory amendments to ensure ratification.233 Caught between a strategic need to resist 
amendment and an ideological and procedural commitment to popular authority, some 
Federalists saw the need for a textual authority prior to ratification. The Philadelphia 
Convention’s limited mandate of providing suggested revisions to the Articles of Confederation 
had provided Federalist with no legal basis from which to argue that ratification could only be 
adoption or rejection of the Constitution as written.  Seeing the importance of unity for the 
document in the process of ratifying it, they sought an authority that could provide that unity in 
the absence of legal sanction for their actions. Without legal authority (which could only have 
come from a direct commission for a new constitution by the people or their representatives), 
they turned to the authority that the Convention held vis-à-vis the constitutional text.  In these 
instances, Federalists offered arguments reliant upon the nature and composition of the 
Philadelphia Convention in order to deny the legitimacy of textual amendment. !
!
Authorship and the Constitution!
 
 From early 1788 then, a unifying authority for the constitutional text became a 
requirement for those Federalists who sought to deny the legitimacy – and not mere 
inconvenience - of prior amendment. Turning now to three such efforts, the article traces the 
responses of Alexander Contee Hanson, John Jay, and James Madison to this issue, showing the 
manner in which each writer invoked the authority of the Convention in order to protect the 
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constitutional document from dismemberment. Taken together, they illustrate the awareness of 
some Federalists of the need for a textual authority in the liminal period between the 
Constitution’s production and its authorization by the people. Between them they advanced two 
interrelated claims. The first was the procedural claim that any future assembly or convention 
would be unable to engage in the compromise and negotiation afforded by the conditions 
experienced by the Philadelphia Convention. The second was the impossibility of forming a 
second convention equal in talent to the body gathered at Philadelphia. In responding to 
arguments for prior amendment, these Federalist writers did not reject the amendments on the 
basis of substance or the difficulty of ensuring agreement over them alone. Instead they invoked 
the Convention as authority whose work was deserving of unique respect. The convention’s 
product was the result of the impossible to recreate convention and, as such, attempts at 
amendment were not merely inconvenient but illegitimate. That is to say, that they invoked the 
particular authority that an author has over their text in order to argue that the document should 
not be subjected to revision prior to its popular approval. 
 In early 1788, Alexander Contee Hanson, writing under the pseudonym “Aristides,” 
issued a pamphlet entitled “Remarks on the Proposed Plan.”234 In the essay, Hanson, a Maryland 
General Court judge, set out to counter what he regarded as the key objections to the 
Constitution that had emerged from its opponents. Before turning his attention to these 
objections, he noted that both sides had “laid a particular stress on the names” attached to the 
document. Reviewing the composition of the Convention he feigned shock at the “vague 
insinuations” directed towards them, and at the same time gently praised the “illustrious 
assemblage” at Philadelphia. Significantly though, he resisted an argument for the perfection of 
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the document. He affirmed the limited scope of the convention’s powers, stating that they had 
not exceeded their role of offering suggestions for amendment; “Its office was to advise, and no 
further has it proceeded.” And allowing for at least the possibility of imperfection, Hanson made 
a case for reform of the Constitution – if required – after its acceptance:!
“If there be any man, who approves the great outlines of the plan, and… would 
reject it, because he views some of the minute parts as imperfect, he should 
reflect, that, if the states shall think as he does, an alteration may be hereafter 
effected, at leisure.” 
Hanson’s position was thus far a nuanced one – he praised the personal capacities of the 
Philadelphia Convention, but suggested that theirs was a limited role of proposing and that 
people had the power to amend the convention’s product. Thus far Hanson seemed in agreement 
with the idea of the Convention as writers. 
 However, Hanson made a point of opposing amendment of the text prior to its 
ratification. Noting the impracticalities of multiple revisions of the document – that if every state 
were given the chance to amend the text the result would likely be thirteen proposals in the place 
of one – he suggests that in following that path  
“there can never be an end. We must return to this, - that whatever is agreed on, 
by the assembly appointed to propose, must be either adopted in the whole, or in 
the whole rejected.” 
Even were there to be a second convention, equipped with the recommendations of the states, 
they would be unable to decide which reforms and objections were pre-eminent. The result of 
such an experiment would be a similar return to the thirteen states and the “same probability of a 
mutilated plan.” Complete adoption or complete rejection were the only options Hanson could 
foresee for the plan. But how could the impossibility of amendment prior to acceptance or 
rejection be squared with a commitment to the idea that the people were to be the ultimate 
authority for the Constitution? If the people were only “advised” by the Philadelphia Convention, 
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then surely the former could decide which advice to take and which to reject – approving what 
they approved of, and cutting out what they did not?  
Hanson may have been correct in identifying the inconveniences in subjecting the 
document to multiple revisions, but this alone did not provide a principled reason for accepting 
the document as prepared by the members of the convention. Hanson here fell back on the 
particular character of the members in order to make a principle of a practicality. The ratifying 
conventions ought not insert their own revisions because the Constitution represented the work 
of the nation’s “first characters.” And a second convention, “if it consist of different men, must 
inevitably be inferior to the first” and was unlikely to provide a proposal superior to the current. 
Trust ought to be placed in “the wisdom of America” and the plan proposed by it. Here then, was 
Hanson’s defense of the Constitution in the face of prior amendment – that as the “product of 
[the] joint wisdom” of America’s “august assembly” the unity of the proposal must be accepted 
as presented, at least until ratification transferred responsibility for the document to the people. 
The people would grant it authority, but until then the authorial intent of the Convention bound 
the Constitution together and made amendment an illegitimate act. 
 In Federalist 85 Hamilton took up the prospect of prior amendments briefly, in order to 
express his belief that amendments would be more easily obtained after ratification than before, 
and to direct the attentions of his readers to “an excellent little pamphlet lately published in this 
city,” the contents of which “are unanswerable to shew the utter improbability of assembling a 
new convention” for the purpose of prior amendment.235 The pamphlet, John Jay’s 
pseudonymous “An Address to the People of the State of New York,” signed “A Citizen of New-
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York,” provided a detailed argument against the idea of a second convention amending the work 
of first. 
 Jay’s pamphlet offered an account of the Philadelphia Convention in which the members 
comprised such talent and proven patriotism that criticism of them reflected badly on the people, 
not the convention; 
“Let us continue careful therefore that facts do not warrant historians to tell future 
generations, that envy, malice and uncharitableness pursued our patriotic 
benefactors to their graves.”236  
The convention’s “temper and talent” enabled it to “reconcile the different views and interests” 
of the states and produce unanimity on “a subject so intricate and perplexed.” Indeed, such was 
the task that its very accomplishment was evidence that “it must have been thoroughly discussed 
and understood.” Deploying the argument that the very existence of a single proposal proved it to 
be the only possible one, Jay cautioned that 
“Gentlemen out of doors therefore should not be hasty in condemning a system, 
which probably rests on more good reasons than they are aware of, especially 
when formed under such advantages, and recommended by so many men of 
distinguished worth and abilities.” 
But if Jay’s argument echoed the elitism of Hanson’s (one critic derided Jay’s use of an 
“hackneyed argument… drawn from the character and ability of the framers of the new 
constitution”237), he also went further in making a procedural argument for the convention’s 
unique ability to provide a constitution. 
 Jay had deployed the talent of the Convention in order to deny the possibility that 
“[g]entlemen out of doors” might legitimately offer amendments to the constitution that they 
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were asked to ratify. The concessions and negotiations that had taken place in Philadelphia had 
produced a document that was acceptable to each state, although not the ideal of any particular 
one. Emphasizing the mutual accommodation and respect which he attributed to the convention, 
Jay suggested that amendment would undo the delicate settlement achieved. If the people of the 
states sought amendments, it was because they were not in a position to comprehend the 
necessary balances struck by the convention. As the product of that particularly auspicious body, 
the text should be maintained as it had been delivered. 
Moreover, he went further in arguing that the ratification debates had themselves made 
additional conventions necessarily deficient. Addressing the potential argument that a subsequent 
convention would better know the sense of the people and perhaps even equal the Philadelphia 
Convention in terms of talent, Jay argued that circumstances made this impossible. The divisive 
nature of the ratification process had created partisans whose votes would make the “spirit of 
candor, of calm enquiry” which had marked the first unattainable: 
“Federal electors will vote for federal deputies, and anti-federal electors for anti-
federal ones. Nor will either party prefer the most moderate of their adherents… 
so the men most willing and able to carry points, to oppose, and divide, and 
embarrass their opponents will be chosen.”238  
The Philadelphia Convention was therefore a unique body, a mixture of talents and circumstance 
whose very work rendered it irreproducible. And as such that assembly’s product could not be 
revised by subsequent conventions. As with Hanson, Jay argued for an unique authority on the 
part of the Philadelphia Convention that denied the legitimacy of amendment until after 
authorization by the people. 
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In Federalist 41, Madison would map out a similar approach to the threat of amendment 
as that offered by Hanson. In Federalist 40 Madison followed the Federalist approach of framing 
the Philadelphia Convention as a body of drafters and emphasizing people’s authority, but with 
slight nuance:  
“[i]t is time now to recollect that the powers [of the convention] were merely 
advisory and recommendatory; that they were meant so by the States and so 
understood by the convention; and that the latter have accordingly planned and 
proposed a Constitution which is to be of no more consequence than the paper 
upon which it is written, unless it be stamped with the approbation of those to 
whom it is addressed.”239 
Madison repeated the claim that the Convention operated only in the capacity of proposing body. 
But he also stressed the convention’s commission by the states – that the Philadelphia 
Convention was tasked with producing proposals for review, which will receive approbation 
from the people. Breaking down the constituting procedural into two steps, Madison arrived at a 
position that included a role for the framers as authors.  
 Following the discussion of the convention’s task in Federalist 40 but immediately 
bearing upon a dispute over taxation powers, Madison wrote in Federalist 41; “But the idea of an 
enumeration of particulars which neither explain nor qualify the general meaning, and can have 
no other effect than to confound and mislead, is an absurdity, which, as we are reduced to the 
dilemma of charging either on the authors of the objection or on the authors of the Constitution, 
we take the liberty of supposing had not its origin with the latter.”240 This use of “authors of the 
Constitution” is the only time that construction is used in The Federalist Papers.  Building from 
the positions of the other Federalists, one would expect that Madison would be keen to assert the 
limited nature of the Philadelphia Convention’s claim to the text. As has been seen elsewhere, 
some Federalists worked to dismiss or at least obscure the authorial claims of the convention. 
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However, in utilizing “authors” here, Madison seems to have the framers as authors very much 
in mind.241  
The context of the particular discussion, one of intent behind the language of the 
Constitution, also points towards an understanding of the “authors” as being the Philadelphia 
Convention. Anti-federalist critics derided the partial enumeration of congressional powers as an 
all-too-flexible mechanism for constraining the legislature. Without the full enumeration, there 
was little to stop the legislature from exceeding the powers supposed to be granted it.242 Madison 
took the position that the enumeration is sufficient and that in this case exceeded the claims made 
in the objection, arguing that the objection is based on willful misreading of Article 1, Section 8 
of the Constitution. Madison met these objections on the field of language, and dove into the 
grammatical arrangement of the actual sentence; 
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“But what color can the objection have, when a specification of the objects 
alluded to by these general terms immediately follows and is not even separated 
by a longer pause than a semicolon? If the different parts of the same instrument 
ought to be so expounded as to give meaning to every part which will bear it, 
shall one part of the same sentence be excluded altogether from a share of the 
meaning; and shall the more doubtful and indefinite terms be retained in their full 
extent, and the clear and precise expressions be denied any signification 
whatsoever?”243  
Madison claimed that the disputed section of the first article of the Constitution should be 
understood in accordance with established modes of composition – and that to read it otherwise 
is a perversion that ought not be attributed to the “authors of the Constitution.” In drawing upon 
linguistic usage as the basis of his response, Madison mobilized the authorial authority of the 
framers, and in so doing forewent the position that the framers are without any authority vis-à-vis 
the Constitution. 
While such clashes over language were characteristic of the ratification debates, Madison 
might have responded without conceding the fiction of the framers as writers. As Howe has 
documented, Anti-federalists were highly concerned by the Federalist attitude towards the 
flexibility of language.244 Federalists, viewing the events of the 1780s, had come to conclude that 
the rhetoric and concepts advanced during the imperial crisis were no longer wholly appropriate 
to the former colonies. Without desiring to diminish the republican nature of post-colonial 
politics, they came to regard virtue as a weak protection against loss of liberty. Instead, as 
evinced in the Constitution, they sought to balance interest against interest in order to avoid the 
emergence of a dominant, and so liberty-threatening, grouping.245 However, the nature of 
Madison’s argument here avoids recourse to claims that the interlocking of departments will 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
243 James Madison, “The Federalist No. 41” 
244 John Howe, Language and Political Meaning in Revolutionary America, (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 2004), 202-203. 
245 Howe, Language and Political Meaning in Revolutionary America, 218-221. 
!
!
!!109!
ensure that congressional powers are not abused. Neither does he posit that the character of 
politicians will preclude abuse. As Howe’s analysis suggests, these would have been the standard 
retorts from a typical Federalist.  
As with Hanson, Madison believed that once conceded, the idea of amendments would 
fracture the unity of both the opponents and advocates of the Constitution in the various states – 
for it was unlikely that each state would seek the same reforms or be minded to honor those of 
differing states. Responding to Edmund Randolph a week before Federalist 41 was printed at the 
beginning of 1788,246 Madison would chide the Governor for his folly in thinking a second 
convention would ease the Constitution’s passage; “the inference with me is unavoidable that 
were a second trial to be made, the friends of a good constitution for the Union would not only 
find themselves not a little differing from each other as to the proper amendments; but perplexed 
& frustrated by men who had objects totally different.”247 
 Madison went further in this letter than merely despairing the damage amendments might 
render to the Constitution, he also made the case for authorial authority as a principle at this 
juncture. The letter expresses Madison’s view that in the midst of ratification, prior to the assent 
of the people, the Federalists must make use of authorial authority to defend the Constitution. A 
second convention recognizing the people’s ability to propose amendments would risk what little 
purchase the Constitution held in early 1788: 
“The great body of those who are both for & against it [the Constitution], must 
follow the judgment of others not their own. Had the Constitution been framed & 
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recommended by an obscure individual, instead of a body possessing public 
respect & confidence, there can be no doubt, that altho’ it would have stood in the 
most identical words, it would have commanded little attention from most of 
those that now admire its wisdom.248” 
In this argument, Madison is abandoning the Federalist position staked out elsewhere by 
Pendleton and MacLaine. Where they argued that the identity of the writers was irrelevant, 
Madison locates the very authority that the Constitution commands in the persons of the authors. 
The reversal here – that the public reputation of the authors is the basis of the text’s claim to 
public support, not the words themselves – fits with Madison’s concerns regarding ratification. 
Placed within the context of opposing prior amendment of the document, Madison can be seen 
here to collapse the unity of the text and the stature of the framers into one – the threat to the 
document posed by a second convention is important because it undercuts the authority that the 
“body possessing public respect & confidence” could command.  
Madison conceived of Randolph’s hoped-for second convention as a grave threat because 
it would create conflicting amendments, but also because it would undermine public confidence 
in the Philadelphia Convention itself. Madison was not primarily concerned that a “re-edited” 
constitution would lack endorsement, but rather than the existence of a second convention in 
addition to the first would “destroy an effectual confidence” in either convention.  A second 
convention would strike at the only basis of authority, albeit extralegal, at this point within the 
ratifying process, the authority the Convention commanded as a consequence of the confidence 
placed in it – an authority transferred to the document by the convention’s act of authorship. The 
loss of authority by the Convention would be critical, because it was the Convention’s authority 
that provided the document’s – without a “general confidence of the people” in those who 
offered the document for consideration, there was no basis for the document’s authority. 
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In this sense, the deployment of “authors of the Constitution” in Federalist 41 can be 
understood as an echo of the ratification debate surrounding it. In calling on the Constitution’s 
textual authors, Madison is invoking the only available unifying authority for the text prior to its 
popular approval. In the all-or-nothing battle for the Constitution, the authority of the 
Philadelphia Convention is necessary both strategically and textually to solidify the unity of and 
for the constitutional document.249 Meeting the “authors of the objection” on the field of 
language is not a momentary slip of Federalist identification as writers, but a step to bolster the 
Constitution by an appeal to a unifying authority. The threat to the constitutional text is a 
corresponding threat to its passage, and Madison meets the dual threat through mobilization of 
the “Author Function.”250 
Interpreted in this way, Madison’s “Publius,” Jay’s “A Citizen of New-York,” and 
Hanson’s “Aristides” were not rejecting the commitment to popular sovereignty evidenced in 
their fellow Federalists’ posture as writers.  Rather, their actions might be best comprehended as 
a studied observance of the consequences for notions of authority within a two-step ratification 
process. As Madison had noted himself, “a Constitution… is to be of no more consequence than 
the paper upon which it is written” until the people give it sanction.251 But in the midst of the 
ratification process the people could not provide the unifying authority required to see the 
Constitution through. And neither, without time to garner its earned reverence could the text of 
the Constitution itself. Prior to authorization by the people, Madison, Jay, and Hanson were 
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required to invoke the convention’s authority vis-à-vis the text – the author’s authority – in order 
to ensure the text’s integrity in the face of amendment. But they did so only for the liminal 
period of the ratification debate, acknowledging the people’s authority over the text upon 
ratification.  
 
Post-Ratification 
Post-ratification, Madison strove to emphasize the view that it was the people, via the 
ratification conventions, that provided authority to the Constitution. In 1796 he would reiterate 
the view that the Constitution was “nothing but a dead letter, until life and validity were breathed 
into it, by the voice of the people” and repeated this view for the remainder of his life.252 Taking 
to the floor of the House of Representatives in 1789, he proposed the amendments that formed 
the basis of the Bill of Rights. The first of Madison’s proposed amendments was an assertion of 
the people’s sovereign authority in relation to the Constitution; 
“First.  That there be prefixed to the Constitution a declaration, that all power is 
originally invested in, and consequently derived from the people.  
  That Government is instituted and ought to be exercised for the benefit of 
the people… 
  That the people have an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to 
reform or change their Government, whenever it be found adverse or inadequate 
to the purposes of its institution.”253 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
252 Quoted in Maier, Ratification, xvii. Levy asserts that after a sole exception in 1791, Madison would 
never claim any interpretative authority but the ratification conventions. (Leonard Levy, Original Intent 
and the Framer’s Constitution, (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2000), 7-8. 
253 James Madison, “Amendments to the Constitution,” (1789) in PJM digital. My emphasis. Madison’s 
language here chimes with (although perhaps exceeds) the Lockean notions of popular sovereignty found 
in the Second Treatise (John Locke, “The Second Treatise: An Essay Concerning the True Original, 
!
!
!!113!
As this commitment suggests, upon ratification of the Constitution the authority was understood 
to transfer from the framers to the people. While Madison would not endorse unrestrained 
intervention in the constituted order, he nevertheless was willing to recognize the people as 
entitled to reform the government at their will.254 The proposed, but never ratified,255 amendment 
acknowledges the idea, in line with Hanson’s, Jay’s, and Madison’s use of authorial authority, of 
a constitutional document, whose unity and authority was initially a product of a discrete group 
of framers, subsequently endorsed by the people. Although authorized by the people, it does not 
originate from them.  
The two-step model of constitutional creation used in 1787-88, with a text produced by 
convention and subsequently ratified by the people, and the deployment of authorship within this 
framework provides an explanation for the emergence in the Nineteenth century of the role of the 
framers as interpretive guides. Although invoked only until ratification, the authority of the 
Convention did not dissipate upon adoption of the Constitution. The Fourth of July orations of 
1788 reflected an understanding of the constitution-making process that celebrated the 
uniqueness of the Philadelphia Convention, and reduced the people’s role to acceptance of their 
wisdom. In New Haven, Simeon Baldwin claimed that  
“[n]ever before has the collected wisdom of any nation been permitted quietly to 
deliberate, and determine upon the form of government best adapted to the genius, 
views and circumstances of the citizens. Never before have the people of any 
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254 Too ready revision of the Constitution would risk the veneration required to establish its governing 
authority. Critical of Jefferson’s support for generational sovereignty, Madison wrote to his friend in 
1790, “[w]ould not a Government so often revised become too mutable and novel to retain that share of 
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nation been permitted, candidly to examine, and then deliberately adopt or reject 
the constitution proposed.”256 
Similarly, Savannah heard an oration in which the people were recipients of the convention’s 
Constitution; “This is handed to the people, - its contents are examined, and, after the utmost 
freedom of discussion, they come forward, and peaceably join in a new compact.”257 In 
Providence, Enos Hitchcock suggested that the honor of the people lay in their willingness to 
accept the convention’s work: 
“The abilities and political knowledge, - the patient deliberation and constant 
attention, - the mutual candour and condescention, which were exhibited by those 
who framed the Federal Constitution – and the similar spirit which actuated the 
most of those States in which it has been received, do immortal honour to our 
country…”258  
The possibility of prior amendment is absent from these narratives, along with the ceding of 
authority over the text to the people upon ratification. Tellingly, the humility of the Convention 
as mere writers makes no appearance, and people’s role is conceived as one of acceptance or 
rejection – to the point that in Boston the restriction of their role to one of binary choice is 
marshaled as further evidence of convention’s wisdom.259 
The Author-function and the Constitution 
 The assumption that the author is the first owner of a text is of importance to our 
examination of the Constitution insofar as the authorial relationship came to be understood as a 
tool in classification and interpretation. Already in the late Eighteenth century the “fixedness” of 
linguistic meaning was being challenged, calling forth a need to navigate texts with the help of 
externally supported modes of interpretation. The weakening faith in text alone reached to the 
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Constitution itself, challenging key assumptions associated with it and heightening the 
significance of the dual conceptions of authorship offered by Madison. 
As noted, Warner has argued that the Constitution’s power at the time of its ratification 
lay in its ability to tap into the understanding of texts that underpinned the republican printed 
sphere. The conception of print as disinterested contribution to public debate, drawing authority 
from no particular individual, provided a basis for regarding the constitutional text as non-reliant 
on hierarchical forms of authority. Without a reliance on external authority, the constitutional 
text could constitute the authority from which it derived its power. The people could partake in 
the creation of their own constituted government without recourse to a pre-existing and 
legitimizing authority. Echoing Derrida’s account of the signing of the Declaration of 
Independence,260 Warner describes the process in the following way: 
“By constituting the government, the people’s text literally constitutes the people. 
In the concrete form of these texts, the people decides the conditions of its own 
embodiment. The text itself becomes not only the supreme law, but the only 
original embodiment of the people.”261   
Underwriting the popular authorship of the Constitution, the text was seen as emanating from no 
one, deriving its authority from the very process by which it interpellated the people. “The 
Constitution’s printedness allows it to emanate from no one in particular, and thus from the 
people.”262 But positing the document as deriving from no one in particular requires the 
corresponding idea that its language holds “plain meaning”, universally comprehendible, if it is 
to operate as a shared basis of government. Just as the polemic interventions of the imperial 
crisis relied only on reason and persuasive power for their authority, so too must a non-authored 
Constitution appeal only internally for meaning. If it was to emanate from all, it also had to be 
comprehended by all.  
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By the time of the Constitution’s creation, such confidence in the universality of language 
was already receding. Howe’s account of Anti-federalist suspicions of Federalist “up-dating” of 
republican values has been noted above. Howe suggests that by the late eighteenth century 
confidence in the universality of language was already waning among those forming the 
Federalists. They increasingly viewed language as historically situated and open to multiple 
interpretations and so saw it as a weak protection for individual liberties, a position reflected in 
Madison’s oft quoted distain for “parchment barriers.”263 Such suspicion was, Howe argues, 
written into the Constitution itself with the inclusion of an amendment process designed to 
enable the modification of constitutional language.264 Gradually replacing the republican belief 
in the essential permanence of textual meaning, new notions of the contingency of linguistic 
meaning were emerging. 
Declining faith in the “fixedness” of linguistic meaning had consequences for the manner 
in which texts could be understood, but it severely mischaracterize the early period of the 
Republic to suggest it was a period in which all written emanations were problematized. Rather, 
the period was one in which confidence in language as unproblematic across time weakened. 
Noah Webster’s work in forging American attitudes to language exemplifies the hesitant nature 
of this movement. On one hand, Webster would decry the “corruptions and errors which prevail 
in the English language”, highlighting regional differences in meaning.265 On the other, he 
worked to “show how far truth and accuracy of thinking are concerned in a clear understanding 
of words,”266 which is to say that a clear understanding could be assigned to each word. Indeed, 
his dictionary project (and Johnson’s) reflects a belief in the ability to fix, even if temporarily, 
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the meanings of words.267 Nonetheless, with regards to the Constitution the trend in the early 
Republic was away from the idea that words (or texts) in themselves could be relied upon to 
communicate a single universal meaning challenged the republican view and undermined the 
notion that interpretation, as an active component of reading, has no place in comprehension.  
 This can be seen in the approaches taken to the Constitution in the main legal 
commentaries of the period. Starting with Wilson’s Lectures on Law legal thinking moved 
steadily away from a trust in the text alone. Wilson projected a vision of a highly participatory 
society, grounded in his strong belief in the people as the source of sovereign power.268 The 
Constitution was the creation of the people: 
“From their authority the constitution originates: for their safety and felicity it is 
established: in their hands it is as clay in the hands of the potter: they have the 
right to mould, to preserve, to improve, to refine, and to finish it as they 
please.”269  
Consequently, it was the people who exercised final authority over the Constitution and provided 
it with meaning. A key element of the people’s authority over the Constitution was that it met the 
standard that Wilson hoped for all laws – “simplicity and plainness and precision should mark 
the texture of a law. It claims the obedience ― it should be level to the understanding of all.”270 
While Wilson argued that all law should be rescued from complexity that had been foisted upon 
it, he was pleased to note that “[t]his manner has been already adopted, with success, in the 
Constitution of the United States.”271 Indeed, this simplicity of language ensures the citizen 
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“knows those duties and those rights” necessary for fulfilling his role as “a just and an 
independent part” of the community.272 
 Tucker’s 1803 edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries shared much the same outlook as 
Wilson’s Lectures. Tucker noted, as Wilson had not in any extended manner, the novelty of 
America’s use of written constitutions. The writtenness of the Constitution advanced democratic 
pretensions in Tucker’s view by defining powers such that they could easily be referred to. 
Without a text  
“the disquisition of social rights… is a task, equally above ordinary capacities, 
and incompatable [sic] with the ordinary pursuits, of the body of the people.”273 
He continues, 
“But, as it is necessary to the preservation of a free government… that every man 
should know his own rights, it is also indispensably necessary that he should be 
able, on all occasions, to refer to them.”274 
While Tucker, given the decade of constitutional debates witnessed by the time of writing, could 
not be as sanguine as Wilson regarding the simplicity of the text, he nevertheless displayed 
considerable faith in its permanence of meaning. Equating written-ness with permanence, he 
declared the United States the herald of a new era in which popular sovereignty might truly exist, 
in contradistinction to those 
“governments whose original foundations cannot be traced to the certain and 
undeniable criterion of an original written compact .... whose forms as well as 
principles are subject to perpetual variation from the usurpations of the strong, or 
the concessions of the weak; where tradition supplies the place of written 
evidence; where every new construction is in fact a new edict; and where the 
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fountain of power hath been immemorially transferred from the people, to the 
usurpers of their natural rights.”275   
Admittedly, Tucker’s broader aim, of advancing the Virginian states’ rights mantra, lead 
him to conceive the Constitution in essentially limiting terms, but despite these ideological 
commitments, he exhibited a recurring faith in the exactitude of these limits. In drawing on the 
example of congressional powers, he argues that they are “clearly limited and restrained.”276 The 
“object” of government 
“was defined, it's principles ascertained; its powers limited, and fixed; its structure 
organized; and the functions of every part of the machine so clearly designated, as 
to prevent any interference.”277 
Elsewhere powers are “definite,”278 “prescribed,”279 or “defined and limited” in “the visible 
constitution,” which is to say textual constitution.280 It is by a faith in “the general use of letters” 
that a people can effectively restrain their government. Echoing Wilson’s commitment to popular 
sovereignty, Tucker believes that it is text alone that provides the permanency that enables the 
people to be sovereign. He implicitly assumes that text alone is unchanging, a vehicle for the 
people’s unchanging delegation of authority.  
 By the publication of two later flagship commentaries of the pre-Jacksonian republic this 
faith in the simplicity and fixed nature of constitutional text had ebbed away. In both Kent’s and 
Story’s works the constitutional text was problematized. For Kent, the minimal text left space for 
practice and judicial opinion to fill out detail. For Story, however, the text was constrained by the 
inherent fallibility of human language. 
 James Kent published the first edition of his Commentaries on American Law in 1826 
after two decades of developing precedent had progressed the law beyond Tucker’s observations. 
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Kent, reflecting a more unionist sentiment than Tucker, would see the Constitution not as setting 
out clear constraints, but rather setting out the broad framework of federal government onto 
which particularities could be projected over time. Seeking to examine the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court, Kent looked not primarily to the constitutional document for guidance, but 
established practice and judicial decisions.281 The text alone was insufficient to acquire a full 
meaning of the Constitution. Indeed, Kent conceived of the Constitution as requiring 
construction in order to be applied as a constraint on institutions. The text could not be 
understood without the intervention of the judiciary: 
“The Constitution is the act of the people, speaking in their original character, and 
defining the permanent conditions of the social alliance; and there can be no 
doubt on the point with us, that every act of the legislative power, contrary to the 
true intent and meaning of the Constitution, is absolutely null and void. The 
judicial department is the proper power in the government to determine whether a 
statute be or be not constitutional. The interpretation or construction of the 
Constitution is as much a judicial act, and requires the exercise of the same legal 
discretion, as the interpretation or construction of a law.” 282 
Far from the plain and simple Constitution of Wilson, by the late 1820’s the text alone was 
meaningful only after the application modes of “interpretation.” However, Kent’s Commentaries 
were aimed at the legal profession283 and presented the Constitution as a facet of the law to be 
understood, largely spurning the opportunity to grapple with philosophical and theoretical 
questions arising from the nature of the Constitution itself.284 
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By the time Story wrote his 1833 Commentaries on the Constitution, in his telling the 
constitutional text was neither simple nor plain, and as a result an intentionalist-based method of 
interpretation was required. The fragility of the text itself forced Story to reach for a hermeneutic 
support, and in so doing he forged a mode of interpretation in which the Philadelphia 
Convention’s claim to authorial authority was implicitly invoked.  
While suggesting that the text was central to understanding the Constitution, Story 
believed that only through a “careful survey of the language of the constitution itself”285 could 
the meaning be ascertained. Notwithstanding that the document was “made by the people, made 
for the people, and is responsible to the people”, Story moved in his Commentaries to “consider 
the rules, by which it ought to be interpreted.”286 The move to modes of interpretation is an 
acknowledgement of the weaknesses of assuming that the text conveys a single meaning without 
external supports – and a mechanism by which expertise is invoked so as to undermine the 
people’s claim to constitutional authority. Crucially, for Story one could not even suppose that 
the people at the time of ratification read the text in the same way: 
“The constitution was adopted by the people of the United States; and it was 
submitted to the whole upon a just survey of its provisions, as they stood in the 
text itself. In different states and in different conventions, different and very 
opposite objections are known to have prevailed; and might well be presumed to 
prevail. Opposite interpretations, and different explanations of different 
provisions, may well be presumed to have been presented in different bodies, to 
remove local objections, or to win local favour. And there can be no certainty, 
either that the different state conventions in ratifying the constitution, gave the 
same uniform interpretation to its language, or that, even in a single state 
convention, the same reasoning prevailed with a majority, much less with the 
whole of the supporters of it.” 287 
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The cause of variation was, as Madison had noted in The Federalist,288 the inherent frailty of 
human language. Story argued that “the necessary imperfection of all human language” results in 
words “acquiring different shades of meaning, each of which is equally appropriate, and equally 
legitimate.”289 The ambiguity of human language is further exacerbated by the passage of time, 
whereby “[n]o person can fail to remark the gradual deflections in the meanings of words from 
one age to another.”290 As such the text itself was not an objective standard of meaning. 
Despite this, Story was tied to the aim of identifying one authoritative constitutional 
meaning. Without this single meaning the Constitution would be exposed to fluctuation and the 
passions of the moment, stripping it of its ability to constrain violations of rights. Without a 
single meaning the document was open to contestation, subject to capture by whichever group 
most forcefully articulated its preferred reading.291 Shorn of its authority, its ability to maintain 
the Union was void. For Story, “[t]he constitution is not to be subject to such fluctuations. It is to 
have a fixed, uniform, permanent construction… the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever.”292 In 
the face of the weaknesses of language, to fulfill its function the Constitution was required to 
sustain a single, authoritative interpretation. 
To do this he acts as if the framers’ authorship is co-equal with the people’s in terms of 
textual legitimacy but predominant in terms of meaning.293 To not do so risks the possibility of 
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293 Scholarship on Story’s mode of constitutional interpretation, and the Commentaries in particular, has 
come to various conclusions. In no small way due to the complexity of Story’s chapter on constitutional 
interpretation, subsequent accounts have varied widely on what Story’s core aim was. H. Jefferson Powell 
has argued that Story was motivated by the “actual and efficient functioning” of the constitutional system, 
placing the judiciary in the role of creating some akin to an constitutional common law grounded in the 
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an authoritative meaning, and so he raises the text itself to the level of authority while attributing 
it to both the framer and the people. However, Story identifies the intent of the framers as the 
guide to constitutional meaning. Where Madison’s use of the authors’ authority represented a 
temporary response to the exigencies of ratification, Story’s operates as an enabling device for 
interpretation. Madison had temporally demarked the two meanings of author, but Story utilized 
their ambiguous relationship to the end of textual exegesis. Where Madison (and his readers) saw 
constitutional authorship as a two stage process in which the later stage gave “meaning,” Story 
reverses this in reality such that it is the initial stage which provides “intent.” The intention of the 
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constitutional text. Raoul Berger responded critically to Powell’s account, conceding that Story did 
oppose Jefferson’s “originalism” but also pointing out that Story advocated the use of multiple sources, 
prominently including The Federalist Papers and the actions of the Philadelphia Convention, in order to 
identify the meaning of the text. Alternate readings have been offered by James McClellan and Stephen 
B. Presser, who both posit that Story sought to outline a natural law-based Constitution - although 
McClellan does note that the Marshall Court bound itself to original intent when known. James W. 
Ducayet’s recent examination of the use of The Federalist Papers has concluded that Story sought not 
framer intent but an “insightful framework of political theory” in utilizing the essays. However, Gary L. 
McDowell’s most recent evaluation of Story argues that, influenced by Francis Lieber’s thoughts on the 
infirmity of language, Story adhered to “originalism” as “a textually based approach to interpreting the 
fundamental law.” Story’s biographer, R. Kent Newmyer, characterizes the Justice’s view as 
incorporating a role for the judge, but only when text and framer intent were ambiguous. The argument 
that I will outline here is that Story followed Madison in marshaling authorial (framer) intent in order to 
locate definitive meaning, which could then be entrenched by judicial precedent. The significance of the 
Marshall Court, and Marshall in particular, in his discussion relates to that second movement. It would be 
disingenuous to claim that Story utilized only ideas of framer intent in outlining a system of 
interpretation, but I would argue, insofar as he sought to negotiate the frailty of constitutional language, 
framer intent was a crucial tool. Contextualizing the Commentaries within a vigorous debate over the 
states’ compact school of “originalism”, Newmyer notes Story’s nationalizing goal was nonetheless 
grounded in ideas of framer intent; “It could be argued that this nationalist, capitalist construction of the 
Constitution only followed the general intent of the framers. Story’s Commentaries, as we have seen, 
argued precisely that, and he was probably correct.” H. Jefferson Powell, “Joseph Story’s Commentaries 
on the Constitution: A Belated Review” The Yale Law Journal 94 (1985): 1298; James W. Ducayet, 
“Publius and Federalism: On the Use and Abuse of The Federalist in Constitutional Interpretation”, New 
York University Law Review 68 (1993): 830; Gary L. McDowell, The Language of Law and the 
Foundations of American Constitutionalism, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010): 363; R. 
Kent Newmyer, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story: Statesman of the Old Republic, (Chapel Hill, NC: 
The University of North Carolina Press, 1985): 198; Raoul Berger, “”Original Intention” in Historical 
Perspective”, George Washington Law Review 54 (1985): 320-324; Stephen B. Presser, “Some Alarming 
Aspects of the Legacies of Judicial Review and of John Marshall”, William and Mary Law Review 43 
(2002, No. 4): 1510-1511; James McClellan, Joseph Story and the American Constitution: A Study in 
Political and Legal Thought, (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1971). 
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authors is to be the guiding principle of constitutional interpretation - and it will be the textual-
authors who give meaning to the document. 
 Story’s introduction of the author-function is necessarily disguised, lest he delegitimize 
the popular Constitution, but his reliance upon it is recurrent throughout the Commentaries in his 
recourse to The Federalist Papers. He cites two principal sources in the Preface to the 
Commentaries, the first being The Federalist Papers and the second is the jurisprudence of John 
Marshall. But if Marshall’s work “expounded the application and limits or its powers and 
functions with unrivalled profoundness and felicity,” the Chief Justice could do so only by 
following the work of The Federalist Papers “out to their ultimate results and boundaries.”294 
Marshall builds upon the “incomparable commentary of three of the greatest statesmen of their 
age” who, with “with admirable fullness and force,” laid out the structure and organization of the 
national government.295 If Marshall is invoked as guiding light in Story’s account, it is only so as 
to bring  
“before the reader the true view of its powers maintained by its founders and 
friends, and confirmed and illustrated by the actual practice of the 
government.”296   
Story’s goal in his Commentaries is emphatically not to present a new mode of constitutional 
interpretation, but to faithfully articulate the meaning given to the constitutional text by its 
framers: 
“The expositions to be found in the work are less to be regarded, as my own 
opinions, than as those of the great minds, which framed the Constitution, or 
which have been from time to time called upon to administer it.”297 
Story’s personal fondness for Marshall leads him to recur to a dual process in describing his 
work. The framers framed, and Marshall expounded, and each is significant. However, 
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294 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution, v, vi. 
295 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution, v. 
296 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution, vi. 
297 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution, vi. 
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Marshall’s presence in this narrative has no real bearing on Story’s later attempt to understand 
the Constitution only as a text. Marshall’s work (here) is post-textual, attempting to wrest a 
meaning from the text. Marshall is himself faced with the same unstable text and the need to 
delineate a single meaning from it.298 That Marshall, and the Supreme Court, are not regarded by 
Story as further competitors in the market of constitutional meaning is because their work is to 
distill the meaning once the authoritative mode of interpretation is identified, not to offer one 
themselves. To extend the market analogy, the Supreme Court is here the consumer, not the 
seller, of constitutional meaning. Marshall picks from what is on offer, and applies and then 
extends its application. For Story, the quality purveyors of constitutional meaning are the 
framers, and more particularly, the authors of The Federalist Papers.  
However, as noted, the framers stand in only in an indirect manner. Story acts as if the 
1787 Convention was the Constitution’s author, but repeatedly says that the people are, in fact, 
the constitutional author. The Constitution is “to be construed, as a frame, or fundamental law of 
government, established by the PEOPLE of the United States.”299 Nonetheless what guides 
interpretation is the “view of the constitution [that] was taken by its framers and friends, and was 
submitted to the people before its adoption.”300 Examples of this reasoning are abundant in the 
text; On popular sovereignty: 
“The convention determined, that the fabric of American empire ought to rest and 
should rest on the solid basis of the consent of the people.”301 
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298 Of course Marshall did not face exactly the same problem as Story, having been a principal actor 
within the ratification and so presumably having an already formed conception of what the text meant, at 
the time of its creation. Moreover, as we shall see in a later chapter, Story’s depiction of Marshall as 
seeking the intent of the framers in his opinions is itself a highly contestable one. 
299 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution, 393. (original emphasis) 
300 With reference to the supremacy of judiciary, supported by four separate citations from The Federalist 
Papers. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution, 360. 
301 Once more supported by four separate citations from The Federalist Papers. Story, Commentaries on 
the Constitution, 447. 
!
!
!
!
126!
On the merits of the Preamble: 
“There does not seem any reason why, in a fundamental law or constitution of 
government, an equal attention should not be given to the intention of the framers, 
as stated in the preamble.”302  
On the power of Congress to tax: 
“The constitution was, from its very origin, contemplated to be the frame of a 
national government, of special and enumerated powers, and not of general and 
unlimited powers. This is apparent, as will be presently seen, from the history of 
the proceedings of the convention, which framed it.”303  
And on the issue of a national bank, where Story supposes that the Convention must have shared 
the (subsequently established) view of its constitutionality, and retroactively applies the “correct” 
interpretation to the Convention: 
“Indeed, it is most manifest, that it never could have been contemplated by the 
convention, that congress should, in no case, possess the power to erect a 
corporation.”304 
This continual recourse to the convention, while simultaneously proclaiming the Constitution to 
be created by the people, is in effect the complication of Madison’s carefully erected notion of 
two-stage authorship. Story offers rhetorical support for the authority of the people, while acting 
as if the framers are the unifying authority for the text.  
Where Madison and his readers could navigate two registers by holding the authors as 
temporary authorities until the people’s ratification, necessarily temporally distinct, the 
imperative of the unstable constitutional text and his rejection of the belief that all ratifiers held 
the same textual understanding leaves Story no such luxury. Story operates within an 
environment in which authorship and the text are drawn together, locating authority in the 
authors-of-the-text. It is no longer the people that give meaning to a text written by others – 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
302 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution, 444. 
303 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution…Volume 2, 369. 
304 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution…Volume 3, 133. 
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Story, reflecting the mindset sketched out by Foucault, uses the authors in order to unify and 
cohere the text.305 Mapping the burgeoning liberal notion of authorship and a text-centric mode 
of constitutional interpretation onto the dual notions of authorship, Story breaks down the two-
stage model of constitutional founding which vitally underpinned Madison’s account. The text is 
the Constitution, and the textual-authors give it meaning – in determining the correct 
interpretation of the Constitution one must first turn to the Convention, or more specifically to 
The Federalist Papers.306 
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305 Story had previously indicated receptiveness to intentionalist approaches to literary criticism. For 
examples of his attributing texts to the personality of their authors see Joseph Story, “Discourse 
pronounce at Cambridge, before the Phi Bet Kappa Society, on the Anniversary Celebration, August 31, 
1826” in Joseph Story, The Miscellaneous Writings, Literary, Critical, Juridical, and Political of Joseph 
Story, LL. D., Now First Collected, (Boston: James Munroe and Company, 1835): 3-33. 
306 However, it would overstate this argument to depict Story as having transcended completely the earlier 
understanding of the Constitution. Indeed the ideas discussed above only developed gradually. In 1831 
Story offered his views on the education of young boys in the science of politics with the statement that: 
“In the first place, as to the constitution of the United States; (and similar considerations 
will apply, with at least equal force, to all state constitutions;) the text is contained in a 
few pages, and speaks a language, which is generally clear and intelligible to any youth 
of the higher classes at our common schools, before the close of academic studies. Nay, it 
may be stated with confidence, that any boy, of ordinary capacity, may be made fully to 
understand it, between his fourteenth and sixteenth year, if he has an instructor of 
reasonable ability and qualifications.” 
But if the text was apparently simple enough for an educated youth to understand, in the same address he 
offered the earlier view that: 
“In the interpretation of constitutional questions alone, a vast field is open for discussion 
and argument. The text, indeed, is singularly brief and expressive. But that very brevity 
becomes of itself a source of obscurity; and that very expressiveness, while it gives 
prominence to the leading objects, leaves an ample space of debatable ground, upon 
which the champions of all opinions may contend, with alternate victory and defeat.” 
Perhaps this earlier piece reflects Story’s developing ideas, or the beginnings of the realization that the 
textual Constitution must be inherently unstable. Whatever the position it holds with the trajectory of 
Story’s thought, it is striking the degree to which these two extracts of the same speech contradict each 
other; the first affirming the “plain and simple” text, the second the weaknesses of America’s 
constitutional language. Joseph Story, “Lecture on the Science of Government; Delivered before the 
American Institute of Instruction, August, 1831” in Joseph Story, The Miscellaneous Writings, Literary, 
Critical, Juridical, and Political of Joseph Story, LL. D., Now First Collected, (Boston: James Munroe 
and Company, 1835): 159, 153.  
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Madison’s Papers and Constitutional Intention 
To suggest that Story’s conflation of the people-as-author and the framers-as-authors 
within the realm of textual authorship was the final word on the matter would be to overstate the 
case. Story’s move did not radically shift the nature of understandings of the Constitution such 
that the idea of popular authorship was abandoned. Nonetheless, it did reflect a changing 
conception of the constitutional text. John Quincy Adams would still be able in 1839 to describe 
the people as “the authors of the Constitution” and in the same speech suggest that Hamilton was 
“almost entitled to be called jointly with Madison, the author of the Constitution itself.”307 But it 
would be increasingly less the case that the Constitution was regarded as only comprehendible 
with recourse to the latter. 
 Much of the post-Revolutionary history contains something of a temporal serendipity, 
and in keeping with this it would be exactly fifty years after the Convention wrote the 
Constitution that its claim to authorship would become the subject of legislative debate. Of all 
the framers, Madison rose to greatest prominence and was seen as the foremost among them.308 
In 1837, the death of Madison had opened up the possibility of acquiring his papers, and it was to 
Congress that Dolly Madison would offer first refusal. The ensuing Senate debate provided a 
forum in which Senators laid out their understanding of Madison’s, and the framer’s, relationship 
with the Constitution.  
On 18th February 1837, Senator Robbins rose to speak on the joint resolution for the 
purchase of Madison’s papers, comparing the founder’s work in political science to that of 
Francis Bacon’s on analytics. That comparison, if apt, would alone seem to make Madison’s 
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307 John Quincy Adams, The Jubilee of the Constitution. A Discourse delivered at the request of the New 
York Historical Society, in the City of the New York, on Tuesday, the 30th of April 1839, (New York: 
Samuel Colman, 1839): 47, 107. 
308 Indeed, such was Madison’s privileged position that a correspondent to The Banner of Constitution in 
1830 felt compelled to remind his countrymen “that Mr. Madison was not the sole author of the Federal 
Constitution.” Sulpicius, “Strictures upon the “Commentaries on American Law, by James Kent, Esq. L. 
L. D.” No. XIII”, The Banner of the Constitution, August 25, 1830, 60. 
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work worthy of purchase, but Robbins used this only as an introduction to his actual argument. 
The purchase of Madison’s work was necessary for the insight it provided on the Constitution; 
“Those who think (if any think) that the result itself – namely, the constitution – 
of itself and by itself, will be enough for the instruction of mankind on this 
subject, are much mistaken. For there is a vast difference between the knowledge 
which is acquired analytically, and that which is acquired synthetically; the latter 
is but isolated knowledge; the former is knowledge that is the consequence of 
other knowledge. Synthesis gives to us a general truth, but acquired in a mode that 
is barren of other fruit; analysis not only gives to us the same general truth, but 
puts us on the track of invention and discovery….it places us upon an eminence 
that overtops and overlooks the general truth in the wide survey it commands and 
gives to us; and as to that general truth, it enables us not only to comprehend it 
more perfectly, but to apply it more successfully.”309 
To know the Constitution perfectly requires not merely exposure to the document, but also an 
understanding of how and why it was composed such, to know and understand the intentions 
behind it – to know and understand Madison’s intent. Senator Calhoun took the opportunity to 
welcome the praise of Madison, but also to question the constitutionality of the purchase. While 
he saved the full force of his argument for the resolution’s third reading, he offered the origins of 
his opposition to Robbin’s assertions in intentionalist form - he believed that Madison would 
have himself regarded the purchase as beyond the powers of Congress. 
 When debate was reopened on the third reading of the resolution in the Senate, Calhoun 
would renew his opposition, but the case for purchase (and against) would be even more firmly 
grounded in arguments assuming the value of intentionalist knowledge of the Constitution. 
Calhoun’s rejection of the constitutional authority to purchase the papers would itself be based 
on the positions adopted by Madison. Accepting that the “invaluable papers” would throw “a 
light upon the constitution which had never been shed upon it before,” Calhoun nevertheless 
questioned the role of Congress in providing for their diffusion. For Calhoun, the “opinions of 
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309 Register of Debates in Congress 13,  (Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1837): 851. Robbins would also 
add that it would also be an appropriate expression of the nation’s gratitude to the figure, who aside from 
Washington, “will ever shine with a purer, with a brighter, [and] more inextinguishable lustre” than the 
rest of “the constellation… of American worthies.” Register of Debates in Congress 13, 852. 
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Mr. Madison” which were his very “text book… demanded that he should not” abandon his 
opposition.310 Calhoun’s opposition was met by a wall of defiant supporters of the purchase, 
starting with Senator Preston’s overtly intentionalist stance, in which he declared he was  
“by no means disposed to construe the constitution merely by the words it 
contained, but he through it exceedingly desirable to know the views and 
intentions of its framers, which must be regarded as the only true spirit of the 
instrument.”311 
Collapsing any authoritative distance between Madison and the Constitution, Preston would state 
“that these papers were part and parcel of the constitution.” Webster wholly concurred in the 
assessment of the value of both a work by Madison and of a record of the intent of the 
Convention.312 Crittenden would suggest the reason he  
“was desirous of obtaining this and all other productions of Mr. Madison was the 
conviction that we could nowhere find more light as to the just interpretation of 
the powers of the constitution.”313 
Calhoun was forced to respond, making further recourse to Madison’s intent,314 before Senator 
Rives would, in the last substantive contribution to the debate, refute the problematic nature of 
the bequests charged by Madison to the manuscripts by invoking the author’s claim to be first 
among the framers: 
“The nation, as the matter stands, are, in fact, his legataries. He has bequeathed to 
them the constitution, of which he was the chief founder and framer…” 315 
In the vote that followed, the resolution was approved by a vote of 32 to 14.  
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310 Register of Debates in Congress 13, 859. 
311 Register of Debates in Congress 13, 859-860. 
312 Register of Debates in Congress 13, 861-862. 
313 Register of Debates in Congress 13, 864. My emphasis. 
314 “…his regret was yet heightened, because a compliance with her request [Dolly Madison’s] involved a 
plain and palpable violation of that rule in the interpretation of the constitution which Mr. Madison 
himself had laid down. …He then went on in a course of argument to show that the appropriation 
involved a violation of the principles laid down by Mr. Madison with respect to limited powers.” Register 
of Debates in Congress 13, 866. 
315 Register of Debates in Congress 13, 870. 
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Interestingly, only one Senator protested the purchase without recourse to Madison’s 
intentions. Senator Niles instead raised the dangers of Congress giving one account of the 
Constitution the status of being “officially’ approved, and of the prospect of that account being 
subjected to a congressionally-owned copyright and therefore subject to suppress by that single 
body. “But can Congress take upon itself to decide what political information is proper to be 
distributed among the people, and then become the publisher and distributer of the works 
containing the same, at the expense of the national Treasury?” That this objection secured no 
hold within the debate is perhaps indicative of how strongly the assumption of one single, 
framer-led interpretation of the Constitution had taken hold.316  
 Throughout the debate operates the assumption that Madison’s Papers (and the “Reports” 
of the Convention contained within them) are of value as a consequence of his privileged 
position vis-à-vis the Constitution. This position is essentially one of authorship, and it is here 
that intentionalist textual attitudes are applied to the Constitution. The navigation of a text is 
understood primarily as an act of retracing the steps of the author and thereby gleaning their 
meaning. While Senator Niles might challenge the wisdom of ascribing such authority to an 
individual (or group) his is a lone voice, even in opposition to the resolution at hand.317 If Story 
had problematized authorship of the text, the congressional debates of 1837 signaled that 
substantial resolution would be in favor of the dominance of the author-as-writer as the 
Constitution’s interpretative authority. 
 
Conclusion 
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316 Register of Debates in Congress 13, 863. It is striking too, that Niles displays the only resistance to the 
idea that Madison has a copyright to these papers. Throughout the arguments premised on intent is an 
unquestioned assumption of Madison’s authorial property rights.  
317 See above footnote. 
!
!
!
!
132!
 Walter Benjamin’s discussion of authorship in the essay “The Author as Producer” 
suggested that in revolutionary texts the apparent distinction between literary worth and political 
purpose could be collapsed. Positing that the truly revolutionary text would actually fulfill an 
organizing function, Benjamin could claim that “a work that exhibits the correct tendency must 
of necessity have every other quality.”318 Accepting this premise might render the above 
discussion of writers and authors irrelevant. If the democratic value of a text is located in its form 
and content, there would be no requirement for a mechanism by which to popularly approval of a 
democratic constitution. Neither could appeals to philosophical soundness of the document be 
abstracted from its claim to speak for the people. But the Americans of the 1780s chose not to 
commit themselves to ideal of continuous revolutionary struggle that underpins Benjamin’s 
understanding of authorship. Instead they followed Paine’s “common sense” advice and installed 
the law as king.319 In doing so they faced the task of purposively writing and enshrining popular 
constitutions within apparently self-organizing polities. To this end, starting in Massachusetts 
and carried forth to the federal Constitution, they engaged in a two-step process of constitutional 
creation in which framers put forth a document for popular, extralegal ratification. 
But, as Madison recognized, this commitment to a process of ratification that separates 
the temporal moment of constitutional document creation from the conferment on it of 
constitutional authority, leaves the document in a liminal state. In the temporal space between 
creation and ratification the constitutional document hovers in limbo, lacking popular sanction 
and vulnerable to revision or fragmentation. In this moment, for Cottee Hanson, Jay, and 
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318 Walter Benjamin, “The Author as Producer” in Walter Benjamin, Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, 
Autobiographical Writings, ed. with intro. Peter Demetz and trans. Edmund Jephcott, (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1978), 221.   
319 Thomas Paine, “Common Sense” in Thomas Paine, The Thomas Paine Reader, eds. Michael Foot & 
Isaac Kramnick, (London: Penguin, 1987), 92.  
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Madison at least, the articulation of authorial authority is both necessary and proper as a response 
to dismemberment, an invocation witnessing the as yet undemocratic nature of the document 
whilst simultaneously anticipating its democratic sanction. However, the quoted Fourth of July 
narratives suggest that in utilizing a privileged relationship between the framers and the 
constitutional text, Madison, Jay, and Hanson planted the seeds of a constitutional authority in 
the author that would calcify as the text of the document became subjected to interpretative 
debates. The weak claim to authority inherent in the metaphor of a clerk was unable to carry over 
into the post-ratification world of textual exegesis. The emergence of a veneration for and 
mythology of the founders that had begun with the Revolution continued to develop, and as it did 
so it made room and rationale for the framers as great lawgivers. As we have seen, as early as 
1810-11, newspaper debates over the renewal of the National Bank’s charter were marked by 
reference to the authoritative intention of the framers. By the 1830s, the notion of the 
Constitution as the framer’s document held such purchase that the President, Martin Van Buren, 
would affirm his allegiance to this ideal in his inaugural address.320 
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Chapter 3: The Constitution as Authored: The rise of the Founders 
“It is a species of political vanity which leads us to think ourselves wiser in our day and 
generation than our fathers: and to be unwilling to be guided by their counsels.”321 
“It is a question in casuistry how long one generation can bind another.”322  
Writing the preface to his history of the Constitution in 1854, George Ticknor Curtis tried 
to assess the significance of his endeavour. His book was a task, he reasoned, unlike that of 
writing a history of monarchy as the Constitution was “a living code, for the perpetuation of a 
system of free government, which the people of each succeeding generation must administer for 
themselves.”323 Nonetheless, the transformation of the United States since its founding was due 
in no small part, in Ticknor Curtis’s estimation, to “the great code of civil government which the 
fathers of our republic wrought out of the very perils by which they were surrounded.”324 More 
than a happy consequence of the Revolution though, Ticknor Curtis saw the Constitution as the 
Revolution: 
“Let any man compare the condition of this country at the peace of 1783, and 
during the four years which followed that event, with its present position… He 
will see a people who had at first achieved nothing but independence, and had 
contributed nothing to the cause of free government, but the example of their 
determination to enjoy it, founding institutions to which mankind may look for 
hope, for encouragement and light.”325 
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321 Speech of Mr. Miner, of Pennsylvania in Defence of the Constitution, Delivered in the House of 
Representatives, March 28, 1826, (Washington: Gales & Seaton, 1826), 14. 
322 “ART. III – Story’s Constitutional Law”, The North American Review 38, (January 1834): 67.  
323 George Ticknor Curtis, History of the Origins, Formation, and Adoption of the Constitution of the 
United States; with Notices of its principal Framers, Volume One, (New York: Harper and Brothers, 
1860), x. The preface was written in 1854. 
324 Ticknor Curtis, History of the Origins, Formation, and Adoption of the Constitution of the United 
States, xiv. 
325 Ticknor Curtis, History of the Origins, Formation, and Adoption of the Constitution of the United 
States, xii-xiv. 
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The Constitution, for Ticknor Curtis, was the American Revolution, and also the cause of the 
rapid success of the country since then – in only “the span of one mortal life.”326 Indeed, the 
continuation of the American polity was intertwined with the fate of the Constitution; “Every 
line of it is as operative and as binding to-day as it was when the government was first set in 
motion by its provisions, and no part of it can fall into neglect or decay while that government 
continues to exist.”327 
 Ticknor Curtis’s reflections on the Constitution are laden with apparent contradictions. 
The Constitution is both “a living code” and composed of lines that are binding and 
unchangeable. It must be administered by each generation anew, but was wrought out of 
particular times by particular men. It must be understood in relation to a historicized, storied 
past, although one that only spans one lifetime. It is, in short, historical and contemporary, 
mythical and tangible. 
 These views were not unique to Ticknor Curtis, but reflected a broad social 
understanding of the Constitution in the middle of the Antebellum period. After the American 
Revolution, the generation following the revolutionaries was forced to negotiate its relationship 
with those momentous events.328  This chapter traces these attitudes through contemporary 
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326 Ticknor Curtis, History of the Origins, Formation, and Adoption of the Constitution of the United 
States, xiv. 
327 Ticknor Curtis, History of the Origins, Formation, and Adoption of the Constitution of the United 
States, x-xi. 
328 This generation’s moniker is somewhat disputed. Joyce Appleby has identified them in her own work 
as the first generation of Americans. At the time, the preferred designation was the “rising” generation, 
and some scholars have followed this contemporaneous usage. In this chapter I have made use of “second 
generation” to describe those that came of age after the major events of the founding period and self-
identified as the inheritors of its settlement. I do so in order to emphasize their position as actors 
subsequent to the Revolution and Constitution, and whose sense of (national) identity was informed by it. 
Joyce Appleby, Inheriting the Revolution: The First Generation of Americans, (Cambridge, MA: The 
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discussions and the celebrations on the Fourth of July, illustrating how the second generation’s 
response to this challenge created a political culture in which the Constitution came to be 
sanctified. This second generation was forced to construct a politics around – for the first time in 
modernity – the existence of a democratic-republican founding. Republican thought urged the 
importance of maintaining and returning to the virtue of the founding moment. But if that virtue 
was ultimately evinced by the act of creating a new republic, how could subsequent generations 
express such virtue without challenging the institutions of the founding. How could that ultimate 
virtue be expressed without violating the founding? Borrowing from Levin’s notion of 
“heritage,” the chapter will show that in locating themselves in relation to the Revolution the 
second generation of Americans crafted a mode of national remembrance in which the founding 
period was held simultaneously immediate and distant.329 Positioned in what Len Travers has 
described as a “liminal period,”330 the founders of the republic and their actions took on a 
mythical stature against which subsequent actors would assess themselves. Caught between filial 
loyalty to the founders and a desire for achievements that equaled the fathers’, this generation 
would construe preservation of the Constitution as a heroic act. As such the maintenance of the 
original Constitution became a gauge of identity with the republican values of the founding. The 
consequences of these trends were the increasing centrality of the Constitution within American 
political culture and an understanding of the Constitution itself as closely linked to the individual 
founders as both the cause of and evidence for their brilliance.331  
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The chapter examines responses to the founding, initially by providing a theoretical 
discussion of the problems presented by an actual founding for republican notions of virtue. It 
then provides a historical consideration of the manner in which the founding generation sought to 
manage their legacy. In so doing they began the process of sanctification of the founding which 
made the republican conceptual problem more acute for second generation Americans. The final 
section, the bulk of the chapter, traces the subsequent response of the second generation as 
asserted in Fourth of July orations and toasts.  
 
Republican Foundings and the American Founding 
The emerging relationship of the second generation to the Constitution tracks a refocusing 
of the republican notion of virtue within the early Republic. As the theatre of political action 
moved from constitutional creation, and to the construction of a political life under the 
Constitution, so too did civic virtue shift from the capacity to create enduring institutions and to 
the capacity to maintain them. Echoing, in a different conceptual language, Arendt’s 
observations regarding the meaning of freedom in post-revolutionary periods, the adjustment of 
republican virtue drew upon lineages analyzed by Pocock but reconfigured them, such that in its 
Antebellum half-life American civic republican thought made accommodation with and inflected 
the Jacksonian democracy that would replace it. 
Pocock has noted the degree to which the early modern notion of virtue emerged from the 
blending of Christian, Roman, and Greek conceptions. The Roman ideal of virtus denoted the 
“quality of personality that commanded good fortune” as well as the capacity to deal “effectively 
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and nobly with whatever fortune might send.”332 Initially associated with elite - and particular 
military - actions, the term intertwined with the Greek aretē, “that moral goodness which alone 
qualified a man for civic capacity,” to create a broad term for the moral goodness of a man 
situated within a wider cosmos.333 Within the thinking of Civic humanists, virtue became 
politicized, such that the good man was the good citizen, and the virtuous act was that which 
maintained the structures within which citizenship was possible. Virtue here became associated 
with the political life and the capacity to live within an interactive polis. Virtue stood against 
fortune insofar as the practice of the former helped sustain the republic against the contingencies 
that beset it internally and externally.334 To the extent that these contingencies represented the 
tangible whim of fortune, Machiavelli’s consideration of fortuna and virtu could be understood 
as the attempt to account for the nature of the classical sense of virtue within the post-
Augustinian politics of Renaissance Europe. In Pocock’s analysis, The Prince reverts to an 
exploration of the originary Latin concept of virtue as the individual commanding and 
responding to fortune, exploring the peculiar challenges faced by a new prince outside the 
framework of citizenship. Machiavelli in The Prince is engaging the question of whether the 
innovative prince can ever act with virtue - can political virtue make sense when it forms a break 
with or reform of a political structure rather than its preservation? The Discourses, as a 
complementing piece, explore the possibility that republican stability can emerge from 
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contingency335 and, crucially for this discussion, the role of the people as guardians of liberty 
within Rome.336 
Winding down through the Anglo-American discussions of corruption, Court and 
Country, and commercial empire, Pocock posits that the patriots of American Revolution drew 
upon the intellectual apparatus of civic republicanism. Following the lead of Bailyn, Wood, and 
preempting the temporally expansive claims of Banning, Pocock locates the revolutionary spirit 
of 1787 as outgrowth of the “Country” ideology of the Eighteenth century Anglo-Atlantic 
community.337 Concerned with the threat posed by corruption of the political institutions of the 
British empire to the point of paranoia, the American revolutionaries saw the imposition of 
commercial regulation and weakening of colonial assemblies as the early signs of a decaying 
polity and sought “a return to the fundamental principles of British government,” and failing that 
to “the constitution of the commonwealth itself,” in an attempt to “reconstitute that form of 
polity in which virtue would be both free and secure.”338 However, Pocock documents through 
Gordon Wood the manner in which, post Revolution, the Constitution came to represent a legal 
order grounded in Madisonian interest, not Jeffersonian virtue, which marked the fading away of 
the republican ethos in the face of the liberal, commercial deposition that colored the Nineteenth 
century.339 
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Such accounts of the Constitution - as a thermidor to, not only 1776, but also to the 
republican ethos itself - chime with more recent scholarly views of the Constitution in the early 
Republic. From the so-called “Republican revival” to the “neo-progressive” works of Terry 
Bouton and Woody Holton,340 recent accounts of the founding have depicted the entrenchment of 
the Constitution as a corresponding loss of agency on the part of the democratic body of the 
people. Surrounding these arguments is an assumption that in creating an additional layer of 
government, the institutions bequeathed by the Constitution removed political agency from the 
people and prized representation, interest, and institutional balance over direct participation, 
disinterestedness, and dynamic contestation. However, it would be mistaken to understand the 
early Republic as devoid of contestation and participation. Recent work has emphasized the 
manner in which the very concept of “the people” provided space for democratic contestation 
and expansion of the democratic community.341 Moreover, the style of politics in the early to 
Antebellum republic continued to display many republican facets. From the toasts as acts of 
public commemoration and the commitment to the value of oration to widespread militia 
displays and the robust mobbing of the 1830s, politics in the period was of and for the public 
space and aimed at the engendering of republican spirit.  
And the Constitution was an important symbol within the republican persuasion of politics 
in this period rather than a check on it. The strongest case for this, and by dint of the argument it 
makes, the most classically republican articulation of the Constitution, has been offered by Lance 
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Banning. Positing that the American founders understood the Constitution as the initial point of 
institutional balance, Banning reads strict construction as a mode of constitutional interpretation 
as owing much to republican thought. Banning has suggested that an orientation towards strict 
construction of the Constitution in the first decade of its operation owed much to republican fears 
of corruption and decay. Suggesting that a “structured universe of classical thought” provided the 
medium through which Americans understood political life, Banning argues that for this 
generation, “almost by definition a constitution was something to protect.”342 Accepting that the 
“Corruption was the normal direction of constitutional change,” a strict adherence to the text and 
a willingness to return to it with regularity was necessary to ensure continued liberty.343 
However, there are two important counterpoints to Banning’s narrative. The first is that, as we 
have seen, strict construction was neither undisputed nor growing in acceptance in the period 
after 1787-88. Two rival conceptions of the Constitution — as posing a “spirit” and as the work 
of a particular set of framers — became more important as the Constitution bedded down. The 
second is that, as Banning himself notes, it was the Anti-federalists rather than the Federalist 
who were the strongest advocates of strict construction after ratification. That a republican 
understanding of the Constitution continued to inform Anti-federalist thinking does not negate 
Wood’s claims that the Federalists were transitioning to a more liberal understanding.344 
Nevertheless, the weaknesses of Banning’s claims do not mean that the creation of 
Constitution is best comprehended as a moment of disjuncture with the republican ethos. 
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Numerous observers of the early Republic have noted the endurance of republican modes of 
political activity and thought.345 As with the debates over liberal and republican notions of 
authorship,346 it was not the case that classical modes of political thought collapsed suddenly into 
modern liberal conceptions of the individual and the state.347 Pocock correctly notes that a degree 
of republican thought connected to innovative virtue of the new prince survived into Antebellum 
America in the form of the rugged dynamism of the frontiersman and Andrew Jackson’s 
rejection of legal authority of the Supreme Court.348 And while the liberal strands of the 
revolutionary ethos proved more amenable to the market society emergent in the Nineteenth-
century, in was within a partially-republican framework of politics that they evolved. Marvin 
Meyers’s observation that the Jacksonian socio-economic paradox consisted of a movement and 
society clearing “the path for laissez-faire capitalism and its culture in America” while holding 
the ideal of “ a chaste republican order, resisting the seduction of risk and novelty, greed and 
extravagance, rapid motion and complex dealings” has in this sense a political parallel.349 For it 
was in the process of enacting the republican modes of participation, and specifically the defense 
of a founding, that the Constitution - despite its commitment to representation and interest — 
became more firmly entrenched within America’s political culture.  It was not, as Banning 
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suggests, that republicanism’s substantive commitments made the Constitution important 
(although to be sure, where they were actualized they did), but rather that the style, the modes, 
and — perhaps most crucially — the expectations350 of Eighteenth-century republican politics 
led a greater importance for the Constitution. 
In a sense, Banning’s argument regarding the republican nature of constitutional 
preservation is half correct; correct in the sense that republicanism was significant in imparting 
to the Constitution the latter’s importance, wrong in the extent to which he identifies the agents 
as the Anti-federalists and the symptom as strict construction. In actuality, the agents in the 
longer term were those segments of the population taking part in public commemorations and the 
symptom of strict construction was mediated through a desire to preserve the framers’ intent. As 
we shall see, the development of celebrations held on the Fourth of July between 1810 and 1835 
saw a shift towards commemorations of the Constitution as well as its increasing association 
with the framers. Orators and the organizers of celebrations in attempting both to ensure that 
their own revolutionary acts were remembered appropriately and to use these events to instill 
republican virtue in the “rising generation,” placed the founding at the heart of the United States’ 
republican identity. The virtuous example of the founders was offered as a basis for the 
cultivation in the people of the qualities necessary to preserve the constituted order. When allied 
with the second generation’s desire to carve out for themselves a world-historic role in the face 
of inheriting a completed revolution, the result was a posture of “heroic preservation.” Heroic 
preservation meant for the second generation of Americans a commitment to handing on the 
institutions and Constitution bequeathed to them intact to their children. Faced with the prospect 
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of erosion of the Constitution’s protections, this posture was actualized in a fierce commitment 
to the text as it was written by the virtuous fathers of the republic. Shifting from the innovative 
virtue of the new prince and the framers, Americans came to prize the institutional stability - 
albeit one born of continual contestation - that enabled the Greek aretē.351  
The result was exemplified in the politics of the 1820s and 1830s marked by appeals to 
memory, a conceptual division between the few and the people, and a paranoid fear of 
constitutional erosion. Joel Silbey has characterized the politics of this period as one in which 
“values and battles from another era remained alive… partisan discussions from the 1820s 
onward began as the politics of memory and never completely lost that dimension.”352 The 
political discourse was inflected with concerns over “the fragility and survivability of republican 
liberty in a world that was hostile and dangerous,”353 and threats to that liberty were seen in the 
“unconstitutional” actions of the Second Bank of the United States, the policies of (and 
opposition to) Jackson, and (as is discussed in Chapters One and Five) discussion of slavery. 
And, as Machiavelli had suggested in The Discourses, the people’s guardianship of the 
constitutional order was seen as the key to avoiding the collapse of the republic. Summarized in 
a Fourth of July toast offered in Baker’s Spring, VA in 1826, the people’s continued republican 
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vigilance was the only way to preserve the freedoms secured by the revolutionary fathers; 
“Republics: Virtue and vigilance their only preservatives: "The people who go to sleep with the 
Constitution under their heads, will awaken with fetters on their hands”.”354 Political leaders 
were praised for their commitment to protecting the Constitution, and likened to classical heroes 
- Solon, Cato, even Leonidas. They, in turn, beseeched the people to remember that the “history 
of our day is… the proper school for American citizens” and to ensure that the American 
“examples of heroic ardour not excelled by Rome” would “be handed down… for instructions 
and imitation of our children’s children.”355 Bouyed by this outlook, the Constitution would 
become an increasingly important symbol within the politics of the early- to mid-Antebellum 
period - and would equally be increasingly tied to the persons of the framers themselves. 
Revolutionary History 
 The history of the Revolution became of subject of concern for elites almost as soon as it 
was over. As early as 1790, John Adams would complain in his now renowned comment that, 
“The History of our Revolution will be one continued Lye from one end to the 
other. The essence of the whole will be that Dr. Franklins electrical Rod, smote 
the Earth and out sprung General Washington. That Franklin electrified him with 
his rod – and thence forward these two conducted all Policy, Negotiations, 
Legislatures and War.”356 
Adams grumble was somewhat self-serving, reflecting a life-long belief that history was treating 
and would continue to treat his contribution unfairly (see below), but it also points to two themes 
that emerged from the historical discussions of the revolutionary generation and which would 
shape the views of the second. The first is that the Revolution was an event of (almost) 
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mythological stature. The second was that it would be narrated through the lens of individuals. 
These themes did not diminish with distance from the founding, but were consciously fostered 
by the founding generation. Using history as a didactic tool, the founders encouraged the view of 
a glorious national history in order to further their nationalist project. At the same time, a 
republican posture of disinterestedness counter-intuitively stimulated the narration of this history 
in terms of individuals, as a result of the importance attributed to reputation and character.  Both 
trends left the second generation posed to embrace the Revolution as mythic and individualized, 
and so come to understand the Constitution in those terms. 
It was certainly the case that historical retelling and remembrance – not least that enacted 
on the anniversary of the 4th of July - emerged as key instruments for the creation of nationalist 
sentiment in the early Republic.357 Indeed, the legitimating potential of the history of the 
founding period was certainly understood by contemporaries and, as Peter Messer has 
documented, history became a theatre within the struggle over the meaning of the Revolution.358 
Making use of history as a didactic tool, political and social elites re-conceptualized the narrative 
of the Revolution, in Messer’s telling, so as to marginalize the people’s involvement and to link 
republican virtue to submission to governmental institutions.359  
A key aspect of that nascent national history was the Constitution itself. Writing early in 
the Twentieth century, Frank Schecter described the framers’ relationship with the Constitution 
as being “not merely its authors but also its apostles.”360 Active participants in the politics of the 
newly constituted nation, they worked to encourage the veneration of their achievement, the 
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Constitution.361 Marshaled as a unifying symbol within the early Republic, the Constitution 
served to bolster the fragile nationalist sentiment that both elements of the first party system 
valued. Initially, according to Schecter, a rough coalition of the Federalists, the clergy and the 
judiciary actively worked to convince the young nation that the Constitution was “fraught with 
supernal wisdom and endowed with extraordinary intrinsic properties and potentialities.”362 
Mobilizing Washington’s personal cache in support of the Constitution,  
“the patriots worked hard to celebrate their oneness around the Constitution. The 
adulation with which they speedily began to praise the work of their leaders was 
an exercise not only in national self-congratulation but also in the need for 
unity.”363 
With the success of the Republican push back against central government in 1800, Joyce 
Appleby contends that a reconceptualized notion of the Constitution was again deployed towards 
the end of national unity: 
“What was left for nationalist sentiment to feed on was an abstract union 
embodied in a written Constitution. The culture of constitutionalism forthwith 
took the place of a powerful central government as the nation’s unifier.”364 
Conjuring a notion of constitutionalism out of a nation with thirteen constitutions “but not a 
culture of… constitutionalism”, political elites in the early Republic encouraged veneration of 
the federal Constitution in order to shore up the new polity.365  
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Attaching events and institutions to certain individuals was deemed part of the wider 
project of creating good citizens and the Constitution was only partially exempt from this.366 
Individual attribution within the creation of the document was complicated by the absence of 
publicly available convention records and the larger project of emphasizing the unifying popular 
origin of the Constitution, but despite these issues – or perhaps in light of them – broad 
attribution to political elites as a group was pursued.367 Messer’s work has shown that, from a 
constitutional history that emphasized popular participation and deliberation, historians situated 
within the elite milieu posited the significant figures of the revolutionary cause as leading and 
forging public sentiment.368 In this narration the Constitution was the culmination of the 
revolutionary period but one which “place[d] particular emphasis on the role played by the 
educated part of society.”369 Allied with a source base that relied heavily on Whiggish history of 
“great men”370 and a burgeoning industry in hagiography,371 the American people were well 
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prepped to understand the Constitution in terms of attachment to the founding generation’s 
significant individuals by the time of the second generation’s maturity.   
The individualization of the historical record also reflected the performative notion of 
republican disinterest, which worked towards a view of history as composed of great individuals. 
As Adair has shown, fame and its attainment were understood by the founders in historic rather 
than immediate terms, and so one’s historical position was a significant element in one’s 
satisfaction with achievement.372 But more than historic reputation was at stake. Gordon Wood 
has suggested that late Eighteenth century American elites saw themselves as integrated within a 
network of similarly minded peers, through whom they interacted in order to form their own 
character. Within this web of contacts, they performed a public persona of disinterested gentility 
in which the independent individual was seen as the bearer of civic virtue. As Wood notes, 
“Preoccupied with their honor or their reputation, or, in other words, the way they 
were represented and viewed by others, these revolutionary leaders inevitably 
became characters, self-fashioned performers in the theater of life.”373 
As such, the parts they played in the Revolution took on significance in validating their 
performed identity and lent credence to their self-image. Related to the republic ideal of the 
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Psychological Interpretation of Lincoln and His Age, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1979), 36-
49; On Snowden cf. Shalev, Rome Reborn on Western Shores, 202-204. 
372 Douglass Adair, “Fame and the Founding Fathers” in Douglass Adair, Fame and the Founding 
Fathers: Essays by Douglass Adair, ed. T. Colbourn, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 
1974). 
373 Gordon S. Wood, Revolutionary Characters: What Made the Founders Different, (New York: The 
Penguin Press, 2006), 23. 
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disinterested individual, the key figures in the founding were discussed in terms of towering 
classical figures, as individuals whose virtue and achievements echoed antiquity.374 And unlike 
the classical figure of Solon, they remained present after their achievements to ensure that they 
were correctly recorded by historians.375  
The move by individuals to emphasize their own role created a pressure for 
understanding the achievements of the Revolution as attachable to individuals or elite groups. 
Most overt in Adams’s written conflict with Mercy Otis Warren, but nonetheless common 
amongst the founders, was a tendency towards ensuring their own personal story was suitably 
accentuated – which is to say that individuals were credited with a suitably significant role. Even 
before his conflict with Warren, Adams had invested himself in a series for the Boston Patriot 
setting the Hamiltonian record of him straight.376 Other founders, including Jefferson and 
Madison, saw their papers as a method of compiling their legacy, but were not merely content to 
wait until their deaths to shape the record.377 Washington’s own attempts to manage his image 
did much to bolster his personal attachment to the Revolution, but John Marshall and Jefferson 
also engaged in telling the first President’s story lest it pass down to posterity in the “wrong” 
manner.378 As much as these elite figures used history to shape the new nation, they also shaped 
history to make themselves elite figures. 
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374 Cf. Shalev, Rome Reborn on Western Shores. 
375 A disjuncture between classical and modern narrative noted by Frank I. Schecter. Frank I. Schecter, 
“The Early History of the Tradition of the Constitution” in American Political Science Review 9, (Nov. 
1915): 708. 
376 R. B. Bernstein, The Founding Fathers Reconsidered, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 121. 
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 These concerns were mirrored in the now famous correspondence between Adams, 
Jefferson and Rush. Their letters articulate the problems of historical construction and seek 
validation from their peers (the “intellectual fraternity” that Wood claims operated as the 
“spectators” of their public character), but they also express a tendency to shape a history of 
individuals.379 Witness, for example, Rush’s and Adams’s grumbling that Washington and their 
other bête noire, Hamilton, have been depicted as responsible for the acts of a generation. 
Concerned that individuals were accorded undue credit, they attempted to pour cold water on the 
aggrandizement of Washington and Hamilton, but nevertheless sought to refine their own 
reputation amongst their network of peers – in this case, each other. Rush to Adams in 1805; 
“The French and American Revolutions differed from each other in many things, 
but they were alike in one particular – the former gave all its power to a single 
man, the latter all its fame.”380 
Adams to Rush in the same year; 
“The Revolution began in strict exactness from the surrender of Montreal in 1759. 
It took a gloomy and dreadful form in 1761, so as to convince me at least that it 
would be inevitable. It continued till 1776, when on the fourth of July it was 
completed. …I know, therefore of no fair title that Hamilton has to a 
revolutionary character. …Hamilton’s talents have been greatly exaggerated.”381 
But both were keen to ensure that they received their due individual credit – for example, Adams 
in September of that year; 
“All this you will call vanity and egotism. Such indeed it is. But Jefferson and 
Hamilton ought not to steal from me my good name and rob me of the reputation 
of a system which I was born to introduce, “refin’d it first and show’d its use,” as 
really as Dean Swift did irony.”382 
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380 Benjamin Rush to John Adams, August 14, 1805 in The Spur of Fame, 32. Original emphasis. 
381 John Adams to Benjamin Rush, August 23, 1805 in The Spur of Fame, 34-35. 
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Exchanging letters in 1815, Adams and Jefferson expressed similar concern over the ability of 
the documentary history to do justice to the participating individuals.383 In 1819 a more direct 
challenge to their personal histories came in the publication of the Mecklenburg Declaration of 
Independence.384 In passing news of its existence on to Jefferson, Adams sought to use its 
existence to diminish Tom Paine’s contribution to independence in favor of Joseph Hughes’s 
congressional vote and so presumably improve the significance of Adams’s own congress-based 
politicking for independence.385 Jefferson’s response was an overbearing barrage of proof that it 
was in fact a forgery, suggesting that Adams’s characterization of the incident as “a charge of 
Plagiarism against…you, the undoubted, acknowledged draughtsman of the Declaration of 
Independence” was shared by the Sage of Montcello.386 As with other discrepancies, the point at 
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383 In July 1815, Adams wrote to Jefferson (and Thomas McKean), 
“Who shall write the history of the American revolution? Who can write it? Who will ever be 
able to write it? 
 The most essential documents, the debates and deliberations in Congress from 1774 to 1783 were 
all in secret, and are now lost forever. Mr. Dickinson printed a speech, which he said he made in Congress 
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John Adams to Thomas Jefferson and Thomas McKean, July 30, 1815 in The Adams-Jefferson Letters: 
The Complete Correspondence Between Thomas Jefferson and Abigail and John Adams, ed. Lester J. 
Cappon, (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1987), 451; Thomas Jefferson to John 
Adams, August 10-11, 1815 in The Adams-Jefferson Letters, 452. 
384 The Mecklenburg Declaration was first emerged in 1819 and was cited as a basis for Jefferson’s 
Declaration. Jefferson denied knowledge of the Mecklenburg Declaration, and questions remain over the 
authenticity of it. Cf. Robert M. S. McDonald, “Thomas Jefferson’s Changing Reputation as Author of 
the Declaration of Independence: The First Fifty Years,” Journal of the Early Republic 19:2 (1999), 187. 
For the text of the Mecklenburg Declaration see 
http://www.fordham.edu/Halsall/mod/1775mecklenberg.asp 
385 Adams denounced Common Sense as “a poor ignorant, Malicious, short-sighted, Crapulous Mass.” 
John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, June 22, 1819, in The Adams-Jefferson Letters, 542. 
386 Thomas Jefferson to John Adams, August 10-11, 1815 in The Adams-Jefferson Letters, 543-544. 
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issue was personal reputation, but the effect was to form a historical account around individuals’ 
actions. 
These two concerns – fashioning a people, and fashioning a public character linked to 
disinterested achievement – created a deep interest on the part of the founders in the historical 
record, but it also prepped the second generation to understand the founding as a period of 
greatness and great individuals. Operating within a cultural understanding of history that had not 
yet embraced historicism, and which was shifting to Romantic conceptions of history, the second 
generation came to their understandings of the Revolution and attendant Constitution as great 
events orchestrated by great individuals.387 Inheriting a conception of the Revolution as located 
within America’s providential exceptionalism, the second generation would see the Constitution 
as a realization of the universal promise of American millennialism. 388 
 
The Founding and the Second Generation 
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John Adams to Thomas Jefferson, July 21, 1819, in The Adams-Jefferson Letters, 545. Of course another 
such incident would occur in 1822, when Adams would misremember – or self interestedly reconstruct – 
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Despite the best efforts of the founding generation to shape the history of it, many 
contemporary historians see the second generation as key actors within this process. Even 
Bercovitch, perhaps most committed of all American watchers to the ease with which the 
Revolution was wielded to notions of divine mission, contends that the sanctifying of the 
Revolution unfolded over a “generation or so.”389 Catherine Albanese links it to  “a “winding 
down” of patriotism” following the founding, while Michael Kammen suggests constitutional 
veneration did not gain momentum until the 1850s.390 For scholars of the period, the shift from 
the revolutionary generation to its successors is a crucial moment in the fashioning of veneration 
for the Revolution. Edward Tang has, for example, suggested that it was the engagement 
between generations that engendered the collective memory of the Revolution; 
“Existing together within the same historical moment, the revolutionary and post-
revolutionary generations conceived, disputed, and transformed the larger, 
malleable culture that simultaneously enmeshed them with the nineteenth 
century.”391 
Other historians have noted the significance of the 1820s, and particularly 1826, within this 
process. For Mercieca, the year of Jefferson’s and Adams’s deaths marked the second 
generation’s arrival and the conflation of what she has labeled the American romantic and tragic 
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Edward Corwin, “The Worship of the Constitution” in Corwin on the Constitution: Volume One, The 
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story arcs.392 For Burstein, 1826 was a “watershed”, that built upon Lafayette’s visit, and in 
which all Americans agreed that “homage should be paid to the their Revolutionary origins.”393 
Others though, have seen the arrival of the second generation’s maturity, rather than 1826 per se, 
as the decisive moment in the forging of the Revolution’s history. Wood sees the founders’ place 
in history settled before 1826; “The succeeding generations of Americans were unable to look 
back at the revolutionary leaders and constitution makers without being overawed by the 
brilliance of their achievement.”394 In this he follows Forgie, who saw the Revolution coming 
down “to the post-heroic generation as a cosmic, half-fabulous occurrence.”395   
 That the second generation would be central in giving historical meaning to the founding 
is perhaps not surprising, as they were most implicated in a process of coming to terms with it as 
a legacy. Writers have long noted the difficult position that the second generation of Americans 
found itself in. Hermann Von Holst’s account of the constitutional history of the United States, 
which became available in English in 1876, identified the universalist tendency of the American 
Revolution as a source of both destructive energy and ultimate stagnation. The Enlightenment-
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inspired ideal of an abstractly formulated system of government uprooted what was framed as 
centuries of “monkish” and aristocratic custom, denouncing “as a weak and a damnable species 
of commerce with the injustice of a thousand years” that which conflicted with the new order.396 
At the same time however, the adoption of a philosophy grounded in abstract perfectibility was 
to  
“declare stagnation the natural condition of all social and political order. If the 
principles were to be unchangeable, incapable of refinement and progress, there 
would be no possibility of development, for principles are only the quintessence of 
the aggregate intellectual and moral knowledge of a people or of the age, reduced 
to the simplest formula.”397 
The Revolution promised to liberate every generation from the oppression of historical custom, 
but replaced it with a claimed universal order that denied the possibility of substantively 
improving it. Only by rejecting the universal order proposed could subsequent individuals enact 
the freedom from historical restraint that the Revolution had delivered. In the context of the 
United States, this legacy of the Revolution proclaimed the freedom of posterity, while 
demanding filial obedience to the revolutionary act.  David Lowenthal has argued that this 
created a Janus-like approach to history amongst the first Americans; “On one hand, freedom 
from the encumbering past was a virtual dogma of the Revolution and the new republic; on the 
other, Americans… reverently protected the Founding Fathers’ achievements.”398 Caught 
between a promise of generational sovereignty and a culture that called for veneration of the 
founding past, Americans could be forgiven for sharing Hawthorne’s assessment of their 
relationship with the founders – “let us thank God for having given us such ancestors, and let 
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each successive generation thank him not less fervently, for being one step further from them in 
the march of the ages.”399 
 As a result the post-revolutionary generation in early American Republic were presented 
with a dilemma. Heirs to this “democratic” revolution, they had the choice of accepting or 
rejecting the founding. In accepting the founding this generation conceded that they lived in the 
shadow of greatness, and forwent their own opportunity for participation in the act of democratic 
creation. To accept was to affirm the Revolution’s own narrative, of a world-historic intervention  
“which to the end of time must be an honor to the age that accomplished it: and 
which has contributed more to enlighten the world, and diffuse a spirit of freedom 
and liberality among mankind, than any human event (if this may be called one) 
that ever preceded it.”400  
A revolution, led by the “illustrious saviour… sublime example of virtue” Washington, which 
was “destined… to enlighten a benighted world” and “to change the whole order of political 
opinion.”401 The alternative – rejection – was to reject all that bound the revolutionary narrative 
together - the virtue of Washington and the patriots, the enlightening of mankind, and the role of 
providence in the fate of America. It was to question, even perhaps to problematize the supreme 
virtue of the founders402 and/or America’s divine mission.403 In the still young Republic in 
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which, we have seen, national political culture centered on commemorations of the virtue of the 
Revolution and revolutionaries404 such a step was daunting if not impossible.  
Situated in what Forgie has labeled the “post-heroic” age the second generation were 
forced to negotiate their own relationship with the Revolution against this backdrop.405 As 
Adair’s discussion of the changing attitudes towards fame during the founding era concluded, for 
individuals at the turn of Nineteenth century the act of creating a state was seen to be amongst 
the highest possible achievements.406 However, for the second generation of Americans, this 
possibility could only be realized at the expense of the revolutionary settlement itself. In 
Lowenthal’s words, they 
“could not resemble the Founding Fathers without endangering their [the fathers’] 
legacy, or preserve it without acknowledging their [own] subordination. Simply to 
save their legacy relegated them to everlasting inferiority as sons unable to act on 
their own.”407  
Given the “fact” of the Revolution, the second generation had to concede that, in Daniel 
Webster’s construction, they could 
“win no laurels in a war for independence. Earlier and worthier hands have 
gathered them all. Nor are there places for us by the side of Solon, and Alfred, 
and other founders of states. Our fathers have filled them.”408 
Loyal to the founding, the actors of the post-heroic age had the challenge of forging a 
meaningful role for themselves within the constraints of the existing revolutionary settlement.  
It was in the response of the second generation to this situation that a history of the 
founding privileging the Constitution and the attachment of the founding generation to it was 
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405 Forgie, Patricide in the House Divided. Forgie dates the “post-heroic” age from the mid-1820s, but as 
the discussion below will demonstrate I argue that attempts to address the problems faced by a “post-
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forged. The second generation attempted to navigate the challenges presented by their paternal 
legacy with a variety of strategies before settling on one somewhat akin to what Daniel Levin, in 
his consideration of modern doctrines of original intent, has defined as “heritage.”409 In so doing, 
this generation was able to assert its generational sovereignty without challenging the 
revolutionary narrative. But as a consequence of this, they privileged an understanding of the 
Constitution as being both a product of founders as a partial group and as an object worthy of 
veneration itself. 
 
Heritage and History 
Daniel Levin’s consideration of original intent seeks to draw parallels between that 
doctrine of constitutional interpretation and a particular manner of historical representation that 
works to reduce and contort the relationship between past and present. Pointing to Independence 
Hall as a pertinent example, Levin suggests that the hall as it currently stands has little in 
common with the hall in which the Declaration of Independence was adopted. As a consequence 
of ideologically motivated renovation and aesthetic landscaping, Independence Hall would more 
likely provoke perplexity than recognition should a freshly reincarnated Benjamin Franklin pass 
down Philadelphia’s Chestnut Street. For Levin, the modification and manipulation of 
Independence Hall’s environment represents an example of “heritage”, as “the representation of 
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Theory”, Law & Society 29 (2004): 105-126. In a similar way, Jill Lepore has documented the attitude of 
“antihistory” amongst members of the current TEA party movements: “In antihistory, time is an illusion. 
Either we’re there, two hundred years ago, or they’re here, among us. When Congress began debating an 
overhaul of the health care system, this, apparently, was very distressing to the Founding Fathers. “The 
founders are here today,” said John Ridpath of the Ayn Rand Institute, at a Boston Tea Party rally on the 
Common on the Fourth of July. “They’re all around us.”” Jill Lepore, The Whites of Their Eyes: The Tea 
Party’s Revolution and the Battle over American History, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). 
!
!
!
!
160!
the past as a useful source of contemporary moral instruction.”410 Crucially, heritage “has many 
characteristics, but among its most important is its ability to strip away the mediation of time and 
gradual change and thereby present the past as immediate and understandable.”411  
Within Levin’s account, the rendering of the past as immediate works to enable modern 
individuals to identify with historic points in time without the requirement of recognizing the 
necessary disjuncture between any two non-continuous temporal moments. As a political tool, 
heritage operates “to emphasize the continuity of values rather than political struggle or social 
and institutional change.”412 It also asserts “not only [that] we can “know” the past, but …[also] 
the conceit that the past is a “real thing” with integrity and unity that belongs to itself, rather than 
an interpretation of the past by moderns.”413  
Levin hopes to draw attention to the tendency of advocates of original intent to treat the 
creation of the Constitution as something immediately accessible and ultimately knowable 
without recognizing the historical gulf between today and 1787-88. But as a theory of historical 
reception, heritage points to a dual tendency that Levin sought to highlight with his choice of 
title. Echoing Tony Horwitz’s account of Civil War re-enactors, Confederates in the Attic, the 
essay’s title sets up Levin to lambast those individuals who seek to replicate historic battles. 
Noting the propensity of these enactors to adopt a level of authenticity which risks their health, 
Levin deems their efforts a “denial of the progress that has been made” and a “negation of one’s 
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historical self as much as [the assumption of] an identity from another time.”414 What looks “like 
a genuine interest in history, …[is] actually a denial of history.”415 
Frozen in “history,” this mode of heritage enables its subscribers to cleave from the past 
the present they wish to commemorate. Re-enactors are freed from the need to contemplate the 
causes or consequences of the Civil War, much less to accept the mindset of a confederate 
soldier beyond his battlefield concerns. Instead, they can make immediate the perceived valor of 
the confederate army, while historicizing their racist cause. Separating the historical period from 
the flow of history, “heritage” empowers the current generation to make immediate what they 
wish, while making distant what they would rather not deal with.  
For the second generation of Americans, born into the shadow of the great patriots of the 
Revolution, heritage offered a strategy by which to hold the Revolution both immediate and 
distant, enabling them to hold it forth as legacy and an example, without it also operating to 
highlight the lesser role that the generation was destined to play. Distorting the temporal distance 
between themselves and the founding, the second generation emphasized the connection of the 
founding to the past and exaggerated the distance between 1776 and their existence in the Early 
Republic. By dislocating the Revolution’s position in time in this way, this generation could 
position the founding as being of another era and so shape their own role as being necessarily 
different, but not necessarily lesser – a different era would after all call for a different response.  
At the same time however, the Revolution was firmly rooted in America’s past and given an 
immediacy that allowed the current generation to identify with, and claim symbolic unity with, 
the Revolution and the revolutionary generation. Made continually fresh and in unity with the 
present, the revolutionary virtue could be an inspiration for and a characteristic of the 
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contemporaneous generation. Taking the founding out of time and simultaneously making it 
immediately locatable, the second generation relieved themselves of a direct comparison to the 
founders while remaining loyal witnesses to the founding.416  
 
Fourth of July  
The practice of using the Fourth of July as ritual of commemoration was well established 
very early in the Republic’s history. Tracing these celebrations from the middle of the early 
Republic until the mid-1830s, a pattern of strategic engagement with the past emerges, 
culminating in the adoption of “heritage” as a method of relating to the revolutionary period. 
By the end of eighteenth century Fourth of July Addresses began to engage with the 
transition from a revolutionary to a post-revolutionary generation. While at times, the Revolution 
was still viewed as the work of the speaker and audience (“...those blessings for which you have 
toiled and bled”)417 or at least conceptualized as their own,418 it was equally the case that at times 
it was not. Noah Webster, despite being eighteen in 1776 and therefore holding a strong claim to 
being present at the Revolution, was among the vanguard in moving beyond the revolutionary 
generation. By as early as 1798 he identified himself and his audience as sons of the 
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revolutionary patriots,419 and in 1802 he had deposited “[m]ost of the civil and military 
characters, conspicuous in the revolution… in their graves.”420 While faster than most421 Webster 
was only anticipating a trend that would gather speed with time. In time the theme of aging 
revolutionaries and their gradual loss to the grave would emerge. An 1808 Savannah oratory 
would note the ongoing demise of the revolutionary generation and the emergence of a second, 
in its effort “to inspire [the second] with gratitude to the sages, and heroes of our revolution, 
whether they now “sleep the sleep of death,” or still live to bless and to protect our country.”422 
Another orator would offer tribute “to the manes [spirits] of those departed Heroes.”423 A year 
later Joel Barlow would echo these sentiments and lament that “[t[he present race is… passing 
away.”424   
The acceleration of this trend and the renewal of conflict with Britain in 1812 pushed the 
question of the second generation’s relationship to the Revolution to the fore. The War of 1812 
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419 “…our fathers were men – they were heroes and patriots…” Webster, An Oration…1798, 16.   
420 Noah Webster, An Oration, Pronounced before the Citizens of New Haven, on the Anniversary of the 
Declaration of Independence; July, 1802. And Published at their Request, (New Haven, Conn.: William 
W. Morse, 1802), 6. 
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D’Oyley, An Oration, Delivered in St. Michael’s Church Before the Inhabitants of Charleston, South-
Carolina, On the Fourth of July, 1803; In Commemoration of American Independence, (Charleston, SC: 
T. B. Bowen, 1803), 1. 
422 Col. John Macpherson Berrien, An Oration, Commemorative of the Anniversary of American 
Independence. Delivered as the Baptist Church in Savannah, (Savannah: Seymour & Woolhopter, 1808), 
7. Hair appeared as a symbolic measure of the generation’s passing, with the “grey-headed patriot of ‘76” 
turning into the “whitened locks that still wave among us.” Gardiner, An Oration… 1807, 15; Joel 
Barlow, Oration Delivered at Washington, July Fourth, 1809; at the Request of the Democratic Citizens 
of the District of Columbia, (Washington City: R. C. Weightman, 1809), 4. 
423 Captain James Marshall, An Oration, Commemorative of the Anniversary of American Independence, 
Delivered as the Filature, in Savannah, (Savannah: Seymour & Woolhopter, 1808), 10. 
424 Barlow, Oration, 4. 
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would prove to be something of a pivotal moment in this process. The mobilization highlighted 
the fact that most patriots of ’76 were no longer of fighting age.425 The observation that “[m]any 
who are now present were then unborn. Many who are now present were so young as to have but 
little political knowledge – but a feeble sense of the situation in the country [then]”,426 prompted 
concern and reflection. For some the realization lead to a fear that the Revolution was imperiled 
without the presence of the patriots – for without their virtue how could the nation survive?427 
Others, though, saw the possibility of infusing the next generation with the virtue of their 
fathers.428  
To many amongst the second generation the War of 1812 offered the prospect of 
displaying their equal to the revolutionary generation. Framing the war as a sequel to the 
Revolution, Addresses put forward the idea that 1812 marked a second world-historical battle for 
liberty against the old foe of 1776. The war was “but a struggle for our indisputable rights… a 
righteous cause – it was the common cause of mankind.”429 Its successful execution 
demonstrated “that the spirit which animated our sires, is retained with undiminished lustre.”430 
The War of 1812 proved that the second generation were “not an unworthy offspring of patriot 
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425 Although some, notable among them Andrew Jackson, did fight in both conflicts. 
426 John Barnet, An Oration, Delivered at Amenia in Union Society, July 4, 1812, to an Assemblage of 
Citizens, met to Celebrate the Birth-Day of Our Republic, (Poughkeepsie, New York: C. C, Adams, 
1812),  7. 
427 “Where are the patriots of our revolution? Where are the sons and disciples of Washington?” Festus 
Foster, An Oration Pronounced at Hardwick, July 4th, 1812, Being the Thirty-Sixth Anniversary of 
American Independence, (Brookfield: E. Merriam & Co., 1812), 16.  
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…The Spirit of the Fathers may even now save the Sons.” Samuel C. Allen, An Oration, Delivered at 
Greenfield, July 6, 1812: In Commemoration of American Independence; at the Request of the 
Washington Benevolent Societies, of the County of Franklin, (Greenfield, Mass.: Denio and Phelps, 
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429 Samuel Berrian, An Oration, Delivered before The Tammany Society, or Columbian Order, Hibernian 
Provident, Columbian, and Shipwright’s Societies, in the City of New-York, on the Fourth Day of July, 
1815, (New York: John Low, 1815), 9. 
430 Adoniram Chandler, An Oration, Delivered before the New-York Typographical Society, on their 
Seventh Anniversary, July 4, 1816, (New York: J. Seymour, 1816), 8. 
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fathers. The holy flame of the revolution was again rekindled.”431 The war offered its own 
“immortal” victories and heroes - Perry, Pike, Lawrence, and above all Jackson432 - and for some, 
this struggle and these heroes equalled the Revolution.433  
Framing the War of 1812 this way enabled the second generation to assert that they were 
equal to the exertions of the founders. By re-fighting the Revolutionary War, the second 
generation could lay claim to equality with the patriots of 1776 without repudiating that 
generation’s founding order. Jackson could be Washington’s equal without unfounding 
Washington’s legacy. The past would not shape the present, for the present was responsible for 
its continued reign. Forcing an identity between 1776 and 1812, the orators of the mid-1810s 
enabled the second generation to look the first in the metaphorical eye.  
However, as a solution to the second generation’s problem this conceptual apparatus 
could only subsist as long as the identity between 1776 and 1812 was accepted. Such an identity 
sat ill with the notion that the Revolution had “no parallel in the history of the world.”434 
Moreover, after the enthusiasm of war had subsided it was difficult to maintain that 1812 was an 
event on a par with the Revolution. Instead of 1776’s equal, 1812 was soon relegated to a 
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431 Leonard M. Parker, An Oration, Pronounced at Charlestown, Massachusetts, on the Fourth of July, A. 
D. 1816. By Request of the Citizens of Middlesex County, Being the Fortieth Anniversary of American 
Independence, (Boston: Rowe and Hooper, 1816), 7. 
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consequences of our victory equalled even the wonders of the revolution.” William Lance, An Oration, 
Delivered on the Fourth of July, 1816, In St. Michael’s Church, S. C. By Appointment of the ’76 
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434 James N. Barker, An Oration, Delivered at Philadelphia Vauxhall Gardens, on the Forty-First 
Anniversary of American Independence, (Philadelphia: John Binns, 1817), 3. 
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defense of435 or a support for436 the Revolution, and with this regulation returned the question of 
the inability of the second generation to equal the feats of their fathers. But if this particular 
strategy failed, it did point to a manner in which the second generation could maintain the 
revolutionary settlement without accepting their inferior status.  
The notion that the War of 1812 had been a defense of the Revolution brought to the fore 
the idea that ownership of, or perhaps more accurately responsibility for, the revolutionary 
settlement had passed to a new generation. Recurrent within the Addresses of the later 1810s was 
the notion of an inherited responsibility to maintain the revolution.437 Themes of inheritance and 
filial connection to the Revolution were not new,438 but in the period after the war they coalesced 
around ideas of preservation and transmission. Emphasizing the duty of the second generation to 
pass the Revolution’s spoils onto succeeding generations, preservation came to be depicted as an 
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435 “…that what their fathers nobly won, they as nobly defended.” Barker, An Oration, 7. 
436 “War was declared… its event will form a proud era in our national history, whilst it adds a new prop 
to our Independence.” Ammi Harrison, Oration, Delivered before the Harmony Society, in New-Haven, 
on the Forty-First Anniversary of American Independence, (New Haven, Conn.: Steel and Gray, 1817), 
11.  
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United Citizens, at Whitehall, N. Y. July 4, 1817, (Rutland, Vermont: Fay, Davison & Burt, 1817), 12. 
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a rich inheritance of liberty and empire, which we have no right to surrender….” Webster, An 
Oration…1798, 16. On the importance of filial metaphors in early American attitudes their past see 
Lowenthal, The Past is a Foreign Country, 105-7. On the idea that notions of paternal relations were key 
to the republican ethos of the period see Peter S. Onuf & Leonard J. Sadosky, Jeffersonian America, 
(Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, Inc., 2002), 85-101. 
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act of supreme virtue itself.439 The revolutionary settlement and its maintenance was transformed 
from an obligation into an opportunity, with the second generation the heroic actors that would 
undertake it.440 
Key to this paradigm was the idea that the revolutionary moment in which liberty 
defeated tyranny was only one aspect of the Revolution’s claim to world-historic status. The 
transmission of a particular moment made little sense, and so weight was given to the view that 
America’s political and social institutions were part of the Revolution’s lasting significance. 
Central to this was the Constitution. Often overlooked or deemed worthy of only passing 
mention in earlier Addresses, it was now lavishly praised as America’s gift to the world: 
“When the States of North America formed the present constitution, they created, 
what the world never before saw, the social compact. …The supposed perfection 
of government… is happily attained in our political constitution.”441 
It was “a stupendous monument of man’s last, and greatest efforts for the preservation of 
liberty”442 “which has never had a superior, and which now challenges the world to produce its 
equal.”443 Moreover, the Constitution was the most tangible inheritance of the second generation 
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441 Andrew Dunlap, An Oration, Delivered as Salem, on Monday, July 5, 1819, at the Request of the 
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Warwick Palfray, 1819), 9. 
442 Parker, An Oration, 6. 
443 Harrison, Oration, Delivered…in New-Haven, 8. 
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from the founders, and as such was the barometer by which successful transmission was judged. 
As “their monuments are our political institutions”444 and “[o]ur inimitable constitution, the 
magna charta of our liberties, displays… the wisdom of our fathers”,445 it was through 
venerating and maintaining the (founders’) Constitution that the second generation could enact 
their heroic preservation.  
The link between the Constitution and the founders was strongly emphasized within this 
paradigm. Francis Gray would state in 1818, that “[t]he federal constitution, whose 
establishment was most difficult, and its success the most doubted, derives from our veneration 
for its founders… an authority over public opinion.”446 Association of the document with a 
distinct group or generation enabled its continuance to be understood in terms of filial loyalty, 
leading orators such as Alexander Anderson to implicitly reiterate division of ownership and 
operation along generational lines: “Whenever we adopt your constitution to justify our 
authority….”447 Loyalty to the Constitution as it existed became the measure of loyalty to the 
principles of the Revolution. Such was the currency of constitutional fidelity, that at the state 
level Charles Loring could praise the Massachusetts electorate in foregoing the opportunity of 
engaging in constitutional politics and “clinging with fond veneration to the institutions of their 
fathers” in their rejection of constitutional amendments drawn up by the 1820 convention.448  
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Heroic preservation as a method of negotiating the second generation’s position vis-à-vis 
the first had much to offer but it also contained an inherent tension. Preservation allowed 
Americans to carve out a specific role for themselves, distinct from that of creation and so 
unthreatening to the founding that had already taken place.449 As such these two roles, creation 
and preservation, could be depicted as co-operative, with both generations sharing in the glory 
of institutional stability: 
“This day should not pass with a tribute of veneration and gratitude to the 
illustrious men who achieved our Independence, and of honor to those who have 
since so nobly maintained our national reputation.”450 
If the duty of the second generation was  
“less splendid, [it was] not less important. To us belongs the task to preserve and 
to defend, to enlarge and to improve, the glorious inheritance we have 
received.”451 
However, as these quotes illustrate the very strength of the preservation strategy was also a 
weakness insofar as a focus upon preserving inherited institutions worked to entrench the idea 
that their creation was a glorious act. As the maintenance became a focus, it brought to the fore 
the second generation’s central complex by requiring the active veneration for and so 
glorification of the first generation’s achievements. It forced upon the second generation a 
posture of emulating the Revolution by venerating it: 
“…for it is our pride, to dwell on the virtues and glories of our ancestors, to 
emulate them in our actions, and to transmit to posterity the accumulated and 
incorruptible inheritance of freedom.”452 
In so much as it required this, preservation was a double-edged sword, working to institutionalize 
the very problem that it was aimed at addressing. 
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Divided. 
450 Loring, An Oration, 5. My emphasis. 
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This tension was apparent in the speeches given by those attempting to execute the 
strategy of preservation. Henry Smith, addressing the people of Dorchester in 1822, found the 
tension almost impossible to navigate. Criticizing the tendency to be cowed by the legacy of the 
founders, he nonetheless almost immediately conceded his own generation’s role was 
subservient to that of the former:  
“But because they have done much for us, it is no reason that we should do 
nothing for ourselves, and because we reverence their memory, we should not 
therefore cling with more fondness to the errors which they have left us to correct, 
than to the liberal institutions which they have transmitted to us. And, although 
we cannot expect to equal them in our exertions for the cause of freedom, we may 
yet avail ourselves of the light of experience to perfect their work according to the 
original spirit in which it was formed.”453 
Others who worked to frame preservation as an active expansion of the benefits of America’s 
institutions – “Perish the parsimonious, the degrading prejudice, which would prompt you to sit 
down at the delicious banquet spread by freedom, in selfish enjoyment or in bigoted exclusion” – 
nonetheless quickly fell into justifying such depictions in terms of filial trust; “[The] American 
who would seek to exclude his fellow man… it is not uncharitable to declare, would prove 
himself a traitor to the spotless memory of his fathers.”454 Indeed, justifying the preservation of 
institutions often boiled down to a commitment not to raise “parricidal hands” against “the 
institutions [the Revolution] has given us.”455 Some showed sufficient self-awareness to see that 
preservation was itself rooted in the inescapable shadow of the founders; It was, after all, “in 
light of their illustrious deeds, [that we] feel a glowing zeal to show ourselves worthy of such 
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453 Henry B. Smith, An Oration, Delivered at Dorchester, on the Fourth of July, 1822, (Boston: The 
Office of the American Statesman, 1822), 10. 
454 James R. Shays, An Oration Delivered at Paterson, New-Jersey, on the Fourth of July, 1825, (Newark, 
NJ: D. A. Cameron and Co., 1826), 9. 
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sires.”456 It was the melancholy truth for this generation, that “[t]he remembrance we so ardently 
desire, we render unto others.”457  
In was within this conceptual cul-de-sac that the introduction of conceptions akin to 
heritage took place. With emulation, in the form of the War of 1812, and preservation of 
institutions proving conceptually weak approaches to the humiliating disparity between first and 
second generation achievement, heritage provided mitigation. Dislocating the passage of time 
between the founding and the contemporary period enabled the origin of the revolutionary 
institutions to positioned in an “exceptional” time that bore little comparison to the immediate 
era. This reduced the impact of the second generation’s inability to rival their forefathers. 
Crucially though, heritage also enabled the posture of preservation to remain coherent by 
enabling an identity between the past and the present, such that maintaining institutions did not 
need contemporary, in addition to its original, rationalization.  By drawing the founding 
temporally closer – rendering it always imminent - and simultaneously pushing it farther back 
into history, the second generation could more credibly maintain the fiction that preservation was 
a heroic endeavor. 
In the Addresses of the 1820s and early 1830s this dual approach to temporally locating 
the Revolution can be seen in attempts to complicate understandings of the passage of time. The 
Revolution had long been framed as the initiation of a new period in human history, but its 
temporal location had always been very much intertwined with human history.458 In 1826, 
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George Bancroft, an individual who would emerge as a key historian of the Revolution for the 
second generation, instead posited that the Revolution had altered not just human history, but 
also time itself; 
“The stream of time, which flowed through so many of the past centuries with a 
lazy current, has at last rushed onwards with overwhelming fury, leaping down 
one precipice after another, destroying all barriers in its ungovernable 
swiftness.”459  
This change meant a period of fifty years in which events had exponentially increased. “No so 
short period of history ever presented so many or mighty revolutions, …grand displays of 
national force; armies so numerous, …battles so…decisive.”460 Time itself had become denser, 
and as a result the fifty years following the Revolution represented a greater passage time than 
the calendar suggested. Concurring in this assessment of those fifty years, William Hunter would 
declare in the same year that recounting the period would require “the compressing energy of 
Tacitus or Montesquieu” – for those of “ordinary abilities” it would be a “hopeless and endless 
labour.”461 Others, too, would note the density of this apparently short period. In 1833, Edward 
Prescott would declare that “[s]hort as are the records of our Country, every page is filled with 
events involving the momentous consequences… exerting a sway over the different 
Governments of the world, at once unanticipated and irresistible.”462  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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(Northampton, Mass.: T, Watson Shepard, 1826), 11. 
460 Bancroft, An Oration, 11. 
461 William Hunter, Oration Pronounced Before the Citizens of Providence, on the Fourth of July, 1826, 
Being the Fiftieth Anniversary of American Independence, (Providence: Smith & Parmenter, 1826), 43. 
462 Edward G. Prescott, An Oration: Delivered Before the Citizens of Boston, on the Fifty Eighth 
Anniversary of American Independence, (Boston: Johm H. Eastburn, 1833), 3. 
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Alongside the attention to the density of the time between the contemporary period and 
the Revolution, and working to the same effect, sat an effort to emphasize the difference between 
the past and present. Drawing distinction between the Founding and the current period, speakers 
encouraged a view of what was essentially recent history as pertaining more strongly to the past 
rather than the present. The past fifty or so years had “rolled into the shoreless ocean of eternity” 
and separated the concerns of the past from those of present.463 Emphasizing temporal distance, 
James Austin would dismiss the early party squabbles as being as little cared of in contemporary 
life as “the prosecutions of the Quakers or the persecution of the witches in the early history of 
New England”, before suggesting the former were as alien as the disputes of the fictional 
inhabitants of Lilliput.464 Charles Cutter would be more explicit, if less lyrical, in drawing a 
distinction between the “by-gone times” that they celebrated on the Fourth – a period before 
even the “palmy days of Federalism” - and “modern times.”465 As Cutter’s use of the adjective 
“palmy” suggests, notions of a golden age466 operated to separate past from present. The 
Revolution had existed in “a purer age,”467 and in narration was subject to a consensus that 
contrasted with the “debatable ground” of the current day.468 Pushed into the past, the Revolution 
became not merely legend, as it had become as soon as the feats of Washington were told in 
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fantastical terms, but an event associated with mythical period, set conceptually outside of 
historicized time. 
However, as much as speakers worked to separate past and present, they also sought to 
forge continuity between them. With the Revolution a mythical moment, the closeness to and 
continuity of the Revolution to the present was also simultaneously emphasized. On one hand, 
the origins of the Revolution were pushed further back in time, ensuring that the colonial, 
revolutionary, and republican periods were seen as continuous and organically linked to each 
other. Covers Francis would stress that it was “principles which have been so long wrought into 
the character of community”, not particular great men of the Revolution that lead to Liberty’s 
victory.469 Even as he dismissed the Lilliputian disputes of the early Republic, Austin would push 
back the birth of liberty from the Revolution and to colonial Massachusetts.470 On the other hand, 
that very continuity and historical placement was deployed to indicate the freshness and 
relevance of the past. The link between the colonies, the Revolution, and the present showed the 
continuity of sentiment that made the past comprehensible to the present.471 The Revolution was 
“but the prelude of the swelling scenes” which were to come.472 Additionally, the ability to 
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tasked with preserving the Revolution. William S. Allen, An Oration, Delivered in Newburyport, on the 
Fifty-Fourth Anniversary of the Declaration of American Independence, (Newburyport, Mass.: The 
Herald Office, 1830), 6. 
472 Plumer, An Address, 21. 
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intelligently narrate the origins and course of the Revolution were used to place it within the 
scope of contemporary comprehension. There was not need for the celebration of American 
origins to rest on fable, declared a New Orleans speaker, for its birth could be intelligently 
known.473 Through learning of the patriots’ deeds, Americans kept the founders immediate  - 
“fresh and living from generation to generation.”474 In a particularly ambitious synthesis of these 
trends, Charles Cutter, while advocating the distinction between the 1830s and the 1790s (see 
above), would suggest that it was America’s fortune to be able to effectively and explicitly trace 
her origins – to the Anglo-Saxons of Roman-Era German Forests!475 Cutter’s belief that the 
events of fifty years past were “by-gone” while the events of eighteen hundred years ago were 
eminently knowable, brings into sharp relief the distortion of time that was taking place. 
Immediacy was sat alongside obscurity, and alternated without apparent contradiction. Heritage, 
deployed in this way, simultaneously acknowledged the passage of time between the 
contemporary moment and the Founding and displaced it.476  
Contorting the passage of time like this enabled the second generation to partially 
undermine the hold the Founding placed upon them. Heroic preservation did not suffer in 
comparison to creation, as the latter belonged to a different, distant “non-time.” But the creation 
was also made immediately available as a didactic tool and a claimed legacy. Heritage meant 
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473 O. P. Jackson, An Oration, Delivered by O. P. Jackson, Esq. on the Fourth of July, 1835, By the 
Request of the Young Men’s Committee of Arrangements, (New Orleans: Hotchkiss & Co., 1835), 5-6. 
474 Jackson, An Oration, 4. 
475 Cutter, An Oration, 12. 
476 It is of interest that the paratext of these addresses seems also to have been deployed to this end. 
Inserting the year of commemoration (e.g. fifty-first, forty-eighth) into the Addresses’ titles worked to 
quantify their temporal distance from the Revolution and drew attention to both the connection between 
the events and the measureable gap between them. Interestingly, such a reflex is also observable in the 
mid-1810s, the previous occasion in which parallels between current events and the Revolution were 
desired, but in which the concept of distance also significant. On a discussion of Genette’s concept of 
paratext see Leslie Howsam, “What is the Historiography of Books? Recent Studies in Authorship, 
Publishing and Reading in Modern Britain and North America,” The Historical Journal 51, (2008): 1091. 
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making immediate the spirit of the Revolution, but making distant its events. The founders could 
be worthy of their “lofty merit,” their government - “a perpetual monument of their wisdom” - 
would endure, and they had fulfilled their destiny. But such achievement did not reflect upon the 
present generation, as theirs was another destiny marked out for the new era, in which “those 
liberal precepts… dimly seen, and known to our fathers only in theory” could be carried more 
fully into practice.477 This new age faced new challenges that the patriots had lacked the 
knowledge or willingness to address. Allied with heritage, preservation meant filial fidelity 
through adaptation – it demanded the application of the Revolution to a new world. The new age, 
separated from the founding by an increase in political knowledge rendered the present 
generation not subservient to the past, but willingly and consciously honoring it through meeting 
new challenges.  
As with the earlier iteration of preservation, the Constitution operated as a potent symbol 
of both the new challenges and filial fidelity. The Constitution was seen as the guarantor of 
liberty, but the mechanism by which it was to achieve this in the era of new challenges became a 
fault-line. While some sought to challenge the notion that the Constitution was “too sacred to be 
tampered with”478 by framing it as “ a bridle in the mouth of people,”479 by and large it was the 
former view that dominated. But that consensus in itself did little to resolve political conflict – 
instead the Constitution was deemed to be at stake in almost every oration. Defense of the 
Constitution became a crucial gauge of “correct” political action, and individuals and policies 
were fashioned as legitimate or flawed insofar as they accorded with the document. The 
Constitution was mobilized in identifying partisan heroes; a Jackson - Washington’s equal in 
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477 David Henshaw, An Address, Delivered Before an Assembly of Citizens From all parts of the 
Commonwealth, at Faneuil Hall….Boston. July 4, 1836, (Boston: Beals and Greene, 1836), 4-5. 
478 Wilder, An Oration, 21. 
479 Bancroft, “An Oration”, 8. 
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being “benefactors of the human race” - whose administration would be “the brightest page of 
American history”;480 and a Webster, “the noble champion of our Constitution.”481 And partisan 
villains – Jackson again,482 the North,483 and anti-slavery agitation.484 Partisan squabbles came to 
be cast in constitutional terms. President Jackson was either praised for keeping the national 
government “within the prescribed limits of the Constitution”485 or condemned for construing 
“the Constitution as he pretends to understand it.”486 William Henry Harrison would argue that 
secession was never within the intent of the Federal Convention,487 South Carolina’s Henry 
Pinckney would counter that the Convention intended a compact of states.488 Perhaps nothing 
more exemplifies period’s contention that the Constitution is above politics while thrusting it 
into all partisan debates than Jackson’s Farewell Address in which every issue is a constitutional 
one – and Jackson is on the correct side of each.489 In the vivid words of one 1834 critic of this 
tendency, “The Constitution has been obliged to leave its temple, and come down into the forum, 
and traverse the streets.”490 Throughout these conflicts, the second generation sought to 
rearticulate the intent of the Constitution and apply it to the contemporary problems they faced. 
Emerging from the second generation’s use of heritage in order to relate satisfactorily to their 
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480 Henshaw, An Address, 35. My emphasis. 
481 Allen, An Oration, Delivered in Newburyport, 12. 
482 Cutter, An Oration. 
483 Henry, L. Pinckney, An Oration, Delivered in the Independent, or Congregational Church, 
Charleston, Before the State Rights & Free Trade Party, The State Society of Cincinnati, The Revolution 
Society, The ’76 Association and the State Volunteers, on the 4th of July, 1833, Being the 57th Anniversary 
of American Independence, (Charleston, SC: A. E. Miller, 1833). 
484 Joseph R. Williams, An Oration Delivered Before the Citizens of the Town of New-Bedford, on the 
Fourth of July, 1835, (New-Bedford: J. G. W. Pope, 1835); William Henry Harrison, Address by General 
Harrison, Delivered on the Fourth of July, 1833, at Cheviot, Greene Township, Hamilton County, Ohio, 
(Cincinnati: Reynolds, Allen & Disney, 1833). 
485 Henshaw, An Address, 35. 
486 Cutter, An Oration, 28. 
487 Harrison, Address, 16-17. 
488 Pinckney, An Oration, 16. 
489 Andrew Jackson, “Farewell Address, March 4, 1837.” Accessed May 2, 2011. 
http://millercenter.org/scripps/archive/speeches/detail/3644.  
490 “ART. III – Story’s Constitutional Law,” 66. 
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revolutionary legacy, the Constitution became a symbol of the founders as well as a lodestone of 
political debate.  
As a strategy, heritage therefore enabled the second generation to negotiate their place 
within the narrative of American development, but also heightened the rhetorical value of 
constitutional veneration. Freed from direct comparison to the glories of the Revolution, the 
second generation could nevertheless claim a share in its afterglow through preservation. They 
could claim to “[h]onor… the memory of the men from whom we inherit the rich bequest of civil 
liberty,”491 but see themselves in engaged in more than continuing that bequest. They were 
reminded that they, like their fathers, had “public duties to perform”, for the “times do not indeed 
ask of us those sacrifices of fortune and life… but they do require every man… to exert his 
talents and his influence.”492 Their preservation became not an act of filial fidelity, but an act 
valuable of itself. Their duty was not to preserve what their inheritance because it was 
bequeathed them, but also because it was an objectively worthy act – and by extension their 
inheritance was also a worthy one. Their allegiance was to the institutions, and the values that 
underpinned them, rather than to their fathers; 
“The trial of adversity was theirs; the trial of prosperity is ours… If we fail: if we 
fail; - not only do we defraud our children of the inheritance which we received 
from our fathers, but we blast the hopes of friends of liberty throughout our 
continent… throughout the world, to the end of time.”493 
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491 George Bancroft, An Oration Delivered Before the Democracy of Springfield and Neighboring Towns, 
July 4, 1836, (Springfield: George and Charles Merriam, 1836), 3.  
492 Plumer, An Address, 15, 16. 
493 Edward Everett, “Oration Delivered before the Citizens of Charlestown, on the 4th July, 1828”, in 
Edward Everett, Orations and Speeches, on Various Occasions, (Boston: American Stationers’ Company, 
1836), 161. My emphasis. 
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“We rejoice in free institutions, and in our favored condition; it is our duty to 
elevate our character as a people, to a level with these institutions and this 
condition. We must make ourselves worthy of them.”494 
Revolutionary history thus became a didactic instrument, and the legacy not framed primarily in 
terms of an obligation; “The duty, then, of vigilance and devotion to public service is first among 
the great moral lessons, applicable to the present times, which are taught us by the history of the 
revolution.”495 The Revolution provided inspiration for the challenges of the day, not a binding 
hold on the second generation’s response to them. Nevertheless, the challenges that the second 
generation would address were once more framed around ideas of preserving of the Constitution, 
which became the theatre of rhetorical conflict. And as will be shown below, the mythology of 
the Constitution under “heritage” was marked in comparison to its earlier symbolism. 
 
The Constitution and Fourth of July Toasts 
Occupying a central position within American’s historical self-narrative, the Constitution 
became a totem of loyalty to the founders and a mechanism for marshaling their support for any 
given political project. Alongside its rhetorical position within Fourth of July orations, the rise of 
the Constitution as a symbol can be seen in its invocation in Fourth of July toasts. By utilizing 
the Readex electronic database of Early American newspapers I created a sample of toasts for the 
years 1810-1835.496 A simple search for the term “toasts” was used for the seven days following 
the Fourth (5th-11th of July) of the each year497 and then each successful return examined and 
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494 James Humphrey Wilder, An Oration Delivered at the Request of the Young Men of Hingham, on the 
Fourth of July, 1832, (Hingham: Jedidaah Farmer, 1832), 8. 
495 Plumer, An Oration, 16. 
496 Readex: America’s Historical Newspapers. Accessed 27th March 2011 to 6th March 2012.  
497 Low levels of successful returns meant the expansion of the date range for 9 days after 1831.  
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logged if it was a report of a series of at least six Fourth of July toasts.498 Recording each 
individual toast within a given series, the proportion that contained a toast to the federal 
Constitution could be calculated. The results are shown on the chart (figure 1) alongside a three-
year rolling average of the proportions. As the chart shows, the proportion of 4th of July toasts to 
the Constitution was approximately a third from 1810 until the 1820s. However, moving into 
1830s that proportion substantially increased – reflecting the Constitution’s role as a symbol of 
the second generation’s witnessing of the founding.  
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498 Reports of less than six toasts, those that amalgamated several distinct locations, and those that 
appeared to be satire or which did not seem to have been publicly offered, were rejected. 
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Figure'1.'Percentage'of'Fourth'of'July'Celebrations'that'Included'a'Toast'to'the'
Constitution:'1810>1835 
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At the same time, the nature of the Constitution’s invocation during Fourth of July toasts 
evinced a view of the document as sacred. While opposition to reform of the Constitution had 
been a theme within earlier toasts, by the 1830s alteration of the text became an almost 
existential threat - alteration would violate the myth that the document was one of timeless 
wisdom. To be sure, in 1815 fear of innovation (as distinct from violation or destruction) was 
seen in the toast: 
“Our Constitution - The noblest model of a free government, which human 
wisdom has ever produced. Let those who venerate its principles guard it from 
innovation,”499 
but over the subsequent decades it became a significant theme. In the toasts of 1830 fear of 
innovation was linked to the duration of the founders’ Constitution; 
“The Constitution - may no rust corrupt it, and no tinkers mend it.”500 
“The Constitution - The Legacy of our fathers' love: let our filial reverence guard 
it from rash innovation.”501 
In addition, concern over loyal interpretation could also be seen:  
“The Constitution of the United States, our political Chart. May it never be 
frittered away by the adoption of constructive powers not clearly defined by its 
letter and its spirit.”502 
“The Constitution of the United States - A noble text vilely misinterpreted.”503 
Such ideas would be repeated in 1835. In two distinct toasts Chesterfield, revelers acknowledged 
the origin of the document and linked this to fear of violation; 
“The Constitution of the United States; The work of wise heads and pure hearts; 
may each attempt at its violation hallow and endear it to the affections of 
Americans.”504 
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499 Columbia Patriot, July 5, 1815. 
500 Ithaca Journal and General Advertiser, July 7, 1830. 
501 Richmond Enquirer, July 9, 1830. 
502 The Farmers’ Cabinet, July 10, 1830. 
503 Charleston Courier, July 14, 1828. Original emphasis. 
504 Richmond Enquirer, July 14, 1835. Original emphasis. 
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“The Constitution of the United States: Purchased with blood, perfected with 
wisdom - may it never be sold for money, or lost through folly.”505 
The claim that the Constitution was “purchased by blood” reflected the location of the 
Constitution with the mythological time of the Revolution – positing the former as a direct 
consequence of the latter. Other celebrations shared the similar fear of constitutional “tinkering.” 
In Lynn, MA, 
“The Constitution of the United States. Palsied be the arm, and short and 
wretched the life of the man, who shall dare approach this sacred ark of our 
liberties with sacrilegious and ruffian hands.”506 
In Richmond, MA, 
“The Constitution of the United States - May its "figure head" never be 
molested.”507  
And in Meredith Bridge, NH, the succinct view that 
“The Constitution. "It must be preserved".”508 
In such a way, the imperative of constitutional preservation, free from innovation and loyal to the 
creation of the founding fathers - the culmination of the views put forth in the orations discussed 
above – became reflected in the accompanying toasts. 
 The increasing invocation of the Constitution within the toasts, sat alongside a growing 
conception of Constitution as of significance due to its claim to be the work of the founders 
themselves. Extracting from all the toasts to the Constitution those that contain an allusion to the 
origins of the document creates the distribution shown in table 1.  This table shows a breakdown 
by decade of the origins of the Constitution, as expressed in these toasts. Indicating a steady 
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505 Richmond Enquirer, July 14, 1835. Original emphasis. 
506 Salem Gazette, July 7, 1835. 
507 The Pittsfield Sun, July 16, 1835. Original emphasis. 
508 New Hampshire Patriot and State Gazette, July 20, 1835. 
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increase in particularized attributions (those which located the origins of the Constitution in an 
historical individual or group). While in the 1810s attribution was predominantly to abstracted 
notions of “wisdom” or the slightly less abstract “national wisdom,” by the 1820s the dominance 
of “wisdom” was being challenged by notions of “architects” and “framers.” With the 1830s 
wisdom has become rooted in particular figures – “wise men” – and the categories of “framer,” 
“father,” and “ancestor” sit alongside abstract notions of “American skill” and “genius” instead 
of the earlier values of “virtue,” “patriotism,” and “valor.” These toasts attest to the closer 
association of the Constitution with the particularized figures of the founders that reflects the 
understanding of the document described in the orations.  
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The association also suggested a view that preservation ought to be understood in terms 
of maintaining the founders’ intent, and within the toasts some evidence of this emerges. A 1833 
celebration at Richmond, VA would express a commitment to that idea with the toast 
“The Constitution of the U. States - interpreted not according to temporary policy 
or sectional views, but in the spirit and on the principles of its venerated 
founders.”509 
While in Hartford, Connecticut opposition to Jackson was articulated as fidelity to the founders: 
“The Constitution of the United States - As its framers understood it, and not as 
General Jackson understands it.”510 
and Lenox, Massachusetts hoped that interpretation would be grounded in  an insight 
comparable to the Constitution’s authors: 
“The Constitution - the Charter of American Liberty - May those who interpret it, 
possess the wisdom and patriotism of its Authors.”511 
In St. Albans, Vermont, revelers would identify the intent of the framers as expressed in the form 
of the Federalist Papers as worthy of celebration: 
“The Authors of the Federalist. A triumvirate not to destroy the Republic, but to 
consolidate the union of its members. Their comment should be read with the 
text.”512 
and in Richmond again Madison would be praised, not as a President or the author of 
Resolutions, but as a framer, 
“The venerable Madison - The ablest expounder of the Federal Constitution, and 
the best interpreter of his own work.”513 
As the Constitution was drawn closer to its framers in the historiography, it seemed inevitably 
drawn closer in the realm of interpretation as well. 
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509 Richmond Enquirer, July 9, 1833.  
510 Connecticut Courant, July 7, 1834. 
511 Berkshire Journal, July 8, 1830. 
512 The Repertory, July 8, 1830. 
513 Richmond Enquirer, July 9, 1833.  
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Just as the toasts reflected an understanding of the Constitution as worthy of and 
demanding preservation, so too did they indicate the increasing political value of an individual 
association with the document. The toasts to individuals suggest that political heroes of the late 
1820s and 1830s were measured and assessed, at least in part, by their relationship to the 
Constitution. Henry Clay’s claim to presidential candidacy was advanced by the Volunteers of 
Richmond via his relationship to the Constitution. 
“The Hon. Henry Clay; the able defender of the Constitution: May he be our next 
President.”514 
Elsewhere, John Quincy Adams’s constitutional knowledge was praised; 
“John Quincy Adams - "He studied the Constitution that he might defend it; he 
examined its principles that he might maintain them".”515 
Daniel Webster’s value came of his interpretative abilities; 
“The Constitution of our Union: "And the king's wise men, and the magicians, 
and the soothsayers, were brought in; but they could not read the writings: Then 
Daniel was called, and he shewed the interpretation thereof: So this Daniel was 
preferred above the Presidents and princes; forasmuch as he was faithful, and 
because an excellent spirit was in him”.”516 
The Chief Justice was lauded for his preservation of the Constitution; 
“The Chief Justice of the United States - In expounding the Constitutional Law, 
he has "preserved" the Union.”517 
And the irrepressible President Jackson was framed as the Constitution’s guardian; 
“Constructive Powers - The forbidden fruit, between which and the wily tempters, 
our Chief, as dauntless in the cabinet as in the field, has interposed a shield that 
will save our happy Constitution from eternal death.”518 
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515 Daily National Intelligencer, July 9, 1830. 
516 Salem Gazette, July 9, 1830. 
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Indeed, for some celebrants, it seemed wholly impossible that their chosen heroes could not have 
had an intimate relationship with the Constitution: 
“Washington, the Saviour of his Country – Jefferson, the framer of the 
Constitution: May their names be never forgotten by the true Republicans.”519 
As with the toasts to the Constitution and the orations, the Constitution came to operate as a 
symbol by which an individual’s greatness – their unity with the founding fathers – could be 
symbolized.  
 The Fourth of July toasts reflected then the processes seen in the orations and the broader 
historiography urged by the founders themselves. The toasts track an increasing importance for 
the Constitution within the outpouring of early American nationalism that marked the annual 
Fourth of July celebrations. Becoming ever more central to American self-identification, the 
Constitution emerged as both a central symbol of national unity and an invocation with 
significant rhetorical currency. As the final toasts show, the Constitution emerged as an 
important association for aspiring national figures and for their policies. However, this 
importance was grounded in the development of the attitude of “heroic preservation” detailed 
above. The Constitution became more important because it came to be understood as a moment 
of republican founding and an intervention marked by exceptional virtue. The second generation 
sought to preserve the constitutional settlement as testament to their own republican virtue – and 
in doing so paid homage to the virtue of the founding generation. That the Constitution’s rising 
prominence within the toasts maps on to a closer association of the document with the founders 
is then not surprising. But that the association would ultimately be formed within the public 
realm of Fourth of July remembrance rather than private letters and histories of the actors of 
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1787-88 challenges claims that the Constitution’s historiography represents an elite victory over 
the people’s agency. 
 
Conclusion 
As quoted above, an 1834 observer of constitutional law noted that “The Constitution has 
been obliged to leave its temple, and come down into the forum, and traverse the streets.”520 
Reviewing Joseph Story’s Commentaries, the writer hoped that the Justice’s guidance would 
satisfy the public mind on questions of constitutional law and “put an end to the controversies, 
which agitate the country.”521 “Constitutional Law, in our day,” the writer lamented, “instead of 
being the calm occupation of the schools, or the curious pursuit of the professional student, has 
become – as it were, –  an element of real life.”522 As the toasts from the 1830s detailed above 
demonstrate, this writer was certainly correct in the view that by the time he wrote the 
deployment of the Constitution was a regular and central rhetorical device within partisan 
politics. However, this chapter has also demonstrated that a belief that there was a time when the 
realm of constitutional law was not “an element of real life” is misplaced. Throughout the early 
Republic Americans sought to make sense of their relationship with the Constitution through 
public enactments, social celebrations, and the invocation of collective memory. The role of the 
Constitution within American political life was never something determined in the seminars and 
courtrooms of the nation’s legal elites. And as such it was never a wholly elite project – the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
520 “ART. III – Story’s Constitutional Law,” 66. 
521 “ART. III – Story’s Constitutional Law,” 66. Interestingly, the writer saw written constitutions as 
innately the source of contestation. Story would, he hoped, be able to unfold “the purport of the letter 
through the unity and connexion of the spirit.” 
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meaning of the Constitution, and crucially the reverence for it, was forged within the 
participatory realm of politics “out of doors.” 
Belying the writer’s lament, the Constitution was not brought down from its temple as the 
second generation of Americans sought to make sense of their constitutional legacy. Instead, it 
was through the process of improvising a relationship with the constitutional founding that they 
inherited that the second generations of Americans installed both the Constitution and its authors 
within a temple. Deprived of the opportunity to partake in the creation of a polity by the 
existence of the Founding, they were required to direct their ambition in a different direction. 
Utilizing the technique or strategy of heritage to distort the passage of time between the 
foundation of the American republic and the contemporary period, they simultaneously pushed 
the Revolution further back in imaginable time and made it more immediate. This enabled the 
Revolution to be claimed by the second generation and deployed as a didactic tool, while at the 
same time framing it as a distinct period, separated from the challenges of early Antebellum 
America. As such the generation could, to paraphrase Joyce Appleby’s description, rework their 
cultural inheritance, respond selectively to it, and adapt techniques and prescriptions that met the 
exigencies of the living.523 
In adopting this approach, they seized upon the Constitution as a means by which to 
justify the perceived greatness of the founders, but also a method of assessing their own stature. 
The Constitution both proved the founders’ greatness and established the greatness of the 
country they had founded. It also allowed the second generation to assert their own connection 
with the founding and to measure their fidelity to it. Re-conceiving the challenge of 
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523 Appleby’s actual description reads thus; “Each set of heirs necessarily reworks its cultural inheritance; 
its members respond selectively, adapting techniques and prescriptions to the exigencies of living, 
unthinkingly neglectful of some elements, willfully rejecting others, often atavistically spurning its 
parents’ beliefs to revive the tastes and interests of an earlier age.” Appleby, Inheriting the Revolution, 18. 
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constitutional preservation to be era-specific, the second generation accelerated the veneration of 
the constitutional document. In seeking to negotiate their own position vis-à-vis the greatness of 
the founders, the second generation actually responded by forging a second cult, that of the 
Constitution, into which the founders were incorporated.  
However, in becoming the litmus test of political action and political actors, the 
Constitution came to operate simultaneously within the reified sphere of cultural self-identity and 
the more robust sphere of partisan politics. As the quote mentioned in this chapter’s body vividly 
suggests, if the Constitution did indeed traverse the streets in 1830s, it was also the case that it 
came down from its temple to do so. As much as the Constitution would emerge as a political 
football, it would do so precisely because of its venerable association with the founders. To 
capture the Constitution was to capture their glory, and to frame one’s own actions against the 
continuing glory of the country. In negotiating their revolutionary inheritance, the second 
generation also advanced a worship of the founders’ Constitution. 
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Chapter 4: Founding Authority: John Marshall, Democratic Founding, and McCulloch v. 
Maryland 
 
The Judiciary of the United States - The guardians of the Constitution and the palladium of 
individual rights524  
 
John Marshall - One of the fathers of the Constitution, and its highest official expounder: a pure 
intellect without passions, except the love of country525 
 
Alongside the originary authority of the Constitution’s authors and the emerging social 
importance of the latter’s relationship with the constitutional document, came the development 
of an institutional locus for the Constitution itself. This development, more so than the other two, 
was refracted through the institutions given shape by the Constitution itself. The Supreme 
Court’s brethren, under the Chief Justiceship of John Marshall, came to be positioned as the 
“guardians of the Constitution” and in the process to stake out their own authority over the text 
itself. Shaping the manner in which the Constitution would be understood, Marshall and his 
colleagues became to an extent “fathers” of the Constitution alongside the authors of 1787, 
insofar as they relocated and advanced textual authority within the judicial apparatus.  
The institutionalization of the Supreme Court’s authority proceeded along two distinct 
trajectories: (1) the institutionalization of the judiciary; and (2) the appropriation of constitutional 
authority by the Court. Both trends supported the emergence of a Court able to articulate a claim 
to guardianship of the Constitution, although as President Andrew Jackson’s apocryphal 
rejection of the Court’s authority in Worcester v. Georgia (31 US 515) suggests, such a process 
was not complete by the 1830s. This chapter focuses on the latter development. As the body of 
law, corps of lawyers, and personnel of the Supreme Court grew in the early nineteenth-century, 
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the federal judiciary developed the capacity to claim control over constitutional meaning.526 
Alongside this capacity came an appropriation of constitutional authority. This chapter examines 
the ideological claims made by John Marshall (and to a lesser extent Justice Samuel Chase) in 
pursuit of this authority. Examining five cases closely, the chapter shows that in order to grant 
the Court textual authority, Marshall was forced to grapple with, and reconfigure, the claims of 
the people and the framers to constitutional authority. In doing so, he constructed an authority for 
the Court which drew upon the sovereign authority of people and mitigated the textual authority 
of the framers, creating a position for the Supreme Court as a popularly-sanctioned expounder of 
the framers’ text. Wielding together the twin authorities of the founding in the institution of the 
Court, Marshall created a constitutional authority for the Court that recognized but marginalized 
both prior authorities. In this way, he relocated authority in the text itself and the judiciary as the 
authoritative interpreter of that text.  
 
Role of Marshall in Creating the Court’s Authority 
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526 The institutional development of the Court can be seen in numerous measures. Evidence of this 
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(each justice presenting an independent opinion) to the idea of an opinion of the Court (Scott Doulas 
Gerber, “Introduction,” in Seriatim: The Supreme Court before John Marshall, ed. Scott Douglas Gerber, 
(New York: New York University Press, 1998), 20; Donald G. Morgan, “Marshall, the Marshall Court, 
and the Constitution,” in Chief Justice John Marshall: A Reappraisal, ed. W. Melville Jones, (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1956)); (2) the emergence of the figure of the Court reporter (Craig Joyce, The 
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Marshall Court and the Making of Constitutional Democracy,” in John Marshall’s Achievement: Law, 
Politics, and Constitutional Interpretation, ed. Thomas C. Shevory, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1989), 
16); (4) the expansion of the rules of the Court (cf. Figure 2) (Henry Wheaton, A Digest of the Decisions 
of the Supreme Court of the United States, From its Establishment in 1780, to February Term, 1820, 
(New York: R. Donaldson 1821), vii-xiv); and (5) the increasing use and development of precedent by the 
Court (Timothy R. Johnson, James F. Spriggs, & Paul J. Wahlbeck, “The Origin and Development of 
Stare Decisis at the U.S. Supreme Court,” in New Directions in Judicial Politics, ed. Kevin T. McGuire, 
(New York: Routledge, 2012)). 
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Seeking to account for the success of the American founding, Hannah Arendt argued for the 
institutionalization of constitutional authority in the Supreme Court as a central facet of the new 
nation’s stability. Writing in On Revolution, Arendt suggested that the American founders 
followed the Romans in locating authority in an institution, whose existence was representative 
of the link back to the moment of beginning. For the Romans, this was the Senate and its 
connection to the ancestors, and for the Americans it was the Supreme Court and its connection 
to the Constitution. In Arendt’s words, “The Supreme Court derives its own authority from the 
Constitution as a written document, while the Roman Senate… held their authority because they 
represented, or rather reincarnated, the ancestors…”527 Conceiving of success as a consequence 
of the creation of authority, Arendt regards the institutionalization of authority in the Court as a 
defining characteristic of the founding: “…that their [the Americans] revolution succeeded 
where all others were to fail… one is tempted to think, was decided the very moment when the 
Constitution began to be ‘worshipped’, even though it had hardly begun to operate.”528  
In locating authority in an institution (the Supreme Court), Arendt drew upon her earlier 
consideration of the nature of authority. In “What is authority?”, Arendt sought to separate the 
concept of authority from power and persuasion, the former resting on coercive force and the 
latter presupposing an equality between parties that undermined the possibility of an 
authoritative relationship.529 Tracing Plato’s attempt to forge an authority rooted in neither the 
persuasive norms of domestic politics nor the violent norms of foreign policy, she pointed to 
notion of authority as grounded in a pre-existing acceptance of the location of expert knowledge 
in one party to an interaction – be it in the form of captain-sailor, shepherd-flock, or doctor-
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528 Arendt, On Revolution, 198-199. 
529 Hannah Arendt, “What is Authority?” in Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in 
Political Thought, (New York: Viking Press, 1961), 93-93. 
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patient; “What he [Plato] was looking for was a relationship in which the compelling element 
lies in the relationship itself and is prior to the actual issuance of commands.”530 For Arendt, the 
great success of the American founding lay in its creation of authority within the polity without 
recourse to violence.531  
 As Honig has noted, Arendt believed the American founding avoided recourse to an 
absolute basis for its authority by harnessing the potential for authority derived from 
augmentation.532 The worship of the Constitution drew upon the performative authority of the 
Declaration of Independence, and through subsequent augmentative interactions with the 
Constitution kept “the beginning always present.”533 Tapping the prior (and so authoritative) 
performance of the founding, while enacting its authority in the present, constitutional 
augmentation allowed for authority without coercion/violent imposition or recurrent persuasion. 
Indeed, the continued possibility of resistance to that authority is central to its operation - it is 
with the possibility of rejection of the founding that the return to the beginning (augmentation) is 
not recurrence to originary violence but is the return to the human capacity to originate.534 
 The institutional location of this augmentative process in the Supreme Court reflects the 
Arendtian definition of authority as distinct from power or persuasion. Shorn of the power of the 
sword or the purse, the Court’s own capacity to act rests solely upon the willingness of other 
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530 Arendt, “What is Authority?” 109. 
531 Arendt, “What is Authority?” 140. Excepting, of course, the violence that constituted the War of 
Independence, the extralegal violence that muted domestic opposition to it, and the legal violence that 
enforced the subsequent constitutional order (Jeremy Engels, Enemyship: Democracy and the Counter-
Revolution in the Early Republic, (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2010), 117-126). 
As well as the metaphorical violence involved in the destruction of the pre-existing colonial polities. 
532 Bonnie Honig, “Declarations of Independence: Arendt and Derrida on the Problem of Founding a 
Republic,” American Political Science Review 85 (1991). 
533 Honig, “Declarations of Independence,” 110. Honig remained skeptical of such an approach, 
contrasting it with Derrida’s belief that the performance of the Declaration of Independence marks the 
entry of the absolute. 
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agents to recognize its authority. To be sure, the modern Court extends persuasive appeals in the 
form of its written opinions, but these speak to the particular decisions rather than its capacity to 
render the decisions themselves. In moments of constitutional interpretation, the Court seeks to 
“augment” the founding by extending and clarifying its application and relationship to 
contemporary America. Augmentation then, provides for an acceptance of a prior locus of 
“expertise” - and the institutionalization of that relationship without compulsion.  
 Within Arendt’s account, the process by which the Court institutionalized the 
augmentative capacity of society is underdeveloped. Moving quickly from the significance of the 
Constitution as the basis of the augmentation to the success of the Court in embodying the 
founding, Arendt’s description is suggestive of an instantaneous (or at least rapid and inevitable) 
process of institutionalization. As numerous scholars have demonstrated however, the Court’s 
supremacy in this area was neither immediate nor inevitable.535 These accounts have pointed 
towards institutional constraints on the Court’s ability to assert supremacy in this area, in order to 
posit that the process was drawn out and contested. Such institutional competition speaks in part 
to the emergent and solidifying institutional capacity of the Court noted in the first footnote to 
this chapter. However, the Court’s emergence as the institutional locus of constitutional authority 
equally relied upon ideological construction. As much as Arendt’s account overlooks the 
institutional development, it also downplays the centrality of John Marshall in creating an 
ideological support for the Court’s authority. Exploration of this development is crucial in 
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Oxford University Press, 2004); Keith E. Whittington, Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy: The 
Presidency, the Supreme Court, and Constitutional Leadership in U.S. History, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2007); Stephen M. Engel, “Before the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: Regime Unity, 
Loyal Opposition, and Hostilities toward Judicial Authority in Early America,” Studies in American 
Political Development 23 (2009); Barry Friedman, The Will of the People, (New York: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, 2009). 
!
!
!!197!
understanding the Constitution’s position within contemporary American society, but moreover, 
suggests that authority — rather than being prior — was constructed by Marshall’s use of 
rhetorical and narrative persuasion. 
 Examining the development of the Supreme Court’s ideological basis of authority over 
three crucial terms, this section will show the centrality of Marshall and the necessity of invoking 
the dual authorities of the framers and the people to this process. An appeal to the people’s 
sovereignty formed the ideological basis of the Court’s constitutional authority in the early 
Republic. Two cases — Ware v. Hylton (1796) and McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) — exemplify 
this invocation. In these cases the Supreme Court argued for an understanding of its role as the 
guardian of the constitutional settlement consented to by the people (through ratification). 
Moving beyond the “departmentalism” favored by the Jeffersonians, the Court positioned itself 
as the people’s designated check upon rival political institutions. Calling upon the people’s 
sovereign authority, the Court sought to forge a constitutional authority for itself through an 
institutional identification with the people and the moment of Founding.536 Such an identification 
could not be assumed, and so the Court’s opinions are themselves attempts to persuade the 
American public of the validity of this identity. At the same time, the Court’s posture as the 
guardian of a particular settlement brought forth the requirement of a single, authoritative 
understanding of the Founding and Constitution. To this end, the Court sought to fashion a 
highly textual mode of constitutional interpretation. Marshall’s extensive opinions worked to 
elucidate a body of constitutional law that narrated a single, unified meaning of the constitutional 
text. At the heart of this project lay an uneven and unfulfilled attempt to marginalize the 
transitional authority of the framers as authors of the constitutional text. In United States v. 
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536 To this extent, Arendt’s view that the Court paralleled the Roman Senate in providing a link back to 
the Founding moment is undoubtedly sound. 
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Hylton (1796) and Sturgis v. Crowninshield (1819), the Court offers the textual nature of the 
Constitution as a basis for articulation of the single “moment” for preservation and in doing 
elaborates an understanding of the text as authoritative in itself and superior to ordinary law. But 
the Court is also required to revert to the historical context of the Philadelphia Convention to do 
so. Unable to fully break the hold of the framers’ power over the text, the Court seeks to hold 
intent as a guide to textual interpretation, not the basis of the text’s content. Through these 
twinned cases, the Court can be seen to unevenly address and also inscribe the tension between 
the framers and the people within American ideology as it sought to assert both its own authority 
and the possibility of a uniform meaning for the text. Marbury v. Madison proves pivotal within 
this development, but two terms of the Court, 1796 and 1819, offer important frameworks for 
understanding both the importance and the strategies deployed in the Supreme Court’s most 
famous case. In examining those cases arising in 1796 and 1819 in greater detail the ideological 
significance of Marbury and Marshall’s work therein can be better identified as a partial 
articulation of the willed constitutional authority of the Court and the ideological supports 
thereof. At the heart of this development is a deployment of persuasive rhetoric that belies 
Arendt’s claim that authority in the United States was created without recourse to coercion or 
persuasion.  
 
Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Review 
Chief Justice John Marshall’s role in the development of constitutional thought in the United 
States has scarcely been understated. John Brigham has suggested that each generation has its 
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own Marshal,l537 but it often seems that every new incarnation supersedes the last. Writing in 
1891, Lord Bryce would claimed that “…the Constitution seemed not so much to rise under his 
[Marshall’s] hands to its full stature, as to be gradually unveiled by him till it stood revealed in 
the harmonious perfection of the form which its framers had designed.”538 George Haskins 
would suggest that to Marshall, “more than to any other single person, belongs the credit for 
establishing the foundations of constitutional interpretation.”539 Robert Faulkner argued that 
“Marshall and his associates raised the Supreme Court from erratic obscurity to semipolitical 
eminence as the voice of the semisacred fundamental law.”540 More recently Matthew J. Franck 
has described Marshall, without irony, as “the Socrates of American constitutional law.”541  
 Central to the contemporary mythology of Marshall is his role in authoring, and unifying 
the Court around, the opinion in Marbury v. Madison in 1803. The role of Marbury v. Madison 
in the history of the Supreme Court’s authority has long been assumed in textbooks. Viewed as 
the moment in which Marshall (and the Court) claimed the authority to strike down legislation as 
unconstitutional, the case can be seen as the beginning of “constitutional law” within the United 
States.542 The mythology of the case suggests that Marshall craftily moved between the political 
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threat of the Jeffersonian Republicans and the Federalist Court’s desire to establish an 
independent base of power within the federal government. Gamely losing the battle on the day 
(by finding the Court unable to assist the Federalist Marbury), Marshall nonetheless positioned 
the Court well for the “war” by establishing a power of judicial review.543 However, scholars 
have consistently suggested that the significance of Marbury has been overstated and have 
sought to challenge the view that the case marks a pivotal point in the judicial history of the 
Constitution.544 Sanford Levinson infamously refuses to assign the case during his constitutional 
law course,545 while Mark Graber has argued that the “popular notion that Marbury established 
judicial review by judicial fiat is nonsense. …The Judiciary Act of 1789 did far more than 
Marbury v. Madison to establish judicial power in the United States.”546 Critics of the high status 
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opinion in the case (Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2009). 
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Framers Have in Mind?” in Corwin’s Constitution: Essays and Insights of Edward S. Corwin, ed. 
Kenneth D. Crews, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), 89). On Cooper and Marbury cf. Keith E. 
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1803-2001: Un dialogue franco-américain, ed. Élizabeth Zoller, (Paris: Dalloz, 2003), 170. 
544 Clinton lays the blame for the high status accorded to the decision at the feet of seminal Marshall 
biographer Beveridge, but this seems unfair given Beveridge’s claim that “Marshall, in his opinion in 
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of men.” (Robert Lowry Clinton, Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Review, (Lawrence, KS: University 
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“heroic image” of the Chief Justice establishing a counter-majoritarian institution as a significant point in 
the growing hegemony of the opinion (Jack N. Rakove, “Judicial Review Before and Beyond Marbury,” 
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545 Mark A. Graber, “Establishing Judicial Review: Marbury and the Judicial Act of 1789,” Tulsa Law 
Review 38 (2002-2003), 609-610. 
546 Graber, “Establishing Judicial Review,” 610. 
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accorded to Marbury often point out that the striking down of legislation was not repeated until 
the ill-fated Dred Scott decision fifty years later,547 downplay its significance within the early 
Republic,548 or identify it as one episode within an inter-institutional conflict.549 Still others 
dispute its importance by detailing the existence of precedent and support for judicial review 
prior to the decision.550 Nonetheless, the case remains significant within Marshall’s corpus both 
for the political context within which it was decided and for its consideration of the nature of a 
written constitution and the consequences of this nature for the Supreme Court.  
The Marbury decision came at the crescendo of tensions between the Federalists and 
Republicans which had followed Jefferson’s election to the Presidency, and were embodied in  
the issue of the judiciary’s relationship to its fellow branches of government. Hobson has argued 
that the “opinion delivered by the chief justice, whether denounced by Republicans or hailed by 
Federalists, was interpreted by contemporaries almost exclusively in partisan terms.”551 In the 
Senate, debates associated with the case drew Republican charges that “enemies to the President” 
were attempting to subvert the executive, and that the very debates themselves were 
“degrogatory to [the President’s] dignity.” In response, Federalists expressed fears of “the most 
monstrous system of tyranny” should the records of the Senate on this issue not be made 
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available to the plaintiffs.552 These elite debates and the case itself came at a moment of 
heightened hysteria over the fate of the country. In Boston, “Verus Honestus” denounced 
Jefferson’s support for the arrival of Thomas Paine as evidence of the former’s commitment to 
destroy America’s Christian faith and “open the flood-gates of profligacy and vice” as “Voltaire 
and Rosseau [sic] insinuated;…Condorcet dreamed… Godwin advocated… [and] Weishaupt 
designed.”553 In Haddonfield, New Jersey, Paine’s effigy was publicly burned with a copy of The 
Age of Reason. Reports darkly noted that “[n]o person objected to the execution of Paine; 
although it was observed by some, that he was invited to this country by President Jefferson.”554 
Paine’s invitation exacerbated Federalist beliefs of the President’s longstanding “hostility to the 
federal constitution… his infidelity, and hatred of Washington.”555 The tension was not confined 
to the printed page; A newspaper in Providence, RI, reported that on the anniversary of 
Jefferson’s election in March about “150 [Federalists] paraded the streets with clubs, swords and 
knives in a riotous and mob-like manner, insulting and hunting at every person not of their 
sect.”556 By mid-March the municipal government of New York felt the need to a pass an 
ordinance to the effect that any person displaying an effigy would be fined ten dollars.557  
The federal judiciary formed a central aspect of radical Republicans’ beliefs that the 
Federalists had “been endeavouring ever since the revolution to establish a monarchy or an 
aristocracy on the ruins of our present constitution.”558 William Branch Giles would write to 
Jefferson in 1810 that the Revolution of 1800 would be “incomplete so long as that strong 
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fortress [the Judiciary] is in possession of the enemy.”559 Jefferson would concur, writing to 
Dickinson later that year: 
“on their part they [the Federalists] have retired into the Judiciary as a strong 
hold. there the remains of federalism are to be preserved & fed from the treasury, 
and from that battery all the works of republicanism are to be beaten down & 
erased. by a fraudulent use of the constitution which has made judges 
irremoveable, they have multiplied useless judges merely to strengthen their 
phalanx.”560 
For some Republicans, Marshall’s position on the Supreme Court was itself evidence of a 
Federalist plot to weaken Jefferson’s executive power. From his appointment in early 1801, the 
General Advertiser (later to become the Aurora) had reprinted articles framing Marshall as a 
deliberated bulwark against the popular will (embodied in Jefferson). Writing “To John 
Marshall” in February 1803, “Hortensius” criticized Marshall’s role in the blocking of 
Jefferson’s appointment - a result which would mean the “government will be at an end… the 
fabric of the American constitution will tumble to earth, and bury beneath its ruins the peace, the 
happiness, the honor, the independence of out country.”561 The same month “Lucius” would 
address himself to Marshall in the same newspaper, warning the “Idol of [his] party” that the 
writer would “unveil your motives… expose you uncovered [in?] the fight of the people — your 
depravity shall excite their odium.”562  
The Jeffersonian push back against the judiciary would continue into 1803, resulting in 
Federalist denouncements that, since 1801, the phrase “preservation of the general government” 
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had meant nothing more than the destruction of judicial independence.563 At the outset of the 
1803 term the House of Representatives would impeach Judge John Pickering of New 
Hampshire paralleling the impeachment of Judge Alexander Addison in Pennsylvania at the 
same time.564  A little over two months after the Court issued its opinion in Marbury, Justice 
Chase would deliver a jury charge in Baltimore which would result in his impeachment.  
 Such was the political environment into which Marshall brought his opinion in Marbury. 
That he managed to negotiate the combustible political atmosphere of 1803 would give the 
opinion credit enough, but the decision is more - and less - than a politically savvy response to 
partisan pressures. Less than, to the extent that the partisan significance of the opinion has 
increased, not decreased, with historical time. As Beveridge noted, and others have attested to, 
the opinion did not excite much attention at the time; Beveridge claims that the Louisiana 
Purchase and the fact that only the radical Jeffersonians believed judicial review controversial 
meant “the first of Marshall’s great Constitutional opinions received scant notice at the time of 
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delivery. The newspapers had little to say about it.”565 For Smith, it was the Federalists, rather 
than the Republicans, who lost most from the decision insofar as Marshall refused to directly 
challenge Jefferson and Madison.566 Contemporary evidence supports the view that judicial 
review in particular did not excite much partisan interest. The radical Aurora for the Country 
printed a series of seven essays under the signature “Littleton” from April 23rd 1803 to May 3rd 
1803 listing every imaginable sin of the Court in this decision, none of which extended to its 
exercise of judicial review.567 The Republican house paper National Intelligencer, in reporting 
Chase’s infamous jury charge later in May, would exclude Chase’s comments on judicial review, 
noting only that “[Justice Chase here went into an assertion of the right of the judiciary to decide 
on the constitutionality of laws.]”568 If the charge as a whole was deemed as worthy of 
impeachment, it seems this aspect, judicial review, was not controversial enough to reprint. Even 
accounts emphasizing the political nature of the decision downplay the extent to which Marshall 
was engaged in careful partisan strategizing in order to secure judicial review.569  
 Marshall’s opinion is more than a political response to the extent that the text itself is an 
important reflection and response to questions that had been touched upon by the Supreme Court 
in the 1790s but never fully explored. To this extent, Marshall’s opinion in Marbury v. Madison 
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is pivotal in linking the problems emerging for the role of Court in its pre-Marshall period to the 
strident answers offered in the crucial 1819 term. The opinion represents a meditation on the 
meaning of a written constitution for the role of the judiciary. Contemplating the relationship 
between the people, the constitutional document, and the branches of government, the opinion 
explores the consequences of and for judicial review in the era of written constitutions. To be 
sure, Marshall’s conclusions in this regard would ultimately serve his (and the Federalists’) 
interests insofar as they worked to locate a peculiar authority in the Supreme Court itself.570 But 
to the extent that the opinion shaped the institutional understanding of constitutional politics in 
the early Republic it remains an important landmark. Moreover it is a central site of Marshall’s 
use of persuasion and a founding narrative to establish the authority of the Constitution and the 
Court. O’Fallon has correctly claimed the opinion as a moment in which “the people’s 
sovereignty became the mechanism for dismissing them from a role in preserving (or…  
constituting) the fundamental structure of their government.”571 In order to fully appreciate the 
work of Marshall in Marbury however, it is first useful to understand the questions raised by two 
1796 cases:  Hylton v. United States and Ware v. Hylton. Two themes within these cases — the 
idea of judicial review and the nature of a written constitution — illustrate the discussions of 
Marbury v. Madison. 
 
Judicial Review in the 1796 Term 
 Hylton v. United States (3 Dallas 171) — the 1796 Supreme Court case concerning the 
carriage tax — and the justices’ ambiguous claim to powers of judicial review in their opinions 
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therein is a crucial data point for the argument that federal judicial review was recognized prior 
to Marbury.572 The “carriage case” is often seen as the dog that didn’t bark of early judicial 
review. The opinions in Hylton v. United States centered on the question, as Justice Chase put it, 
of “whether the law of Congress, of the 5th of June, 1794, entitled, “An act to lay duties upon 
carriages, for the conveyance of persons,” is unconstitutional and void?”573 The crux of the 
constitutionality of the law lay in the plausible identity of the carriage tax as a direct tax. If the 
tax was direct, the Constitution required its apportionment amongst the states on the basis of 
population as per Article I, Section 2’s infamous three-fifths clause.574 The Supreme Court 
disposed of the issue by finding that the carriage tax was not in fact a direct tax, and so the law 
stood. This resolved the immediate question of the Act’s constitutionality without engaging the 
question of whether the Court could strike down a law of Congress. As Chase expressed it: 
“As I do not think the tax on carriages is a direct tax, it is unnecessary, at this 
time, for me to determine, whether this court, constitutionally possesses the power 
to declare an act of Congress void, on the ground of its being contrary to, and in 
violation of, the Constitution; but if the court have such a power, I am free 
declare, that I will never exercise it, but in a very clear case.”575  
Paterson, Iredell and Wilson agreed that the tax was constitutional, affirming Wilson’s lower 
court decision.576 Agreeing that Congress had acted within the Constitution, the Court was not 
required to advance an opinion on the issue of judicial review. Nonetheless, the possibility of 
judicial review was raised by the case, and prompted Chase to put his above thoughts regarding 
the issue on record. The other justices were more reticent in this regard, but the willingness of 
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572 Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court, 33. 
573 3 Dallas 172. Original emphasis. 
574 Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included 
within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the 
whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding 
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575 3 Dallas 175. Original emphasis. 
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the Court to pass judgment on the constitutionality of legislation has prompted some scholars to 
argue that the power of judicial review was implicitly advanced in the opinions. “If the Court had 
the authority to uphold an act of Congress,” says Fisher “presumably it had the authority to strike 
one down.”577 
 The claim for implicit assertion of judicial review in Hylton v. United States is given 
support by the case of Ware v. Hylton in the same term. Ware v. Hylton (3 Dallas 199) concerned 
a claim from a British creditor against citizens of Virginia for a debt contracted prior to the 
Revolution. A Virginian law of 1779 had provided for the cancellation of debts owed to British 
citizens through equivalent payment to the state treasury, but following the 1783 Treaty of Paris 
the administrator of William Jones’s estate sued for the payment of a debt contracted by Daniel 
Hylton & Co. and Francis Eppes, citizens of Virginia.  At stake then was the supremacy of 
treaties entered into by the United States over the legislative acts of the states.  The case 
represented a subject of “uncommon magnitude” in the words of Justice Iredell, the Circuit Court 
judge, and brought forth arguments equal to its importance. Iredell would remark that “I shall, as 
long as I live, remember, with pleasure and respect, the arguments which I have heard on this 
case… the heart has been warmed, while the understanding has been instructed.”578 Iredell ruled 
in favor of the defendants, and the case was pursued to the Supreme Court. His fellow Justices 
apparently felt that Iredell had not been instructed enough, as they unanimously ruled to overturn 
his decision and side with the plaintiff.  
 The Supreme Court issued opinions seriatim (each justice in turn), so no single opinion of 
the Court emerged as definitive, but three of the four opinions (excluding Iredell who offered 
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only an explanation of his lower court ruling) held an understanding of the Constitution as 
superior to state law. Justices Chase, Paterson, and Cushing would all suggest either explicitly or 
implicitly that the Treaty of Paris held authority over state laws through the Constitution.579 
Cushing would argue “there is no want of power, the treaty being sanctioned as the supreme law 
by the Constitution of the United States, which nobody pretends to deny to be paramount and 
controlling to all state laws…”580 Paterson crafted an opinion primarily concerned with his belief 
that “National differences should not affect private bargains,”581 but one which nonetheless took 
for granted the notion that the Treaty’s “fourth article… repeals the legislative act of 
Virginia.”582 Justice Chase would state that “[o]ur federal constitution established the power of a 
treaty over the constitution and laws of any of the states.”583 In the words of these opinions, it 
seemed beyond doubt that the supremacy of the Constitution contained the authority to narrow or 
strike down state laws, but to the extent that such a claim is merely an articulation of the 
Constitution’s Article VI commitment that “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under 
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land”584 it offers no direct 
support for the idea of judicial review. 
 However Justice Chase’s opinion in the case went further than merely stating the 
supremacy of the Constitution, and offered both an elaborated defense of that supremacy and a 
consideration of the judicial response to that claim. Read alongside Hylton v. United States 
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580 3 Dallas 284. 
581 3 Dallas 255. 
582 3 Dallas 256. 
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584 US Constitution, Art.IV. 
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Chase’s opinion sketches out a democratic theory of judicial review. The development of this 
argument is of particular interest for the history of judicial review in the early Republic not only 
for its content, but also for the fact that Chase was directly addressing the claims put forward by 
one of the plaintiffs’ advocates — John Marshall of Virginia, future Chief Justice. 
 Arguing for the plaintiffs John Marshall had put forward a case for understanding the 
courts as constrained to follow the will of the legislature. Developing a position that the law of 
property in a given state ought to be deemed authoritative, Marshall posited that property rights 
were created by, not merely upheld by, societies. Denying the existence of property in a state of 
nature (“…the law of property, in its origin and operation, is the offspring of the social state; not 
the incident of a state of nature”) Marshall moved to deny that plaintiffs’ claim could be 
sustained either as existing during the state of war between the British and Americans (natural 
law), or under the law as written by Virginia (positive law). Positing the legislative authority in 
the realm of property to be supreme, Marshall rejected the notion that appeal could be made to 
the courts on the basis that the Virginia law was defective. Emphasizing that the “legislative 
authority of any country can only be restrained by its own municipal constitution” Marshall 
argued that “the judicial authority can have no right to question the validity of a law, unless such 
a jurisdiction is expressly given by the constitution.”585 Outside of direct authorization by the 
constitution, the judicial branch of any government was constrained to follow the will of the 
community as expressed through the legislature. While violations of “the laws of God” might fall 
outside this restriction, Marshall deemed this point unnecessary for inquiry in the case at hand, 
for “property is the creature of civil society, and subject, in all respects, to the disposition and 
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control of civil institutions.”586 The role of the judiciary in such cases was to follow the guidance 
of the legislative body even in cases where it found itself in disagreement; “the act of the 
government, though disgraceful, would be obligatory on the judicial department.”587 
 Chase’s response was an expansive consideration of the nature of constitutional authority 
and the role of the judiciary in protecting the former. Accepting Marshall’s implicit claim of 
constitutional supremacy, Chase nonetheless tied such supremacy to the ability of the judiciary to 
declare acts contrary to the Constitution null and void. Chase began by considering the 
democratic source of all legal authority. Taking up the question of the legitimacy of the 
Virginian law, the Justice, regarding the people as “the genuine source and fountain of all 
power” deemed it within the power of the people of Virginia to arrange that commonwealth’s 
government as they sought fit.588 In this light, it was “unquestionable, that the legislature of 
Virginia, established… by the authority of the people, was for ever thereafter invested with the 
supreme and sovereign power of the state, and the authority to make any laws in their discretion” 
within the limits of their power as set out in the state’s constitution.589 Like Marshall, on this 
point, Chase conceded “it is the duty of [the nation’s] courts of justice not to question the validity 
of any law made in pursuance of the constitution.”590 Like Marshall too, Chase saw this 
obligation as extending to issues upon which the courts found themselves in disagreement with 
the legislature: “It is admitted that Virginia could not confiscate private debts without a violation 
of the modern law of nations; yet if in fact she has so done, the law is obligatory on all citizens of 
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Virginia and on her courts of justice, and in my opinion on all the courts of the United States.”591 
The people’s originary delegation of power to the legislature, executive, and judiciary was the 
basis of the several branches’ authority, and, in accordance with that delegation, their powers 
allowed the branches to “make… to execute… and… to declare or expound, the laws of the 
commonwealth” respectively.592 With regard to the laws of the states Chase agreed with 
Marshall that the judicial role was deference to the legislature within the constitution. 
 However, the Treaty of Paris and the subsequent federal constitution altered the 
relationship between the courts and the legislature in Chase’s analysis. The very authority — the 
people — which provided the basis of the Virginian legislature’s primacy over the courts prior to 
the federal constitution had willed the alteration of that relationship through its actions in 1787-
88. To Chase’s mind, “[I]f doubts [concerning the supremacy of the Treaty of Paris over the 
1779 Virginian Law] could exist before the establishment of the present national government, 
they must be entirely removed by the 6th article of the Constitution.”593 The act of the people in 
ratifying the US Constitution and Article VI asserted their originary authority to supersede the 
existing constitutions and laws of the states: 
“There can be no limitation on the power of the people of the United States. By 
their authority, the state constitutions were made, and by their authority the 
constitution of the United States was established; and they had the power to 
change or abolish the state constitutions, or make them yield to the general 
government, and to treaties made by their authority.”594  
The supremacy of the Treaty of Paris over state law reflected the “declared will of the people of 
the United States, that every treaty made by the authority of the United States, shall be superior 
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to the constitution and laws of any individual state; and their will alone is to decide.”595  
 Chase argued that the articulation of the people’s will through the Constitution placed a 
new responsibility upon state and federal judges. Whereas prior to the Constitution596 judges 
were beholden to the delegated authority located in the state legislatures, the direct intervention 
of the people in the form of constitutional ratification required their deference no longer to the 
state legislatures but to the constitutional text itself. In their intervention “[t]he people of 
America have been pleased to declare that all treaties made before the establishment of the 
national Constitution or laws of any of the states contrary to a treaty shall be disregarded.”597 In 
light of this, Chase reasoned, it could not be the case that the state legislatures alone could alter 
the standing law (e.g. voluntarily amend the existing state laws to match the superior federal 
constitution and treaties supreme under it) or else “the will of a small part of the United States 
may control or defeat the will of the whole.”598 He concluded “it is the declared duty of the state 
judges to determine any constitution or laws of any state, contrary to that treaty, made under the 
authority of the United States, null and void.”599 Crucially, “National or federal judges are bound 
by duty and oath to the same conduct.”600   
 Chase’s opinion in Ware v. Hylton fell short of advocating judicial supremacy (the belief 
that the judiciary ought to have the final say on the constitutionality of legislation), and indeed he 
was careful to maintain a posture of deference to the federal legislature, distancing the judiciary 
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from assessments as to the constitutionality of treaties entered into by the federal government.601 
But it nevertheless articulated a vision of the judiciary as the enforcers of federal supremacy 
against the states, and crucially did so on the democratic basis that the people “were the genuine 
source and fountain of all power.” Defining the Constitution as the will of the people, Chase 
carved out a role for the judiciary as the guardians of that will, charged with protecting the 
majority’s constitutional settlement from the dissent of state legislatures. Taking the very basis of 
Marshall’s resistance to judicial review of the Virginia law — that the people’s will as expressed 
through the legislature was supreme in regard to regulation of property — Chase fashioned a 
rationale for federal supremacy in which the antimajoritarian branch became the defender of 
majoritarian will. That John Marshall would be the primary recipient of Chase’s lesson in 
constitutional theory is significant to the extent that the former’s most famous opinions, Marbury 
v. Madison and  McCulloch v. Maryland would share not a few of the premises that Chase 
articulated in the 1796 term. 
 
The Written Constitution in the 1796 Term  
 A second important theme within these cases is the manner in which the written-ness of 
the Constitution relates to the possibilities for constitutional interpretation. While the relationship 
between Hylton v United States and Marbury v Madison regarding judicial review is the subject 
of debate, the cases do share a firm commitment to the idea that questions of the constitutionality 
of legislation lead back to a consideration of the intent of the text. For Hylton intention turns on 
the question of whether or not the carriage tax represents a direct form of taxation as the framers 
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would have understood it. As they considered the nature of direct federal taxation, the justices 
made recourse to the image of government that the framers had sought to construe in the 
constitutional text.  
For Paterson, this recourse was expressed in the view “that the principal, I will not say, 
the only, objects of the framers of the constitution contemplated, as falling within the rule of 
apportionment, were a capitation tax and a tax on land.”602 It was, he stated, “obviously the 
intention of the framers of the constitution, that congress should possess full power over every 
species of taxable property.”603 Understanding the Constitution as a work of political comprise 
between representatives of distinct sectional interests, the apportionment clause could only be 
interpreted as a protection offered to the Slave states - drawing from its existence a commitment 
to apportionment generally, as the plaintiff in error had argued, was “radically wrong.”604 Chase 
too would turn to the intent of the framers to flesh out an understanding of “direct” taxes. 
Construing the text of the Constitution as evidence of the framers’ intent, Chase considered that, 
if “there are any other species of taxes that are not direct, and not included within the words, 
duties, imposts, or excises, they may be laid by the rule of uniformity, or not; as Congress shall 
think proper and reasonable. If the framers of the Constitution did not contemplate other taxes 
than direct taxes, and duties, imposts and excises, there is great inaccuracy in their language.”605  
 Although Ware v. Hylton would not hinge in the same manner upon constitutional 
interpretation, the case did bring similar questions of interpretation to bear on treaties. As with 
Hylton, the guide to interpretation of texts (in the form of treaties) would, in the Blackstonian 
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mode, look to authorial intent. Paterson’s opinion would state that “Treaties must be construed in 
such a manner, as to effectuate the intention of the parties. The intention is to be collected from 
the letter and spirit of the instrument, and may be illustrated and enforced by the considerations 
deducible from the situation of the parties.”606 Intention then was central, and historical context 
could be used to identify and clarify that on occasions when the text alone was insufficient. But 
Chase would once more offer a fuller conception, drawing a distinction between moments of 
textual clarity and moments of interpretation through reference to Rutherford and Vattel.  
 Chase began his consideration of treaty interpretation with the observation that the 
“intention of the framers of the treaty must be collected from a view of the whole instrument, and 
from the words made use of by them to express their intention, or from the probable or rational 
conjectures.”607 Implicitly he argues that what must be recaptured by interpretation is intent, but 
he also offers three potentially distinct modes of arriving at a judgment of intention; the view of 
the whole instrument, the words that comprise it, or probable or rational conjectures as to the 
intent. These first two modes, offering a distinction between the whole instrument and particular 
words, provide two distinct, textual approaches to assessing intent.608 The third offers the third 
non-textual measure - conjecture as to intent — which moves entirely outside the text but does 
not abandon a commitment to the intent “expressed” in the text. This move reinforces Chase’s 
commitment to the relationship between the actors “behind” a text and authoritative 
interpretation, but leaves open a wide array of interpretative techniques.  
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However, Chase offers further clarification; “If the words express the meaning of the 
parties plainly, distinctly and perfectly, there ought to be no other means of interpretation; but if 
the words are obscure, or ambiguous, or imperfect, recourse must be had to other means of 
interpretation… we must collect the meaning from the words, or from probable or rational 
conjectures, or from both.”609 This is a confusing command, requiring judges to “collect the 
meaning from the words” in those cases when “the words are obscure… ambiguous, or 
imperfect.” However, it is perhaps possible to glean a coherent meaning through the context of 
the next sentences:  
“When we collect the intention from the words only, as they lie in the writing 
before us, it is a literal interpretation; and indeed, if the words, and the 
construction of a writing, are clear and precise, we can scarce call it 
interpretation, to collect the intention of the writer from thence. The principal rule 
to be observed in literal interpretation is to follow that sense, in respect both of the 
words and the construction which is agreeable to common use.”610  
Interpretation is defined here as the attempt to construct the intent of a text when the literal 
meaning of the text proves confused or illogical - “interpretation” as an act ought to occur only 
in cases when the text is not “clear and precise.” In moments when a singular meaning for the 
text could be disputed, rational and probable conjectures as to the intent of the actors responsible 
for the document are admissible in attempts to find uniform meaning. In this sense, Chase’s 
recommended method accords with Johnathan O’Neill’s assessment of early American 
constitutional interpretation, that “[a]lthough Americans occasionally consulted extrinsic 
sources, the usual practice, following Blackstone and the English inheritance, sought the 
originally intended meaning by examination of the constitutional text.”611  When the text failed 
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as a record of intent, recurrence to the supposed intentions of its framers were justifiable. 
“Interpretation” in this sense was an act of reconstructing that intent. 
 These two cases then are suggestive of a judicial approach to interpretation of texts that 
prized intention, and understood judicial interpretation to be a recapturing of that intent. To be 
sure, neither case bears the claim that it offers a full theory of constitutional interpretation - 
Hylton afforded no description of the interpretative method and Ware concerned the meaning of 
a treaty, not a constitution. However, they do point to interrelationship of questions of judicial 
review and textual interpretation, and their existence as judicial issues in need of resolution (or at 
least direct engagement). The failure to offer a clear statement on either issue in 1796 means that 
these cases do not hold the status that Marbury has acquired; Indeed, the great theoretical 
contribution of that latter opinion was the manner in which it brought the two issues together 
under one head. 
 
Marshall’s Marbury 
 The outlines of the controversy decided in Marbury are well known. President Adams in 
departing the office of the presidency sought to rapidly process a variety of judicial 
appointments. One such appointment was that of William Marbury to the position of Justice of 
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the Peace in Washington DC. Despite Adams’s signature the commission was never delivered to 
Marbury. Through application to the Supreme Court, Marbury sought a writ of mandamus to 
compel the Secretary of State, James Madison, to deliver the commission. The Court ultimately 
ruled that Marbury’s request was justified, but that the Court lacked the authority to issue a 
mandamus as the legislation granting it this authority had unconstitutionally altered the 
distribution of original and appellate jurisdiction of the Court as outlined in the Constitution. The 
crucial holding in the case for constitutional law was that the Supreme Court could refuse to 
implement a congressional statute it deemed to be in conflict with the Constitution, that is to say, 
could engage in judicial review. However, scholars have differed on the exact extent of this 
claim. In contrast to the view that Marshall made an aggressive assertion of a hitherto 
unrecognized judicial right, some recent works have emphasized the limited nature of Marshall’s 
claim612 Nonetheless, it is widely accepted that Marshall’s aim was to reaffirm some sense of 
judicial review through his decision.613 To do so, Marshall would offer a conceptualization of the 
Constitution as a record of the moment of founding and an associated understanding of that 
record as a written text. 
 Marshall’s decision proceeds in three stages. In the first Marshall ascertains that Marbury 
does have a claim that his right to his commission has been violated. “To withhold his 
commission, therefore, is an act deemed by the court not warranted by law, but violative of a 
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vested legal right.”614 In the second part of the opinion, Marshall considers whether resort to the 
law is available to Marbury; “The government of the United States has been emphatically termed 
a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if 
the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.”615 Divining a distinction 
between the political and legal acts of Executive officials, Marshall finds the latter to be subject 
to law and as such allow for injured parties to resort to the courts.616 He then turns to the final 
part of the opinion, a consideration of whether a writ of mandamus is the appropriate remedy and 
whether the Supreme Court can issue such a writ. To the first of these points Marshall finds in 
the affirmative (“This, then, is a plain case for a mandamus”617). It is the second point that raises 
the specter of judicial review and contains Marshall’s consideration of the nature of the 
Constitution. 
 Marshall begins the section by quoting the 1789 act creating the federal judicial system to 
the effect that the Supreme Court has the power “to issue writs of mandamus.”618 From here he 
concludes, “if this court is not authorized to issue a writ of mandamus… it must be because the 
law is unconstitutional.”619 Comparing the statute with the Constitution’s provision that “the 
supreme court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other public 
ministers and consuls, and those in which a state shall be a party. In all other cases, the supreme 
court shall have appellate jurisdiction” Marshall finds a conflict. If the Court should have 
original jurisdiction in only the former instances, then the request for a writ of mandamus in the 
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current case would place the Court in the unconstitutional position of acting as a court of original 
jurisdiction in a case in which neither states nor foreign officials were parties. To take “the plain 
import of the words” of the Constitution, the Court should not issue mandamus unless it be 
shown to be “an exercise of appellate jurisdiction.”620 As a writ of mandamus pertains to original 
jurisdiction, Marshall argued that this power of the Court “appears not to be warranted by the 
constitution.”621  
 At this point Marshall engaged the “deeply interesting” question of whether “an act, 
repugnant to the constitution, can become the law of the land.”622 In order to do so, he offers a 
meditation on the nature of the Constitution which outlines and links together two characteristics 
of the document — its popular origin and its textual form. To Marshall’s thinking, the supremacy 
of the Constitution document rested upon its authority as an original act of the people: 
“That the people have an original right to establish, for their future government, 
such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their happiness, is the 
basis, on which the whole American fabric has been erected. The exercise of this 
original right is a very great exertion; not can it, nor ought it to be frequently 
repeated. The principles, therefore, so established, are deemed fundamental. And 
as the  authority, from which they proceed, is supreme, and can seldom act, they 
are designed to be permanent.”623  
This popular moment of democratic founding is then the source of the Constitution’s authority. 
Such a constituting act could be of two characters. It could organize the departments of 
government and their respective powers, or it could go further and “establish certain limits not to 
be transcended by those departments.”624 The Constitution of the United States was of latter 
description, creating a government but also establishing limitations upon that government. And it 
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was through its written nature that such a capacity was manifest; “that those limits may not be 
mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.”625 The people had enacted a limited 
government and committed those limitations to writing. If the acts of the branches of government 
could violate those limits then the purpose of a written constitution was rendered void; “To what 
purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these 
limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained?”626 It was, argued 
Marshall, certain that “all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as 
forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation.”627 
 Marshall here linked the democratic and written nature of the Constitution together, but 
then went further, transferring the Court’s obligation to uphold the democratic constitution to an 
obligation to uphold the written constitution. Turning once more to the act of founding, Marshall 
equated the creation of the written text with the act of creating the limitations upon government 
and establishing those limits as superior law. “Certainly those who have framed written 
constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation… 
This theory is essentially attached to a written constitution, and is consequently to be considered, 
by this court, as one of the fundamental principles of our society.”628 The Court was necessarily 
involved in the enforcement of these constitutional limitations when confronted with legislation 
that ought to be adjudged void as a consequence of its conflict with the Constitution. As it was 
“emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,” the courts 
were required to uphold the Constitution when ordinary law conflicted with it.629 “This is of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
625 5 U.S. 176. Emphasis added. 
626 5 U.S. 176. Emphasis added. 
627 5 U.S. 177. 
628 5 U.S. 177. 
629 5 U.S. 177. 
!
!
!!223!
very essence of judicial duty,” and to do otherwise would “subvert the very foundation of all 
written constitutions.”630 Here, the separation between the notion of democratic constitution and 
a written constitution becomes particularly blurred. Marshall articulates a judicial duty that 
upholds the “very foundation of all written constitutions,” but we have earlier been told that that 
original foundation of all constitutions is the authority of the people. But by this later point in the 
opinion the people are no longer the point of reference for the authority of the text. Instead the 
written constitutional text has come to stand in for them, and increasingly for the very idea of 
popular sovereignty. Marshall continues to the effect of equating the American Revolution and 
founding with the establishment of written constitutions, not popular government. 
“That it thus reduces to nothing what we have deemed the greatest improvement 
on political institutions — a written constitution — would of itself be sufficient, 
in America, where written constitutions have been viewed with so much 
reverence, for rejecting the construction.”631  
Marshall identifies here the “greatest improvement” of America to be a written constitution. This 
“improvement” was not the same one trumpeted by the authors of The Federalist Papers, who 
saw the application of advances in the science of politics to a notoriously unstable republican 
form of government as America’s great contribution. Enabling government based on “reflection 
and choice,” these (earlier) Federalists had deemed America as making possible a government 
founded on consent and popular sovereignty. Marshall subsumes the motivation for the 
Constitution — to enable popular sovereignty — with the Constitution itself. The document, 
which holds authority as the voice of the people, becomes authoritative itself, sans the people. 
By the end of the opinion the written text becomes authoritative and self-authorizing as to its 
own supremacy as Marshall claims that “Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of 
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the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written 
constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void.”632 
 O’Fallon has claimed that, “In Marbury, with no apparent appreciation for the irony, the 
people’s sovereignty became the mechanism for dismissing them from a role in preserving (or… 
constituting) the fundamental structure of their government.”633 Insofar as Marshall made use of 
the people’s authority to underpin the constitutional authority of the courts to block the actions of 
the elected branches, O’Fallon’s claim has merit. But the starkly partisan account of the case 
offered by O’Fallon, that Marshall used the popular basis of the Constitution to marginalize the 
(Republican) people, does not do justice to the sophisticated and potentially far-reaching 
transposing of authority from the people and to the text. Reducing Marshall’s actions to giving 
the people, in Newmyer’s words, “some good old-fashioned Federalist constitutional 
wisdom,”634 disguises a significant ideological transformation. In Marbury, Marshall developed 
the questions tentatively addressed in Hylton v. United States and Ware v. Hylton, exploiting the 
democratic constitutional authority sketched out by Chase to give the Supreme Court authority to 
assert its power of judicial review. But in merging the authority of the people and the authority of 
the constitutional text, Marshall also brought together the threads of textual interpretation and 
authority that had been present, but not conjoined, in the 1796 cases. In Marbury Marshall had 
turned to the “plain import of the words,” the contemplations of those that had formed it, and, in 
regards to the question of judicial authority, “the intention of those who gave this power.”635 To 
be sure, interpretative technique was not a significant aspect of the case, and Thomas Shevroy 
has argued that the opinion shows Marshall “willing to sacrifice methodological consistency for 
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the sake of achieving important political ends.”636 Nonetheless, the opinion did bring these 
questions into alignment for future consideration by linking the authority of the Constitution and 
its textual character together. Marshall on this occasion was not required to elucidate the 
relationship beyond this, but in the 1819 term and its great restatement of the Constitution’s — 
and the Court’s — authority this relationship would return to the fore. 
 
McCulloch v. Maryland 
The 1796 cases provided a framework for the opinion in Marbury v. Madison, highlighting 
interrelated questions of judicial review, textual interpretation, and constitutional authority. In 
Marbury Marshall responded to these questions by outlining an understanding of the written 
constitution which relied upon the people’s ultimate authority, but which ultimately transferred 
that authority to the text itself. Mitigating the people’s ire towards Chase’s robust Federalism, 
Marshall had nonetheless put the constitutional dimensions of Chase’s thought in place. The 
Constitution was the voice of the people, from whom it derived its supremacy, but its 
interpretation would fall to the Court, giving the latter scope to counter the people’s immediate 
articulations in the form of legislation and the prerogative acts of the popular Executive that 
Jefferson sought to form. The written-ness of the Constitution provided the pivot for Marshall’s 
stance, embodying (and mitigating) the authority of the people and providing the textual basis for 
the Court’s claim to interpret. Nonetheless, Marbury left crucial work undone. Marshall had 
asserted the Court’s role in protecting the Constitution, but the partisan alignments of 1803 had 
made impossible an overt declaration of the Court’s institutional supremacy in constitutional 
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matters. Marbury ended with a restatement of the fact the Constitution was “a rule for the 
government of courts, as well as of the legislature” and “…that a law repugnant to the 
constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that 
instrument.”637 As the original emphasis suggests, the opinion urged that the judicial branch be 
considered as able to adjudicate constitutionality as well as the other branches, not that it alone 
held that authority. Moreover, the opinion had failed to address the equally thorny matter of how 
to resolve constitutional questions when the meaning of the words was not clear — when 
conditions belied Chase’s “literal interpretation.” As the people’s authority became subsumed in 
the text itself, this would present itself as a more pressing issue. The 1819 term would offer an 
opportunity, and necessity, to return to these issues, allowing Marshall to act in a moment when 
the federal interest as a whole aligned with the Court’s.  
 The “Great Bank Case” of McCulloch v. Maryland has gained a foothold in history as the 
occasion that Marshall took to famously remind us that we ought never forget that “it is a 
constitution we are expounding,” and like Marbury its fame has come to have a life of its own.638 
McCulloch is second only to Marbury in the pantheon of Marshall opinions, and in the eyes of 
some not even second. Justice Frankfurter would regard McCulloch as Marshall’s greatest 
opinion and Beveridge, in typically understated fashion, notes the opinion “so decisively 
influenced the growth of the Nation that, by many, it is considered as only second in importance 
to the Constitution itself.”639 The significance of McCulloch can be explained partially by its 
subject matter, the controversial Bank of the United States, but the opinion is significant in its 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
637 5 U.S. 180. Original emphasis. 
638 17 U.S. 316 (1819), 407. 
639 Richard K. Matthews, “Marshall v. Jefferson: Beyond “Sanctimonious Reverence” for a “Sacred” 
Law,” in John Marshall’s Achievement: Law, Politics, and Constitutional Interpretation, ed. Thomas C. 
Shevory, (New York, Greenwood Press, 1989), 118; Albert Beveridge, The Life of John Marshall: 
Volume IV, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1919), 168. 
!
!
!!227!
own right as a compelling articulation of federal supremacy and as an opportunity for Marshall 
to articulate a theoretical justification of the Court’s authoritative relationship vis-a-vis the 
Constitution. The opinion can be understood as addressing three interrelated questions of 
authority. The first – the authority of the federal government over the states – has been 
documented in numerous, if not all, considerations of the case. A second question concerns the 
authority of the Supreme court over questions of constitutionality. Marshall uses the opinion to 
address this question by a return to, and re-construction of, the process of constitutional founding 
in 1787-1788. In doing so, he reaches back to Ware to fulfill the work begun in Marbury.  But as 
was the case in Hylton, Ware, and Marbury, the construction of the Court’s authority on the basis 
of a written constitution touches on questions of interpretation. Here Marshall moves against the 
authority of the Federalist Papers – and the Philadelphia Convention – over the meaning of the 
document itself. In doing so, he locates the authority of text in the text itself. More so than was 
the case in Marbury, McCulloch utilizes the founding authority of the people to underwrite the 
authority of the Constitution and the Court’s claim to enforce the constitutional document. In 
McCulloch Marshall pursues the argument further, constructing the Court as the authoritative 
interpreter of the constitutional text and erasing the people’s and the framers’ claim to 
authoritative interpretation. In so doing, he emphasizes an understanding of the founding as a 
democratic moment that seems uncontroversial – perhaps in part, because in urging us to never 
forget that it is a constitution we expound, he wrote into constitutional dicta, in more expansive 
terms than in Marbury, a notion of what a constitution – and its relationship to a democratic 
founding - actually is. 
 
Democratic Founding in McCulloch v. Maryland 
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 Accounts of Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland tend to focus upon what 
Richard Ellis has described as, given the historical context of the opinion, its “extremely 
nationalist interpretation of the Constitution.”640 As Ellis notes, Marshall conceived of the case 
as a return to the Federalist and Anti-federalist debates of 1787-1788 in which states rights 
proponents sought to return the United States to an institutional framework similar to that of the 
era of the Articles of Confederation. Ellis suggests that it is to this end that Marshall offers an 
“enduring nationalist interpretation of the origins and nature of the Constitution” which even 
supporters of the decision found hard to stomach.641 However Marshall’s framework for 
interpreting the founding was, in reality, very similar to the one held by a majority of Federalists 
in the midst of the ratification debates (including Marshall himself)642 and articulated by Chase 
in 1796 and partially by Marshall himself in 1803.  
 During ratification, Federalists of Marshall’s ilk conceived of the making of the 
Constitution as a two-step process in which the Philadelphia Convention proposed a document 
for consideration by the people. As Archibald McLaine explained to the North Carolina 
convention: “The Constitution is only a mere proposal… After they [Philadelphia Convention] 
had finished the plan, they proposed that it should be recommended to the people by the several 
state legislatures. If the people approve of it, it becomes their act.”643 If ratified, the authority of 
the people would be lent to the document and it would become their own. In James Wilson’s oft-
quoted words, the constitution opened  
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“with a solemn and practical recognition of that principle: - “We, the people of the 
United States […] do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States 
of America.” It is announced in their name – it receives its political existence 
from their authority: they ordain and establish.”644  
Initially produced by the Philadelphia Convention, upon ratification the Constitution becomes 
the work of the people, emanating from them and dependent upon them for its authority. 
Speaking on the behalf of Virginian Federalists in the ratification convention of that state, 
Marshall himself re-iterated this position in addressing challenge that the Philadelphia 
Convention had gone beyond its authority - stating that they (the Federalists) sought only to 
create “a well regulated Democracy.”645 He argued that “[t]he Convention did not in fact assume 
any power. They have proposed to our consideration a scheme of Government which they 
thought advisable. We are not bound to adopt it, if we disapprove of it.”646 It was, he claimed, 
“the people that give power, and can take it back. What shall restrain them? They are the masters 
who give it, and of whom their servants hold it.”647 
In addressing the challenges of the state rights’ opponents of the Bank in 1819, Marshall 
returned to this model of the Constitution’s creation. Rejecting the states rights’ theory of a 
compact between sovereign states, Marshall denied that the Constitution emanated from the 
“sovereign and independent” states rather than the people, and offered a strong articulation of the 
Constitution as the work of the people. Marshall would state that, “The Convention which 
framed the constitution was indeed elected by the State legislatures. But the instrument, when it 
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came from their hands, was a mere proposal, without obligation, or pretensions to it.”648 Echoing 
Wilson, Marshall then lodges the authority of the Constitution in the people’s ratification of it: 
“From these [state] Conventions the constitution derives its whole authority. The government 
proceeds directly from the people: is  “ordained and established” in the name of the people… the 
people were at perfect liberty to accept or reject it; and their act was final.”649 Locating the 
document’s authority in the people’s ratification of it, Marshall denied the states’ agency in its 
creation, framing it instead as the act of the people as a whole.  
In his “A Friend of the Constitution” essays, written in defense of the opinion, Marshall 
would reiterate and clarify this position, writing: 
“… the constitution of the United States is not an alliance, or a league, between 
independent sovereigns; nor a compact between the  government of the union, and 
those of the states; but is itself a government, created for the nation by the whole 
of the American people, acting by convention assembled in and for their 
respective states. … It is the act of a single party. It is the act of the people of the 
United  States…”650  
Depicting the founding as a process by which the entire people, albeit in state conventions, gave 
their assent to the constitutional document provided Marshall with a basis for rejecting the 
conception of the constitution as a compact of states. Grounding his nationalizing ruling in the 
establishment of a nation by the people, he cut the states out of the Constitution’s authorization 
process – as indeed Madison, and others in 1787, had hoped the ratification process would do. In 
McCulloch then he sought to expand and lay out the assumptions of popular authority that under 
rode the authority claimed in Marbury. 
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 But in McCulloch Marshall pushed this argument further, using this popular 
understanding of the founding to not only affirm constitutional review — taking constitutional 
from the people and locating it in the text — but also to frame the Court itself as the inheritor of 
the people’s authority. Once Marshall had grounded the Constitution’s authority on popular 
ratification, he would depict the Court as the popularly appointed institutionalization of that 
authority. Thus, another transfer of authority was made; authority moved from the people to the 
text, and then authority over the text was transferred to the Court. And once more the democratic 
nature of the founding was utilized to legitimize this transfer. The ability of the court to make the 
very ruling it was, was itself a result of the people’s sanctioning of that ability through the 
Constitution. The democratic authority of the Constitution was put to the service of legitimizing 
the Court: “On the Supreme Court of the United States has the constitution of our country 
devolved this important duty.”651 Defending this claimed authority against challenge in his “A 
Friend of the Constitution” essays, Marshall elaborates: “The right asserted by the court [to 
decide this case], is then, expressly given by the great fundamental law which united us as a 
nation. …But this is not now a question open for consideration. The constitution has decided 
it.”652 As a method of under-cutting the states’ rights arguments and of establishing the authority 
of the court to make the decision regarding the taxation of the Bank – through an argument that 
the people had anointed the Court to this role - Marshall appealed to the people’s ratification for 
legitimation. 
 
McCulloch and the Framers 
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 The framing of the Founding as an enactment of popular constituent power might seem 
second nature to us today, but at the moment of Marshall’s argument it brought him into tension 
with another, very vital understanding of authority. In emphasizing the people’s authority over 
the Constitution, Marshall was forced to account for the rival claim of the framers’ to that 
document. In 1819, as today, this was no marginal claim. The arguments in the case had drawn 
heavily on the framers – and The Federalist Papers. Hopkinson arguing for Maryland had 
conceived of the Constitution as authored by the framers and given to the people – seeing the 
Federalist Papers as “the great champion of the constitution” whose commentary reflected those 
“who were supposed best to understand it.”653 In Hopkinson’s argument, reference to the 
Federalist Papers and Hamilton’s Reports showed the limits of the implied powers of Congress 
with regard to the Bank. Walter Jones arguing for Maryland was more forthright -  arguing that 
no construction of the Constitution should 
“…under a constitution of a date so recent, be put in competition with the 
contemporaneous exposition of its illustrious authors, as recorded for our 
instruction, in the “Letters of Publius,” or Federalist. The interpretation of the 
constitution, which was contended for by the State of Maryland, would be 
justified from that text book, containing a commentary, such as no other age or 
nation furnishes, upon its public law.”654 
Luther Martin, the Attorney General of Maryland is recorded as merely reading “several extracts 
from the Federalist, and the debates of the Virginia and New-York Conventions, to show that the 
contemporary exposition of the constitution by its authors, and by those who supported its 
adoption, was wholly repugnant to that now contended for by the counsel for the plaintiff in 
error.”655 Even those on the side of the Bank, whose position was perhaps more strengthened by 
a popular basis of constitutional authority, often reached for the intention of the Convention to 
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bolster their position. Pinkney, after asserting that the Constitution “springs from the people,” 
nevertheless felt the need to argue that his position on the constitutionality of the Bank aligned 
with  “the authors of the constitution themselves. The members of the convention who framed 
the constitution, passed into the first Congress, by which the new government was organized. 
They must have understood their own work.”656  
 Marshall undercut the framers and Federalist Papers’ authority in two ways in his 
opinion. Initially, he complicated the brevity of the Constitution. The famous line “it is a 
constitution we are expounding” drew on Pinkney’s arguments, but Marshall adapted them to 
emphasize the people’s authority. Pinkney had argued that: “It was impossible for the framers of 
the constitution to specify prospectively all these means, both because it would have involved an 
immense variety of details, and because it would have been impossible for them to foresee the 
infinite variety of circumstances in such an unexampled state of political society as ours, forever 
changing and forever improving.”657 Pinkney had seen the framers’ solution to the problem of 
future eventualities in the creation of a popular government able to respond to those 
developments through implied powers.  But adapting Pinkney’s argument, Marshall reconditions 
the brevity of the Constitution to be not a concession by the framers’ to the limits of their vision, 
but instead ties the brevity of the constitution fundamentally to its democratic nature: 
“A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of which its 
great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they would be carried into 
execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be 
embraced by the human mind. It would probably never be understood by the 
public. Its nature, therefore, requires that only its great outlines should be 
marked...”658  
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The inclusion of this additional point – that it would probably never be understood by the public 
– could be dismissed as the laying on of a further minor argument, were it not for the extensive 
recurrence to the authority of the people we have seen elsewhere – and, perhaps more crucially, 
the opportunity Marshall took to expand upon this point in his “A Friend of the Constitution” 
essays; The Constitution  
“is the act of a people, creating a government, without which they cannot exist as 
a people. The object of the instrument is not a single one which can be minutely 
described, with all its circumstances. The attempt to do so, would totally change 
its nature, and  defeat its purpose. … It is impossible to construe such an 
instrument rightly, without adverting to its nature, and marking the points of 
difference which distinguish it from ordinary contracts.”659 
To expound the Constitution is then to recognize, not the framers inability to see all future 
eventualities, but the people’s commitment to leaving themselves room to respond to those 
eventualities. 
 In a second line of argument, Marshall undercuts the framers’ authority by subtlety 
deflating the interpretative authority of the Federalist Papers. Reserving the final section of the 
opinion to a response to arguments drawn from the Federalist, Marshall notes the limits of its 
guidance: 
“In the course of the argument, the Federalist has been quoted; and the opinions 
expressed by the authors of that work have been justly supposed to be entitled to 
great respect in expounding the constitution. No tribute can be paid to them which 
exceeds their merit; but in applying their opinions… a right to judge of their 
correctness must be retained.”660  
By constraining the authority of the Federalist Papers to that of a commentary – and one that 
might indeed be incorrect – Marshall reaffirms the notion of the Constitution as the people’s 
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document. He also acknowledges that the framers’ intention can only have an indirect and non-
authoritative influence upon constitutional interpretation. We can see here push back against the 
idea, witnessed in the lawyers’ arguments in this case, that the framers have an authoritative 
relationship with the constitutional text.  
McCulloch v. Maryland is then more than an important case in the federal government’s 
growing power. It also represents a judicial affirmation of the historical narrative of the founding 
that we accept today. Emphasizing the founding as a moment of popular sovereignty, it locates 
authority in the people  - and in the constitutional document, Supreme Court, and National 
government as they determined to lodge it. As Marshall asserts, “we must never forget, that it is 
a constitution we are expounding.” Situating the claim in an ambiguous tense in which the 
present commits the future to acknowledge the past – we must always remember – Marshall 
interpellates the democracy of the founding and makes the authority of the document, court, and 
government assumed. Marshall’s emphatic demand that we remember that it is a constitution we 
are expounding, represents then not merely a claim that the Constitution needed space and 
resources to meet unanticipated demands. It also reaffirms the ideal of the Constitution as an 
enactment of the people – and in framing this in historical terms, bestows upon that narrative the 
authority of the past. But it does so, as was the case in Marbury, not to establish the people’s 
authority over the Constitution, but rather to transfer that authority to the text and then in turn to 
the Court as guardian of that text. The opinion worked to marginalize both the people’s claim 
and that of the framers’, rendering a constitutional text that embodied an authority derived from 
the former and ultimately independent of both.  
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Sturges v. Crowninshield 
If McCulloch re-emphasized and extended the narrative of a popular founding to 
underwrite the Court’s authority, it did little to address the associated questions of interpretation. 
As this chapter has highlighted, textual authority was associated with the issue of constitutional 
authority in Hylton and Marbury. As the written-ness of the Constitution was mobilized to 
underwrite shifts in authority it brought with it questions as to the methods of arriving at the 
authoritative interpretation necessary for effective judicial review. As McCulloch shows, 
Marshall had sought to marginalize both the people’s and the framers’ authority. What then for 
the idea of intent which had guided Chase’s opinions in 1796? Whose intent would provide the 
locus of uniformity? In McCulloch the meaning of “necessary” had been a point of contention, 
but by 1819 the Bank was well established and re-chartered. The heart of that opinion was a 
refutation of state sovereignty and an assertion of federal supremacy – textual interpretation was 
a minor theme. However, the 1819 case of Sturges v. Crowninshield would require a resolution 
of this issue. In this opinion Marshall would outline a theory of the constitutional text that 
reversed the relationship between intention and the text, and would position the Court as 
authoritative in the field of constitutional interpretation. 
The case of Sturges v. Crowninshield (17 U.S. 122) provides us with a leading 
articulation of Marshall’s method of constitutional exegesis. In this case, concerning the ability 
of New York State to enforce its 1811 Act regarding the discharge of debts in the case of 
insolvency, the Court was called upon to judge the constitutional meaning of the contracts 
clause.661 As with the other monumental cases of 1819, Dartmouth College v. Woodward (17 
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U.S. 518) and McCulloch v. Maryland, the decision in the case would have significance for the 
developing political economy of the Republic. A central case in the Supreme Court’s protection 
of the federal government’s interest in developing a national economy, Sturges v. Crowninshield, 
like McCulloch, was decided within a framework of institutional and political conflict between 
the states and federal government and over the nature of commercial relations in the growing 
republic. At stake were questions of federal supremacy, the sanctity of contract, and the 
relationship between insolvency, bankruptcy, and imprisonment within a democratic republic.662 
It was, in the words of the New York Daily Advertiser, potentially “one of the most important 
decisions that has ever occurred.”663 
The ability to take on and discharge debt in a predictable manner had been deemed of 
such importance at the time of the Constitution’s creation that a commitment to a uniform 
bankruptcy law was written into the text itself.664 Alongside a commitment to the protection of 
copyrights and patents and to the creation and maintenance of the post offices and roads, Article 
1 Section 8 committed the federal government to uniform rules of naturalization and bankruptcy. 
Even Anti-federalist writers had conceded that the lack of uniform bankruptcy legislation had 
hurt the young nation.665 Nonetheless, Congress had failed to maintain uniform regulation in the 
sphere of bankruptcy since the 1805 repeal of existing legislation, providing scope for the states 
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663 Reprinted in the Alexandria Gazette & Daily Advertiser, March 2nd, 1819. 
664 “The Congress shall have the power… To establish… uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies 
throughout the United States.” (U.S. Constitution Art. I Sec. 8) 
665 From the Letters from a Federal Farmer on the failings of the state legislators: “…several legislatures, 
by making tender, suspension, and paper money laws, have given just cause of uneasiness to creditors.” 
On the powers to be ideally given to a national government: “…and to a few internal concerns of the 
community; to the coin, post-offices, weights and measures, a general plan for the militia, to 
naturalization, and, perhaps to bankruptcies…” (Federal Farmer “Letters to the Republican,” in DHRC 
digital. Original emphasis). 
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to fill the void. Sturges represented a challenge to one such instance of state legislation, that of 
New York State. The particular concern creditors had in regard to New York’s legislation lay in 
its commitment to discharge the debts of an individual found to be insolvent. The constitutional 
challenge to the New York act could be — and was — made on at least two grounds; that it 
violated the supremacy of the federal government in the realm of bankruptcy, and that it violated 
the contracts clause of the Constitution by allowing debts to be discharged without payment.  
Initially then the case forced Marshall to make a ruling on whether the federal government’s 
supremacy extended to barring state legislation in areas in which, despite constitutional grants, 
the federal government had failed to legislate. Marshall disposed of this challenge quickly noting 
that “the right of the States to pass a bankrupt law is not taken away by the mere grant of that 
power to Congress… it can only be suspended, by the enactment of a general bankrupt law.”666  
The remaining question was whether New York’s law violated the contracts clause. A 
judgment on this issue required a definition of what was meant by the restriction on a law 
“impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” Like the opinions in Marbury and Hylton v. United 
States, this task required the Court to offer an authoritative — singular and uniform — 
interpretation of the text. As with those cases, the Court would again turn to norms of authorship 
in order to meet this challenge. The intention of the framers would be a recurrent theme in both 
the arguments of both sides and the final ruling of the Court. Set alongside Marshall’s 
consideration of the manner in which constitutional exegesis ought to take place, the invocation 
of the framers in this opinion provides an important instance within the institutionalization of the 
framers within legal thought and a significant counterpoint to the popular constitutional authority 
emphasized in McCulloch. Nonetheless, the invocation of the framers intent would not 
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666 17 U.S. 196. 
!
!
!!239!
understand the text’s authority to be derived from its (the text’s) existence as a record of 
authorial intention. Instead, the invocation of intent would be to the end of providing historical 
context as a guide to the meaning of a text, the authority of which was internalized in the text 
itself. 
Adjudicating the question of the constitutionality of New York’s law, Marshall would 
consider that legislation’s commitments against those of the contracts clause of the Constitution. 
The Chief Justice determined that claim that the Constitution allowed for such legislation ought 
to be “tried by the words of the section,” and in Marshall’s estimation was found to be wanting 
by that standard.667 The Court’s opinion would be that the New York statute, insofar as it worked 
to discharge individuals from freely contracted debts, violated the contracts clause and was 
therefore contrary to the constitution of the United States.668 But it was with regard to the issue 
of insolvency that Marshall would outline a detailed interpretative approach. The unclear 
distinction between insolvency and bankruptcy laws669 had enabled the argument to be made that 
the existence of insolvency laws at the time of the Constitution’s ratification proved that the 
intent of the Philadelphia Convention had been not to infringe such state legislation. Marshall 
rejected the argument that insolvency laws conflicted with the “spirit” of the Constitution as 
framed by the Philadelphia Convention, noting that the effect of these laws was usually to 
“discharge the person of the debtor, but leave his obligation to pay in full force.”670 Nonetheless, 
the presentation of a claim based on the supposed intentions of the Convention gave Marshall 
scope for responding to such arguments.  
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667 17 U.S. 204. 
668 17 U.S. 208. 
669 Although the divisions between the two were unclear, Marshall’s opinion works with a broad 
distinction that bankruptcy was taken to refer to the ability to discharge a debt while insolvency 
concerned imprisonment for debt. 
670 17 U.S. 203. 
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In responding to the deployment of arguments offering the Constitution’s “spirit” as a 
basis for striking down legislative acts, Marshall would reject the idea that the spirit could be 
superior to the text, stating that, “although the spirit of an instrument, especially of a constitution, 
is to be respected not less than its letter, yet the spirit is to be collected chiefly from its words.”671 
Accepting (as Chase had earlier done) that where “words conflict with each other, where the 
different clauses… would be inconsistent unless the natural and common import of words be 
varied, construction becomes necessary,”672 the Chief Justice nevertheless favored an interpretive 
approach grounded in the text itself. Use of the “spirit” or supposed intent of drafters could only 
legitimize a rejection of the plain meaning of the text in the most extreme circumstances:  
“If, in any case, the plain meaning of a provision, not contradicted by any other 
provision in the same instrument, is to be disregarded, because we believe the 
framers of that instrument could not intend what they say, it must be one in which 
the absurdity and injustice of applying the provision to the case, would be so 
monstrous, that all mankind would, without hesitation, united in rejecting that 
application.”673 
The application of the contracts clause to the case at hand, was to Marshall’s mind, “certainly not 
such a case.”674  
Nonetheless, recurrence to the context and understandings of the Convention marks 
Marshall’s consideration of the extent of the restrictions imposed by the contracts clause. To 
illustrate this the opinion is quoted at length:  
“A general dissatisfaction with that lax system of legislation which followed the 
war of our revolution undoubtedly directed the mind of the Convention to this 
subject… The attention of the Convention, therefore, was particularly directed to 
paper money, and to acts which enabled the debtor to discharge his debt, 
otherwise than was stipulated in the contract. Had nothing more been intended, 
nothing more would have been expressed, But, in the opinion of the Convention, 
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671 17 U.S. 202. 
672 17 U.S. 202. 
673 17 U.S. 203. 
674 17 U.S. 203. 
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much more remained to be done. …The Convention appears to have intended to 
establish a great principle, that contracts should be inviolable. The constitution, 
therefore, declares, that no State shall pass “any law impairing the obligation of 
contracts.”675 
Marshall would then conclude that  
“[I]f, as we think, it must be admitted that this intention might actuate the 
Convention; that it is not only consistent with, but is apparently manifested by, all 
that part of the section which respects this subject; that the words used are well 
adapted to the expression of it; that violence would be done to their plain meaning 
by understanding them in a more limited sense; those rules of construction, which 
have been consecrated by the wisdom of ages, compel us to say, that these words 
prohibit the passage of any law discharging a contract without performance.”676  
From these extended quotations it seems that the intention of the Convention did have 
significance for interpretation. How then did Marshall relate intent and the text? 
The editor of Marshall’s papers, Charles F. Hobson, has argued that Sturges v. 
Crowninshield is reflective of Marshall’s belief that “[t]he particular intentions of particular 
framers… should not be confused with the intention of the instrument itself.”677 It is correct to 
argue, as Hobson does, that for Marshall the text ought to be given preference over the spirit; 
Marshall would affirm his position on this point in 1814 by defining the judiciary as the 
department which pursues “only the law as written” in Brown v. United States (12 U.S. 110, 
(1814)). Even so, Marshall also views the text as having potential to exceed the intentions of its 
drafters. Writing to Bushrod Washington on the subject of bankruptcy law in 1814, Marshall 
would actually argue that bankruptcy laws were not in the minds of the members of the 
Philadelphia Convention when considering the impairment of credit, but that they were 
nonetheless included by the text itself: “Paper money, the tender of useless property, & other 
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675 17 U.S. 205-206. Emphasis added. 
676 17 U.S. 206. Emphasis added. 
677 Charles F. Hobson, The Papers of John Marshall: Vol. VIII: Correspondence, Papers, and Selected 
Judicial Opinions March 1814-December 1819, (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 1995), 242. 
!
!
!
!
242!
laws acting directly on the engagements of individuals were the objects of general alarm & were 
probably in the mind of the convention. Yet the words go further; if they do on a fair & 
necessary construction, they must have their full effect.”678 But the reliance upon the 
convention’s mindset in order to develop a sense of the constitutional protections of the contracts 
clause seems to belie Hobson’s claim that the text was understood as authoritative at the expense 
of the framers’ intent. The relationship between the two is rather more complex, and in exploring 
it the significance of Marshall’s appropriation of authority can be better understood. It is not the 
case that Marshall consigned the intent of the framers to the realm of the Constitution’s spirit for 
the simple reason that the binaries of spirit and letter, and text and intent cannot be neatly 
collapsed into each other within Marshall’s thinking. 
Intention, in Sturges, is regarded not as an alternative to the “literal” interpretation of the 
words and clauses, but rather as auxiliary support for that literal interpretation. The intention of 
the framers is put to the service of the text in the opinion, providing a support for Marshall’s 
position that meaning cannot extend beyond the text as written. The invocation of the framers in 
the opinion often works to reinforce the text as understood by Marshall, not to provide that 
understanding in the first place. For example: 
“It seems scarcely possible to suppose that the framers of the constitution, if 
intending to prohibit only laws authorizing the payment of debts by installment, 
would have expressed that intention by saying “no State shall pass any law 
impairing the obligation of contracts”…No court can be justified in restricting 
such comprehensive words to a particular mischief to which no allusion is 
made.”679 
And 
“The fair, and, we think, the necessary construction of the sentence, requires, that 
we should give these words their full and obvious meaning. A general 
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678 Hobson, The Papers of John Marshall: Vol. VIII, 34-35. 
679 17 U.S. 205. Emphasis added. 
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dissatisfaction with that lax system of legislation which followed the war of our 
revolution undoubtedly directed the mind of the Convention to this subject.”680  
Alongside these invocations come expressive commitments to the authority – and plain meaning 
– of the text itself; “Was the general prohibition intended to prevent paper money? We are not 
allowed to say so, because it is expressly provided, that no State shall “emit bills of credit;””681 
and “The words of the constitution, then, are express, and incapable of being misunderstood. 
They admit no variety of construction…”682 Framer intent is not rejected as pertaining to the 
sphere of the Constitution’s “spirit,” but rather provides a support for the plain meaning of the 
text.  
To attempt to understand the consequences of the relationship Marshall sees between 
intent and the text it is useful to draw upon William F. Harris’s deep consideration of the nature 
of the constitutional text. In his article “Bonding of Word and Polity: The Logic of American 
Constitutionalism,” (1982) Harris outlines two binaries within interpretative practice.683 The 
first, positivism v. structuralism, draws a distinction between approaches to constitutional 
interpretation that, in the case of the former, focus “on words and clauses, which are viewed as 
commands” as opposed to structuralist approaches that emphasize “coherent designs and 
wholes.”684 The second division, immanence v. transcendence, denotes an understanding of the 
Constitution which (in the case of immanence) “requires that constitutional meaning be confined 
within the text or close to its ambit,” or an alternative in which focus extends “beyond the text… 
[to] the active conception of meaning, the projection of implications and the drawing of 
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680 17 U.S. 205. 
681 17 U.S. 204. 
682 17 U.S. 198. 
683 Harris, “Bonding of Word and Polity.” 
684 Harris, “Bonding of Word and Polity,” 37. 
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inferences from within the defined scope of the political order”685 (Cf. Figure 3). Immanence can 
be understood broadly as a reliance upon the upper-case “Constitution” — the textual document 
— while transcendence draws upon the lower case “constitution” of the institutions, practices, 
and values that exist and inform our collective political lives.  
Within Harris’s schema Marshall’s approach to interpretation is located within the realm 
of immanence, reflecting his commitment to drawing interpretative conclusions from the text 
alone. But the existence of the second axis within Harris’s account points to a complexity that 
belies the stark division of text and spirit suggested by Hobson. Immanence can be both 
positivist and structuralist. Which is to say that sola Scriptura interpretations (the text alone) can 
look to either the meaning of particular words and clauses (positivism) or to the overall meaning 
of the text as a document (structuralism). Tellingly, Marshall appears in Harris’s account as an 
exemplar of both approaches at different points locating the Chief Justice firmly in the realm of 
immanence but moving between a positivism reliant upon the literal meaning of the text and a 
structuralism based on the broader understanding of the Constitution as a complete document.686 
Which is to say, moving between the meaning of the words and the intent of the constitutional 
project, but always looking to the text as the touchstone from which each is derived. 
In this sense, Marshall’s rejection of the “spirit” of the Constitution is not a rejection of 
the intention of the framers’ per se, but rather a rejection of the transcendent realm as a 
legitimate basis of constitutional interpretation. What remains after such a rejection is not a text 
as the record of its creation/the intention behind it, but instead a text as an authoritative 
documentation of the legitimate sphere of politics. Harris characterizes the creation of the 
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685 Harris, “Bonding of Word and Polity,” 37. 
686 Harris, “Bonding of Word and Polity,” 38, 39. 
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American Constitution as the “wresting [of] the three-dimensional contours of a new public 
order from the two-dimensional realm of thought and theory,”687 but thereafter the Constitution 
operates as an attempt to constrain the three dimensional political world through management of 
its two dimensional representation. Thomas Jefferson articulated this view in relation to the 
constitutionality of a national bank, in his view that to “take a single step beyond the boundaries 
thus specially drawn around the powers of Congress [by the Constitution], is to take possession 
of a boundless field of power, no longer susceptible of any definition.”688 From Harris’s view of 
a three-dimensional world brought into being from two-dimensional thoughts,689 the authority of 
the Constitution emerged as two-dimensional construct (“the boundaries drawn around the 
powers of Congress”) constraining the three-dimensional world (“a boundless field of power, no 
longer susceptible of any definition”). What remains after this transformation is a constitutional 
document that stands outside (around?) the sphere of “politics,” marking the latter’s acceptable 
two dimensional limits but not subject to the contestation over meaning and understanding of 
which politics partially comprises. Marshall’s commitment to constitutional immanence raises 
the authority of the text itself above and out of the reach of “transcendental” discussions over 
rights, justice, and political (as opposed to constitutional) theory. 
In this sense, Marshall’s use of the Philadelphia Convention in Sturges works to reinforce 
the broader projects of Marbury and McCulloch, making use of the history of the founding in 
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687 Harris, “Bonding of Word and Polity,” 34. 
688 Thomas Jefferson, “Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Bill for Establishing a National Bank,” in 
The Papers of Thomas Jefferson Digital Edition, ed. Barbara B. Oberg and J. Jefferson Looney, 
(Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, Rotunda, 2008). 
689 A description reminiscent of those “these vain and bustling projectors” against which conservatives on 
both sides of the Atlantic rallied (Richard H. Dana, Oration Delivered Before the Washington Benevolent 
Society at Cambridge, July 4, 1814, (Cambridge, MA: Hilliard and Metcalf, 1814), 6; Edmund Burke, 
Reflections on the Revolution in France, (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987), but 
amongst whom the Federalists themselves ought to be truthfully counted (Sheldon S. Wolin, “Tending 
and Intending a Constitution: Bicentennial Misgivings,” in Sheldon S. Wolin, The Presence of the Past: 
Essays on the State and the Constitution, (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989). 
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order to isolate the authority of the constitutional text. Whereas those cases saw the people 
invoked in order to marginalize their constitutional authority, Sturges presents the presence of 
the framers in the service of furthering the textual authority internal to the document, 
marginalizing the framers’ own authorial textual authority. Building on the denial of framer 
authority touched on in McCulloch, Marshall in Sturges provides a mode of “interpretation” in 
which the Court is responsible for laying out the plain meaning of the text, not deriving the 
intention that the text might be a record of.  The text operates as something other than a 
documentary record of the original intention; its words provide the substance of the Constitution 
against which legislative and executive acts ought to be compared.  
In Sturges we see the necessary additional dimension of Marshall’s crafting of the 
Court’s authority vis-a-vis the constitutional text. For the Court to be authoritative in this regard 
the authority of the Constitution had to be rendered distinct from the actual actors involved in the 
document’s creation. Highlighting the people’s authority for the text (in McCulloch) 
marginalizes the claim of the framers’ to authority over the text. Inverting the relationship 
between intention and text works to the same end. Coupled with the conceptualization of the 
written Constitution as authoritative at the expense of the people offered in Marbury, the Court 
emerges as the authoritative interpreter of a constitutional document, the authority of which 
derives from the text itself. The impersonal Constitution, which in Michael Warner’s analysis 
had interpellated the whole,690 becomes through Marshall the mechanism by which the people’s 
authority is eroded and the counter-majoritarian judiciary’s is aggrandized.  
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690 “By constituting the government, the people’s text literally constitutes the people. In the concrete form 
of these texts, the people decides the conditions of its own embodiment. The text itself becomes not only 
the supreme law, but the only original embodiment of the people.” (Michael Warner, Letters of the 
Republic: Publication and the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century America, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1990), 102).  
!
!
!!247!
 
Conclusion 
Taken together, these cases highlight Marshall’s use of rhetoric and narrative in order to 
construct the Supreme Court’s constitutional authority. This construction of this authority 
indicates that it was neither a prior product of the relationship between Court and country, nor 
was it independent of persuasion or force. Crucially, the Court’s embodiment of the link between 
the contemporary moment and the founding was aggressively asserted in Marshall’s opinion, not 
assumed. Moreover, the constitutional authority would not serve a link to the persons of the 
framers but would marginalize their understanding in rejecting both intention and the Federalist 
Papers as authoritative. Democratically, Marshall’s development of the Court’s constitutional 
authority both required and ultimately rejected the people’s authority over the textual 
constitution. Required, in order that the supremacy of the text – and so by extension its judicial 
interpreters – could be given a democratic basis. Rejected, insofar as the Court’s authority would 
reduce the ability of the people to intervene in a constitutional order embedded in a fixed text.  
Set against the increasing association of the Constitution with the persons of the framers 
that was occurring with popular culture and which has been explored in earlier chapters, this 
development represents the people’s gradual loss of control over their own Constitution. In 
popular culture the people ceded this authority to the pseudo-historical figures of the founding 
fathers. In the legal sphere, the people’s authority was utilized and diluted in favor of the 
Supreme Court. These developments ascribed the people’s and the framers’ authority into 
constitutional discourse, but worked to actualize that authority only in the case of the framers and 
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in the form of cultural authority. The people would be rendered the basis of the Court’s counter 
democratic authority.  
This depiction of the course of constitutional authority in the early Republic presents a 
challenge to Arendt’s account of the founding. The working out of the Court’s authority was not 
an immediate development, and nor was it directly the basis of the Revolution’s “success.” By 
the late Antebellum period, then-President Lincoln – no opponent of the Constitution’s authority 
– would reject the position that “the policy of government…is to be irrevocably fixed by 
decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made.” The infamous decision of the Taney 
Court in Dred Scott would rock the authority of the Court, bringing to a head the disjuncture 
between the Constitution’s problematic racial dimension and the increasing opposition to the 
institution of slavery. That tension, as we will see, would itself drive forward debates about the 
authority of the Constitution and the framers. 
But, constraining attention to the role of Marshall, we should, in light of his role in 
shaping the Court’s constitutional authority, take seriously the characterization of Marshall’s 
agency given in the toast offered in Washington on the 4th of July 1831 – “John Marshall - One 
of the fathers of the Constitution, and its highest official expounder.” Not the passive inheritor of 
the authority of the founding depicted by Arendt, instead Marshall is better understood as active 
participant in the process of founding authority in and for the Supreme Court. In this sense, 
Marshall is perhaps a founder of authority more so for his efforts on the bench, then his efforts in 
Virginia in 1788. 
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Chapter 5: Abolitionism, The American Party System and Framer Intent 
“Let us confess that, as a nation, we are disgraced.” 
Amasa Walker691 
 
“We shall offend our southern brethren.” 
William J. Snelling692 
 
As we have seen, the preservation of the Constitution took on cultural importance in the 
political discourse of the 1820s and 1830s. The Constitution came to be understood as an 
inheritance from the founding generation that subsequent generations were charged with handing 
on to their children in tact. The 4th of July celebrations linked the constitutional document ever 
more closely to the authors of it and identified it as authoritative within American political 
culture. At the same time developments in legal culture saw the Marshall Court utilize the 
people’s historical authority during ratification to weaken the people’s contemporary authority 
over the Constitution.  In such a way the Constitution’s position within legal and non-legal 
culture diverged. Within legal culture the Constitution became increasingly removed from the 
people, creating a basis of interpretation internal to the document itself and supported by a 
burgeoning body of judicial precedent. Outside of this sphere, the document became increasingly 
removed from the people insofar as it grew tied to the identities of the framers and relegated their 
role to one of preservation. In both instances, the text of the Constitution remained the locus of 
interpretative endeavors. Even as the framers’ authority became more pronounced, it was not the 
case that this readily transferred into an abandonment of text-centered constitutional 
understandings. 
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691 Proceedings of the New-England Anti-Slavery Convention, Held in Boston on the 27th, 28th and 29th 
of May, 1834. (Boston: Garrison & Knapp, 1834), 12. 
692 The Abolitionist 1:4 (1833), 53. 
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Within the emergence of the abolitionist movement in the 1830s, the understandings of 
the Constitution in both the North and the South underwent a revision. As abolitionists pushed 
for the ending of slavery in the District of Columbia, their opponents were required to offer a 
basis for rejecting congressional authority in this area. The very explicit grant of power to 
Congress to regulate the District made it near impossible for advocates of slavery to fashion a 
text-oriented constitutional argument against interference. In response to abolitionist demands, 
their opponents offered a compact theory of the Constitution that forbade reform – or even 
discussion – of slavery in Washington on the basis of a duty to maintain the spirit of compromise 
that had enabled agreement in 1787-88. Raising the spirit of compromise to the level of – and at 
times above – the constitutional text itself, these actors moved beyond an understanding of 
heroic preservation of the constitutional document and towards a duty to protect the spirit of the 
Constitution as defined by the intentions and actions of agents in 1787-88. 
This radical re-evaluation of the Constitution was resisted by abolitionists and dough-
faces alike, both of whom shied away from any commitment to the idea that interference in 
slavery in the District of Columbia was unconstitutional. Nonetheless, they adopted the 
presumption of the compact theory that the intentions of actors during ratification were 
significant in understanding the Constitution. For Van Buren and his followers, the spirit of the 
framers came to be regarded as binding on contemporary political actors. For abolitionists, the 
ability to show that the framers had intended the abolition of slavery became a vital rhetorical 
tool. In accepting this framework for constitutional discussions, Van Buren and the abolitionists 
moved away from the text-oriented framework that had been dominant in popular and legal 
discussions (albeit in very different ways). And ultimately, for the abolitionists, it would mean 
the fracturing of their movement into two distinct understandings of the Constitution.   
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This chapter examines the emergence of the abolitionist movement and its interactions 
with the Constitution.693 The chapter outlines the development of abolitionism in the North and 
ideological resistance to it in the South. The abolition of slavery within the British Empire 
spurred the American abolitionist movement to understand slavery as a peculiarly American sin, 
one tied to the Constitution and symbolically enacted in the nation’s capital. This development 
pushed abolitionists to both begin to see the Constitution as possessing a spirit alongside its text 
and to demand abolition within Washington, D.C. with greater urgency. At the same time, 
slaveholder insecurity resulting from Nat Turner’s Rebellion and the maturing of the American 
system of slavery resulted in a South intolerant of abolitionist activities. Fashioning a 
constitutional response, slaveholders posited a new compact theory of the Constitution. The 
chapter then demonstrates that the compact theory was in turn responded to by Martin Van 
Buren and by the abolitionist movement in the form of acceptance of the premise of framer 
intent.  
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693  The sources utilized in this investigation differ from those offered in other parts of the dissertation. 
The initial tracing of constitutional interpretations looked to newspapers as representations of public 
opinion, while the Fourth of July celebrations provided public enactments that might be regarded as 
having a degree of popular support by dint of their reliance on immediate audience approval. This chapter 
however makes use of public reports (for pro-slavery messages) and abolition pamphlets (for abolitionist 
messages). As such, some account of this shift is perhaps required. A crude explanation lies in the lack of 
newspaper coverage of the arguments of the abolitionists, whose arguments many regarded as having the 
effect of destabilizing the Union. Shunned as extremists, they were forced to open their own newspapers 
(of which the Liberator, the Genius of Universal Emancipation, and the North Star are only the most 
famous). However, during the period under examination perhaps only the Liberator existed as a 
significant and enduring abolitionist sheet, closely tied to the views of its editor, William Lloyd Garrison. 
As such newspapers from the period offer limited scope for understanding the broad development within 
the abolitionist movement of constitutional thought. Instead, their pamphlets and minutes of conventions 
allow access to the movement’s internal ideological discussions and to this end are more enlightening. 
The reliance on governmental reports to illustrate pro-slavery thought is desirable for two reasons. Firstly, 
the official expressions of these views evince the degree to which the claims they offer were not merely 
Southern extremism, but actually accepted within “respectable” debate. Secondly, the locus of the debates 
over slavery in the District of Columbia was within Congress. It was Congress (along with the State 
legislatures) that was required to respond to abolitionist pressure, not newspaper editors in the South. 
Thus, it is in official messages that the interplay of these claims takes place overtly. Elsewhere, the efforts 
to frame the abolitionists as extremists did not necessitate – and would perhaps have been undermined by 
– the formulation of a coherent response to their conception of the Constitution.  
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Abolition and the Constitution 
With the creation of William Lloyd Garrison’s Liberator in 1831 the nation — and the 
prevalent gradualist abolitionist movement — received, in the words of the Vermont Anti-
Slavery Society, a “shock, as if this nation had been shaken by an earthquake.”694 Picking up the 
cause of immediate abolition whose figurehead David Walker had died suddenly in 1830,695 and 
with the financial support of free Blacks in the North who constituted the majority of the 
readership, Garrison’s paper and associated activism provided a focal point for a movement 
which self-consciously rejected the aims and operation of the American Colonization Society.696 
Rejecting the gradualism of the Colonization Society, Garrison discounted “Moderation, under 
such circumstances, [as] deliberate barbarity… calmness [as] marble indifference.”697 Taking 
aim at the Colonization Society, “the great Babel of our country,” Garrison denounced “the 
origins, the designs, and the movements of this great red dragon, red with the blood of the poor 
innocents.”698 Positioning itself against methods which “stigmatize[d] as foreigners” those whose 
“fathers fought bravely to achieve independence” and sought to “send them to a barbarous 
continent,” an uncompromising abolition movement committed to immediacy and which 
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identified print as the means of achieving it arose with Garrison acting as figurehead.699 A year 
after the founding of the Liberator, the New-England Anti-Slavery Society gave an institutional 
concreteness to the movement and The Abolitionist provided an official publication.700 The year-
end of 1833 saw the creation of the National Anti-Slavery in Philadelphia, followed by a 
mushrooming of affiliates across the northern states such that the national organization could list 
527 societies in appendix to its third annual report in mid-1836.701  
The focus on immediate abolition reflected to an important extent an understanding of 
slavery not as a declining institution in need of a political solution but as a moral wrong 
demanding action on the part of professing Christians. At the annual meeting of the New-
England Anti-Slavery Society in 1833, Rev. E. M. P. Wells listed his objections to slavery in 
order thus: “1. Slavery is inconsistent with Christianity. – 2. It is inconsistent with humanity. – 3. 
It is inconsistent with the principles of a republican government.”702 In an anonymous pamphlet 
“A Plea for the Slave Addressed to All Professing Christians in America,” the writer urged 
Americans to “not be indifferent to slavery because it is said to be a political question. It is 
eminently a religious one, and cannot be safely neglected by any who would cultivate “pure 
religion and undefiled before God.”” 703 Central to this objection to slavery was the latter’s 
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failure to recognize that the slave “is constituted, by God, a moral agent.”704  To the 
Abolitionists, slaveholding in the form of ownership of other humans was “contrary to the law 
written on the human heart, as well as in the holy scriptures,”705 and a violation of “that law, 
unchangeable and eternal… that man can [not] hold property in man.”706 Slavery was sinful, 
aside from the immoral claim to have ownership over another, because it denied to the slave “the 
beams of gospel consolation, to which every Christian is entitled.”707 William Oakes of Ipswich 
articulated this directly in stating that “We seek to abolish slavery, that the slaves may be a 
reading population, and may be supplied with the Bible.”708  That slavery was a religious 
question denied to American Christians the luxury of gradual reform. The Anti-slavery students 
of Union College avowed that “slaveholding is a heinous crime in the sight of God; and that 
duty, safety and the best interests of all concerned, require its immediate abandonment.”709  
However, if the system of slavery was inherently sinful, it was through the Constitution 
that this immorality spread to the souls of the abolitionists themselves. The Constitution made 
the existence of slavery in the southern States a sin for those in the North as it required the 
latter’s acquiescence and — more significantly for the abolitionists — potential active support 
for slavery. Fearful that a slave rebellion would see the northern militias called in to service in 
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the South, abolitionists saw the congressional power to suppress insurrections710 as enlisting 
them as participants in the perpetuation of slavery. William Snelling told the New-England Anti-
Slavery Society that: 
“We have, by acceding to the Federal Constitution, solemnly and as a people, 
guaranteed the continuance of slavery. We, that is all of us between eighteen and 
forty-five, are liable to be called to suppress, what we should call rebellion, but 
what all other nations will call a glorious revolution.”711 
The Anti-Slavery Reporter in September of the same year, 1833, printed John G. Whittier’s call 
for immediate abolition. Central to this claim were the North’s constitutional ties to slavery. 
Whittier rejected the view that New England had no interest in slaveholding;  
“New-England is not responsible? Bound by the United States Constitution to 
protect the slaver-holder in his sins, and yet not responsible? Joining hand with 
crime – covenanting with oppression – leaguing with pollution, and yet not 
responsible!”712 
The Constitution, Whittier asserted, bound the North’s militia to active protection of the slave 
system. “Slavery is protected by the constitutional compact – by the standing army – by the 
militia of the free states.”713 The constitutional requirement to return of those held under service 
or labor was also understood by abolitionists to bind them to the immoral system.714 The October 
1833 Abolitionist, listing the proof that the “American nation… approves and encourages 
slavery,” made point number one that “The constitution of the United States binds, as far as it 
can, the people of the northern States, to restore runaway slaves to their owners.”715 Even as it 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
710 Article I, Section 8: “To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, 
suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions” 
711 The Abolitionist 1:3 (1833), 35. 
712 Anti-Slavery Reporter 1:4 (1833), 51. 
713 Anti-Slavery Reporter 1:4 (1833), 51. 
714 Article IV, Section 2: “No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, 
escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such 
Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may 
be due.” 
715 The Abolitionist 1:10 (1833), 158. 
!
!
!
!
258!
rejected its moral authority, the First Annual Report of American Anti-Slavery Society, 
concluded that through the constitutional requirement to return fugitives, Americans in the North 
had been “hired to abet oppression — to be the tools of tyrants”716 Constitutionally tied to the 
South, northern abolitionists identified with the guilt of slavery as “a nation, then, until we do 
something to amend our constitution and laws.”717 Immediate abolition was the only response to 
“all the iniquity of Slavery,” for all the United States “are responsible for the shame and guilt of 
slavery.”718 Abolition was, said Garrison in 1834, “aimed at the redemption of the whole land… 
We [are] all in bondage.” 719 The Constitution, underwriting the Union of the sections, made the 
sin of slavery a stain on northern as well as southern souls. 
Despite this, in the initial period of Garrisonian abolition at least, the Constitution’s role 
in binding the abolitionists to slavery did not necessitate its rejection. While the early 
abolitionists identified the Constitution as central to their complicity in slaveholding, they also 
understood the text itself as a somewhat amoral framework for federal governance. Even as it 
bound them to slavery, it offered a means by which slavery might be addressed. The Providence 
Anti-Slavery Society declared themselves satisfied “that we have no other purpose but to 
overthrow a most unrighteous and cruel system, by the means pointed out in the Constitution of 
the Republic, for the improvement of our civil and social state.”720 The U.S. Constitution was an 
important abolitionist resource insofar as it guaranteed the abolitionists the free speech needed to 
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spread their literature,721 but also as it offered resources by which to problematize and harry 
slavery itself.  In their “Address to the People of the United States,” New England abolitionists 
conceded that “It is true that slavery, as it exists in our country, is supported by law, and by the 
constitution as it is generally understood”722 but they questioned the belief that this required 
acquiescence. “Ought it not” they asked “to be to us the most powerful inducement, to use every 
means which the constitution has left us, to remove this fatal inconsistency with the vital 
principle of our social institutions?”723 The Anti-Slavery Reporter argued that “while we confine 
ourselves within the strictest construction of the constitutional rights we do not intend to be 
precluded from urging any measure which the constitution warrants.” 724  
Such measures included the use of the constitutional protection of free speech to urge a 
constitutional amendment,725 but more significantly they also involved the proffering of the 
Constitution as a basis for opposing slavery. Although unlikely to persuade slaveholders, 
abolitionists invoked constitutional clauses such as the ban on cruel and unusual punishments,726 
the privileges and immunities clause,727 and the guarantee of republican government,728 in order 
to juxtaposition the Constitution and the reality of slavery. Furthermore, they emphasized the 
lack of specific reference to slavery in the constitutional document in order to challenge the view 
that it was inherently pro-slavery. At the American Anti-Slavery Society’s Annual Meeting in 
1834 Rev. Samuel J. May denied the that the “constitution sanctions slavery” as neither “slavery 
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nor slaves are mentioned in the constitution. The words are not there.”729 Garrison noted that the 
Constitution “knows nothing of white and black men… it is broad enough to cover [colored] 
persons; it has power enough to vindicate [their] rights.”730 The Constitution, Garrison 
proclaimed, “stands, firm as the rock of Gibraltar, a high refuge from oppression.”731  
Notwithstanding the text’s proclaimed neutrality, it was in the invocation of the 
Constitution’s symbolic authority that the abolitionists most actively sought to break the 
association of slavery with the Constitution. The abolitionists understood the Constitution as 
intimately linked to the Declaration of Independence and as such an embodiment of the spirit of 
the founding period. Resurrection of that spirit would, they argued, lead to the ending of 
slavery.732  The Anti-Slavery Reporter asked: 
“What is our duty? To give effect to the spirit of our Constitution; to plant 
ourselves upon the great Declaration … to loose at once the bands of wickedness 
— to undo the heavy burdens, and let the oppressed go free.”733 
The Declaration provided a spirit or ethos to the Founding independent of the constitutional text 
but nonetheless equally — or indeed, given the willingness to amend the text, more — binding 
on subsequent generations. “We will,” Garrison asserted, “preach the DECLARATION OF 
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INDEPENDENCE, till it begins to be put in PRACTICE.”734 To be sure, there was nothing 
radical in tapping the spirit of ’76 for rhetorical purposes - by the 1830s this was a well worn 
political technique. But in using the Declaration as a prism for understanding the Constitution, 
the abolitionists could frame their actions as constitutional and patriotic. A month after defining 
its duty in terms of effecting the constitutional spirit, the Anti-Slavery Reporter would reason that 
“in seeking the abolition of slavery we conform to the spirit of the constitution, and are strictly 
within the letters of it, is plain from the fact, that this venerated instrument gives no sanction to a 
system so abhorrent to the principles of ’76.”735 Here 1776 was radically collapsed into 1787 — 
the principles of ’76 belie the possibility that the document of ’87 included slavery within its 
spirit. The interplay between the philosophical Declaration of 1776 and the mechanistic 
document of 1787 within abolitionist literature infused the latter text with the spirit of — and 
perhaps more crucially, the promise of — liberty. In early 1834, the American Anti-Slavery 
Reporter asserted that “The Constitution of our Union is framed with a view to liberty and not 
slavery, and the hearts of freeman cannot forever slumber over the wrongs of the bleeding, the 
destitute and the oppressed.”736 
As the Reporter’s description of unsettled hearts suggests, the infusion of the 
Constitution with the spirit of the Declaration led to a shift from the prevailing constitutional 
discourse of heroic preservation. As we have seen in the 4th of July celebrations of the 1820s and 
1830s, attitudes towards the Constitution were coalescing around an understanding typified by 
President Jackson’s view that “The Constitution is still the object of our reverence, the bond of 
our Union, our defence in danger, the source of our prosperity in peace. It shall descend, as we 
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have received it, uncorrupted by sophistical construction, to our posterity…”737 The duty of those 
sharing Jackson’s deference to the Constitution was to guard against encroachments upon the 
constitutionally settled division of power. Jackson thundered in the direction of South Carolina, 
that “The letter of this great instrument is free from… radical fault… The sages, whose memory 
will always be reverenced, have given us a practical, and… permanent constitutional 
compact.”738 Patriotism in this understanding meant a commitment to preservation. But with the 
notion of a constitutional spirit derived from the Declaration, the abolitionists conceived of the 
Constitution at risk not from degeneration but rather constriction; their role was completion, not 
preservation. The existence of slavery marked an aspect of the nation unfulfilled by the 
Constitution’s spirit of liberty. Reverence for the Founding required the extension of that spirit to 
the slave and the completion of the constitutional project. “And although our fathers left their 
great work unfinished, it is our duty to follow out their principles. Short of Liberty and Equality 
we cannot stop without doing injustice to their memories.”739 The task of “completing” the 
Constitution was directly linked to a notion of inheriting an unfinished constitutional project 
from the founders of the American state. Its spirit and aims were the abolitionist’s chosen 
inheritance from the founders, as opposed to the Madisonian distribution of power.  
Thus, the early 1830s abolitionists’ understanding of a spiritual Constitution gave them 
scope to understand their rejection of the slaveholding provisions of the document as 
conformable to the Constitution. Moreover, it provided the possibility of a constitution which 
extended beyond the fragile text inherited from 1788, both in terms of drawing upon the 
principles of 1776 and in providing a constitutional framework for the moral struggle of the 
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1830s. The “Declaration of the National Anti-Slavery Convention” construed their mission in 
light of this: “We have met together for the achievement of an enterprise, without which, that of 
our fathers is incomplete, and which… as far transcends theirs, as moral truth does physical 
force.”740 As this suggests their mission moved them beyond the founders’ settlement and 
towards a more expansive one. Textual preservation was rejected in favor of spiritual 
completion, and the text was regarded as an imperfect (albeit binding) rendering of what was 
“constitutional.” The higher spiritual form of the Constitution made it possible for abolitionists to 
avow that “our course is the only one by which slavery can be abolished, consistently with the 
Constitution.”741  
Far from the outright rejection which saw Garrison burn the Constitution in 1854, the 
“immediate” abolitionists of the early 1830s held a profoundly complex view of the Constitution. 
Conceiving it both to be the basis of their implication in the immoral slave system of the 
southern States and as the means by which the immoral system could be overturned, abolitionists 
could simultaneously advocate amendment and completion. Implicitly regarding it as possessing 
both a spiritual and textual form, they resisted the prevailing Jacksonian attitude of “heroic 
preservation,” and instead advocated a fidelity to the founders which would be actualized by the 
repudiation of slavery. They called on “the Patriot, — the friend of liberty and the Union of the 
States, [to] no longer shut his eyes to the great danger”742 and asserted that the “very reputation 
of our fathers…demanded”743 emancipation. However as the 1830s continued two issues would 
sharpen the constitutional dimensions of abolition. The emancipation of the slaves in the British 
Empire and the continuation of slavery in Washington D.C. worked in turn to Americanize the 
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existence of slavery and to provide a geographical area in which a national debate over slavery 
could be joined. Both heightened the urgency of abolition in the minds of the abolitionists, and 
the latter forced opponents of abolition to offer constitutional understandings to counter those of 
the abolitionists.   
 
Americanization of Abolition/Slavery 
 Three months before the formation of the National Anti-Slavery Society in December 
1833, news reached American shores of the abolition of slavery in the British colonies. From late 
July news that provisions of an abolition bill had passed the House of Commons two weeks 
earlier was circulating in the United States,744 and by late September confirmation of its passage 
by both Houses arrived.745 The news that the nation that Americans had fought a revolution 
against had acted to abolish slavery throughout its colonies was greeted with mixed feelings by 
Americans abolitionists. The Abolitionist noted the development with equal parts jubilation and 
melancholy; “This glorious act of the British nation, presents a mortifying contrast to the conduct 
of our own.”746 Nevertheless, the journal saw a positive in the fact that the United States 
remained alone amongst the English-speaking world in maintaining slavery: “The abolition of 
slavery in the British colonies, cannot be looked upon with unconcern in the United States… 
When the British king put his name to the statute… he signed the death warrant of slavery 
throughout the civilized world.”747 Believing the moral influence of the British abolition would 
be irresistible in the United States, the abolitionists looked forward to “the moral force of the 
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great body of the people” being roused to “exterminate at once and forever” the system of 
American slavery.748 As it became apparent that they waited in vain for such an uprising, and 
that the United States would remain an outpost of slavery in the Anglo-American world, 
abolitionist thought drew more strongly on the idea that they faced a particularly American sin.  
That Americans were peculiarly compromised ideologically by the existence of slavery in 
the United States was an observation that pre-dated the British abolition of colonial slavery. At 
least since Samuel Johnson had sarcastically enquired “how is it that we hear the loudest yelps 
for liberty among the drivers of negroes?,”749 the incongruities between the rhetoric of the 
American Revolution and the existence of slavery had been recognized. “Slavery” a 1825 
correspondent to the Boston Recorder wrote “is not only indefensible upon the general principles 
of right, but it is in flagrant opposition to the genius of our government.”750 In A Disquisition on 
Egyptian, Roman and American Slavery published in 1831 Kentucky, “Onesimus” wrote that 
with regard to the “heinous crime” of slavery, “above all people in the world, the Americans 
ought to be the most ashamed of it.”751 The root of that shame lay in the hypocrisy of a nation 
which had “declared to the world, in defiance of kings and despots, that men are by nature equal 
and free” and “staked the lives, fortunes, and sacred honour of her sages upon this maxim, and 
who [held] up the beacon of liberty to an astonished world” but which had failed to address 
slavery.752 Should the discrepancy have been missed by Americans, the reproaches of the Irish 
champion Daniel O’Connell on America and George Washington in particular for their 
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slaveholding highlighted the distance between the rhetoric of the “asylum of mankind” and its 
reality. Americans could only fume as O’Connell named Bolivar a more virtuous revolutionary 
for liberty than General Washington and quoted their own Declaration of Independence back at 
them.753 Even those more gradualist than the Garrisonian abolitionists recognized that for slaves 
to remain in bondage longer than was absolutely necessary was “irreconcilable with every 
principle that constitutes this republic a glorious nation.”754  
Nonetheless, the 1833 abolition of slavery in the British colonies presented something of 
a minor crisis of identity. Anticipation of the British reform and the relative conducive 
environment for abolition there had given the American abolitionists pause even before the 
passage of the Act. Leaving for the British Isles in the Spring of 1833, Garrison addressed 
meetings with the observation that 
“I propose to leave this free republican, christian country, and go to one in which 
there is a king and a proud nobility; but where my denunciations against the 
persecution and oppression of your color will be received, not as in this country 
with astonishment, and rage, and scorn, but with loud cheers – with thunders of 
applause!” 755 
When confirmation arrived that this country, of “a king and a proud nobility,” had acted where 
the United States apparently could or would not, the stark contrast jolted the abolitionist 
movement. “Let it not be said,” pleaded the October 1833 Anti-Slavery Reporter, “that in free 
America, truth and the sentiments of humanity, have less sway than in the monarchies of the old 
world.”756 At the New-England Anti-Slavery Convention the following year, Rev. John Blain 
noted, that to the sixth of the population held in bondage, “the 4th of July is no day of 
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Independence.” How could it be, he asked, that “While the proud eagles of our country have 
been trumpeting long and loud the praises of liberty, a large portion of our fellow men enslaved 
and oppressed, have been toiling beneath the lash, in our very midst?”757  The meeting composed 
an “Address to the People of the United States” which challenged the people “Shall the United 
States, the free United States, which could not bear the bonds of a King, cradle the bondage 
which a King is abolishing? Shall a republic be less free than a monarchy?”758 Britain’s example 
confounded the abolitionists even as it energized them. Indeed the issue resulted in one of the 
few contentious debates in the early meetings of the abolitionist movement. 
The New England meeting was roused from routine approval of resolutions condemning 
the variety of sins slavery birthed and commending the efforts of abolitionists to combat them, 
by the proposal of a resolution by Amasa Walker. Walker, a delegate from Boston, offered up a 
resolution: 
“Resolved, That ‘THE LAND OF FREEDOM’ is a phrase inapplicable to the 
United States of America, and ought not to be used by any real friends of 
universal liberty until slavery be abolished.759” 
Suggesting he was struck by the incongruity of its use at an abolitionist meeting, Walker said 
that the phrase “the land of freedom” seemed “a contradiction to the whole spirit and tenor of all 
we have done, and all we intended to do.”760 Conceding that the “The glorious land of liberty’ 
had long been the boast of our people,” Walker nonetheless demanded recognition of the fact 
“that we live in a land of Slavery, bitter, unalleviated Slavery.”761 It was not merely that “the 
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land of freedom” erased the guilt of slavery that motivated Walker, but that the phrase worked to 
set the United States apart from other nations: 
 “In contradistinction to other civilized nations, we call ourselves a free people. 
We point across the Atlantic to the empires of Europe, and thank God that we are 
not like other men… But how empty, how vain, was this boast! Where shall we 
find slavery in its most aggravated  and direful forms; in Europe or 
America?”762 
Challenging his listeners to find “a despotism like ‘the despotism of freedom,” Walker denied 
that amongst the “half-starved peasantry of Ireland… The serfs of [Russia]…  the subjects of the 
Grand Seignor himself, do we find human degradation so complete and awful” as that of the 
American slave.763 “Let us” said the delegate, “frankly and honestly confess that we live… in a 
land where the right of freedom depends upon the complexion of the skin.”764 The phrase was 
not merely unjust and improper, he asserted, but actively worked to “paralyze the public mind to 
the subject of slavery.”765 
“It was a self deception; it was a concealment of a great and glaring fact; it tended 
to sear the consciences of men, and create a self complacency altogether 
unwarranted by the true state of the case.”766 
“Let us no talk about ‘Southern Slavery’ and ‘American Freedom’… but let the astounding 
conviction come home to our hearts, that, as a nation, we are polluted.”767 Walker urged the 
assembled delegates to “confess that, as a nation, we are disgraced.”768 
  Walker’s jeremiad was too much for some of the delegates. Perhaps unwilling to accept 
that America’s exceptionalism was now grounded in its slavery rather than its liberty, Rev. 
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762 Proceedings …New-England Anti-Slavery Convention…1834, 11-12. 
763 Proceedings …New-England Anti-Slavery Convention…1834, 12. 
764 Proceedings …New-England Anti-Slavery Convention…1834, 12. 
765 Proceedings …New-England Anti-Slavery Convention…1834, 12. 
766 Proceedings …New-England Anti-Slavery Convention…1834, 12. 
767 Proceedings …New-England Anti-Slavery Convention…1834, 12. 
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Grosvenor objected to Walker’s claim that freedom was dependent on skin color in the United 
States. Grosvenor pointed out that many slaves were as white or whiter than their masters. 
Quoting the Constitution’s preamble, he argued that the mulatto children of slaveholders were as 
much the inheritors of the Constitution’s guarantees of liberty as the white population.769 
Emphasizing the commitment to securing liberty for posterity, Grosvenor seems to suggest that 
the United States’ claim to be a land of freedom was rooted in its trajectory not current status. 
Taking another tact, Rev. Rand of Lowell sought to secure American title to the phrase through a 
more abstracted understanding of the words. Rand believed that Walker had “departed from the 
ordinary and general use of words.”770 Rand asked “is not this a land of Literature and Religion, 
although perhaps a large majority of our people possess neither?”771  It would, he believed, be 
“improper” to deny it was a land of freedom as a “very great majority… were in the enjoyment 
of freedom.”772  These arguments were pushed back against by C. C. Burleigh who pointed out 
that “slavery was upheld by the Laws of half the Union, and that the Constitution of the United 
States was general considered to sanction slavery.”773 Possibly trying to diffuse the tension, 
William Oakes posited that in place of debating the United States as a land of freedom, the 
correct question was rather “whether this was a land of slavery.”774 The debate was resolved by 
Garrison’s intervention, and declaration that it was “not merely an abuse of language, but an 
outrage upon common sense; it was consummate hypocrisy and glaring falsehood, to call ours a 
free country.”775 He “trusted the resolution would pass unanimously.”776 It was adopted.  
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770 Proceedings …New-England Anti-Slavery Convention…1834, 13. 
771 Proceedings …New-England Anti-Slavery Convention…1834, 13. 
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The existence of this debate over the use of a particular cultural phrase could be 
understood as an example of the strident yet ultimately symbolic resolutions and denunciations 
often associated with marginal political movements. Yet, the resistance to the resolution, the 
attempts to gloss the tensions it aroused, and the intervention of Garrison and his expectation of 
unanimity suggest that the debate was reflective of the deep ill ease British colonial abolition 
triggered in abolitionist circles. More than a symbolic resolution, Walker’s offering actually 
called forth a tense debate over the justice of using an abstract, albeit culturally significant, 
epithet. At its heart lay the fundamental question of what it was that the United States primarily 
symbolized, slavery or freedom. Grosvenor and Rand sought to hold fast to the heroic idea of 
American liberty while simultaneously rejecting a form of slavery now legally supported only in 
the United States, a compartmentalization disrupted by Walker’s fervent denunciation. That 
Grosvenor turned to the promise of the Constitution to refute Walker’s indictment is 
illuminating, highlighting a collapsing of America’s self-defined moral mission with its 
constitutional document. Equally telling is Burleigh’s rejection of Grosvenor’s arguments on the 
very basis of the Constitution itself. Such a division was perhaps not unsurprising given the dual 
understanding of the Constitution held by the abolitionists.777 But the structuring of these 
arguments complicated the relationships between slavery and the Constitution seen above. 
Whereas more broadly, the questions were over the Constitution’s capacity to support or destroy 
slavery as a political-economic system, here the issue was whether or not the Constitution’s 
relationship to slavery made the latter American or unAmerican. Put another way, the 
Constitution was invested with the authority to sanctify or to cast out American cultural artifacts. 
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777 In significant ways then, this early debate can be seen as initial indication of the conceptual divisions 
over the Constitution’s relationship with slavery that would pit Garrison’s complete rejection of the 
“agreement with Hell” against Gerrit Smith’s and Frederick Douglass’s textually derived anti-slavery 
constitution. 
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American and constitutional become, in this debate, synonymous. As the debate resolved itself 
on these grounds in favor of Walker’s denunciation, it rendered slavery both constitutional and 
American. Nevertheless, it would be the second characteristic of slavery — its Americanness — 
that would be systematically developed by the abolitionist movement in the period immediately 
following. 
The American-ness of slavery became a salient issue for abolitionists. The second annual 
report of the American Anti-Slavery in 1835 conceded that the continuation of slavery in the 
United States “makes our republic a laughing stock.”778 The report suggested public support as a 
reason for slavery’s continuation: 
“Here is the reason why slavery stands firm in Republican America. …The appeal 
“Am I not a MAN and a brother?” is answered with a proud and contemptuous 
NO.”779 
The unpalatable truth was that this situation could no longer be put down to institutional inertia, 
but was a reflection of the values that were acceptable to Americans. Not so much an anomaly to 
American culture, slavery was understood to exist as a central part of it. And more worryingly, it 
seemed to be coming more central not less. At the present trend, the Society pessimistically 
concluded, “there is a thousand-fold more probability that slavery will overthrow our 
republicanism than the reverse.”780  
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778 Second Annual Report of the American Anti-Slavery Society; with the Speeches Delivered at the 
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As this critique strengthened abolitionists came to see their object not in the removal of 
slavery from the United States, but in the defeat of the American system of slavery.781 In 1832, 
the New-England Anti-Slavery Society had committed to “effect the abolition of slavery in the 
United States.”782 Similarly the national Anti-Slavery Society was committed by its constitution 
to seek “the entire abolition of slavery in the United States.”783 But the address of the New York 
State Anti-Slavery society in 1835 “To the Citizens of the United States” aimed squarely at 
American slavery. Beginning with an observation that the United States had fallen short of its 
mission, the address pointed to the nation’s “two million and two hundred and fifty thousand 
slaves… mere property — good for nothing else than to gratify the passion and subserve the 
interest of any owner who may chance to hold them. Such is the system of American Slavery.”784 
Narrating the historical development of the slavery in the Atlantic world, the address located 
American slavery as the apex of this development: 
“At length, as the finishing stroke of the foulest policy which ever outraged 
heaven and disgraced the earth, the solemnity and authority of law were employed 
to protect and uphold an extensive and complicated scheme of theft, adultery and 
murder. THIS IS THE SCHEME OF AMERICAN SLAVERY.”785 
Returning to the concept of an American system, the New York Society’s address “To the 
Friends of Immediate and Universal Emancipation” issued at the same time, committed the 
Society to never relax its “exertions till the system of American slavery is utterly, universally, 
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781  To spell out this distinction, “slavery in the United States” communicates the existence of a politico-
economic system of slaveholding within the territory of the United States. On the other hand the 
“American system of slavery” is a system of slaveholding that is both peculiar to the United States and 
constitutive of the American political and economic life. The shift in terms denotes a transfer of the 
“ownership” of slavery to the United States; America is not merely an example of slavery, but the author 
of unique form of slavery. 
782 The Abolitionist 1:1 (1833), 2. 
783 Constitution of the American Anti-Slavery Society, (1833). 
784 Proceedings of the New York Anti-Slavery Convention, Held at Utica, October 21, and New York Anti-
Slavery State Society, Held at Peterboro’, October 22, 1835, (Utica, NY: Standard & Democrat Office, 
1835), 23. 
785 Proceedings of the New York Anti-Slavery Convention… 1835, 27. 
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and forever abolished.”786 Elsewhere, some new Anti-Slavery Societies similarly seemed to hint 
at a conception of their mission in terms of defeating “American Slavery” rather than the 
instances of slavery in the United States.  In 1836 Ohio, the State Society tweaked the national 
grouping’s mission so as to commit themselves to “the entire abolition of Slavery throughout the 
United States,”787 Rhode Island anti-slavery activists were more explicit, organizing themselves 
“into a Society for the extirpation of American Slavery,”788 while next year the nascent 
Pennsylvanian abolitionists declared themselves “associated for the purpose of promoting the 
abolition of American slavery” and denounced “the slavery of the Southern states” as “a system 
of unparalleled oppression.”789 Meeting at Utica, NY in 1836, the New-York State Anti-Slavery 
Society would return to its earlier theme, addressing the abolitionists of the State to the effect 
that “American Slavery is a pyramid of crime,” and labeling the slave States  
“the head quarters of cruelty for the world; the residence of duelling, the native 
land of Lynch law, where its professors reside and its scholars practice. These 
states are the asylum of piracy made respectable by the sanctions of law, where 
immortal minds are ruined, in the wholesale, by constitutional edicts… this is the 
Land of SLAVES.” 790  
In this way the “Americanization” of slavery brought with it its own perverse exceptionalism, in 
which the system of American slavery was both “superior” to and a locus for oppressive systems 
in the rest of the world. The American fall from grace was more complete and significant than 
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787 Narrative of the Late Riotous Proceedings Against the Liberty of the Press, in Cincinnati. With 
Remarks and Historical Notices, Relating to Emancipation, (Cincinnati: Ohio Anti-Slavery Society, 
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788 Proceedings of the Rhode-Island Anti-Slavery Convention, Held in Providence, on the 2d, 3d, and 4th 
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790 “Address to the Abolitionists of the State of New York,” Proceedings of the First Annual Meeting of 
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seen elsewhere because it remained, even in its uniquely sinful state, a city upon a hill. And this 
was enacted nowhere more explicitly than in the District of Columbia, the nation’s capital.  
 
The District as Sin 
Nothing exercised abolitionists in the 1830s more than the continued existence of slavery 
in Washington D.C. The presence of slavery in the nation’s capital stood as a tangible rebuke to 
the notion that the United States embodied the values of liberty and republicanism. Moreover, 
the District remained constitutionally under the direct control of Congress, negating the 
constitutionally ambiguous authority that the federal government and the northern States might 
have over slavery elsewhere. Slavery in the District of Columbia was therefore both symbolically 
significant and legally vulnerable to challenge. The abolitionists quickly grasped both 
characteristics and made its overturning a focus of their activism. Encouraging members to 
organize petitions, they hoped that the power of public opinion would sway Congress and ensure 
action.  
The identification of slavery in the District of Columbia as an issue pre-dated the New-
England and American Anti-Slavery Societies. In 1829 Charles Miner, a Representative from 
Pennsylvania, had asked that the House of Representatives consider a gradual plan of abolition in 
the District. Noting that “the Constitution has given to Congress, within the District of Columbia, 
the power of “exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever,”” Miner pointed to the neglect that 
regulation of slavery in the capital had experienced since its creation.791 Urging the ultimate 
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791 Speech of Mr. Miner, Of Pennsylvania, Delivered in the House of Representatives. on Tuesday and 
Wednesday, January 6 and 7, 1829, On the Subject of Slavery and the Slave Trade in the District of 
Columbia. With Notes, (Washington DC: Giles & Seaton, 1829), 3. 
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removal of slavery from the District, Miner nonetheless showed little of the forthrightness and 
moral certainty of the Garrisonians. Framing his intervention as a necessary first step in 
addressing the “numerous corruptions” that had arisen and the opportunity to offer a corrective to 
the situation which “it is our duty to regulate by legislation,” Miner hoped the debate might be 
held “in a suitable temper, and with a proper deference for the opinions, and delicacy for the 
feelings, of those who entertain different sentiments.”792 The House would accept resolutions 
seeking a review of slavery in the District of Columbia by the Committee on the District of 
Columbia and amendments to the laws as were deemed necessary (120 to 59) and an instruction 
to the Committee “to inquire into the expediency of providing by law for the gradual abolition of 
slavery within the District, in such a manner that the interests of no individual shall be injured 
thereby” (114 to 66).793 Miner’s extensive preamble detailing the corruptions which the reviews 
sought to address and noting the constitutional power of Congress to act against them was struck 
down with 37 votes in favor and 141 opposed.794 
Once formed the new Anti-Slavery Societies made abolition in the District of Columbia 
their immediate aim and petitioning the means by which to achieve it. At the convention to form 
the National Anti-Slavery Society in 1833, Benjamin Lundy offered a resolution that the 
assembled members “exert themselves to urge forward, without delay, the petition of Congress 
for the abolition of Slavery in the District of Columbia…”795 By this point the groundwork for 
such a campaign had already been laid. The Annual Report of the New-England Anti-Slavery 
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792 Speech of Mr. Miner…, 5. 
793 Register of Debates, 20th Congress, 2nd Session, (Washington DC: Giles & Seaton, 1829), 192; 
Speech of Mr. Miner…, 4. The commitment to gradual abolition and the provision that no interests should 
be injured made this resolution far less radical in reality than the apparent willingness to countenance an 
end to slavery suggests. 
794 Register of Debates, 20th Congress, 2nd Session, 192. 
795 The Abolitionist 1:12 (1833), 184. 
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Society at the start of that year had claimed that “so long as slaves are held in the District of 
Columbia and in the Territories of the United States… it never can be true that the people of 
New-England are not bound to overthrow slavery in the United States.”796 The September 1833 
edition of The Abolitionist provided a didactic dialogue between a member of the Colonization 
Society and an Abolitionist in which the willingness to challenge slavery in the District was a 
key point of difference.797 The same issue provided an example petition on the topic.798 The next 
month the magazine contained a feature on “Slavery and the Slave Trade in the District of 
Columbia” which noted “there is one part of the country where slavery is allowed, in regard to 
which the citizens of the north have not only a right to indicate and complain of the evil, but a 
great duty to perform of active exertion for its suppression.”799 The reproduction of John 
Whittier’s essay in the September Anti-Slavery Reporter conveyed that the “friends of 
emancipation would urge in the first instance an Immediate Abolition of Slavery in the District 
of Columbia, and in the Territories of Florida and Arkansas.”800 
Targeting slavery in the District enabled abolitionists to side-step the question of the 
constitutional power to abolish slavery in the southern States.  Whittier’s essay had, like Miner’s 
preamble, claimed that “The power to emancipate [slaves in the District] is clear. It is 
indisputable.”801 The nation’s capital was a location where the relationship between the 
Constitution’s spirit and text need not be problematized as the text was unequivocal on 
congressional authority. As such the abolitionists could demand change in the District without 
inviting accusations that they sought unconstitutional goals. The distinction between the District 
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and elsewhere was emphasized in their literature. “And if any defender of slavery… should start 
up and say, that this is out of the question… let him know… that meanwhile each State has even 
now the legal title in its jurisdiction; …that the general government has already the right in its 
own territory of Columbia.”802 The National Society’s Declaration conceded “that Congress, 
under the present national compact, has no right to interfere with any of the slave States…But 
we maintain that Congress has a right, and is solemnly bound… to abolish slavery in those 
portions of our territory which the Constitution has placed under its exclusive jurisdiction.”803 
The distinction worked, abolitionists believed, to guard them against the charge that they were 
departing from the constitutional settlement inherited from the founders. In her Anti-Slavery 
Catechism, Lydis Maria Francis Child partly addressed the objection “…they say your measures 
are unconstitutional” with the assertion that “Nobody disputes that Congress has constitutional 
power to abolish slavery and the slave trade in the District of Columbia.”804 In its September 
1833 dialogue, The Abolitionist’s Colonizationist claimed, “An amendment of the Constitution is 
out of the question, against the will of the slaveholding states.” His abolitionist opponent 
countered, “…there is another consideration. Congress have the sole and absolute regulation of 
the District of Columbia.”805 Congressional control over the District gave abolitionists a 
legitimate grievance and basis for arguing that slavery was not a southern concern but a matter of 
“national cognizance.”806 Indeed, the abolitionists mobilized the very constitutional jurisdiction 
of Congress over Washington as a positive inducement for action. The “Third Annual Report” of 
the American Anti-Slavery Society protested that “Never while that Constitution exists, can any 
voter for a congressman do his duty otherwise than by throwing his vote where it will tell most 
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for the abolition in that District.”807 The particularly authority of Congress in the District made 
northern abolition agitation not a choice but a duty. 
The peculiar legal situation of the District sat alongside its importance as a symbol of 
slavery in the United States. The continuation of the institution in the nation’s capital fed into the 
sense of slavery’s Americanness and undercut attempts to frame the United States as a moral 
entity. Washington’s harboring of slavery was seen as a national disgrace within abolitionist 
circles. “How much longer shall the soil of the District of Columbia be watered with the tears 
and fattened with the blood of Americans?” asked the Vermont Anti-Slavery Society in 1835.808 
Not only was Washington D.C. allowing slavery to continue within its confines, it was also 
understood to be a hub within the domestic slave trade. On the floor of the House of 
Representatives in 1835, David Dickinson condemned the increase in the District’s slave trade, 
in which “Free blacks have been kidnapped, hurried out of the District, and sold for slaves.”809 
Particularly objectionable was the use of the federal government’s prisons in the District to house 
slaves and the legal requirement of free Blacks to prove their freedom or face absorption into the 
slave population.810 Effectively excluding citizens of the Union from visiting the capital, the 
abolitionists impugned the latter as violation of laws of God himself.811 The model petition of the 
New Hampshire abolitionists decried the existence in Washington of “a great market to which 
human flesh and blood are almost daily sent for sale…[,] the cruelties which accompany this 
traffic, the fetters which bind the Slaves, the whips with which they are driven, the auctions at 
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which they are sold.”812 That this slave market was operating in the capital, facilitated by the law 
and public institutions meant, argued the abolitionists, “We are therefore literally A SLAVE 
HOLDING NATION.”813 It belied the American claim to be an asylum for mankind, and 
rendered the United States “the scorn and derision, rather than the boast of the earth.”814 
Convinced that few in the north did not at least share their disgust at slavery in the nation’s 
capital, the abolitionists hoped it would prove a galvanizing issue; “…if we cannot “guarantee to 
each of the States a republican form of government,” let us at least no longer legislate for a free 
nation within view of the falling whip, and within hearing of the execrations of the task-master, 
and the prayer of his slave!”815  “To render this chosen land beloved by all, the pride and the 
glory of all,” said Dickinson “we must first render it lovely.”816 Their petition campaign 
succeeded in getting the attention of Congress but not the anticipated result: at the beginning of 
the 24th Congress the House of Representatives initiated its infamous “gag rule,” under which 
such petitions were not discussed.817    
Despite the failure of the abolitionist movement to achieve the abolition of slavery in the 
District of Columbia, the pressure the campaign applied to Congress did have important 
consequences for understandings of the Constitution. The claims that the slave trade in the 
District dishonored the nation and could be abolished within the confines of the Constitution, 
forced the opponents of such a reform to articulate their reasons for resisting such a step. Here 
the blurring of what was American and what was constitutional, evinced in the abolitionist 
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812 Proceedings of the N.H. Anti-Slavery Convention, Held in Concord, on the 11th & 12th of November, 
1834, (Concord, NH: Eastman, Webster & Co., 1834), 37. 
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debates over the use of “the land of freedom,” became more pronounced. In the responses of 
slavery’s supporters to the challenge over slavery in the District, an understanding of the 
Constitution was formulated which posited a spirit that was holding on the text. Mirroring 
Grosvenor’s arguments in that earlier debate, these supporters of slavery suggested a 
constitutional ethos which was prior to the document itself and argued that the Constitution was 
itself the representation of a more fundamental “compact” which precluded abolition in 
Washington D.C.  
 
The Compact and Public Faith 
The emergence of immediate abolition as a political force in the 1830s came at the 
precise moment that southern fear over slave rebellion peaked. In Virginia the Southampton 
Insurrection (“Nat Turner’s Rebellion”) in 1831 had spread fear of slave uprisings and resulted in 
debates over the continuation of slavery that concluded in a more restrictive system.818 Sensitive 
to the potential for unrest, Southerners saw in the abolitionist agitation incitement of slave 
revolt.819 Pushing back against this perceived threat they sought to protect themselves from the 
abolitionists by whatever means were at their disposal. These included intimidation, the 
repression of free speech, overt violence, and an articulation of the Constitution that rejected the 
legitimacy of abolitionist “interference” in slavery. Arguing the constitutional text was the 
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818 Insofar as an outcome of the insurrection was the illegality of teaching slaves to read and write, the 
timing of the abolitionist surge in the North might not be so coincidental. The high value placed on access 
to the Bible amongst New England Christians may have resulted in newly mobilized opposition to the 
religious repression deemed inherent to the lack of a capacity to read. Equally, the existence of an 
organized rebellion and the involvement of federal forces in its repression gave credence to abolitionist 
fears that they would be enlisted in future attempts to suppress rebellion. 
819 On southern fear of the abolitionist movement cf. John Ashworth, Slavery, Capitalism, and Politics in 
the Antebellum Republic: Volume 1: Commerce and Compromise, 1820-1850, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 125-134. 
!
!
!!281!
expression of a more fundamental compact, they sought to gain acceptance for the notion that a 
“spirit of compromise” was as significant a part of their constitutional inheritance as the 1787 
text itself. Although failing to secure a consensus that abolition of slavery in the District of 
Columbia was unconstitutional, they nevertheless created an understanding of the Constitution 
that both abolitionists and “dough-faces” would come to accept as the basis of debate.  
Economic and ideological shifts meant that, by the 1830s, slavery in the South had firmer 
roots than had been the case during the Revolution. Economically, the closing of the (legal) 
foreign slave trade in 1808 had strengthened rather than weakened the institution. The bargain 
made over the slave trade at the Philadelphia Convention in 1787 had done little to curb slavery 
prior to 1808, and, as George William Van Cleve has shown, even to the extent that 1808 set a 
date for ending the slave trade it did so upon the understanding that slavery would be a 
sustainable institution by that point.820 By 1808 the number of slaves in the nation had increased 
by over 50% from the levels of the 1790s, and had expanded into the trans-Appalachian West.821 
By 1830 the slave population would have nearly doubled again.822 Post-1808, the cotton boom 
and closing of the foreign trade meant slaves could demand higher prices at auction. With 
Europe pre-occupied with the Napoleonic Wars, the United States’ cotton industry and its 
importance began the significant growth that would make it a world-leader; In 1801 the United 
States accounted for 9% of the world’s cotton production, by the mid-century it would produce 
68% of the world’s (now three times as large) annual product.823 The demand for labor created 
by this growth meant that after 1808 an internal slave trade flourished, and the Chesapeake 
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region would increasingly see itself as engaged in the production of slaves for export to the West 
alongside the direct exploitation of their labor.824 Where a prime field hand traded for $400-500 
in 1814, a similar individual would be worth $800-1100 in 1819.825 While prices decreased from 
this peak, by 1830 the range was $425-800 and rose in the first years of the 1830s such that by 
1837 they surpassed 1819.826 Crucially for the new arrangement of the slave system, slaves in 
New Orleans were valued at twice the price of those in Virginia.827 The increased importance of 
cotton, the growth of the slave population, the internal trade, and the greater value of the slaves 
themselves resulted in a greatly increased economic attachment to slavery in the mid-Antebellum 
South.  
Parallel to the entrenchment of slavery economically came a more forthright ideological 
justification for the practice. Daniel Walker Howe notes that during the Missouri debates only a 
“few of the participants actually defended slavery as a positive moral good.”828 In the southern 
reactions to the abolitionists in the 1830s though, elements of the arguments that John Henry 
Hammond and Alexander Stephens would put forward in the later Antebellum period can be 
seen. At a public meeting in South Carolina, Edmund Bellinger would contend that “Slavery is a 
blessing” when individuals were, “from natural and permanent causes,” unable to enjoy 
liberty.829 Arguing that the laws were established for the greatest good of the greatest number, 
Bellinger suggested, “to the Southern slave, food, clothing and protection are ample equivalents 
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for the loss of freedom,” and, moreover, supported by the Bible.830 In Richmond, VA, Charles 
Farley would posit, “no man on earth can demand the enjoyment of his natural rights any farther 
than is consistent with his own well being and the well being of society.” 831 The abolitionists 
started with a justifiable view that “slavery in the abstract is a great evil,” Farley suggested, “But 
they reason falsely upon the principle… that slavery is, under any and all circumstances… a sin 
against God, and a sin against man.”832 Farley disputed the notion of a natural right to liberty 
amongst slaves, instead offering the view that the “natural right of the slave is to kind treatment, 
and to every privilege consisting with the safety and happiness of the social system with which 
he is connected.”833 Under the heading “The Crisis,” the Charleston Courier declared that “we 
hold Slavery to be neither a sin nor a curse, but on the contrary, as an ordinance of Providence 
for our good, and as practical blessing… we would not abolish if we could… [slavery] in all 
probability, will be perpetual among us.”834 The northern sympathizer, John Denny, drew 
parallels between the United States and Athenian democracy and denied the citizenship of the 
Black population. Rejecting the ideal of racial equality, Denny concluded that “We 
compassionate [sic] the situation of the coloured man amongst us, but we are well convinced that 
it must ever continue to be, under this government, one of political and civil inferiority.”835 More 
ideologically and economically entrenched, slavery’s supporters were not receptive to the 
abolitionist’s pressure to reform. Instead, in their heightened state of anxiety, they saw abolition 
in the District of Columbia as the first step in universal emancipation; “Give them this District as 
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a lever, and they will never cease until they bring this Government to act upon the States.”836 
Looking to cut off discussion of abolition in the District and elsewhere, the advocates of slavery 
sought to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of abolition itself. 
Aimed as much at foreclosing abolitionist discussion of slavery as at the articulation of a 
positive understanding of the Constitution, anti-abolitionists in the 1830s offered a vision of a 
constitutional “Compact” as their inheritance from 1787-88. This “Compact” comprised of a 
vision of the Constitution in which the commitment of the framers to compromise was integral. 
The compact theory of the 1830s was marked in difference from the compact theory of earlier 
periods. This later version sought not to comprehend the Constitution as the product of thirteen 
sovereign state entities combining, but rather as the embodiment of the spirit of compromise that 
enabled them to come together. Whereas the state sovereignty version of a compact had been 
tentatively offered since the founding — including, as we have seen, as a basis for seeking prior 
amendment during ratification itself, and in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions — the 
version of the 1830s did not mobilize the compact as a basis for nullification, secession, or 
resistance to concrete policies, but rather to deny the legitimacy of even discussing issues 
deemed fundamental to the Union. Outlining the effect of this argument in 1836, abolitionist 
Rev. Samuel J. May offered a sketch of the Compact:  
“Whenever the Abolitionist goes to plead the cause of our enslaved countrymen, 
he is met with the objection very confidently urged in bar of his proceeding, that 
an arrangement was made in the Constitution of this confederacy, by which the 
people of the non-slaveholding States are bound not to attempt in any way the 
overthrow of Slavery. The alleged compact, it is urged, obliged our predecessors, 
who were the first parties to it, and obliges us, who have succeeded to the 
blessings of the “glorious union” they effected on this condition, silently to 
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acquiesce in the continuance of that accursed system of physical oppression, civil 
degradation and soul-murder; nay more, to co-operate actively to enforce it, if at 
any time our Southern brethren may need our assistance.”837 
As May suggests, the aim of the compact theory was not merely to deny the constitutionality of 
schemes of abolition, but also to deny the constitutionality of even discussing them. It rested on 
an understanding that America’s constitutional inheritance lay not in the constitutional text 
alone, but the penumbral agreements that made the text possible. The attempt to reassess those 
compromises, and even to problematize the idea of compromise, was then as much a strike 
against the Constitution as any unconstitutional legislation. 
For anti-abolitionists, all that was needed to ensure a return to national harmony was 
recognition by the abolitionists of the truth of this compact. Anti-abolitionists in Portland, Maine 
noted that the “The constitution of the United States it is well known, was the result of 
compromise,” and resolved that “the Union must be preserved; and that the principles and spirit 
of the fundamental compact… must be maintained holy and inviolate.”838 The Richmond Whig 
declaimed the persistent agitation of abolitionists that was “destroying the compromise of the 
constitution.”839  By the mid- to late-1830s this mode of argumentation was widespread to the 
point of abolitionist exasperation.  Abolitionist N. P. Rogers would lament by 1837 that one 
“cannot advance in direction of the castle of this pet-monster of the republic — slavery… but 
your ears are assailed from every quarter with cries of, “Compact” - “Pledges to our Southern 
brethren” - “Guaranty of their peculiar institutions” - “The great compromise.”840 Rhode Island 
abolitionists complained in their “Report on the Constitution” that “”We abide by our compact” 
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is the motto of the Pro-slavery party at the North, and ”you are violating your fathers’ compact,” 
is the charge made against us in the South.”” 841   
A key benefit of this compact theory for the opponents of abolition in the 1830s lay in its 
ability to counter the argument that Congress possessed legislative authority over slavery in the 
District of Columbia. The theory was provided with its most systematic and pointed expression 
on this issue by Henry Laurens Pinckney’s Report… Upon the Subject of Slavery in the District 
of Columbia.842 Pinckney, seeking to put to bed forever the issue of abolition in the District, 
provided an elaborate essay in order to justify non-interference in the District despite the overt 
textual authority of Congress with regard to slavery in Washington. Instructed by Congress to 
produce a report showing that interference in slavery in the States would be unconstitutional and 
the same in the District of Columbia would be “a violation of public faith, unwise, impolitic, and 
dangerous to Union,”843 Pinckney set out to show that “a violation of the public faith” was 
“substantially tantamount to a positive declaration that the interference alluded to would be 
unconstitutional.”844 Dealing initially with the unconstitutionality of interference in the States, 
Pinckney demonstrated that the practice of forty years had seen the States exercise authority in 
this area. Rounding off his account, the Report summarized 
“… may we not hope, and indeed conclude, that it will be hereafter deemed a 
solemn and deliberate exposition of the constitution, and that all attempts in future 
to violate those sacred compromises, which lie at the very foundation of our 
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constitutional compact, or to excite apprehension on this subject, will be 
effectually counteracted and defeated.”845 
Turning to the issue of slavery in the District of Columbia, Pinckney hoped to harness the 
authority of those sacred compromises to shield Washington’s slaveholders from regulation. 
Rejecting the notion that the legislative authority of Congress was relevant to this discussion, 
Pinckney instead sought to deny Congress’s authority over slaves in the District by 
demonstrating that such a power was never considered as part of the compromise entered into by 
Maryland and Virginia. The powers of Congress over the District were, he said, “derived from a 
source entirely separate from the general legislative powers granted to Congress by the 
constitution.”846 Congressional authority over the District instead existed in order to secure the 
federal capital from the outside interference of the State governments. As the regulation of 
slavery did not involve such considerations, it would be deemed a violation of the public faith to 
interfere with slavery in a manner at odds with its treatment had the District remained within the 
borders of Virginia and Maryland. Cession of the District, read the Report,  
“was designed by the framers of the constitution, to enure to the benefit of the 
whole confederacy, and was made in the furtherance of that design; and if 
Congress, contrary to the obvious intent and spirit of the cession, shall do an act 
not required by the national objects, contemplated by it, but directly repugnant to 
the interests and wishes of the citizens of the ceded territory, and calculated to 
disturb the peace, and endanger the interests, of the slaveholding members of the 
Union, such an act must be in violation of the public faith;”847 
In such a way, Pinckney could argue that interference in the District was out-with the powers of 
Congress despite the textual authority of the Constitution. But this did not show that exercise of 
such powers would be in any sense unconstitutional. To achieve this, Pinckney articulated the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
845 Report of the Select Committee Upon the Subject of Slavery in the District of Columbia…, 5. 
846 Report of the Select Committee Upon the Subject of Slavery in the District of Columbia…, 5. 
847 Report of the Select Committee Upon the Subject of Slavery in the District of Columbia…, 9. 
!
!
!
!
288!
view that something existed with greater authority than the textual constitution itself — the 
principles which the Constitution embodied: 
 “The constitution, while it confers upon Congress exclusive legislation within 
this District, does not, and could not, confer unlimited or despotic authority over 
it. It could confer no power contrary to the fundamental principles of the 
constitution itself, and the essential and unalienable  rights of American 
citizens.”848 
Driving his point home, Pinckney offered the view that a violation of the public faith was 
significantly more destabilizing than any act that was merely unconstitutional. A violation of the 
spirit of commitments surrounding the Constitution would undermine the very possibility of 
constitutional government and as such was more fundamental than any particular constitutional 
text: 
“Why are treaties regarded as sacred and inviolable? Why, but because they 
involve the pledge, and depend upon the sanctity of the national faith? Why are 
all compacts or promises made by Governments held to be irrevocably binding? 
Why, but because they cannot break them without committing perfidy, and 
destroying all confidence in their justice and integrity?”849 
As the great object of the Constitution had been to form a more perfect union, as the District had 
been ceded to enable this - without the intention of surrendering powers over slavery to the 
federal government, - and as the statesmen of the time (and since) had never considered the 
situation to be other than this, the committee regarded the understanding and intent of cession as 
holding over any constitutional text which could be interpreted to undermine this. Reaching 
beyond the committee’s charge the Report asserted that it had “no hesitation to say, that, in the 
view they [the committee] have taken of the whole question, the obligations of Congress not to 
act on this subject are as fully binding and insuperable as a positive constitutional interdict, or an 
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open acknowledgement of want of power.”850 Which was to say, that the spirit of the 
Constitution was a stronger constraint than its words. 
Pinckney’s assertion that interference in the District was a violation of public faith was 
not enough for the electors of South Carolina. Pinckney found himself defending his actions in 
the lead up to a election in 1836 which ultimately saw him deselected.851 But South Carolina 
was, as was typical during this period, more radical than much of the country. Elsewhere, 
Pinckney’s articulation of a compact chimed with the views of abolition’s opponents. In the 
heartland of abolition, the Governor of Massachusetts called on the houses of the legislature “to 
imitate the example of our fathers“ and exhibit “the principle of forbearance and toleration” on 
the subject of slavery.852 “This compact recognizes the existence of slavery” he instructed them, 
“…Every thing that tends to disturb the relations created by this compact is at war with its 
spirit.”853 In the context of discussing abolitionism, New York Governor Marcy informed the 
Legislature of that States that “The people of this State continue to cherish an unabated 
attachment to the federal compact.”854 This attachment bound “them to a course of fraternal 
conduct towards their sister States,” including “the highest and most sacred obligations… it 
imposes on them, and to abstain from all practices incompatible with these duties, or contrary to 
the spirit of any of its provisions.”855 Collating opinions on the issue from around the country, 
Marcy transmitted to the State Legislature similar sentiments from other States. The Governor of 
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Maine approved the view that “The federal compact owed its origin to the spirit of deference, 
conciliation and mutual forbearance, which pervaded the then independent States.”856 The 
General Assembly of Kentucky condemned abolitionism as “a violation of the original basis of 
the federal compact,” and abolition in the District as “a breach of the implied faith of the 
nation.”857 In Michigan, the Legislature resolved that “the formation of [abolitionist] societies… 
[is] in direct violation of the obligations of the compact of our Union, and destructive to the 
tranquility and welfare of the country.”858 Virginia asserted the right to expect her sister States to 
suppress abolitionist activity that was “in defiance of the obligations of social duty and those of 
the Constitution.”859 This right was, Virginia claimed founded in international law, and 
“peculiarly fortified by a just consideration of the intimate and sacred relations that exist between 
the States of this Union.”860 In case the subtext was overlooked, the Legislature also resolved 
“That Congress has no constitutional power to abolish slavery in the district of Columbia, or in 
the territories of the United States.”861 North Carolina similarly denounced interference in 
Washington, D.C.’s slavery as “a breach of faith.”862 
As these extracts, and the explanation of May offered above, suggest, the compact theory 
rested on the notion that there was continuity in the nature of constitutional compromise. That is 
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to say, that attempts to problematize slavery were, as breaches of the “original” basis of the 
Constitution, as illegitimate in 1836 as they would have been in 1789. It is also crucially the case 
that the compact existed as much, if not more so, in spirit as it did on actual paper. For Pinckney 
and his fellow travelers, the Constitution was not the product of negotiation and horse-trading 
but an artifact of a mode of engagement - a spirit - that actualized the Preamble’s commitment to 
form a more perfect union. This focus upon the spirit necessarily shifted the locus of 
constitutionality away from the impersonal and timeless written text and to the spirit of the 
individuals and time in which its was brought into being. As such it incorporated not merely 
agreements directly expressed in the text, but the understandings that surrounded the 
Philadelphia Convention’s final product. This view, in the words of the citizens of Albany, 
avowed: 
“That the constitution of the United States carries with it an adjustment of all 
questions involved in the deliberations which led to its adoption,  and that the 
compromise of interests in which it was founded, is binding in honor and good 
faith, independently of the force of agreement, on all who live under its protection 
and participate in the benefits of which it is the source.”863 
With regard to the issue of slavery in the District of Columbia this shift was entirely the point, 
undermining the clear textually derived authority of Congress in this area and prioritizing the 
spirit of the Constitution.864 Noting this shift, The Anti-Slavery Examiner asked how now 
constitutionality was to be assessed; “Is it by those glorious charters you have inherited from 
your fathers…? Alas! Another standard has been devised.”865 Deploring the indeterminacy 
created by this compact, it stated that “This compact is not indeed published to the world,” but 
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was defined only by the acts which anti-abolitionists deemed unacceptable. The compact theory 
did indeed represent a break with textual understandings of the Constitution. It raised, and 
defined as extra-textual compromise, the spirit of the Constitution at the expense of the text. In 
the final analysis, it worked to make the intentions and commitments of the framers as exhibited 
at Philadelphia the very substance of the “Constitution” itself.  
 
Constitutional Faiths 
As the assertions of the citizens of Albany signal, the compact theory had influence 
beyond hardened defenders of slavery. The dough-face politicians of the North were equally 
willing to embrace its logic as a method by which to structure a Democratic party with support in 
both sections. As the tension over slavery in DC grew in the 1830s, it emerged as an important 
issue within the 1836 presidential election. Martin Van Buren, aiming to create a durable 
national party tentatively embraced the doctrine as a method of placating supporters in both 
regions. Abolitionists also altered their own arguments in order to address the charges of their 
critics, and in doing so adopted some of the fundamental assumptions of the theory. The result 
was a constitutional discourse in which the intentions and motivations of the framers and 
founders became the point of discussion. 
Van Buren sought to establish himself as candidate that the South could trust in 1836. His 
earlier support for the restriction of slavery during the Missouri crisis made him suspect to 
southern eyes. A northerner who had courted Rufus King, the “leader of Northern restriction 
forces” in those earlier debates, distrust of Van Buren was only heightened by his endorsement 
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by the pro-abolition Oneida Standard and Democrat.866 Exemplifying such distrust, “A Voter” 
asked the readers of the Alexandria Gazette “can you believe that that man who… denied to a 
Territory the privileges of the Union, unless upon making the abolition of slavery therein an 
indispensable requisition, a Jeffersonian Republican?”867 Contemporary critics of Van Buren 
charged that he pursued the issue of slavery in the District of Columbia as a method by which to 
prove his loyalty to the South.868 Whether contrived or not, Van Buren certainly effectively 
abandoned his declared opposition to slavery in order to appease southern critics.869 The Annual 
Report of the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society noted Van Buren’s efforts to “demonstrate 
[his] respect for southern interests, by the most vehement condemnation of the Abolitionists.”870 
He instigated the rejection of abolitionist literature by the Postmaster of New York City, 
encouraged Governor Marcy of New York to use his New Year message to condemn abolition 
(see above), and supported the gag rule in Congress.871 New York Democrats worked hard to 
make it clear that they did not endorse abolitionism. Congressman Samuel Beardsley led at mob 
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at the abolitionist meeting in Utica which saw the New York Anti-Slavery Society retreat to the 
town of Peterboro’ and the destruction of the Oneida Standard and Democrat offices.872 
Abolitionists suspected Beardsley’s subsequent appointment as State Attorney General was 
reward for his actions.873 
Van Buren’s most significant response to his perceived unreliability on the issue of 
slavery though, was the production of a pamphlet outlining his views on abolition in 
Washington. Borrowing liberally from accounts in the supportive Richmond Enquirer, the 
pamphlet stopped short of declaring the power of Congress to regulate slavery in the District 
unconstitutional, but nonetheless made a clear commitment to non-interference. Stating that the 
power over slavery in the District of Columbia was a “casus omissus”874 in the Constitution, Van 
Buren admitted the existence of congressional authority but denied the legitimacy of its use. An 
extract from the Richmond Enquirer explained; “Mr. Van Buren holds… that the abolition of 
slavery in the District, against the wishes of the slave-holding States, would destroy at once that 
compromise of interests which lies at the basis of our social compact:” 875 
“He therefore declares it to be his clear and settled opinion, that it is the sacred 
duty of those who are entrusted with control of the action of the Federal 
Government, to use their constitutional power so as to prevent it; and, of course, if 
he were the President of the United States, he must veto any bill which might 
affect the rights of the slave-holders in the District. No language indeed can be 
stronger than that which he employs. He would go into the Presidential chair “the 
inflexible and uncompromising opponent of any attempt on the part of Congress to 
abolish slavery in the District.””876 
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Providing further evidence for Van Buren’s opposition to abolition in the District, the pamphlet 
offered the Vice President’s letter to a group of gentlemen in North Carolina. In the letter, Van 
Buren referred to his “full concurrence” in the sentiments offered by the citizens of Albany.877 
Responding to the question of slavery in Washington, DC, he reiterated a belief that Congress 
had legal authority but offered the following in addition: 
“…whilst such are my impressions upon the abstract question of the legal power 
of Congress… I do not hesitate to give it to you as my deliberate and well 
considered opinion, that there are objections to the exercise of this power, against 
the wishes of the slave-holding States, as imperative in their nature and 
obligations, in regulating the conduct of public men, as the most palpable want of 
constitutional power would be.”878 
Basing his assessment on criteria markedly similar to those offered by Pinckney in the latter’s 
Report, Van Buren grounded his view in judgments, (i) that had abolitionist agitation been 
foreseen at the time of the Constitution’s adoption an exemption for slavery in DC would have 
been written into the constitutional document, (ii) that had Maryland and Virginia foreseen the 
possibility of abolition they would not have ceded the District, and (iii) that abolition in the 
District would “violate the spirit of that compromise of interests which lies at the basis of our 
social compact.”879 Essentially then, Van Buren argued that abolition in the District would 
contravene the intentions of those involved in the adoption of the Constitution and the cession of 
the District. After his election, Van Buren arrived at his inaugural speech in a carriage fashioned 
from wood taken from the U.S.S. Constitution, and reiterated his commitment to go into the 
“Presidential chair the inflexible and uncompromising opponent of every attempt on the part of 
Congress to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia against the wishes of the slaveholding 
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States.“880  Justifying his position on the basis that his election provided a mandate for his views 
on the subject of abolition offered during the campaign, he added, “It now only remains to add 
that no bill conflicting with these views can ever receive my constitutional sanction. These 
opinions have been adopted in the firm belief that they are in accordance with the spirit that 
actuated the venerated fathers of the Republic, and that succeeding experience has proved them 
to be humane, patriotic, expedient, honorable, and just.”881 In this way, the assumption of the 
compact theory that the spirit that actuated the framers remained binding was given presidential 
assent. 
Abolitionists too adopted some of the logic of the compact, yielding two ideological 
strands of abolition that would fracture the movement in the 1840s.882 Abolitionist attitudes 
towards the Constitution would ultimately polarize around the positions occupied by William 
Lloyd Garrison (covenant with death) and Gerrit Smith and Frederick Douglass (that the 
document contained no support for slavery). But this division would come later, predicated to a 
degree upon the publication of Madison’s notes taken during the Philadelphia Convention.883  In 
the mid-1830s, without extensive accounts of the Philadelphia Convention’s deliberations, 
abolitionists would argue that the continuation of slavery could not have been the intent of 
framers. Instead, rejecting the compact theory offered by slavery’s defenders, the abolitionists 
sought to show that abolition - or at least non-support of slavery - had been the intent of the 
framers. However, even as they rejected the “compact,” they did so on the grounds that moved 
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beyond modes of strict construction and invoked the intentions and expectations of key founders. 
As such, they conceded that the intentions behind the Constitution were indeed the stakes of the 
constitutional argument. Such an argument can be seen in the response of Ohio abolitionists to 
the unrest in Cincinnati: 
““Now if the institution of slavery was, by mutual compromise, to remain 
inviolate and immoveable, would these illustrious men, such as Jay, Franklin, 
Rush, Madison, and Gerry, have conducted in this manner? Could a compact like 
the one in question have been formed, without John Jay being informed of it?”884 
Further offering Washington’s support for legislative abolition, the Ohio abolitionists argued that 
“From these facts, and from all the examination we have had it in our power to make, we have 
no hesitation in pronouncing the supposed “compact,” or “compromise,” to be a groundless 
fiction, and one, too, of no ordinary malignity.”885 The pro-slavery compact theory was “nothing 
less than a libel on the illustrious dead.”886 Abolitionists in Rhode Island “cheerfully declare[d], 
that their fathers’ principles, their fathers’ examples and their fathers’ compacts, are things 
sacred in their eyes,” but not superior to the Constitution itself.887 Nonetheless, they framed their 
broad mission as an “effort… to regain the ground which liberty occupied in 1787” and 
identified Franklin, Rush, and Jay as typifying the views of 1787 regarding slavery.888 And their 
understanding of the Constitution was rooted in intention: 
“There is a manifest effort in the construction of sentences, to avoid every 
appearance of sanctioning the institution of slavery. …We have but slight 
sketches of the debates in this Convention; but slight as they are, they confirm our 
inferences drawn from the Constitution.”889 
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Elsewhere, N. P. Rogers looked to the preamble “to gather some inklings of their [the framers] 
intent…  some means of conjecturing their purpose,” and found the Constitution to be a “deed of 
universal liberty.”890  
The relationship between the constitutional text and framer intent was given an extended 
consideration by the abolitionist Rev. Samuel J. May in the October 1836 issue of The Anti-
Slavery Magazine. In the piece, entitled “Slavery and the Constitution,” May sought to meet the 
compact theory head on and disprove its claims. Setting his goal as a close consideration of the 
relationship between the Constitution and slavery, May believed that “We owe it to the memory 
of those venerated men whose names are conspicuous in the early history of our Republic, and 
who are accused of having entered into such an iniquitous agreement, to exonerate them, if we 
can, from the tremendous responsibility that is laid upon them by our opposers.”891  If he could 
not, then they deserved to be “covered in infamy” - but any such judgment would need to take 
into account the constraints within which they had operated so as to “judge fairly of what the 
framers of the Constitution actually did with respect to slavery.”892 Combing through the 
Constitution, May reconstructed what he believed to be the intention of the framers, and 
adjudged that “It is impossible not to perceive the pains which the framers of these articles took 
to avoid any explicit recognition of slavery.”893 Addressing the fugitive clause he rejected the 
widely held understanding in favor of one based on a judgment of intent;  “… if a construction 
more honorable to our fathers, and more consonant with their avowed principles and intentions 
can be put upon it, we surely ought to prefer it.”894 He concluded with the opinion that “It seems 
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to us that the framers of our Constitution finding they had not the power to abolish slavery, were 
determined to do the next best thing –  not commit the national government to its support.”895 
Having examined the constitutional document with a view to recapturing the framers intent, May 
could regard it as a base from which to “subvert the foundations of that burning mountain of 
crime and misery, which throws its threatening shadows over our whole country.”896 He looked 
forward “with eager expectation” to the publication of Madison’s manuscript, which would 
surely confirm his reading of the convention’s intent and support such a conclusion.897  
The compact theory then, had consequences beyond its immediate genesis as a method of 
countering abolitionist claims regarding slavery in the District of Columbia. Its extreme 
incarnation, which set the authority of a spirit of compromise above the constitutional text itself, 
was not readily embraced in the North by either Van Buren and his supporters or the 
abolitionists. But both groups nonetheless accepted the premises of that argument to a great 
extent. Van Buren adopted the view that the implicit agreements made around the constitutional 
document could be binding on future generations. The abolitionists accepted that the intentions 
of the Philadelphia Convention informed the correct meaning of the document. Both conceded 
the legitimacy of deploying the views of the collective or individual founders within 
contemporary constitutional debates. As much as these views were often projected, hypothetical, 
and ascribed rather than proven, their recognition within constitutional debates marked a shift 
from Gerry’s rejection of Madison’s personal recollections in 1791 or the hysterical fear of 
constitutional tinkering in the 1820s. In the debates surrounding slavery in the District of 
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Columbia the text alone gave way to the intentions of the framers (albeit at times located in the 
text itself). 
 
Conclusion 
 For the abolitionists, the focus on recapturing the intentions of the framers set them up for 
a staggering blow as Madison’s papers revealed the framers’ awareness of and complicity in the 
accommodations with slavery in the Constitution. By the 1840s the belief that the founding 
fathers had made no deal regarding slavery was difficult to maintain. Writing in 1844 on 
Madison’s papers, Wendell Phillips would state, “our fathers bartered honesty for gain and 
became partners with tyrants that they might share in the profits of their tyranny.”898 Disillusion 
would extend to its logical conclusion in Garrison’s burning of the Constitution in 1854. Out 
with abolitionist circles, understandings of the Constitution that prized the text-as-adopted fell to 
the margins of political discussions, or remained locked in a judicial realm that increasingly 
looked to precedent for legitimacy. When these two realms did reconnect it would be in the ill-
fated decision in Dred Scott. There logic of intention would course through a discussion of 
slavery and the Constitution, in which Chief Justice Taney’s opinion that members of the 
“African race” could never be citizens of the United States was predicated on the belief that such 
an eventuality had never been intended by those involved in the Constitution’s creation.899 As the 
nation trundled towards a Civil War that would see the Constitution textually revised in order to 
cast out doubts as to its meaning, it would be marginal figures that remained loyal to the notion 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
898 Phillips, The Constitution A Pro-Slavery Compact, 6. 
899 Scott v. Sandford (60 U.S. 393) 
!
!
!!301!
of the framers as drafters and the people as authority. In 1854 Gerrit Smith echoed Archibald 
MacLaine and Edmund Pendleton in his opposition to the Nebraska Bill: 
“Much stress is laid on the Intentions of the framers of the Constitution. But we 
are to make little more account of their intentions than of the intentions of the 
scrivener, who was employed to write the deed of the land. It is the intentions of 
the adopters of the Constitution, that we are to inquire after; and these we are to 
gather from the words of the Constitution, and not from the words of the framers 
– for it is the text of the Constitution, and not the talk of the Convention, that the 
people adopted.”900 
But Smith would be thwarted in his attempts to stop the Bill and would leave Congress before 
completing a single term. By this point, those rejecting the logic of framer intention were arguing 
against the mainstream of abolitionism and the mainstream of society.  
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Conclusion 
This dissertation has traced developments in constitutional understanding through the 
period after the Philadelphia Convention until the debates surrounding slavery during the 1836 
presidential election. In the process of this, two themes have emerged. The first is the increasing 
complexity of claims to constitutional authority. To this extent the dissertation makes an 
argument linked to, but not the same as, recent works that have emphasized the usurpation of 
people’s original constitutional authority.901 In place of such counter-revolutionary narratives 
however, the dissertation depicts a degree of fluidity in the competing claims to authority that 
belies a straight-forward transfer from the masses and to the elites. Between 1789 and 1836, the 
competing claims of the people and the framers would intertwine with questions of what 
constitutional authority actually meant, bringing understandings of institutional, textual, and 
spiritual authority into conversation and conflict. Thus at different moments, different 
constellations of answers attached themselves to the banners of “the Constitution,” producing a 
dynamic debate that was more complex than the people versus the elite.  Even in the elite realm 
of judicial activity, declarations of the people’s originary authority would be offered, albeit at 
times aimed at providing a mechanism by which to both curtail the current people’s claim over 
the Constitution and to legitimize the Supreme Court’s proclaimed authority with regard to 
constitutional matters. Although interrupted by the infamous Dred Scott decision, this judicial 
understanding would endure in some respects until the case of Cooper v. Aaron in 1958. On the 
other hand, the second theme is the very participation of the people, in the sense of the less-elite 
participants in the public discourse, in the complex development of constitutional authority. As 
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evinced in the printed debates in 1790-91, 1800-01, 1810-11, and 1819-20, the toasts reviewed 
between the period 1810 and 1835, and the abolitionist pamphlets of the 1830s, the period saw a 
concession of constitutional authority by the white, male participants within the public sphere to 
the ever receding first generation of founders. Receding both in the sense that the first generation 
was departing for the “Elysian fields,”902 but also to the degree that the generation was being 
reduced to the actors present in Philadelphia in 1787. The concept of the “framers,” first 
articulated within the theatre of the Ratification debates and intended only for their duration, 
would be increasingly taken to heart as the early Republic developed.  
The discussion has lead up to a point in the mid-1830s in which ideas of framer intent 
had sunk deeps roots in the field of constitutional interpretation. Aside from the judicial realm, 
which was marginalizing the people in a different way, by the 1830s debates over the meaning of 
the Constitution were becoming debates over the intentions of the framers. Particularly with 
regard to the issue of slavery, this framework left political actors with a choice of rejecting the 
Constitution or conceding its existence as a check upon progressive politics. In this conclusion, I 
turn attention to Frederick Douglass’s own transition from an advocate of framer intention to a 
critic of that mode of constitutional interpretation in order to explore how a constitutional politics 
might be developed which breaks free of the constraints of intention. While advocates of framer 
intent are thin on the ground in the United States today, the influence of this way of thinking 
remains potent in conservative and progressive responses since its return to the fore in the 1980s. 
The early Twenty-first century remains in need of a constitutional politics that escapes the 
looming shadow of the drafters and their generation. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
902 Fourth of July toast at Vauxhall Gardens, 1826. Baltimore Patriot, July 8th, 1826. 
!
!
!
!
304!
Frederick Douglass and the Framers 
 As noted above, the publication of Madison’s notes from the Philadelphia Convention 
made arguments for the framers’ anti-slavery intent in the constitutional document difficult. In 
light of this, figures who continued to reject a pro-slavery reading of the Constitution (including 
Samuel J. May and Gerrit Smith) sought to make arguments about the Constitution that did not 
rely upon the framers themselves. Such arguments developed on the basis of two considerations. 
The first, suggested by the speech of Gerrit Smith quoted in the last chapter, pointed to the 
constitutional text’s lack of express provision for slavery in order to argue that there was no 
literal basis for deeming the institution of slavery constitutional. The second was typified in 
Lysander Spooner’s The Unconstitutionality of Slavery (1847), where he developed a 
Blackstonian argument that as nothing immoral could be sanctioned by legitimate law, it was not 
logically possible for the Constitution to be a pro-slavery document.903 Reasoning from the 
position that all constitutions emerged from consent and so could not extend beyond the powers 
“rightfully” delegated, Spooner claimed “that constitutional law, under any form of government, 
consists only of those principles of the written constitution, that are consistent with natural law, 
and man’s natural rights.”904 Constitutions ought, therefore, to be “construed “strictly” in favor 
of natural right.”905 Whether appealing directly to the text or to a more abstract conception of the 
social contract, abolitionists in this vein turned away from the framers in order to make their 
case.  
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However, such arguments were limited in their appeal. The New York circle around 
Gerrit Smith was squeezed between a Garrisonian abolitionist movement for whom the 
Constitution was morally corrupt and a Liberty Party increasingly willing to forego immediate 
abolition in favor of a wider political coalition.906 Alvan Stewart, a member of Smith’s circle, 
could author “The Creed of the Liberty Party Abolitionists”907 in 1844, stating that: 
“We believe, the Constitution of the United States, if properly and truly 
interpreted, is a great and glorious anti-slavery Constitution, for the protection of 
all; and was not made for the destruction of one-sixth of our people.”908 
But by 1848 the circle’s “Liberty League” was formed in an attempt to regain control of a 
Liberty Party which was openly mocked by Garrisonians as having the “good sense to make no 
claim of an Anti-Slavery construction” of the Constitution lest it demonstrate “a collision of 
sentiment with their candidate.”909 Nominating John P. Hale, a Democrat who had served under 
Jackson as Attorney General, as its candidate, the 1848 Liberty Party had eluded internal 
disagreement with a carefully worded platform that fell short of declaring slavery 
unconstitutional. The resolutions of the nominating convention committed the party to the idea 
that “the Constitution imposes no obligation upon the people to sustain or countenance slavery” 
and the “Government has no power to create, extend, or foster domestic slavery,” while 
suggesting they had “no time to waste in discussing the nice points of the Constitution.”910 
Before the election took place, Hale withdrew and the Liberty Party dissolved, with some of its 
members drifting into the Free Soil party that nominated Van Buren. The Liberty League ran 
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Gerrit Smith as a rival presidential National Liberty candidate, but he received less than a tenth 
of a percent of the popular vote and matched only one in a hundred of the Free Soil votes. 
 Despite his weak electoral showing, Gerrit Smith’s vision of the Constitution has become 
historically significant — and instructive for modern constitutional interpretation — insofar as he 
would influence Frederick Douglass’s attitude towards the Constitution. The development of 
Douglass’s view of constitutional interpretation can be seen through comparison between two 
lengthy considerations of the Constitution and slavery at either side of the 1850s. In 1849, the 
North Star published an article “The Constitution and Slavery” and in 1860 Douglass would 
address a Glasgow audience on the topic of “The Constitution of the United States: Is it Pro-
slavery or Anti-slavery?” Comparison of these pieces depicts radically different understandings 
of the Constitution’s relationship with slavery, but also starkly different modes of interpretation. 
In 1849, Douglass espoused an understanding of the Constitution firmly grounded in the 
intention of the framers. By 1860 he would argue that the text ought to be interpreted absent any 
reference to their intent. His own reflections upon this transformation provide both a measure of 
how deeply ingrained the assumption of framer intent was, and an indication of how Douglass, at 
least, incrementally moved from one position to the other. 
The short 1849 essay, “The Constitution and Slavery,” rejects the notion, put forth by 
Gerrit Smith and others, that the Constitution ought to be understood without reference to the 
framers.911 Thundering that, “The Constitution is not abstraction,” Douglass suggested that it was 
“a living, breathing fact,” and as such ought to be engaged within the framework of its actual 
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influence upon society and the nature of its creation.912 In language that mirrored, but then 
reversed, Pendleton’s demand during the ratification that delegates and voters ought treat the 
Constitution as though it had “dropped from one of the planets,”913 Douglass argued that 
“Had the Constitution dropped down from the blue overhanging sky, upon a land 
uncursed by slavery, and without an interpreter… no one would have imagined 
that it recognized or sanctioned slavery. But having a terrestrial, and not a 
celestial origin, we find no difficulty in ascertaining its meaning in all parts which 
we allege to relate to slavery.”914  
The context in which the Constitution was drawn up could not be overlooked when attempting to 
understand the document. “Slavery existed before the Constitution, in the very States by whom it 
was made and adopted. — Slaveholders took a large share in making it.”915 Citing Pinckney’s 
demand at the Philadelphia Convention that the right to import slaves be untouched, Douglass 
argued that the “parties that made the Constitution, aimed to cheat and defraud the slave, who 
was not himself a party to the compact or agreement. It was entered into understandingly on both 
sides.”916 A “most cunningly-devised and wicked compact,” Douglass could not bring himself, 
or encourage his readers to, support anything short of its “complete overthrow.”917 In 1849 then, 
Douglass was willing to espouse a view that the Constitution could only be truly understood with 
regard to the intentions of the Philadelphia Convention. 
Douglass’s move away from this position over the next decade is instructive in terms of 
depicting a constitutional discourse firmly grounded in framer intention and the obstacles 
presented by a move beyond such a discourse. Even around the time Douglass wrote “The 
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Constitution and Slavery,” his correspondence was evincing a weakening commitment to that 
position.918 Writing to his “Dear Friend” Gerrit Smith at the beginning of 1851, Douglass 
admitted that “I have thought much since my personal acquaintance with you and since hearing 
your reasons for regarding the Constitution of the United States an Anti-Slavery instrument.”919 
While he could “not yet see that instrument in the same light” as Smith, Douglass was “sick and 
tired of arguing on the slaveholders’ side of this question.”920 The slaveholders were “doubtless 
right so far as the intentions of the framers of the Constitution are concerned,” so the central 
question for Douglass was whether it is “good morality to take advantage of a legal flaw and put 
a meaning upon a legal instrument the very opposite of what we have good reason to believe was 
the intention of the men who framed it?”921 It is striking that Douglass in 1851 would frame this 
as a moral question.922 The next sentences in the letter display the degree to which such an 
assumption had come to undergird American constitutional politics; “I know well enough that 
slavery is an outrage, contrary to all ideas of justice, and therefore cannot be law according to 
Blackstone. But may it not be law according to American legal authority?”923 Douglass’s 
hesitation is not due to Spooner’s denial of unjust law’s legitimacy but Smith’s rejection of the 
hold of intention over textual meaning.   
Later that year the North Star would publicly state its — and by extension Douglass’s — 
reasons for breaking with the Garrisonian notion of the Constitution as a pro-slavery document. 
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Stating that the change had not “been hastily arrived at,” the paper asserted “the firm conviction 
that the Constitution, construed in the light of well established rules of legal interpretation, might 
be made consistent in its details with the noble purposes avowed in its preamble.”924 In detailing 
its disillusionment with its former position, the paper provided, and repudiated, a concise account 
of constitutional interpretation via intention: 
“We found, in our former position, that, when debating the question, we were 
compelled to go behind the letter of Constitution, and to seek its meaning in the 
history and practice of the nation under it — a process always attended with 
disadvantages; and certainly we feel little inclination to shoulder disadvantages of 
any kind, in order to give slavery the slightest protection.”925 
In a letter to Smith around the same time, Douglass spelt out once again that it was the rejection 
of the authority of the framers that had held back his conversion: 
“You can prove that even in the North Star more than two years ago, I gave up the 
ground that the Constitution, when strictly construed, is a pro-slavery document, 
and that the only points which prevented me from declaring at that time in favor 
of voting and against the disunion ground related to the intentions of the framers 
of the Constitution.”926  
Moreover, even his rejection of the former position was not a complete abandonment of the idea 
of framer intention, but rather a shift to a more textually defined intent. In the same letter, 
Douglass relayed his conversion thus; “I had not made up my mind then, as I have now, that I am 
only in reason and in conscience bound to learn the intentions of those who framed the 
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Constitution in the Constitution itself.”927 The text was authoritative, but as record of intent, not 
apart from it.  
A year later, in “The Meaning of July Fourth for the Negro,” he would display a similar 
conception of the Constitution in asking ”if it be not somewhat singular, that, if the Constitution 
were intended to be, by its framers and adopters, a slaveholding instrument why neither slavery, 
slaveholding, nor slave can anywhere be found in it.“928 However, if “The Meaning of July 
Fourth for the Negro” nodded towards the idea of the text-as-intent, it also signaled the manner 
in which Douglass would ultimately move beyond intent. In asking his question in that speech, 
Douglass also laid out the manner in which he hoped it would be answered. He held “that every 
American citizen has a right to form an opinion of the constitution, and to propagate that opinion, 
and to use all honorable means to make his opinion the prevailing one.”929 Despite an apparent 
commitment to the idea that it was the framers’ — as authors — intention as expressed in the 
text that should guide interpretation, Douglass was willing to state that any individual’s ”plain 
reading” in this sense was as valid as any other’s. 
It is in response to the Dred Scott decisions that the next stage of Douglass’s evolution 
can be observed.  In “The Dred Scott Decision,” a speech given in New York in 1857, Douglass 
would discuss another manner in which the Constitution was the American people’s document. 
Beginning to flesh out the ideas that would take full form in his 1860 Glasgow speech, Douglass 
noted that “Slavery lives in this country not because of any paper Constitution, but in the moral 
blindness of the American people, who persuade themselves that they are safe, though the rights 
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of others may be struck down.”930 Making a corresponding distinction between the 
“Constitution… and its administration,” he pointed to the possibility of a gap between the 
commitments of the text and the practices and policies pursued while claiming its authority. 
Douglass argued that when judging the character of the Constitution we should be careful not to 
“condemn the good law with the wicked practice,” to recognize that the actions taken in the 
name of Constitution are not identical to the Constitution itself.931 Finding such a gap between 
law and practice, and between the paper Constitution and the morality of the American people, 
Douglass could both condemn slavery as unconstitutional and look to the Constitution as the 
basis for America’s moral renewal. In allowing the gap between the written Constitution and 
practice, the “American people ha[d] made void our Constitution.932” But in Douglass’s 
argument the potential for constitutional rehabilitation also lay with the people. Both the ultimate 
interpreters of the Constitution and its administrators, they have the capacity to overcome the gap 
between the paper Constitution and their moral blindness. And mechanism for achieving this lay 
in the rejection of the constitutional interpretations of Garrison on one hand and Chief Justice 
Taney on the other, both of whom reasoned by way of framer intent; “…by showing that the 
Constitution does not mean what it says, and says what it does not mean, by assuming that the 
written Constitution is to be interpreted in the light of a secret and unwritten understanding of its 
framers… They do not point us to the Constitution itself… but they delight in supposed 
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930 Frederick Douglass, “The Dred Scott Decision,”in The Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass: 
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931 Douglass, “The Dred Scott Decision,” 423. 
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intentions — intentions nowhere expressed in the Constitution, and everywhere contradicted in 
the Constitution.”933  
Douglass’s speech in Glasgow in the Spring of 1860, “The Constitution of the United 
States: Is it Pro-slavery or Anti-slavery?” was the culmination of this decade of constitutional 
consideration.934 Beginning with a reiteration of the distinction between the Constitution and its 
application, Douglass stated that if “the Government has been governed by mean, sordid, and 
wicked passions, it does not follow that the Constitution is mean, sordid, and wicked.”935  He 
then repeated the two central claims of “The Dred Scott Decision;” That laws should be judged 
on their content and not their practice, and that the Constitution should be understood only as the 
text, not the “secret intentions of individuals who may have had something to do with writing the 
paper.”936  The laws of America “are one thing, her practice is another,” claimed Douglass.937 
“Shall we condemn the righteous law because wicked men twist it to the support of 
wickedness?”938 To do so would be to grant to slaveholders the argument that the Constitution 
shelters their actions. “Shall we… hand over to slavery all that slavery may claim on the score of 
long practice?“939 Instead Douglass committed himself to “the mere text, and only the text, and 
not any commentaries or creeds written by those who wished to give the text a meaning apart 
from its plain meaning.”940 That was, after all, what had been adopted by the people. Reminding 
his audience that the Philadelphia Convention had sat with closed doors, and that the notes of 
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933 Douglass, “The Dred Scott Decision,” 420. 
934 Frederick Douglass, “The Constitution of the United States: Is it Pro-slavery or Anti-slavery?” in The 
Life and Writings of Frederick Douglass: Volume II Pre-Civil War Decade 1850-1860, edited by Philip S. 
Foner, (International Publishers: New York, 1950) 
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937 “The Constitution of the United States: Is it Pro-slavery or Anti-slavery?” 470. 
938 “The Constitution of the United States: Is it Pro-slavery or Anti-slavery?” 470. 
939 “The Constitution of the United States: Is it Pro-slavery or Anti-slavery?” 470. 
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those discussions were not published until well after the Constitution’s adoption, Douglass asked 
“What will the people of America a hundred years hence care about the intentions of the 
scriveners who wrote the Constitution?”941  Seemingly the text is no longer regarded as a record 
of intent but a text adopted by the people. The correspondence of text and framer intent when it 
occurs is coincidental, not the valuation of the constitutional document - “It should also be borne 
in mind that the intentions of whose who framed the Constitution… are to be respected so far, 
and so far only, as we find those intentions plainly stated in the Constitution.”942 After all, the 
drafters “were for a generation, but the Constitution is for ages.”943  
Detailing at length the neutrality of the Constitution’s textual provisions with regard to 
the ability to end slavery, Douglass conceded that the practice of the Constitution had been to 
enable slavery. Once again he turned to the American people as the party responsible for this. 
”But to all this it is said that the practice of the American people is against my view. I admit it. 
They have committed innumerable wrongs against the Negro in the name of the Constitution.”944 
But he also reiterated that it was within the power of the people to reverse this practice. Douglass 
avowed the correctness of the slaveholders’ critical insight that “if there is once a will in the 
people of America to abolish slavery, there is no word, no syllable in the Constitution to forbid 
that result.”945 The administration of the Constitution could fulfill its promise: “If the South has 
made the Constitution bend to the purposes of slavery, let the North now make that instrument 
bend to the cause of freedom and justice.”946  
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In Glasgow, Douglass pushed his argument to the point of confrontation with the idea of 
framer intent. The divisions between government and the Constitution, between law and its 
practice gave him the materials with which to claim that slavery was not merely a drift from the 
aims of the Constitution as set out in the Preamble but an attempt to contort the Constitution 
itself. He highlighted the truth that framer intent was itself a practice – an active reading which 
was tantamount to a specific administration of the Constitution that had the result of changing 
good law into wicked practice. It was not that advocates of a pro-slavery Constitution merely 
went beyond the text, but that they actively read back into the text a reading taken from outside 
it. In doing so they gave Douglass “a powerful argument on my side,” but they also indicated 
that framer intention and practice were two forms of the same action, two ways to move outside 
the text in order to press a meaning upon it.947 Douglass highlighted the active nature of this 
reading by comparing his own conduct with that of his immediate adversary:  
“He pretended to be giving chapter and verse, section and clause, paragraph and 
provision. The words of the Constitution were before him. Why then did he not 
give you the plain words of the Constitution?… These are the words of that 
orator, and not the words of the Constitution of the United States. Now you shall 
see a slight difference between my manner of treating this subject and that which 
my opponent has seen fit, for reasons satisfactory to himself, to pursue. What he 
withheld, that I will spread before you: what he suppressed, I will bring to light: 
and what he passed over in silence, I will proclaim: that you may have the whole 
case before you, and not be left to depend upon either his, or upon my inferences 
or testimony.”948 
The speaker at the City Hall had, Douglass noted, been required to insert text into his accounts of 
the Constitution’s clauses to produce a pro-slavery reading. As the people had chosen not to 
enact an anti-slavery administration of the Constitution, so had the speaker chosen to adopt a 
pro-slavery reading of the Constitution. And as the people could opt to alter their practice of 
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administration, so too could the people choose to reject the external support of framer intent and 
commit to a constitutional understanding that looked only to the text.    
 
A Constitution of the Present 
Douglass’s identification of the people’s complicity in their own loss of authority to the 
framers presents a diverse set of considerations. The arguably most important of these is a 
reflection upon assumptions regarding relationship between popular authority and democracy. 
The “people” in early Republic were participants both in the exclusion of voices critical of the 
Constitution and its creation from the public debate, and in the surrender of their own authority 
to the previous generation. The white abolitionists of the 1830s, holding perhaps the most 
inclusive view of the “people” within the set of legitimized participants in the electoral-
institutional political community, would ultimately be some of the most committed advocates of 
the view that the Constitution’s correct understanding was that of the framers’. Challenges to the 
constituted membership of the “people” would come, as Jason Frank has shown, from those at 
the edges of that definition.949 Those firmly within that definition were active in an ideological 
project that worked to forego the power of “people” that marginal groups sought access to. 
Popular authority here worked to undermine democracy. The framers’ authority was given to 
them, not taken by them and the legitimized people were agents within, and not merely victims 
of, this process. In a contemporary United States, marked by elected branches of government 
which pass and defend policies which act as checks upon the expansion of the franchise and 
exclude minorities from full legal protections, the assumption that returning the Constitution to 
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the people would result in a more democratic society perhaps ought to be subject to further 
scrutiny. And yet, Douglass’s theorization of the Constitution in 1860 suggests that the people’s 
relationship with the constitutional document need not be one that results in stagnation or even 
decline of a democratic society. Douglass shows us that “framer intent” is a choice, not an 
obligation. 
To a degree, recent developments within constitutional theory underline Douglass’s 
claim. Over the last few decades, constitutional theory has seen a movement away from the idea 
that framer intent is a legitimate method by which to interpret the Constitution. Since the forceful 
articulation of framer intent by Edwin Meese in the 1980s, conservatives in particular (but also 
some liberals) have shifted to the ground of “original meaning” as a basis for a timeless, albeit 
1787-88 focused, interpretation of the Constitution. They look not to the intentions of the 
members of the Philadelphia Convention, but rather the understanding of the society that pledged 
itself to the Constitution during Ratification. Grounding their arguments on the ideal of popular 
sovereignty, advocates of original meaning comprehend the Founding as a moment of popular 
assent to a textual constraint on government. For the rule of the people to have meaning, 
advocates of original meaning assert, the text that the people of 1787-88 assented to should 
remain controlling until such time as another constitution receives popular assent.950 The move 
between framer intent and original meaning is itself indicative of the manner in which the 
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950 For the most rigorous articulation of this argument see Whittington. For the practical application of 
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“Originalism: The Lesser Evil.” University of Cincinnati Law Review 57. 
!
!
!!317!
legitimate mode of constitutional interpretation951 can be altered as society reassesses its 
assumptions about the nature of the Constitution’s authority.  
But the move to original meaning is not a shift away from a focus upon 1787-88. Original 
meaning still involves the “temporal imperialism” that Anne Norton identified in framer intent 
by which a group exerts its authority across time.952 It merely replaces the group of elite framers 
with a whole generation - and to the extent that it still provides a basis for restricting policies that 
envision an expansive democratic community, it represents another Douglassian choice to forego 
the full democratic potential of the Constitution. Original meaning, in the final analysis, still 
adheres to the logic of “intention” as outlined by Sheldon Wolin twenty years ago - the desire to 
enforce an order on to the future, to project a rationality on to the world, and to seek to manage 
the political threats to that order - and identifies the intention as that of people in 1787-88.953  
The degree to which some progressive opponents of conservative supporters of original 
meaning have embraced its tenets is indicative of the manner in which this broader sense of 
intention has come to be identified with democracy in American constitutional discussions. Jack 
M. Balkan’s Living Originalism represents one such attempt to accept the principle that the 
commitments of the generation of 1787-88 should be the basis of contemporary constitutional 
discussions.954 Depicting original meaning (“original expected application” in Balkan’s wording) 
as a form of “skyscraper originalism,” Balkan rejects its surrender of political agency to the 
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values of 1787. Instead, Balkan offers “framework originalism” as an alternative. Framework 
originalism accepts the “text and principle” of the Constitution as a basis from which to draw out 
and develop a modern liberal democratic constitutional order. However, Balkan’s view of the 
superiority of his approach to, for example, Dworkin’s “Living Constitution,” resides in the 
manner in which Living Originalism positions the contemporary people as the inheritors of a 
constitutional project initiated by the drafters of 1787.  At its heart, Living Originalism is a 
doctrine of “fidelity” to Constitution written over two hundred years ago. For Balkan, the role of 
the present generation is to add their intention to the one they inherited:  
“In every generation, We the People of the United States make the Constitution 
our own by calling upon its text and its principles and arguing about what they 
mean in our own time. That is how each generation connects its values to the 
commitments of the past and carries forward the constitutional project of the 
American people into the future.”955 
Each generation reworks the cumulative “intentions” of previous generations, and passes it on to 
the next. Breaking with original meaning and framer intention in allowing for constitutional 
agency in the current generation, living originalism nevertheless understands that agency in 
terms of attempting to bind the future to the newly reconfigured constitutional order. The 
intentions of 1787-88, be they framer or generational in scope, are replaced with the intentions of 
1787-2013. The past is still ultimately a bind on the future.  
The path away from the debates of the 1980s over framer intent is not one that travels 
through original meaning, but rather one in which we move to no longer interpret but rather to 
contest. It consists in a willingness to forego intention and instead seek a constitutional politics 
grounded in attempts to problematize the present in place of controlling the future (or past). It 
requires the willingness of the people to choose a constitutional politics for themselves. In 
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contrast to Balkan, Wolin’s own response to “intention” was a politics of “tending.” By this, he 
held up the hope of politics that was motivated not by the suppression of an organic society in 
the name of rationality, but rather the cultivation of democratic counterpoints to “normal” 
politics. Seeing the politics of “tendance” in the protest politics of the 1960s and the ecological, 
feminist, sexual, and civil rights politics that followed that decade, Wolin looked optimistically 
to the stubborn persistence of tending as an alternative to intention.956 Although the politics of 
tendance contain within them an effort to value the past (Wolin describes tending as possessing 
“a concern for the historicity of things,”957 in opposition to intention’s concern for the future), 
the effect is a conscious attempt to resist the authority of intentions. It is a rejection of the 
authority of “beginnings” and recognition of the political world as it exists, organic, contingent, 
and contestable. It is, perhaps in spite of Wolin’s claims, a politics of the present in both senses 
of the phrase (extant and current) concerned with the here and now. This attention to the present, 
holds echoes of Douglass’s view of the Constitution as a decontextualized text, in existence but 
subject to the will of the present generation. For Douglass, the constitutional document was not 
beholden to the conditions of its creation, but it was nonetheless an extant, if neutral, text. The 
Douglassian text is available to be “bent” in the direction of justice by the people. Here Douglass 
offers a way to break free from the intentions of history without abandoning the very real 
existence of the Constitution. In Wolin’s terms, we can participate in a constitutional politics of 
tending: of treating the Constitution as extant institution within American politics, but one 
subject to contestation, problematization, and ultimately to be put to the service of the living. In 
contrast to Balkan, we can recognize the Constitution without committing ourselves to the 
teleological project begun by the drafters. To ignore the Constitution’s place within the politics 
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of the United States would be denial. To sacrifice democracy to its historic claim of popular 
consent would be folly.  
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Appendix: A note on the use of newspapers 
The use of newspapers as the arena of inquiry for much of this dissertation builds on the 
recent work of historians, such as Jeffrey L. Pasley958 and Marcus Daniel,959 which has 
challenged prevailing attitudes towards this period. The overwhelming preponderance of inquiry 
into constitutional interpretation during this time has focused on the debates within Congress, the 
opinions of the federal courts and the letters of great men.960 Newspapers as a major source for 
systematic research into constitutional understandings have been largely overlooked, possibly 
due in no small part to the characterization of the early Nineteenth-Century as the “Dark Ages” 
of American journalism, by Frank Luther Mott in his influential history of the newspapers of the 
United States.961  His assertion that in the period 1801-1833 “[f]ew papers were ably edited; they 
reflected the crassness of the American society of the times. Scurrility, assaults, corruption, 
blatancy were commonplace” meshed with contemporary testimony such as Jefferson’s 
despairing claim during the period that “[n]othing can now be believed which is seen in a 
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newspaper”962 and worked to place newspapers beyond the scope of “top-down” studies of 
constitutional interpretation.963 This attitude has now come under attack from two distinct, but 
interrelated, positions. Firstly, the weaknesses borne of attempting to narrate a history of 
journalism separated from its social and cultural context has been pointed out by John C. Nerone. 
In reviewing the flaws of this approach, he highlights the importance of recognizing that: 
“rather than being a thing unto itself, a medium is exactly what the word suggests: 
something in between other things... The history of the media cannot be 
understood apart from the history of the social and cultural contexts within which 
media developments occurred.”964  
That is to say, that the nature of newspapers at this time is best understood as a reflection of their 
cultural context – and to reverse this logic their nature cannot justify their removal from any 
attempt to comprehend the cultural understandings of the time. 
 The second challenge to the exclusion of newspapers from the study of constitutional 
norms during this period comes as a consequence of the recent political histories that have 
highlighted the centrality of the presses to political life during this period. While histories of the 
newspaper in America have made much of the contribution of the presses to the success of the 
Revolution and the subsequent ratification of the Constitution, the 1790s has been characterized 
as an era of increasingly personal and scurrilous exchanges culminating in publications such as 
William Cobbett’s Porcupine’s Gazette (1797-99), whose very name signaled its intention to 
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needle its opponents.965 The crass nature of the presses led to the belief that they were of limited 
political importance, engaging only in polemic and personal attack and neglecting weighty 
political discussion.966  This position is problematic for two reasons. The first is the simplistic, 
but non-trivial, observation of Daniel that “scandal and incivility have always been a part of 
American politics.”967 As such newspapers in this period cannot be placed beyond the realm of 
constitutional research on account of their content. The second is that the nature of newspapers in 
this period is a consequence of the close connection that existed between partisan politics and 
newspaper editors. The very crudeness of the newspapers was a facet of their key position within 
the public sphere of early national America. 
 In attempting to characterize the public sphere within the early American republic, 
Brooke has observed that in this period conditions were present to both encourage the 
development of the public sphere and to require this development. Indeed for Brooke “the 
American Revolution was both consequence and cause of a widening domain of print and 
association: the public sphere.”968 What was striking in America was that; 
“[b]y the 1830s, even in the 1770s, the United States was an amalgam of extremes 
possibly unique in human history; a bizarre spectrum of civil condition running 
from democracy to slavery.”969 
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Mapping onto this spectrum was a steep gradient in which successive groups participated within 
different deliberative environments and were expected to consent to the governmental structures 
through differing avenues. For Brooke: 
“...fundamentally, this gradient of participation in civil life can be mapped onto a 
gradient of consent, from express to tacit, to alienated and withheld. Civil society, 
and particularly the play of deliberation and persuasion in the public sphere, was 
the site where the terms of consent and participation were negotiated and where 
the practices and outcomes of consent and participation, of citizenship, were 
enacted – and struggled over.”970 
Crucial to this social ordering was the ability of those excluded from rational deliberation to 
engage in politics through persuasion – to operate within the public sphere in the form of printed 
exchange. Placing newspapers at the interface of the political and the public spheres gave 
newspaper editors a unique position as the medium through which the state and society 
corresponded. They would themselves become the linkage between the mass of those excluded 
from direct participation in political deliberation and the political elites who appealed to, and 
relied upon the consent of, those outside the institutions of governance. 
 Pasley’s account of the newspaper politics of the early national period highlights the 
manner in which the role of newspaper editor came to be characterized and institutionalized as 
the linkage between these two realms. As Pasley has noted, this period saw the transformation of 
newspaper editors into figures meeting Max Weber’s definition of professional politicians, 
insofar as they lived for and off of partisan work.971 Pasley points to their unique position as 
individuals engaged in intellectual work while operating with the environment of artisans as an 
indication of their existence as a “new class” within post-colonial society.972 This position saw 
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editors and their newspapers come to operate as “the nodal points of the political system,”973 
fulfilling many of the roles that political parties would carry out once institutionally established. 
As well as fulfilling the role of proto-party structures, they also took on the vital communicative 
role noted above. Moreover, the words of Benjamin Franklin Bache, whose General Advertiser 
(later the Aurora) would come to typify the political newspaper as partisan organ, show they 
were aware of the significance of this role: 
“In a republic of which the public opinion is the basis, it [the press] is of very 
peculiar importance as the organ of that opinion, and in many cases, the only 
organ. There are many occurrences, properly within the sphere of public 
investigation, on which the people cannot express their sentiments by their 
representatives.”974 
Newspapers were the conduits by which those operating within the political structures could 
survey public opinion, and through which they could communicate the “party line” on given 
issues. However, an arrangement making the newspapers and their editors prisms through which 
public opinion could be brought into focus, also gave these figures immense power over how the 
public came to form their own opinions, and how the latter saw the actions of those entrusted to 
represent them. When conscious of this power, editors such as Bache’s successor William Duane 
could become identifiable political actors in their own right – and moreover, they could and did 
shape public opinion in order to further their own political goals.975 Seeking to shape public 
opinion and positioned between those who participated directly in political deliberation within 
institutions and those who did so only indirectly from the outside, newspaper editors would be of 
neither world and of both, and their newspapers would reflect the mixture of deliberation and 
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974 Quoted in Pasley. “Tyranny of the Printers,” 85. 
975 Duane would effectively take control of the Pennsylvanian Democratic movement in the 1805 and 
attempt to replace the Governor with his own favored choice. Elsewhere Matthew Lyon used his position 
as a newspaper editor to propel himself into Congress as the first ex-indentured servant. Pasley. “Tyranny 
of the Printers,” 189, 308-312, 109. 
!
!
!
!
326!
polemic that such a position entailed. Far from excluding newspapers and their editors from 
studies examining the process of forging public opinion regarding constitution interpretation, 
scholars would do well to recognize that the editors and those that contributed to print debate 
were the dominant agents in this process. As a consequence, any attempt to track the changing 
popular understandings of the Constitution during this period would do well to pay attention to 
newspaper debates. 
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